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The objective of the dissertation was to prove that after World War II, between May 1945, and 
the statehood of the Federal Republic of Germany in September 1949 
 1. The Germans in the three western occupation zones of the United States, Great 
 Britain, and France could not have survived mass starvation without the food aid 
 provided by the Allied military forces and the United States starting in late 1945. 
 2. The contributions the western Allies levied from the people of their respective 
 occupation zones in form of occupation costs, reparations, restitutions, and confiscations 
 by far surpassed all Allied food aid, as well as the financial aid provided by the United 
 States through the European Recovery Program, better known as the Marshall Plan.  
 3. The German economy would have survived/restarted without Marshall Plan aid.  
 However, it would have taken much more time to catch up with the other European 
 economies. 
 Looking at the pure occupation costs levied in the three western occupation zones, these 
costs surpassed all Allied aid by far.  Occupation costs of $5,944 billion face Allied aid figures 
from $2,691 billion to $3,277 billion, a rough ratio of 2:1.  Computed with the lowest amount of 
reparations of $4.44 billion, shifts the ratio of occupation costs/reparations to Allied aid to 3.5:1, 
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Who paid the bill? German and American fiscal responsibilities in the revival of Germany 
after World War II 
 
Chapter 1: Occupants and occupied 
1.1. Introduction  
 Defeated and occupied in 1945, partitioned in four zones with tight borders restricting 
movement, ruled by four different Military Governments that rarely reached required consensus 
on critical governing issues, with only torsos of indigenous governments at the local level and no 
central government, the fate of the German people did not look promising.  Who could and 
would pay to feed the homeless masses of bombed-out people, of refugees from the east, of 
expellees from southeastern European countries and millions of displaced persons?  Who could 
satisfy the demands of the million foreign soldiers on German soil?  How to rebuild the 
devastated cities, the destroyed infrastructure with an economy at a standstill and with the 
prospects of becoming an agrarian country with an industry heavily curtailed and reduced to a 
prewar level determined by the occupying powers?   
 Today, migrants and refugees from African and Near Eastern countries, as well as from 
the Balkans, inundate the countries of Europe in numbers never experienced since the end of 
World War II.  More than 413,000 refugees arrived in Germany during the first eight months of 
2015.  The government calculated up to 800,000 refugees for the year.  Today’s refugees enter 
Germany, a stable democracy for more than sixty years and the leading economic power of the 
European Union.  The governments at the federal, state, city and county levels are able to pay the 
expenses to support the refugees.  They are able to provide sufficient food, shelter and healthcare 
for these people during their application process for political asylum.  In 1945, the situation for 
the millions of refugees, evacuees, expellees, and displaced persons, as well as for the residents 
cannot be compared with the situation on the ground in 2015. 
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 Growing up in a country devastated by war fighting and with a shattered economy was 
not easy.  However, it was fascinating as long as one of us kids between the age of four and 
seven years could overcome the feeling of hunger that was a permanent companion during these 
years.  It was fascinating growing up with lots of freedom – no father around, limited school 
attendance in classes with up to 80 students because of the lack of teachers and lack of heating 
fuel.  War material, left behind by retreating German units, weapons and live ammunition were 
exciting toys to play with while disobeying maternal orders not to do so.  It was exciting for us 
kids to play with hand grenades, building cannons from empty cartridges, or causing a 
locomotive to stop in the train station by putting signal ammunition on the tracks designed to 
warn the engineers.   
 It was exciting to cross the street and visit the U.S. Army unit residing there at the little 
airfield.  We did not know anything about the U.S. non-fraternization policy.  The soldiers we 
visited ignored the policy.  They enjoyed playing with us kids.  Every time we visited the 
soldiers we got some candy, chocolate, chewing gum, and sometimes food, for we were always 
hungry.  Our standard menu for a day contained for breakfast a cup of hot Ersatzkaffee1 and two 
slices of bread, which we crumbled and put into the coffee mug.  Breakfast became a feast if we 
had sugar to sweeten the Ersatz coffee with the crumbled bread.  Nobody today can visualize the 
term Schiebebrot, a well-known concept after the war.  Schiebebrot, translated into pushbread, 
was another high point of gluttony for us kids.  On rare occasions the official food ration 
contained some slices of sausage, a kind of bologna sausage.  We put a slice of the sausage on 
one end of a slice of bread.  The sausage covered roughly a third or a quarter of the bread.  While 
biting off a tiny piece of the sausage we bit off a larger part of the slice of bread.  At the same 
                                                
1 Ersatzkaffee is a coffee substitute without caffeine, made from roasted chicory and grains, or sometimes from 
acorns. 
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time we pushed the rest of the sausage with the teeth forward for the next bite.  It took some 
practice to match the size of the bread and sausage to have with the last bite of bread the last 
piece of sausage.  A Swabian friend remembers from this time the Kratzbrot, translated perhaps 
into scratch bread or scrape bread.  The concept stands for a slice of bread spread with 
margarine, lard, or jelly.  With the back of a knife she scraped as much of the margarine, lard or 
jelly as possible from the slice of bread to have enough spread for a second slice of bread.  For 
lunch mostly we had potatoes boiled in their jackets and served with a bit of salt and for dinner 
we got the reheated leftovers.2 The Military Government in the Monthly Report No. 12 
substantiated the state of the food situation.  The report verified that of 81,870 Hessian children 
screened in 1946, seventy per cent were undernourished.3   
 We always looked out for edibles.  No fruit tree was too high, no berry bushes too prickly 
to pick fruit and berries.  Hazel nuts and beechnuts, wild blackberries, raspberries, and 
blueberries were collected when ripe to provide additional calories to the meager ration card 
meals only enough to prevent starvation.  No wonder that food thefts and widespread crops 
pilferage happened on a great scale.4   
 With a handcart we went to the woods to collect dead branches and fir and pine cones for 
heating fuel after we got a Leseschein, a permit allowing the collection of fallen and dead wood 
in the forests surrounding our town.  Many a times we took pieces of wood ready for transport 
hiding it under fallen branches and fir cones.  Picking heads of wheat and rye after the harvest 
was not always fun because of the fierce competition and it became boring soon for us kids. 
However, after grinding it into flour and transformed into bread, it was worth all our efforts.  
                                                
2 Monthly Report of the Military Governor, U.S. Zone, No. 5, Food and Agriculture, 20 December 1945. On page 6 
it stated the same, adding that most families were suffering from a shortage of fat for cooking and sugar.   
3 Monthly Report of the Military Governor, U.S. Zone, No. 12, 20 July 1946. 17.  
4 Monthly Report of the Military Governor, U.S. Zone, No. 13, 20 August 1946. 3. 
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Gleaning potatoes and grabbing turnips added variety to our menu.  Eating raw turnips left in the 
fields was a tidbit.  At home, we were allowed to clean our plates after a meal with our tongues 
to prevent the loss of the smallest particles of food.  Sugar beet molasses from re-appropriated 
sugar beets sweetened our meager diet.  Jumping coal trains in the dark and throwing pieces of 
coal to the ground and collecting the coal secured together with wood and fir cones warmed the 
kitchen during the hard winters of 1945 and 1946 when no coal for heating was allocated to the 
German people.5  The story of a good friend, now 90 years of age, is another example of how the 
people tried to survive during these years.  She attended a teachers’ college near the city of 
Stuttgart in 1946.  A group of four or five young females went to a guarded coal storage yard.  
While one of them philandered with the guards, the others filled all their bags with coal and 
briquettes.  When ready, they signaled the flirting female.  It sometimes became difficult to 
disengage from the guards without raising suspicions.  At the weekend our friend loaded her 
bicycle with bags of briquettes and rode home allowing her mother another week with heating 
fuel.   
 We did not know anything about the paragraph 5(ii) in the Handbook for Military 
Government in Germany instructing the commanders in the field of the official Washington 
position that “no relief supplies are to be imported or distributed for the German population… 
beyond the minimum necessary to prevent disease and such disorder as might endanger or 
impede military operations.”6  However, the American specialists on the ground very soon 
discovered that under the circumstances of defeat and the influx of countless people into the U.S. 
Zone, policies had to change to prevent mass mortality among the Germans.  The agricultural 
                                                
5 Monthly Report of the Military Governor, U.S. Zone, No. 2, 20 September 1945. On page 8 it states that there will 
be a complete lack of coal for the heating of homes of Germans this winter. 
6 Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Office of the Chief of Staff, Handbook for Military 
Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender, Part 1, December 1944. 5(ii).   
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experts of the Military Government estimated that the food production from 1 November 1945 to 
30 September 1946 in the U.S. Zone could provide for the normal consumer (adults above the 
age of eighteen years) a daily ration of only 938 calories,7 less than the official ration of 1,350 
calories/day,8 and much less than the 2,000 calories/day recommended by health officials to 
maintain minimum health.  It began to dawn on some officials in Germany and Washington that 
food, fertilizer, and seed imports* were essential to prevent mass starvation.  These 
considerations affected our lives directly, made the difference between survival and starvation.  
Even today I can recall the taste of salty butter and of red cheddar cheese when we got it for the 
first time in a CARE packet.  
 Many years later it never came to our minds that our survival depended on the 
support of the victors, especially of the United States, the only power able to provide the 
foodstuffs Germany needed to survive.  The question who could and would pay for all the 
support never bothered the majority of Germans, even to this day.  Were the food imports 
considered gifts, were they loaned to Germany?  How could Germany afford to pay for the 
imports with a non-convertible currency as well as paying billions of Reichsmark or Deutsche 
Mark for occupation costs?  
1.2. Scope of the analysis 
To answer the questions one could look at different time windows to analyze the German 
postwar situation regarding the payment of occupation costs and reparations, as well as receiving 
                                                
7 Monthly Report of the Military Governor, U.S. Zone, No. 5, Food and Agriculture, 20 December 1945. 1.  
8 Monthly Report of the Military Governor, U.S. Zone, No. 5, Health and Medical Affairs, 20 December 1945 
reports on page 13 that a weight probe of German civilians in November showed a deviation from the standard 
weight for men of age 20-39 years of 4.1lbs, age 40-59 years of 14.7lbs, and for the age of 60 years and over of 
18.6lbs.  The female weight deviation was 1.1lbs for the 20-39 age group, 14lbs for the age group of 40-59 years, 
and of 16.3lbs for the over 60 years old.  
* The relief supplies forbidden in paragraph 5(ii) above included food, fertilizer and seeds not to be distributed to 
the Germans.  
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aid for the viability of the German people and to restart the economy.  Three time spans come to 
mind considering Germany’s rebirth from the ashes of defeat.   
The first time span would cover the three years from defeat to the currency reform of 20 
June 1948; a second time frame would cover the time from the currency reform to the formation 
of the Federal Republic of Germany in September 1949.  Discussing the time span up to the 1953 
London Debt Agreement could be a valid third option. Which information can the addressed 
scenarios provide concerning the liabilities the occupied and the occupier had to bear?  
The tenure of the thirty-eight months-long first scenario, the scenario this narrative 
focuses on, was characterized by the punitive note of the Directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
1067.  The more conciliatory and supportive Directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1779 replaced 
JCS 1067 in 1947, initiated by the speech of the Secretary of State J.F. Byrnes on 6 September 
1946 in Stuttgart, a capital in the U.S. Occupation Zone.  The inability of the Allied Control 
Council to treat Germany as an economic unit according to the Potsdam Protocol9, the 
establishment of the approved “Level of Industry Plan” for Germany, reparations, the 
repatriation of displaced persons and the influx of refugees and expellees, the creation of the 
U.S.-British Bi-Zone, the unexpectedly slow recovery of the German industrial production and 
the inability of the agriculture to produce sufficient foodstuff for the snowballing indigenous 
population characterized this scenario.  The German authorities had to pay considerable amounts 
of Reichsmark for the services and goods the occupation forces demanded, as well as the salaries 
of the several hundred thousands people employed by the military governments.  To keep the 
German population alive the United States, the only Ally with sufficient resources, had to import 
                                                
9 Potsdam Protocol, Part B, Paragraph 14: During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single 
economic unit.  To this end common policies shall be established in regard to: (a) mining and industrial production 
and its allocation; (b) agriculture, forestry and fishing; (c) wages, prices and rationing; (d) import and export 
programs for Germany as a whole; (e) currency and banking, central taxation and customs; (f) reparation and 
removal of industrial war potential; (g) transportation and communications.   
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into the three western occupation zones hundreds of thousand tons of foodstuff.  With its 
restricted and curtailed economy would Germany ever be able to pay for the food provided by 
the U.S.?   
The fifteen months period of the second time span covered the time from the currency 
reform to the statehood of the Federal Republic of Germany. The currency reform and the 
Marshall Plan were the characteristics of the period, as well as the preparations for statehood.  
The currency reform ended a time where “a cigarette on the black market would yield more than 
a normal days work.”10  The bulk expropriation of all monied wealth eliminated the black 
economy and the prospects of Marshall Plan aid functioned like a blood transfusion stimulating 
the economy beyond belief. 
One can identify the third scenario from the West German statehood to the London Debt 
Agreement as the move toward the end of the occupation regime and by the increase of U.S. 
forces to protect West Germany against Communist threats.  The force increase caused a 
remarkable progression of the now-called stationing costs.  The Korean War prompted the 
Western Allies to deal with West Germany as a future ally to prevent further Communist 
expansion.  
 The focus of this work will be the first and second scenarios, covering the time from 
defeat to statehood of the Federal Republic of Germany in September 1949.  Because a strict 
limiting to the first and second scenarios would provide only a partial picture of the amounts of 
money allocated by the United States or Germany, some general discussion of the third scenario 
is warranted.  During the first time span one can count and balance only the occupation costs 
versus the costs of food aid imported from the United States.  The influx of the aid provided by 
                                                
10 Werner Plumpe, “Entscheidung für den Strukturbruch: Die westdeutsche Währungsreform und ihre Folgen,” in 
Die USA und Deutschland im Zeitalter des Kalten Krieges 1945-1990, Band 1, 1945-1968, herausgegeben von 
Detlef Junker. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 2001). 460. 
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the European Recovery Program (ERP), commonly known as the Marshall Plan characterized 
the second time span.  The third stage for Germany being re-accepted, at least economically in 
the world market ended with the London Agreement on German External Debts, also known as 
the London Debt Agreement of 1953.  With this agreement the international creditors agreed to 
reduce Germany’s external debts considerably, easing Germany’s way back from a heap of 
rubble to a politically and economically flourishing state.  
 This third phase was also marked by the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, 
that fundamentally changed the perception of the three occupation powers in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Assuming that the Korean War was a proxy war of the USSR, the western 
powers of the United States, Great Britain, and France worried about a possible attack on 
Western Europe.  The Allied High Commissioners, the representatives of the former military 
governments in West Germany, asked the Federal Republic to provide in addition to occupation 
costs, a financial contribution to its defense and to the defense of the countries of Western 
Europe within the scope of the newly founded North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
 In a memorandum to Chancellor Adenauer, the head of government of the Federal 
Republic, Secretary of Treasury J. Schäffer stated on 29 August 1950, that of the total budget of 
the Federal Republic for fiscal year 1950 of 12.3 billion Deutsche Mark (DM), 4.5 billion DM, 
roughly thirty-seven percent of the total, was earmarked for occupation costs and related 
expenses caused by the lost war.  Added financial contributions for the security and defense of 
the Federal Republic over and above the 4.5 billion DM probably would cause social unrest.  The 
memorandum recommended a thorough review of all expenditures related to the occupation and 
advocated cutting as well as restructuring the occupation costs paid by the Germans.   
 The Secretary argued that with the foundation of the Federal Republic in September, 
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1949, the federal territory changed its status from an occupied area to that of a protectorate.  The 
status of the occupation forces of the United States, Great Britain and France had altered to the 
status of forces of protecting powers. 
 In view of this modification, the Secretary of Treasury proposed in his memorandum 
inter alia the elimination of the Allied administration at the city, county, district, and state level, 
as well as a reduction in the employment of approximately 450,000 German civilians.  The 
compensation to these employees, paid for by the Federal Republic accounted for roughly 1.3 
billion DM in 1950.  Furthermore, he proposed halting the dismantling of plants for reparations, 
reductions in Allied construction projects, no-cost communication expenses and transportation 
services and more.  The memorandum spelled out that after meticulous examination a reduction 
of occupation costs by close to 2 billion DM could be attained.  Under these circumstances, the 
Secretary of Treasury stated in his letter to Chancellor Adenauer, the Federal Republic could 
contribute 1 billion DM in 1950 to a common western defense.11 
 The impression Malcolm Muir got and recorded in his confidential report of the 
European Trip, 1951, supports the request of the High Commissioners for additional financial 
contributions. Amazed, he reports that in 1951 West Germany’s  
standard of living is good–better than that of Britain… The people are well 
dressed and the shops are filled with good things to buy…Three hundred and 
fifty thousand homes were built in West Germany last year compared with fifty 
thousand in France, and another three hundred and fifty thousand will be built 
this year… One gathers the impression when travelling throughout Germany 
that one is witnessing the rebirth of a nation.12 
 
Muir’s report indicated to the Allied High Commission, that the Federal Republic could shoulder 
additional financial responsibility for its own defense.  When does the bill finally get paid?  
  
                                                
11 Der Bundesminister der Finanzen vom 29. August 1950, HStAStuttgart. EA5/001Bü1639/1.  
12 Malcolm Muir, European Trip 1951. Eisenhower Library. Box 84. Folder Muir, Malcolm. 5-6. 
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1.3. Public awareness of occupation costs  
Many books have been written about particular aspects of the process of occupation, of 
reparations, of demilitarization, of denazification, of democratization, and of reeducation.  
However, a comprehensive study of the financial burden and liabilities of divided Germany and 
of the occupying powers does not exist in German or American historical research.   
The lack of data, especially of financial data, becomes immediately apparent when 
analyzing official texts taught in the German school system from the Volksschule to the 
Gymnasium.  The newly written history books, written under the guidance of U. S. reeducation 
policies mention the events and developments of the occupation period only in general terms.  
Specific data about the costs of the occupation forces, of the costs of reparations and 
compensation are missing.  The analysis of some German schoolbooks validates these facts.  The 
textbook for German history, edition A, Vol. V, 1952, Das Zeitalter der Weltkriege provides 
some numerical data about the war events.  However, the fate of postwar Germany is short (2 
pages) and without any qualifying and quantifying data.  
 The textbook, Geschichte der neuesten Zeit, von 1850 bis zur Gegenwart, 1953, used in 
the upper level of Gymnasium in Hessen, discusses in two to three pages (182-184) topics such 
as the Morgenthau Plan, the Conferences of Yalta and Potsdam, and the Allied Control Council.  
The rift between the USSR and the three Western Allies is mentioned as the reason for not 
reaching an agreement on peace treaties for Germany, Austria, and Japan.  No financial and 
economic data are presented.  
 The history book, Menschen in ihrer Zeit, Vol. 6, In unserer Zeit, covers the period from 
World War I to the 1960s.  It was used in the upper level of the Gymnasium.  As the cost of 
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World War II, it mentions besides the loss of territory, the dismantling of more than 900 plants in 
the western occupation zones up to the year of 1950.   
 A more recent history book (1979), Geschichtliche Weltkunde, Vol. 3, Von der Zeit des 
Imperialismus bis zur Gegenwart, refers to reparations of $10 billion and the dismantling of 
plants in favor of the USSR in its occupation zone.  In addition, the USSR was to receive twenty-
five percent of the dismantled plants of the three western zones in exchange for food and raw 
materials to the other zones.  Nothing is mentioned about the costs of the occupation, of the 
confiscation of German assets in foreign countries, of the free use of German patents and 
methods of production.  The book fails to mention the costs of food imports as well as the 
Marshall Plan aid given to Germany.  
 In Staatensystem und Weltpolitik of 1984, used in junior high school, the authors mention 
in short the reparations for the USSR of $10 billion plus ten to fifteen percent of all dismantled 
industrial plants of the western zones.  However, for the first time in this research the authors 
write in a short paragraph about the extraordinary expenditures caused by the war for the 
Germans.  Up to 1965, West Germany paid roughly DM 350 billions to diverse groups and 
agencies, with no end in sight for the near future.  However, the billions of Reichsmark and 
Deutsche Mark West Germany had to pay for the occupation forces, for their barracks, housing, 
schools and recreational facilities, and for the stationing costs after sovereignty in 1955 is not 
mentioned at all. The book also fails to mention the U.S. support in feeding the German people, 
as well as the financial aid to rebuild the economy.  
One can see in the publications of an officially recognized institution the attitude toward 
the question of occupation, reparations, and compensation by Germany.  The Bundeszentrale für 
Politische Bildung posted in 2009 on its Web Site that President Roosevelt jettisoned the 
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Morgenthau Plan, approved by him and Prime Minister Churchill in August 1944 in Quebec, 
fearing damage to his reelection campaign after leaks to the press caused an extremely negative 
public response.  The posting states further that the appropriate departments in Washington never 
seriously considered the plan and that Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau’s ideas had no 
significance in relation to the occupation of Germany.13  Another German Web Site mentions 
that Morgenthau’s plan “received only temporary approval by Roosevelt based on tactical 
considerations.”14 To find details of the Morgenthau Plan one has to look under extremism and 
anti-Semitism15 on the Web Site of the Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung. The site gives a 
closer explanation of Morgenthau’s project and intended purpose.   
1.4. Thesis statement 
 This monograph invites a discussion as to how the German people engaged in rebuilding 
their devastated country, their government, democratic institutions, and their education system 
dominated and compromised by the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei: how to 
decentralize the highly centralized Führerstaat under party control, how to strengthen local, as 
well as state power and control the political process, and how to revive basic democratic 
traditions and principles jettisoned since 1933.  These obligations thrust on them by the Allied 
Powers after the defeat in May 1945 should “prepare [the German people] for the… 
reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful 
cooperation in international life by Germany.”16  
 How much did this effort depend on the United States’ material, personnel, financial, and 
ideological support?  A case study of the city of Stuttgart and of Württemberg-Baden, one of the 
                                                
13 http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/8P2K99,0,0MorgenthauPlan.html accessed 2009-01-15. 
14 http://www.bpb.de/internationales/amerika/usa/10605/2-weltkrieg accessed 2013-03-02. 
15 http://www.bpb.de/extremismus/antisemitismus/37986/argumente-gegen-rechte-vorurteile?p=13 accessed 2013-
02-03. 
16 Protocol of the Potsdam Conference, Part II, A.3.(iv).  
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three states in the U.S. occupation zone, will illustrate the interactions and consequences of the 
Allied control with the German people in the timeframe from 8 May 1945 to the Allied-initiated 
German currency reform of 1948 and the subsequent Marshall Plan aid.  The case study will 
demonstrate the financial burden both the German and the American people sustained for this 
venture.  It also aims to verify that the contributions of the German people surpassed the aid the 
United States provided to support the re-emergence of Germany as an accepted member of the 
international community.  The acceptance into the international community was keenly 
encouraged by Germany’s willingness to take responsibility for the crimes committed during the 
Nazi rule.     
 A number of key sources provided the foundation for this analysis.  Many readers are 
unacquainted with the Monthly Reports of the Military Governor of the U.S. Zone.  These 
official reports cover the time of occupation under the Military Government, starting with Report 
No. 1 from August 1945 to Report No. 50 from August – 20 September 1949.  Beginning with 
the statehood of West Germany on 21. Sep 1949, the Information Bulletin of the U.S. High 
Commissioner for Germany replaced the Monthly Reports of the Military Government until 
March 1953.  The Monthly Reports cover the timeframe of this analysis, providing the majority 
of the U.S. data.  The Information Bulletins of the U.S. High commissioner allocated final data 
in a few instances like e.g. the denazification results.  
 The Monthly Reports sketched the German realities on the ground from the community 
level up to the Allied actions or inactions at the Allied Control Council.  The Monthly Reports, 
complemented by many special reports for specific fields of activities such as denazification or 
demilitarization par example, described the current state of occupied Germany, often with 
proposals as how to deal with and how to improve the situation on the ground.  These reports are 
 14 
the most accurate description of the current situation on site not filtered through too many layers 
of bureaucracy.  However, there are also inconsistencies in the reports. One can assume that 
unqualified personnel, frequent changes of personnel, lacking language skills, as well as lacking 
standard operating procedures are responsible for the shortcomings.  Nevertheless, the reports 
provided an abundance of valuable information discussed in later chapters.  
 Many of the German sources used in this dissertation are probably also unfamiliar to 
many readers.  To my knowledge, these sources are not available in English translation.  For this 
reason, a brief introduction of the different authors may be noted here.   
 Professor Dr. Hans Günter Hockerts taught modern history at the universities of 
München and Frankfurt am Main from 1981 to 2009.  Professor Dr. Karl Doehring taught public 
law and international law at the universities of Göttingen and München.  Dr. Doehring and Dr. 
Hockerts, together with Dr. Bernd Josef Fehn, a high-ranking official at the Department of 
Finance, co-authored the book Jahrhundertschuld, Jahrhundertsühne. Reparationen, 
Wiedergutmachung, Entschädigung für nationalsozialistisches Kriegs- und Verfolgungsunrecht.  
The book, Wiedergutmachung und Kriegsfolgenliquidation, is authored by Dr. Bernd Josef Fehn, 
Hermann-Josef Brodesser, Wilfried Wirth, and Thilo Franosch, all high-ranking officials of the 
Department of Finance.  I used both works to present the reader with an overview of the 
payments Germany provided to peoples, organizations, and states over several decades after the 
war. 
 Dr. Willi A. Boelcke, professor for social and economic history at the university of 
Stuttgart-Hohenheim, specialized in the economic history of the 19th and 20th century.  
Aditionally, he focused on propaganda and mass media, emphasizing the study of National 
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Socialism and the Third Reich.  His book, Die Kosten von Hitlers Krieg, provided valuable 
insights used in the monograph. 
 Professor Dr. Gerd Hardach is a social and economic historian at the University of 
Marburg.  He may be known to U.S. readers through his publications about World War I. I used 
his book, Der Marshallplan, Auslandshilfe und Wiederaufbau in Westdeutschland 1948-1952 for 
comparative purposes. 
 Dr. Friedrich Jerchow studied modern history, sociology and political science, as well as 
international law at the University of Hamburg.  His publication, Deutschland in der 
Weltwirtschaft 1944-1947, is an extensive compendium of information also used for this 
monograph. 
 Professor Dr. Christoph K. Buchheim taught social and economic history at the 
University of Mannheim.  His book, Die Wiedereingliederung Westdeutschlands in die 
Weltwirtschaft 1945-1958, presented a volume of valuable information considered by this author.  
 The Swiss historian, Jörg Fisch, taught at the universities of Bielefeld, Mainz, and Zürich.  
He focused on the history of international law, World War I, World War II, and National 
Socialism.  His volume, Reparationen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, provided complementary 
information highly valuable for the current analysis. 
 To present a most recent indicator of Germany’s enduring commitment to render 
Wiedergutmachung, one may cite an article of the Süddeutsche Zeitung of 20 May 2015, titled 
Sowjetische Kriegsgefangene erhalten Entschädigung (Russian prisoners of war receive 
compensation).  Seventy years after the end of World War II the German Bundestag pledged to 
pay € 10 million to the estimated 4,000 surviving Russians imprisoned in Hitler’s Third Reich 
during the war.  “This is a late and important historical commitment of Germany to the Nazi 
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policies of extermination,”17 a member of the Bundestag reasoned.  It is a late example of 
Wiedergutmachung for WW II-related actions caused by Germany.  The translation of the term, 
Wiedergutmachung, into compensation or reparation only partly expresses the German idea.  The 
term gutmachen goes back to ancient times in German meaning to reimburse, to settle, as well as 
to atone.18 
 To give an impression of the value of compensation payments West Germany and since 
1990 unified Germany agreed upon during the past seventy years, some numbers may serve to 
demonstrate Germany’s commitment.  The following compilation is not exhaustive.  Occupation 
costs to the Allied Powers and reparations from dismantled plants, from the confiscation of the 
German merchant marine and of German foreign assets, as well as the losses from the arbitrary 
use of German patents, production methods and trademarks are not included, likewise the 
payments on pre-war loans to Germany.  However, the purpose of the compilation is to 
demonstrate the dimensions of Germany’s Wiedergutmachung.     
 For the Wiedergutmachung of injustice caused by Nazi ideology Bernd Josef Fehn lists 
eleven German laws and agreements with payments to aggrieved parties of 103.4 billion DM.  
For the liquidation of the consequences of the war, he itemizes eight laws of the Federal 
Government with a total of 725.5 billion DM as expenses.  The government and many 
corporations created a joint endowment fund of 10 billion DM for the Wiedergutmachung of 
forced labor during the war.19  The aggregate amount of approximately 865.9 billion DM dwarfs 
the occupation costs and reparation payments by a considerable margin. 
                                                
17 http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/zweiter-weltkrieg-sowjetische-kriegsgefangene-erhalten-entschaedigung-
1.2487424 accessed 2015-05-20. 
18 Hans Günter Hockerts, “Wiedergutmachung in Deutschland: Eine historische Bilanz 1945-2000” in 
Jahrhundertschuld, Jahrhundertsühne, herausgegeben von Karl Doehring, Bernd Josef Fehn, Hans Günter Hockerts. 
(München: Olzog, 2001). 92. 
19 Bernd Josef Fehn, “Die deutschen Wiedergutmachungs- und Kriegsfolgeleistungen nach 1945 unter dem 
Blickwinkel der Reparationsfrage,” in Jahrhundertschuld, Jahrhundertsühne, herausgegeben von Karl Doehring, 
Bernd Josef Fehn, Hans Günter Hockerts. 58-60. 
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 However, one has to take into consideration the circumstances of the situation.  Whereas 
the Wiedergutmachung payments stretched over several decades supported by the soon-to-be 
third largest economy of the world, the occupation costs and reparations had to be paid in less 
than a decade by a defeated Germany with an economy not able to feed, house and clothe its own 
people.  An economy, the U.S. Military Governor reported in August 1945, of “approximately 
1,200 industrial establishments … currently operating in the United States Zone of Germany.  
This number has been estimated to represent less than 10 percent of the industrial establishments 
in the Zone.”20  From these operating industrial plants “fifty percent were lumber mills, 
producing for the needs of the U.S. Army, whereas the rest were food processing plants, power 
plants and public utilities trying to reestablish water supply and waste water disposal.”21   
Considering the German payments for Wiedergutmachung, these payments exceeded by far the 
$20 billion in reparations the three Allied Powers agreed upon at the Conference of Yalta in 
February 1945 as the guideline for the Moscow Reparation Commission, as well as the not yet 
appraisable occupation costs.      
1.5. Allied perceptions of Germany  
 Some remarks are necessary on the subject of the perception of Germany by the major 
powers of Great Britain, Russia, the United States and France, since the late 19th century because 
they influenced the treatment of Germany after both World Wars. Gustav Stolper, an emigrated 
political economist, cites the editorial of The Times, London, of 16 July 1870 in his book 
German Realities regarding the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71: 
The greatest national crime that we have had the pain of recording in these 
columns since the days of the First French Empire has been consummated. War 
is declared–an unjust, but premeditated war. The dire calamity, which 
                                                
20 Monthly Report of the Military Governor U.S. Zone, No. 1, Industry, 20 August 1945. 1. 
21 Werner Abelshauser, Wirtschaft in Westdeutschland 1945-1948. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1975). 39. 
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overwhelms Europe with dismay, is, it is now too clear, the act of France, of 
one man in France. It is the ultimate result of personal rule. 
There can be no doubt as to the side on which the world’s sympathies will be 
enlisted, and, whatever may on former occasions have been the offenses of 
Prussia, she will in this instance have on her side all that moral support which 
is seldom denied to those who take up arms in self-defense.22     
 
George Bancroft, the U.S. Ambassador to Prussia expressed the sympathies of the  
 
American people on 12 October 1870, when he uttered that 
 
The leading statesmen as well as public opinion in America regard the present 
war essentially as an act of self-defense on Germany’s part, and the outstanding 
task is to insure Germany permanently, by a better system of frontiers, against 
new wars of aggression on the part of her western neighbors, of which the past 
three centuries have brought so large a number.23        
 
 In the 1930s it should have been common knowledge among western politicians that 
Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles24 of 1919, assigning to Germany the exclusive 
responsibility for the outbreak of World War I was a dictate forced on Germany by the victorious 
powers and not consistent with reality.  Victor Gollancz, a British publisher and humanist 
remembered in his book Our Threatened Values a conversation of Lloyd George, British Prime 
Minister in 1919 with Lord Riddell during the negotiations for the peace treaty for Germany.  
During this conversation Lloyd George conceded,  
…the truth is that we have got our way. We have got most of the things we set 
out to get… The German navy has been handed over, the German shipping has 
been handed over, and the German colonies have been given up. One of our 
chief trade competitors has been seriously crippled…25   
 
                                                
22 Gustav Stolper, German Realities. (New York. 1947). 218. 
23 Ibid. 218. 
24 Treaty of Versailles, Art. 231: The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the 
responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated 
Governments and their nationals have been subject as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the 
aggression of Germany and her allies. http://alphahistory.com//weimargermany/treaty-of-versailles-1919. accessed 
2014-01-14. 
25 Victor Gollancz, Our Threatened Values. (London: Victor Gollancz LTD, 1946). 21. 
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 To prove the mythos of the pretension of Prussian Militarism as the source of 
belligerence in the world as indicated par example in Law No. 4626 of the Allied Control Council 
terminating the existence of the state of Prussia, one has to read textbooks of European or world 
history.   
 Art. 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, known as the war guilt clause, complicated the task 
of politicians of the Weimar Republik, assassinated Foreign Minister Rathenau and Chancellor 
/Foreign Minister Stresemann, to arrange reconciliation with its western neighbors France and 
Belgium.  German public opinion described Art. 231 as the Kriegsschuldlüge, the war guilt lie.  
The article powerfully fueled nationalism and strong antipathies against the victors, and finally, 
among other reasons, permitted the rise of Hitler’s Nationalsozialistische Deutsche 
Arbeiterpartei. 
 Anne Armstrong writes in Unconditional Surrender, about Prussian Militarism and the 
Allied presumption of it as the cause of all recent wars. She criticizes  
the dogma that Prussia-Germany was the perpetual aggressor in European 
warfare, the official view of the exaggerated political importance of the 
German General Staff, the theory of the dangers to democracy, lawful 
government, and peace inherent in Prussia and especially in its ruling class, the 
doctrine of the conspiracy of the industrialists, Junkers, and militarists to push 
Hitler into power…27  
 
As a basis of official decision making in Washington this dogma “seems never to have been 
criticized in official circles during the war, [that were] open to question and critical historical 
analysis.”28  The statement in Anne Armstrong’s book reiterates the longevity and durability of 
                                                
26 Law No. 46 of 25 Feb. 1947 of the Allied Control Council. Recital clause: The Prussian State that from early days 
has been a bearer of militarism and reaction in Germany has de facto ceased to exist. Art. I: The Prussian State 
together with its central government and all its agencies are abolished.  
27 Anne Armstrong, Unconditional Surrender. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1961). 251. 
28 Ibid. 251. 
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the mythos of the Prussian/German militarism as the source of all belligerence in Europe and the 
world.  
1.6. Replacing German authorities with Allied authorities  
 With the Declaration Regarding the defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme 
Authority by the Allied Powers of 5 June 1945, the four Allied Powers recognized that with the 
Act of Surrender by Germany of 8 May 1945, and the arrest of the Dönitz government on 23 May 
no central German government or central German authority existed.  Therefore, the 
representatives of the Allied War Coalition by the power of their military might  
assume[d] supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers 
possessed by the German Government, the High Command and any state, 
municipal, or local government or authority. The assumption, for the purpose 
stated above, of the said authority and powers does not affect the annexation of 
Germany.29    
   
Respective to the different zones of occupation the Allied Statement on Zones of Occupation in 
Germany and the Occupation of ‘Greater Berlin’ of 5 June 1945 delineated  
an eastern zone to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;  
a north-western zone to the United Kingdom; 
a south-western zone to the United States of America;  
a western zone to France30  
 
of the territory of Germany as it existed on 31 December 1937.  The statement further explained 
that the area of ‘Greater Berlin’ be divided up by the four powers to be occupied by them. 
 General Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces 
repeats the assumption of general authority in his Proclamation No. 1 to the German people 
stating in Article II that 
Supreme legislative, judicial and executive authority and powers within the 
occupied territory are vested in me as Supreme Commander of the Allied 
                                                
29 Department of State, Documents on Germany, 1944-1985. (Washington D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1950). 33. 
30 Ibid. 38. 
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Forces and as Military Governor, and the Military Government is established to 
exercise these powers under my direction. All persons in the occupied territory 
will obey immediately and without question all the enactments and orders of 
the Military Government. Military Government Courts will be established for 
the punishment of offenders. Resistance to the Allied Forces will be ruthlessly 
stamped out. Other serious offences will be dealt with severely.31  
 
In addition the directive JCS 1067/6 required the Military Government in paragraph 6 to dissolve 
Hitler’s power base, the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei and its countless 
“formations, affiliated associations and supervised organizations.”32  This specification forced a 
mass-exodus of public servants at the local, county and state level. To hold public office in 
Hitler’s Germany from mailman to university professor one had to be a member of the many 
specialized professional organizations created by the party. This qualification under the 
Occupation Authority, however, delayed, if not disqualified these people from continuing 
employment. 
 Reestablishing a basic administration at the local, county and district level emerged as the 
first important objective of the Military Governments in its particular zones of occupation.  The 
newly Military Government-appointed German authorities from Bürgermeister (mayor) to 
Landrat (district chief executive) and Regierungspräsident (district president) faced the major 
task to ensure public order, to provide fresh water supply, to restore electric power, to distribute 
food, to prevent epidemics and to get the public transportation systems running again.   
 The new German authorities engaged in the task of restoring a semi-normal life received 
their power to enforce law and order from the absolute power and authority of the Military 
Government. The German people, just liberated from Hitler’s dictatorship with all-embracing 
power and authority, faced a military rule with equally unlimited power and authority, with an 
agreed upon objective to eliminate forever Germany’s claimed obsession with militarism and 
                                                
31 Military Government-Germany. Supreme Commander’s Area of Control. HStAStuttgart. EA 1/014 Bü 189.  
32 JCS 1067/6 No. 6.a. 
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war.  A short summary of the economic goals developed by the United States illustrates the 
planned therapy for the German people as a whole.   
1.7. Germany’s import/export interconnections and dependency 
 The presumption that the Prussian/German militarism was the evil genius in the world 
persuaded the Secretary of Treasury, Henry Morgenthau Jr. to draft his radical plan, the 
“Program to Prevent Germany from starting a World War III.”  Common sense and a realistic 
perspective seem missing.  To believe that Germany as the country with the largest 
manufacturing capacity, only second to the United States could be eliminated without grave 
consequences to the European economic system borders on mental bankruptcy.  How the 
Secretary convinced President Roosevelt, against the resistance of State and War Departments to 
approve such a plan is not documented.  To this day no one knows the rationale behind 
Morgenthau’s intentions.   
 In his book Germany is our Problem Morgenthau declares that not only the Directive JCS 
1067/6, but also the Potsdam Declaration carried out the objectives of his proposed policies33 in 
the “Plan of the Allied Control Council for Reparations and the Level of Post-War German 
Economy” of March 1946.  Morgenthau uses numbers and statistics purposefully for his aims. 
According to Morgenthau, in 1938 Germany imported 17 per cent of its foodstuff,34 indicating 
that postwar pastoralized Germany should be able to produce all its necessary food with workers 
released from dismantled industries.  However, he fails to mention that the loss of German 
territory to Poland and the USSR reduced its agricultural capacity by 27 per cent.  He also fails 
to take into account that much of the arable land left in dismembered Germany was not suited for 
large-scale agricultural production.  He conceals the fact that the reduced arable land available to 
                                                
33 Henry Morgenthau Jr., Germany is our Problem. (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1945). XII. 
34 Ibid. 62. 
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food production had to feed a population increased by more than 12 million refugees, expellees 
and displaced persons.  
 Section 4, The Ruhr Area, (a) reflects the most serious shortcoming of his proposed 
policy.  The subparagraph calls for the dismantling of all industrial plants and equipment for 
restitution to the liberated countries, as well as closing of all coalmines.35   In 1936, the Ruhr 
industrial area produced 138,000,000 metric tons of hard coal. Of this production 31 per cent or 
42,800,000 metric tons were exported.  Germany’s western neighbors France, the Netherlands 
and Belgium-Luxembourg received more than 50 per cent of the exports.  The Netherlands 
depended on 25 per cent, Belgium-Luxembourg on 17 per cent and France on 9 per cent of their 
total usage from the Ruhr coal.36  To destroy the largest anthracite producing area of Western 
Europe would mean to denude Germany and all liberated and neutral countries of North and 
Western Europe, longing for energy of a source of energy able to provide, according to Gustav 
Stolper, up to 440,000 metric tons per day.37  
 Ex-president Herbert Hoover travelled on behalf of President Truman through several 
European countries in 1947 to survey the conditions of the respective economies.  His report No. 
3, “The President’s Economic Mission to Germany and Austria” is a scathing criticism of the 
official economic policies expressed in the directive JCS 1067/6 and in The Level of Industry 
Plan of the Allied Control Council (ACC).  Without any attempt at palliation, he stated that 
[t]here is only one path to recovery in Europe. That is production. The whole 
economy of Europe is interlinked with German economy through the exchange 
of raw materials and manufactured goods. The productivity of Europe cannot 
be restored without the restoration of Germany as contributor to that 
productivity.38  
   
                                                
35 Ibid. Page 1 of the Program to Prevent Germany from starting a World War III. 
36 Hoyt Price, Carl E. Schorske, The Problem of Germany. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1947). 34. 
37 Maximum production in 1943 in G. Stolper, German Realities. (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1948). 86-87. 
38 Report No. 3 by Herbert Hoover. Truman Library, Box 1724, OF 950-B. 2. 
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Hoover refers with acidity to Morgenthau’s Plan to pastoralize Germany approved at the 
Conference of Quebec, September 1944, stating that: 
There is the illusion that the new Germany left after the annexations can be 
reduced to a “pastoral state.” It cannot be done unless we exterminate or move 
25,000,000 people out of it. This would approximately reduce Germany to the 
density of the population of France.39 
 
 Hoover’s reports about the situation in Germany pushed official Washington to rethink the 
United States policies toward Germany and to initiate the new directive JCS1779 of 11 July 
1947. 
 However, no one imagined a situation in 1945, neither the starving German people nor 
the western Allied Powers, in which a country unable to produce or import enough food for its 
own people, being dependent on the generosity of other countries to prevent starvation, would be 
asked to provide funds five years later for the defense of the Federal Republic and for the 
defense of the countries of Western Europe within the scope of the NATO Alliance.  During 
these five long years the Allies provided large amounts of food to “prevent starvation or such 
disease and unrest as would endanger these [occupation] forces.”40  Historically, since its 
inception in 1871, the German Empire and its successor states never produced enough foodstuffs 
to feed its indigenous population, neither Hitler’s Third Reich despite its strong bid for autarchy, 
nor the tri-zonal Germany and its replacement, the Federal Republic.        
 The proportion of foodstuffs of the total imports of Germany remained relatively stable 
over time.  Wolfgang F. Stolper demonstrated the sine qua non of foodstuff dependency in 
Germany between East and West.  The combined area of the three western occupation zones, the 
future West Germany, imported in 1936 RM 1.8 billion agricultural and food products.  The sum 
                                                
39 Ibid. 12. 
40 Directive to Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces of Occupation regarding the Military Government of Germany, 
JCS 1067/6, April 26, 1945, Part I, No. 5a. 
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of RM 1.8 billion out of a total sum of RM 3.8 billion represented 47.4 per cent of all agricultural 
and food products reported for Germany in 1936.41  RM 0.9 billion worth was imported from 
outside Germany, while RM 0.9 billion value resulted from intra-German trade (the German 
areas east of the Oder-Neisse Rivers, the Soviet occupation zone and Berlin). The numbers 
demonstrate the absolute import dependency of the three western occupation zones on food 
imports already by 1936.  The dependency increased drastically in 1945 with the influx of 
millions of refugees and expellees.  Lack of fertilizer, farm equipment and transportation means 
intensified the situation critically in the American, British and French zones.       
 Horst Mendershausen, an economist from Columbia University, cites a foodstuff import 
ration of 38.7 per cent of total imports during the German Empire.  Foodstuff imports increased 
to 40.9 per cent during the Weimar Republic in 1928, then fell slightly to 35.5 per cent in 1935 
during Hitler’s policy of autarchy, and increased in 1952 to 37.4 per cent.42  During the first 
years of the occupation, the domestic production of foodstuffs dropped relative to the average of 
1935 - 1939 harvests to 67 per cent in 1946/47 and to 58 per cent in 1947/48.  From 1948/49, the 
production rose from 79 per cent to 93 per cent in 1949/50 and to 103 per cent in 1950/51 for the 
area of the three western occupation zones.43  However, feeding the additional twelve million 
refugees, expellees, and displaced persons living in the western occupation zones increased the 
demand for further food imports.  
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1.8. Liabilities of the occupants   
 The critical condition of the European food production prevented “the western zones… 
[from securing] adequate food supplies either from indigenous production or elsewhere in 
Germany”44 or from other sources.  Only the United States could provide the necessary amounts 
of agricultural imports.  The United States as victor accepted, according to the Directive to 
Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces of Occupation regarding the Military Government of 
Germany, commonly known as Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 1067/6, the obligation to prevent 
starvation and unrest in occupied Germany.  However, this obligation was not based on the JCS 
1067/6 only.  Max Rheinstein, Professor of International Law at the University of Chicago and 
member of the Legal Division of the Allied Control Council (ACC), the highest governing 
authority in occupied Germany argued that  
in the present food situation of Germany the importation by the occupants—
practically, that means the United States—of food into Germany is not simply 
an act of charity or generosity but the fulfillment of a duty of international law, 
which is part of the general duty of an occupant, even a belligerent one, to 
restore and maintain law and order in the occupied territory. The fulfillment of 
this duty has repeatedly been claimed of Germany by Allied Powers, when 
Germany found herself in the position of occupant.45  
  
 International law, the ACC agreement, as well as the Directive JCS 1067/6, forced the 
United States to support the population in their occupation zone with food.  Because of the 
limited or respectively non-existent surplus of food resources of their Allies, Great Britain and 
France, the United States also provided considerable foodstuff to the people of those occupation 
zones.  Although the average caloric intake allocated to the German people barely prevented 
starvation during the first three years of occupation, the food imports into Germany added up to 
billions of dollars furnished by the U.S. taxpayer.  
                                                
44 Hoyt Price, C.E. Schorske, The Problem of Germany. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1947). 17. 
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 27 
1.9. Changing Allied perceptions toward Germany  
 With time passing, the expectation grew in the United States and Great Britain that 
Germany ought to be self-supporting, to become independent of tax subsidies of the U.S. and 
Great Britain.  However, to support the task of German self-sufficiency the general attitude of 
the JCS 1067/6 Directive needed to change.  The new “Directive to Commander-In-Chief Of 
U.S. Forces Of Occupation, Regarding The Military Government Of Germany,” JCS 1779 of 11 
July 1947 provided this change by stating in Section II, No. 3, that: 
The basic interest of the United States throughout the world is just and lasting 
peace. Such a peace can be achieved only if conditions of public order and 
prosperity are created in Europe as a whole. An orderly and prosperous Europe 
requires the economic contribution of a stable and productive Germany as well 
as the necessary restraints to insure that Germany is not allowed to revive its 
destructive militarism.46  
 
Furthermore, in Section IV, No. 5 United States Political Objectives in Germany the directive 
stated that: 
It is an objective of the United States Government that there should arise in 
Germany as rapidly as possible a form of political organization and a manner 
of political life which, resting on a substantial basis of economic well-being, 
will lead to tranquility within Germany and will contribute to the spirit of 
peace among nations. 
Your task, therefore, is fundamentally that of helping to lay the economic and 
educational bases of a sound German democracy, of encouraging bona fide 
democratic efforts and of prohibiting those activities, which would jeopardize 
genuinely democratic developments.47  
 
 This change of policy proved to be the basic prerequisite for the German participation in 
the European Recovery Program (ERP), in public known as the Marshall Plan.  The ERP 
provided the financial aid to kick-start the German economy.  The story of financial aid to 
Germany and Germany’s own contributions to get back on its feet after the total defeat, of 
destruction and dismemberment, of partition and occupation is not very well known.  It is the 
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purpose of this dissertation to present facts and data about the Allied aid and the German 
contributions during the time span from the total defeat up to the statehood of the Federal 
Republic of Germany.  
1.10. Summary 
 It was a unique situation the Allied war coalition and defeated Germany faced after the 
unconditional surrender of the Drittes Reich on 8 May 1945.  Never before in recent history had 
a war ended with the total defeat, occupation of the entire territory of the conquered, and the 
dissolution of any form of a central government able to exercise sovereign power or to negotiate 
with the victors.  With their declaration of 5 June 1945, the Allies proclaimed the non-existence 
of a central government or authority in Germany. The four victorious governments “assume[d] 
supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the German 
Government, the High Command and any state, municipal, or local government or authority,”48 
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Chapter 2: The United States Zone of occupation  
 
2.1. Creation of the U.S. Zone 
  
 President Roosevelt agreed at the second Quebec Conference to switch with the British 
the previously favored U.S. Zone of northern Germany with its major ports of Hamburg and 
Bremen to a southern German zone (see Appendix F).  At Yalta President Roosevelt proposed to 
include the states of Hessen Kassel and parts of Hessen Nassau into the U.S. Zone, as well as an 
enclave around the ports of Bremen, Bremerhaven and the urban district of Wesermünde, with 
access routes for rail and road transport through the British Zone to the U.S. Zone.  
 At Yalta, the Big Three also agreed upon an additional French Zone, to be carved out of 
the British and American Zones.  How did the final U.S. occupation zone look after VE-Day and 
final agreements with the French government regarding its zone?  On 19 September 1945, 
General Eisenhower, the Commanding General, European Theatre of Operations (ETOUSA) 
signed the Proclamation No. 2.  Article 1 of the proclamation constituted in the area of the U.S. 
Zone three administrative areas called states with respective governments: 
GREATER HESSEN – comprised of Kurhessen and Nassau (excepting 
exclaves thereof and the Kreise Oberwesterwald, Unterwesterwald, Unterlahn 
and Sankt Goarshausen) and Hessen-Starkenburg, Oberhessen, and the part of 
Rheinhessen east of the Rhine; 
WÜRTTEMBERG-BADEN – comprised of the Kreise Aalen, Backnang, 
Böblingen, Crailsheim, Esslingen, Gmünd, Göppingen, Hall, Heidenheim, 
Heilbronn, Künzelsau, Leonberg, Ludwigsburg, Mergentheim, Nürtingen, 
Münsingen north of the Autobahn, Öhringen, Stuttgart, Ulm, Vaihingen, 
Waiblingen, the Landeskommissarbezirk Mannheim, and the Kreise Bruchsal, 
Karlsruhe Stadt and Land, and Pforzheim Stadt and Land; 
BAVARIA – comprising all of Bavaria as constituted in 1933, less Kreis 
Lindau.49    
 
 The proclamation created new administrative and political entities in Germany, some still 
existing.  Hessen lost the Kreise (counties) of Oberwesterwald, Unterwesterwald, Unterlahn and 
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St. Goarshausen on the right bank of the Rhein River, as well as the areas of Rheinhessen on the 
west bank of the Rhein River.  These areas were carved out of the original U.S. Zone for the 
French Zone agreed upon at Yalta.  Later they became a part of the still existing state of 
Rheinland-Pfalz.  Interestingly, the Proclamation No. 2 forgot the Hessian exclave of Wimpfen, 
a township located between the states of Baden and Württemberg.  By referendum the people 
voted in 1952 to become part of the state of Baden-Württemberg.  
 The two separate states of Baden and Württemberg were cut in half along the 
Reichsautobahn Karlsruhe-Stuttgart-Ulm.  The southern parts were added to the French zone 
while the northern parts were combined into the state of Württemberg-Baden.  The Proclamation 
No. 2 also dismembered Bavaria of the Pfalz, an area on the left bank of the Rhein River, part of 
the French Zone and later integrated into the state of Rheinland-Pfalz.50 
 General Joseph T. McNarney, the Commanding General of the United States Forces, 
European Theater, and Military Governor for Germany (U.S.), the successor to General 
Eisenhower, enacted Proclamation No. 3 on 21 January 1947.  In compliance with an American-
British agreement the enclave of Bremen with its surrounding areas became subject of the 
exclusive control of the U.S. Military Government.  Article I “constituted the following 
administrative area, which will henceforth be referred to as a State and which will have a State 
Government: BREMEN – comprising the Stadt Bremen, Land Gebiet Bremen and Stadtkreis 
Wesermünde, including Bremerhaven.”51   
 To antedate a further development, the Proclamation No. 4, Article I, of 1 March 1947 
conceded to the states of Bavaria, Hessen and Württemberg-Baden full legislative, executive and 
judicial powers with following reservations to the Military Government:  
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a. International agreements to which the United States is a party,  
b. Quadripartite legislation,  
c. Powers reserved to Military Government in order to effectuate basic policies of the 
occupation.   
These powers will also be granted to the State of Bremen, too, as Article IV states, with the 
acceptance of a constitution.52  
 It was generally accepted among the Big Three that “the Russians received the 
agriculture, the British the heavy industry, and the Americans the scenery”53 of Germany in their 
respective zones.  How did this artificial construct of Allied occupation policy look when the 
U.S. Military Government took over?  What did the Americans expect after four years of 
bombing campaigns?  According to the Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher Gemeinden, the U.S. 
Zone covered an area of 107,459 km2 (41,490 sq. mi) with a population of 17,254,945 based on 
the census of 29 October 1946.54  
2.2. Effects of the bombing campaigns 
 The U.S. Zone got its part of the “almost 2,700,000 tons of bombs dropped [over 
Germany in] more than 1,440,000 bomber sorties and 2,680,000 fighter sorties flown… In 
Germany, 3,600,000 dwelling units, approximately 20% of the total, were destroyed or heavily 
damaged.  Survey estimates show some 300,000 civilians killed and 780,000 wounded.  The 
number made homeless aggregates 7,500,000.”  The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys 
(USSBS) continues, “the principal German cities have been largely reduced to hollow walls and 
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piles of rubble.  German industry is bruised and temporarily paralyzed.”55  To the bombing 
damage one has to add the destruction caused by fighting with the retreating German forces 
bound by Hitler’s Nero Order of 19 March 1945, to destroy everything that might be of use by 
the Allied forces.   
 The evidence of the bombing on the ground demonstrated “the destruction of the national 
economic and civil life of a great nation, doomed… to be set back by a century as a result.”56  All 
major population centers, industrial concentrations, as well as infrastructure from roads to rails 
and waterways in the U.S. Zone were attacked, heavily damaged and depopulated.  The 
examples of some municipalities may manifest the magnitude of suffering through the bombing 
and ground fighting.  
2.2.1. City bombing  
 The city of Bremen, with a population of 424,000 sustained 173 Allied air attacks during 
the war.  A total of 3,562 people were killed, 58 per cent of the living quarters were destroyed 
and the port facilities were heavily damaged.57  The 890,000 bombs dropped equaled 25,513 tons 
of bombs ejected by U.S. and British aircrafts.58  
 The major air attack on the city of Kassel occurred on 22 October 1943.  The 569 aircraft 
dropped 416,000 incendiary bombs.  10,000 people were killed, a tenth of the inner city 
population and 4.42 per cent of the total population.59  Scientists estimated that 60-70 per cent of 
the people killed died from carbon monoxide suffocation.60  Richard Overy reports that 59 per 
cent of the city was incinerated and 6,636 dwellings destroyed, with an estimated 6,000 people 
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killed.61  However, how one may explain the difference in numbers, nobody will ever know the 
exact numbers of people killed through the Allied bombing campaign.  
 The attack on the city of Kassel generated my earliest childhood memory, still present 
today. We four children with my mother lived in a small town fifteen miles north of Kassel. Air 
raid warnings woke us up. Standing outside among neighbors in absolute darkness we heard 
airplanes roaring in the sky. To the south, the sky was burning from east to west over Kassel like 
a volcanic eruption. In silence, the people stood and watched the tragedy as Kassel burned. Too 
small to understand the catastrophe, we watched the sky, a sky I have never seen since. 
 The fatalities of Allied air attacks on cities with industrial concentrations may be justified 
under the premise to shorten the war.  The air attacks on cities without any noteworthy war-
related industries had the only task to terrorize the population, to break the morale of the people.  
However, the terror attacks, starting in late 1944, failed to accomplish their intended purpose but 
inflicted incredible human and material losses. Late-war air attacks of this kind effaced the cities 
of Heilbronn, Pforzheim, and Würzburg, all located in the U.S. Zone. 
 Heilbronn, a city of roughly 74,000 residents, was the center of a wine-growing rural 
region situated on the Neckar River.  Winemaking was its only industry of importance, not at all 
essential and decisive for the outcome of the war.  In Der Brand, Jörg Friedrich gives a precise 
account of the attack of the 4 December 1944 by the U.S. Bomber Group No. 5.  “At 19.16 the 
bombs start to drop, at 19.45 1,254 tons of bombs were discharged… As the explosions of the 
time-delayed bombs ended and the people tried to exit their bunkers, a firestorm raged over an 
area of 5 km2  (~2 sq. mi).  The fire lasted four hours and destroyed the city center to 82 per 
cent.”62  The medieval city center of small and narrow half-timbered houses burnt like a blast 
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furnace.  Heat, lack of oxygen and an abundance of carbon monoxide killed 6,530 people 
including 1,000 children younger than six years.  8.3 per cent of the population lost their lives in 
this attack.63  
 The city of Pforzheim, situated on the northern slope of the Black Forest and the 
confluence of the small rivers Nagold and Enz, a center of jewelry and clock manufacture burnt 
to ashes on 24 February 1945.  The 379 airplanes of the British Bomber Command dropped 
1,551 tons of bombs on the residences of about 65,000.  The ensuing firestorm killed, according 
to Jörg Friedrich, 20, 277 people, roughly a third of the actual population.64  Richard Overy 
reports that the airplanes dropped their bombs from 8,000 feet (~2,500m) on the well-marked 
city.  “The subsequent conflagration consumed 83 per cent of the city area, until then the worst 
in any raid of the war and killed an estimated 17,600 people… the third highest [death toll] in the 
European bombing war.”65  The attack lasted from 19.50 to 20.12, however the firestorm reached 
its maximum later at 23.30.  The extreme heat melted metals with a melting point of 1,700˚C 
(~3,100˚F).66 
 The terror attacks of the Allies initiated a further escalation at the NSDAP hierarchy.  The 
Gauleiter (leader of a Party district) Albert Hoffmann of the district of Westfalen-Süd issued, 
after the air raids on Dresden and Pforzheim, his famous Fliegerbefehl. The instruction requested 
all police and constabulary members to not protect captured Allied pilots.  The pilots had to be  
exposed to the popular outrage.  In many cases captured Allied pilots became the victims of mob 
law.67  
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    kommissar des Gaues Westfalen-Süd 
   1.) An alle Landräte, Oberbürgermeister u. Polizeibeamte; 
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 Würzburg, a bishop’s see in northern Bavaria, is located in the narrow Main River valley.  
During the war the city suffered eleven air attacks between 1942 and 22 March 1945.  On 16 
March 1945, 236 Allied airplanes attacked the city without any relevant war related industries.  
The planes carried 924 tons of bombs, 389 tons of explosive bombs to open the structures 
attacked and 572 tons of incendiary bombs to light the fire.  Between 21.25 and 21.45 256 
explosive bombs and 397,650 incendiary bombs hit the city center with its invaluable art 
treasuries.  Seventeen minutes of bombardment destroyed 90 per cent of the city, killing roughly 
5,000 of its 107,000 residents.68  The bombing of Würzburg did not produce any military 
benefits for the Allies.  On the contrary, the 3,500 German soldiers, entrenched in the ruins of the 
city fought the attacking U.S. ground forces for six days before the Americans took the city on 6 
April 1945, twenty days after the incineration of 16. March.  
The fight for the city was, as Jörg Friedrich concluded, the fiercest and longest for American 
soldiers capturing a city in ruins since the fight for Aachen.69  
2.2.2. Industries and industrial production under attack 
 All major cities with large and important industrial production sites in the U.S. Zone were 
heavily bombed many times, destroying residential areas between, par example, 45 per cent in 
                                                                                                                                                       
   2.) Den Kreisleitern zur Kenntnis; 
   3.) Die Kreistagsführer des deutschen Volkssturms haben eine entsprechende 
        Unterrichtung der Volkssturmmänner vorzunehmen. 
 
    Sämtliche Jabo-Piloten, die abgeschossen wurden, sind grundsätzlich der 
    Volksempörung nicht zu entziehen. Ich erwarte von allen Dienststellen der Polizei,  
    dass sie sich nicht als Beschützer dieser Gangstertypen zur Verfügung stellen. 
    Behörden, die dem Volksempfinden zuwider handeln, werden von mir zur  
    Rechenschaft gezogen. Alle Polizei- und Gendarmeriebeamte sind unverzüglich über 
    diese meine Auffassung zu unterrichten. 
                                                                          gez. Albert Hoffmann 
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München and more than 90 per cent in Nürnberg.70  However, the Allied air attacks did not 
achieve the one cardinal objective, the elimination of the German war industry until into the last 
months of the war when the lack of fuel, transportation and labor shortage curtailed German 
airplane, tank and ammunition output to close to zero.  
 The MAN (Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nürnberg) plant at Augsburg, the only plant 
manufacturing diesel engines for submarines, was a prime target of the Bomber Command.  An 
air raid with eight Lancaster bombers failed to destroy the plant despite the intensive training of 
the pilots on original site maps.  Three of the attacking planes were destroyed by anti aircraft 
fire.  The factory “recorded damage valued at 2.4 million Mark, some submarine engines were 
delivered a few days late,”71  Jörg Friedrich reports, concluding that with these kinds of attacks, 
Germany would not lose the war. 
 As another example, Allied attacks from 20 to 25 February 1944, to reduce Allied losses, 
targeted the German aircraft production.  20,000 tons of bombs should have pulverized the 
Messerschmitt factories in Augsburg, as well as the major ball-bearing production sites in the 
cities of Regensburg, Stuttgart, and Schweinfurt. The attacks caused major destruction of 70 per 
cent in residential areas.  However, as Jörg Friedrich observed, the German fighter plane 
production did not suffer the hoped for decline.  In March 1944, he stated, the plants produced 
200 fighter planes more than in January and June saw the double amount of planes produced in 
February.72  Richard Overy reports that “in Augsburg… where industry was among the most 
heavily damaged, the average value of monthly production was 964,000RM in the last five 
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months of 1943; in the five months of heavy raiding in 1944 the average was 844,000RM.”73  
 The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys, considering air raid efficacy on the 
Schweinfurt ball-bearing factories, concluded that the attacks starting on 17 August 1943 
severely damaged the plants. “Production of bearings at this center was reduced sharply–
September production was 35% of the pre-raid level… Energetic steps were taken [by the 
Germans] to disperse the industry.  Restoration was aided by the circumstances… that machines 
and machine tools were damaged far less severely than factory structures… Although there were 
further attacks, production by the autumn of 1944 was back to pre-raid levels.”74 
 The attacks on a second MAN plant in Nürnberg, an object with highest priority for the 
Allies, one of only four production sites of the famous armored fighting vehicle V, called 
Panther V, did barely reduce the tank production.  A September 1944 air raid of 173 Flying 
Fortresses resulted “in a 30 per cent decline of one weeks production.”75  Production of the 
Panther V started in 1943.  Despite the bombing attacks on cities and factories the output of the 
Panther V averaged 315-380 tanks per month in 1944 and 1945.76  The site, Lexikon der 
Wehrmacht, reports a Panther V output of 1,768 in 1943, increased to 3,717 in 1944 and even 
441 in the first quarter of 1945.77  
 The Germans produced, according to the U.S. Strategic Bombing Surveys, between 
October 1943 and July 1944, 14,000 tanks and armored vehicles during the first cycle of air 
attacks.  
By the time of the heavier attacks [in August, September and October 1944] 
production… had been considerably expanded and dispersed… Production 
dropped from 1,616 in August to 1,552 in September [1944]. However, it rose 
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to 1,612 in October and to 1,770 in November, and reached its wartime peak in 
December, when 1,854 tanks and armored vehicles were produced.78 
  
These numbers demonstrate the difficulties the Allied air fleets had in eliminating or reducing 
the German war production.  Richard Overy in The Bombers and the Bombed cites a further 
example of the relative invulnerability of decisive German war productions.  The German fighter 
plane production rose from 962 in March 1943 to a maximum of 3,375 in September 1944 and a 
decline to 2,630 in December 1944.  The bomber plane production decreased in the same period 
from 757 to 703 in June 1944 and a minimum of 262 in December 1944.79  
 The Allied attempts through the early years of the war to defeat Germany from the air 
failed.  Neither the British philosophy of widespread area bombing of large cities to break the 
morale of the people nor the American philosophy of precision bombing of critical war 
production sites forced Germany to end the war.  The German reactions to the bombings 
demonstrated the efficiency of the production system.  Cushions of spare parts, the sturdiness of 
the machine tools, as well as widespread decentralization and the relocation of factories into the 
countryside or underground, restored critical productions more or less immediately after air 
raids.  Richard Overy observed that the wartime economy “was ‘expanding and resilient, not 
static and brittle,’”80 as John Kenneth Galbright evaluated the missing successes of the air 
attacks.  A shift in the Allied air war philosophy in late 1944 and the effects on the ground finally 
brought the German economy to a standstill in 1945.       
2.2.3. The Achilles Heel: Fuel production and transportation 
 The flexibility of the German war economy, the skills to find substitutes and to disperse 
production, enabled the country to resist the Allied bombing campaign between 1941 and 1944.  
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During these years the “German production [of armaments] increased threefold… despite all the 
bombings.”81  However, the increased intensified attacks on aircraft factories in 1944 proved 
finally to be successful in reducing the German airpower considerably.  
 In late 1944, with the nearly eliminated German air force, the Allies concentrated their air 
raids on fuel production sites and the transportation infrastructure.  Increased and highly precise 
attacks on the synthetic fuel production and refineries reduced the production and consequently 
the availability of these products for the armed forces.  The total of 852,000 tons of oil 
production and imports in January 1944 increased to a maximum of 919,000 tons in March and 
decreased steadily to 294,000 tons by December 1944.  The sixteen synthetic fuel production 
plants, according to the USSBS “the only source for aviation gasoline,”82 delivered a maximum 
of 501,000 tons in April 1944 and declined to 164,000 tons by December.  The imports of 
200,000 tons of oil dropped to a low of 11,000 tons in August when the Red Army captured the 
Ploesti oilfields in Romania.  The output of Germany’s own oil production declined from 
175,000 tons in January to 108,000 tons by December 1944.83  
 Richard Overy does not specify the production of a specific aviation gasoline.  The 
USSBS claimed overly optimistically that the output of the synthetic plants dropped from an 
average of 316,000 tons per months before the concentrated attacks, to 107,000 tons in June and 
17,000 tons in September 1944.  However, Richard Overy reports for this time a production of 
298,000 tons in June, respectively of 152,000 tons in September.84  According to the USSBS the 
aviation gasoline output dropped “from 175,000 tons in April to 30,000 tons in July and 5,000 
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tons in September.”85  These numbers of the USSBS do not seems realistic considering the still 
existing German air activities.  Nevertheless, the attacks on the fuel production system proved to 
be an important step toward German defeat.  Besides the almost complete elimination of the 
German air power and the successful reduction of the fuel production system, the new 
philosophy of precision attacks on the German transportation infrastructure, on roads, railways 
and waterways in late 1944 and early 1945 broke the camel’s back. 
 Andreas Knipping and Reinhard Schulz, in Die Deutsche Reichsbahn 1939-1945, put it in 
a nutshell stating that the Allied air attacks, even the ones directed against the fuel production in 
1944, did not destroy the German war economy.  “Not until the specific and dense, almost 
ceaseless air attacks against the crucial railway lines and marshaling yards in the Ruhr area, very 
important for the shipping of the mined coal, caused the industrial collapse not achieved 
throughout the preceding years.”86  The Strategic Bombing Surveys support the findings of the 
authors.  The Surveys concluded “the attacks on transportation [were] the decisive blow that 
completely disorganized the German economy.  It reduced war production in all categories and 
made it difficult to move what was produced to the front.  The attack also limited the tactical 
mobility of the German front.”87  
 Sufficient supply of coal, the major product of the mines of the Ruhr area, was vital for 
the German industry, a lesson the Allies had to learn while trying to revive the economy in their 
respective zones.  The generation of electricity depended for the most part on coal, shipped by 
rail and barge from the Ruhr area to the regional power plants.  Coal transport on inland 
waterways dropped from “2.2 million tons in September… [to] 422,000 tons in December 
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[1944].”88  The canals of the inland waterway system were partly closed down by air raids on 23 
September and the Rhein River [the major supply route for south Germany] was blocked by an 
air raid of 14 October on the Rhein bridge at Köln.  The raids shut down barge traffic to north, 
central and southern Germany.89 
 The Reichsbahn, the German rail company’s freight car loading capacity of 
“approximately 900,000 cars for the Reich as a whole in the week ending August 19 [1944] fell 
to 700,000 cars in the last week of October… declined erratically to 550,000 cars in the week 
ending December 23 and to 214,000 cars during the week ending March 3 [1945].”90  
 Analyzing these numbers it should have become clear that the U.S. Military Government 
faced a transportation nightmare in its zone.  From 8,200 locomotives only 2,600 were fit for 
service, 17,950 of 44,250 passenger cars in the three western occupation zones could be used and 
of 427,700 freight cars 396,000 were ready for use.  Further hampering rail service in the U.S. 
Zone, military action had destroyed 885 out of 10,168 bridges.91  The U.S. Military Government 
reported in July 1945 10,377 km (6,448 mi) of 13,193 km (8198 mi) track operational.92  Inland 
waterways in the U.S. Zone were inoperable because of destroyed bridges: Rhein River 11 
bridges, Main River 30 bridges, Neckar River 36 bridges, and Donau River 33 bridges.93  Of a 
total of 1,724 vessels of all kind in the U.S. Zone the Military Government reported 393 
serviceable and 754 sunk, the rest could be repaired.94  Not at all a pretty picture awaiting the 
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occupiers in their zones and a considerably less good-looking future for the defeated, war-weary 
and disillusioned German people.  
2.3. Agriculture and farming 
 Agriculture became immediately after the end of the war the most pressing question for 
the occupation powers.  Only agriculture could produce the food necessary for the survival of the 
German people.  As mentioned above, the Russians got the most productive agricultural areas of 
Germany, whereas the Americans got the scenery.  Never had the residents in the scenic U.S. 
Zone grown sufficient food for its indigenous population.  The situation deteriorated with the 
influx of a “multitude of mouths into the overcrowded British and American zones,”95 as 
Ninkovich cited Winston Churchill, caused by the Allied approved Russian and Polish 
depopulation policies.  
 A few numbers may illustrate the situation.  The population of the Potsdam-Germany  
(post August 1945) increased from 60 million in 1939 to 66 million in 1946.  The grain 
production decreased in the same timeframe from 10.3 million tons to 5.5 million tons, the potato 
harvest declined from 40 million tons to 22 million tons.  Cattle stock fell from 16 millions to 14 
millions and the number of hogs declined from 19.4 millions to 7.5 millions.96  The major 
reasons for the reduced agricultural output in 1946 resulted from “acute farm labor and 
machinery shortages, the lack of fertilizer, and the collapse of the transportation system.”97 
 The historical dependence on food imports is stated in the report, A Year of Potsdam, 
issued by the U.S. Military Government.  In 1943-44 Germany imported 7 million tons of 
foodstuffs.  Additionally, under Potsdam Protocol, twenty five per cent of Germany’s most 
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productive arable land was lost to Russia and Poland as a result of the war.  This agricultural 
land, the report observed was “capable of producing enough surplus food to feed some 4,000,000 
people.”98  Roughly 820,000 of the approximately 900,000 farms in the U.S. Zone had farmland 
of less than 49 acres.  The farmland declined seventeen per cent during the decade, 1935 to 1945.  
The number of hogs declined 49 per cent and the quantity of cattle declined 5 per cent.  Lack of 
fertilizer in the last years of the war caused a general decline of the crop harvest.  The report 
concluded that the U.S. occupation forces faced the responsibility of preventing the starvation of 
17 million people in their zone, an area never even close to self-sufficiency.  A bright light in the 
sad state of affairs of the agriculture industry in the U.S. Zone was observed in a monthly report, 
of the “61 plants for agricultural machinery in the U.S. Zone eight [plants] produce[d] 
equipment,”99 as long as parts and raw materials are available.  
2.4. Summary 
  The occupation force entered a territory consisting of towns and cities in ruins, with 
transportation infrastructure and public utilities destroyed or in disrepair, with millions of 
homeless people entering the area as refugees and expellees from East and Southeastern Europe, 
with starvation and epidemics looming, and with a non-existing public administration able to 
feed the hungry and house the homeless.  The people were punished by the JCS 1067 policy of 
not taking any steps toward a rehabilitation of the German economy, of policies like non-
fraternization, and orders such as one not to give away to starving Germans excess food supplies, 
banning U.S. families from giving leftover food to their German servants.  Excess food had to be 
degraded or made uneatable.100  For their own well-being the occupation forces soon had to use 
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the loopholes JCS 1067 provided to start to help rebuild infrastructure, to fight homelessness and 















Chapter 3: From the Atlantic Charter to Potsdam: Allied plans for post-war Germany 
 This chapter explores the meetings and conferences of the Big Three during and after the 
war. It examines the decisions and policies proposed and enacted by the Allies from the 
postulation of unconditional surrender to partition and dismemberment, as well as Germany’s 
reduction to a purely agricultural country as the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Henry 
Morgenthau forcefully argued.  Will Germany be granted a future existence as an independent 
nation state?  Or will Germany be broken up into several independent small entities, partly 
internationalized, deprived of its major industries?  In the Atlantic Charter, President Roosevelt 
and Prime Minister Churchill tried to formulate universal principles to govern the future life on 
earth.  Were those lofty principles to be the basis for life for defeated Germany?    
3.1. The Atlantic Charter, 9-12 August 1941 
 The secretive meeting of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at the 
Placentia Bay, 9-12 August 1941, in Newfoundland, Canada, led to a series of wartime meetings 
of the two leaders.  Churchill, fearing an invasion by the German military, pressed Roosevelt for 
sweeping financial and material support.  However, Roosevelt refused to officially commit the 
United States to enter the war on the side of Great Britain and the USSR.  Roosevelt expected the 
surge of criticism at home from isolationists and interventionists facing him after the 
announcement of the meeting.  Theodore Wilson explains, the president “judged that the meeting 
[with Churchill] pinned his administration even more tightly between the horns of isolationist 
denunciation and interventionist outcry.”101  An immediate commitment to war by the United 
States, the President feared, would extremely jeopardize the timely delivery of “desperately 
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needed aid to the Allies – as happened during World War I.”102 
 During the meetings at Placentia Bay both leaders composed the Atlantic Charter, on the 
record as the “Joint Declaration by the President and the Prime Minister.”  The charter served as 
the ideological backbone of the war alliance against Germany and Japan, envisioning a 
perception of a world of peaceful nations after the defeat of the Axis powers.  In the charter, 
both, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill reaffirmed the principle of self-
determination as a universal human right, a principle inserted into diplomacy by President 
Wilson at the end of World War I, an idealistic conception of the world.  The noble and 
ambitious objectives expressed made it attractive to many countries.  On 24 September 1941, the 
exile governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland and Yugoslavia signed the charter in London.  The representatives of twenty-six 
countries joined the Atlantic Charter on 1 January 1942.  “United Nations” became the 
commonly used name for the allied war coalition and the supporting countries.  
The charter announced as its general objective the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny 
and the disarmament of the aggressor nations.  Furthermore, the charter declares that countries 
should no longer seek territorial or other aggrandizements, that territorial changes can only be 
justified by the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and that all peoples have the 
right to choose the government under which they will live.  Calling inter alia for free trade and 
unrestricted access to the high seas and oceans, the charter ends with a proposal to create a 
permanent system of general security.103  Would vanquished Germany be treated according to 
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the noble ambitions of the Atlantic Charter?  Would the ideals of the Atlantic Charter prevail 
over the attempts of the war alliance to levy heavy charges on Germany, intended to marginalize 
it for a long time?  Would it be possible to bring the realities on the ground – annexations, 
partitioning, industrial dismantling and pastoralization – which the military leaders faced on-site 
in Germany into compliance with the ideological considerations of the Atlantic Charter?  
3.2. Casablanca Conference, 14-24 January 1943: Unconditional surrender 
  At the end of 1942 a positive trend emerged for the Allies.  The start of the second battle 
of Alamein on 23 October by the British Eighth Army commanded by General Montgomery 
defined the beginning of the end of the Italian-German presence in North Africa.  The landing of 
one hundred thousand Anglo-American troops on 8 November in Morocco increased the 
pressure on the Italian-German forces under Field Marshal Rommel to withdraw into Tunisia as 
the last bridgehead of the Axis Powers in Africa.  The final stage of the battle of Stalingrad 
marked the turning point for the Wehrmacht in Russia, demanded Stalin’s presence in the USSR. 
One can assume that these positive events quickened the pace of strategic planning at the 
Conference of Casablanca (14-24 January 1943) between President Roosevelt and Prime 
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Minister Churchill, and their military advisers General Marshall and Admiral King from the 
United States, a well as General Brooke, Field Marshal Dill, Air Chief Marshall Portal and 
Admiral Pound from Great Britain.  
 Militarily, the conference set the stage for the conduct of the war in 1943 by confirming 
the strategy proposed by the British.  Wheeler-Bennett cites “the lack of co-ordination between 
the three American services, none of which was enthusiastic about Mediterranean operations but 
which had no coherent plan to suggest in the place of the British one.”104  For the British, 
focused on Europe, Germany was the major adversary.  With adequate U.S. participation they 
wanted to destroy the German U-Boot force in the Atlantic, to increase the air attacks on German 
cities and production facilities, to defeat the Axis Powers in North Africa soonest, to extend the 
British-American North Africa Campaign into Sicily, anticipating a break-off of Italy from 
Germany, and finally hoping to lure neutral Turkey on to the Allies’ side opening the Balkan 
peninsula for Allied penetration.105 
 The major political event of the conference to the world, however, became the policy of 
Unconditional Surrender.  At the press conference on 24 January, President Roosevelt’s notes 
included the passage cited by Wheeler-Bennett: 
The President and the Prime Minister, after a complete survey of the world war 
situation, are more than ever determined that peace can come to the world only 
by a total elimination of German and Japanese war power. This involves the 
simple formula of placing the objective of this war in terms of unconditional 
surrender by Germany, Italy and Japan. Unconditional surrender by them 
means a reasonable assurance of world peace for generations. Unconditional 
surrender means not the destruction of the German populace, nor of the Italian 
or Japanese populace, but does mean the destruction of a philosophy in 
Germany, Italy and Japan which is based on the conquest and subjugation of 
other peoples.106    
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 Both, Wheeler-Bennett and Armstrong recall that President Roosevelt talked about the 
concept of unconditional surrender to the Joint Chiefs of Staff107 108 before he departed for 
Casablanca.  According to Armstrong, General Grant used the term of unconditional surrender in 
1862 attacking Fort Donelson in Tennessee.  When asked about the terms of surrender by the 
Fort’s commandant, Grant demanded unconditional surrender of the garrison.  Anyway, nobody 
can compare the unconditional surrender of a single garrison with the unconditional surrender of 
a state.  In recent history such a postulation between adversaries was never made; European wars 
ended in negotiated peace.  To this day the legal definitions and the precise legal terms of 
unconditional surrender are not clear.109  
 Prime Minister Churchill, as Michael Beschloss notes, “had his private doubts [about the 
policy of unconditional surrender as pursued by President Roosevelt] but was so dependent on 
Roosevelt’s support of England that he strained to show enthusiasm.”110  He worried “that 
unconditional surrender would cause Germans to struggle harder against the Allies and prolong 
the war,”111 an argument paralleled by Michael Balfour, claiming that the policy would be “a 
free gift… made to Goebbels of which he made full use, spurring on the German people to make 
their resistance outlast their hopes of victory by harping on the horrors which would follow 
defeat.”112  In M. Balfour’s view the policy of unconditional surrender proved to be disastrous as 
it discouraged German officials who were in a position to take Hitler out, “from making the 
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attempt by their inability to extract from the Allies any sort of assurance that such action would 
improve the treatment meted out to their country.”113  
 John Wheeler-Bennett points to the difficulties defining the term unconditional surrender. 
He cites British Foreign Minister Bevin claiming after the war that the policy of unconditional 
surrender  
[l]eft us with a Germany without Law, without a Constitution, without a single 
person with whom we could deal, without a single institution to grapple with 
the situation, and we have had to build right from the bottom with nothing at 
all.114  
 
However, one can argue that President Roosevelt’s policy of unconditional surrender aimed at 
maintaining and tightening the war alliance with the Soviet Union.  Later on, the legal 
uncertainties of the term of unconditional surrender strained Allied policies. 
3.3. Tehran Conference, 28 November-1 Dec 1943: Dismemberment of Germany  
 At the time of the Tehran Conference it seemed clear to the Allies that Germany would 
be defeated.  Italy veered out of the pact with Hitler, joined the Allies and declared war on 
Germany on 13 October.  In the east, the Red Army attacked successfully the Wehrmacht in the 
middle and southern section of the front.  With the military achievements in mind the three 
leaders of the Allies, the ‘Big Three’ met in Tehran for the first time in person.  “No formal 
agenda had been prepared.  [President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill] thought that 
unstructured discussion would be more conducive to agreement”115 with the Soviet leader, 
Marshal Stalin.  
 The Big Three formulated no new policies toward Germany; however, the exchange of 
views and opinions extremely influenced Germany’s future.  The final statement of the 
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conference reiterated in Paragraph (a) the intent of the United States, Great Britain and the USSR 
to destroy the “German armies by land, their U Boats by sea, and their war plants from the air.” 
The Big Three called for a future of “a world family of Democratic Nations… look[ing] with 
confidence to the day when all people of the world may live free lives, untouched by tyranny, 
and according to their varying desires and their own consciences.”116  The single exclusive 
agreement of the conference listed in Paragraph (c) Military Conclusions of the Tehran 
Conference, (4), concluded, “Operation OVERLORD would be launched during May 1944, in 
conjunction with an operation in Southern France… Soviet forces would launch an offensive at 
about the same time with the object of preventing the German forces from transferring from the 
Eastern to the Western Front.”117  
 Several proposals for the dismemberment of Germany evolved prior to the Tehran 
Conference.  As early as August 1943 at the QUADRANT Conference (17-24 August) the 
British suggested a partition of Germany into occupation zones. COSSAC (Chief of Staff to the 
Supreme Allied Commander) “assigned northwest Germany including the Ruhr to the British 
and the Rhine valley from the Swiss border to Düsseldorf to the Americans.  [No attempt was 
made] to determine an eastern border…”118  Some time later a second British proposal argued to 
divide Germany into three parts.  According to the planned force distribution of the operation 
OVERLORD, Great Britain would receive northwest Germany with the industrial heart of the 
Ruhr, the port cities Hamburg and Bremen, as well as the Kiel Canal.  To the earlier identified 
southwestern zone of the U.S., a “sphere of influence in France [would be added] since the 
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American lines of supply and communications would presumably ran across France.”119  
 President Roosevelt on his way to Cairo and Tehran, E. Ziemke furthermore reports, 
thought about dividing Germany into “three, possibly five separate states after the war [that] 
ought to conform to the geographic subdivisions of the country.  He saw these entities as being a 
Roman Catholic south, a Protestant northwest extending to Berlin, and a northeastern region 
which he described as having ‘Prussianism’ as its religion.”120  According to Ziemke, President 
Roosevelt liked neither the idea of a southwestern American zone, nor to be in any way 
dependent on a French government.  He postulated it better for the United States to take the 
northwestern zone with its port cities granting easy lines of supply and communication.  Berlin, 
in his opinion ought to be part of the U.S. Zone.  All other segments of Germany to the east 
belonged to the USSR sphere of interest.   
 During the discussions and the exchange of opinions at Tehran, Marshal Stalin acted as 
the most outspoken proponent of German dismemberment.  “’If Germany is to be dismembered,’ 
M. Beschloss cites Stalin, ‘it should really be dismembered,’ singling out Prussia wasn’t 
enough.”121  President Roosevelt submitted a plan for a Germany of five autonomous states 
comprised of: “(1) Prussia (reduced), (2) Hanover and Northwest, (3) Saxony and Leipzig area, 
(4) Hesse-Darmstadt, Hesse-Kassel and the area south of the Rhine, (5) Bavaria, Baden and 
Wurtemberg–whereas the Kiel Canal and Hamburg, and the Ruhr and the Saar, to be under 
United Nations control.”122   
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 Prime Minister Churchill favored the “separation of Prussia and a loose grouping of 
southern and western German states.”123  He envisioned that the southern states should join a 
Danubian Confederation124 compiled of a resurrected Austria and Hungary, recreating “a larger 
version of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.”125  Marshal Stalin, according to Anne Armstrong, 
“opposed this on the ground that the Germans would soon dominate any Danubian 
Confederation and maintained that all Germans, not merely Prussians, were dangerous…”126 
Churchill, the heir of a centuries-old balance of power policy on the continent feared the Russian 
intentions of a conglomeration of weak continental states open to Russian domination.  Wheeler-
Bennett characterized bluntly that “such a scheme of [a Danubian Confederation] was naturally 
most unpalatable for Marshal Stalin.”127   
 No settlement could be reached among the Big Three over the question of the 
dismemberment of Germany.  For further consideration and for a consent solution acceptable to 
all parties the problem was transferred to the newly formed European Advisory Commission 
(EAC).  
 Marshal Stalin demonstrated the grim outlook for Germany at the tripartite dinner on 29 
November.  “To prevent Germany from rising again within 15 or 20 years, [he] requested that (1) 
at least 50,000 and perhaps 100,000 of the German Commanding Staff must be physically 
liquidated, (2) the victorious Allies must retain possession of the important strategic points in the 
world so that if Germany moved a muscle she could be rapidly stopped.  [Mitigating] President 
Roosevelt [added humorously that he] would put the figure of the German Commanding Staff 
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which should be executed at 49,000 or more.”128  Prime Minister Churchill, aroused by Stalin’s 
proposal and Roosevelt’s answer “took strong exception to what he termed cold blooded 
execution of soldiers who fought for their country… war criminals must pay for their crimes… 
they must stand trial.  He objected vigorously, however, to executions for political purposes.”129  
 Marshal Stalin, according to Anne Armstrong, requested that after the war, Germany 
should forfeit East Prussia and all areas east of the Oder River, as well as four million Germans 
should be transferred to the USSR for forced labor.  “It was clear after Teheran that the Stalin 
definition of Unconditional Surrender had a Carthaginian flavor.”130  Vojtech Mastny draws a 
conclusion from the Tehran Conference citing an assessment of the Soviet objectives by Charles 
E. Bohlen, President Roosevelt’s interpreter at the conference: 
Germany is to be broken up and kept broken up. The states of eastern, 
southeastern and central Europe will not be permitted to group themselves into 
any federations or association. France is to be stripped of her colonies and 
strategic bases beyond her borders and will not be permitted to maintain any 
appreciable military establishment. Poland and Italy will remain approximately 
their present territorial size, but it is doubtful if either will be permitted to 
maintain any appreciable armed force. The result would be that the Soviet 
Union would be the only important military and political force on the continent 
of Europe. The rest of Europe would be reduced to military and political 
impotence.131  
 
No wonder that Prime Minister Churchill saw the future of the European continent not too bright 
and not too auspicious.  
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3.4. Second Quebec Conference, 12-16 September 1944: The Morgenthau Plan 
 Probably the most decisive conference concerning the future of Germany was, beside the 
Tehran Conference, the Second Quebec Conference between President Roosevelt and Prime 
Minister Churchill in September 1944.  The conference will forever be indelibly connected with 
the name of the Secretary of Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., a longtime member of President 
Roosevelt’s administration.  
 Who was this Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, Jr.?  The Morgenthau family 
with 10-year-old Henry, the father of the future Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, left the city of 
Mannheim in the Grand Duchy of Baden in 1866 and emigrated to New York.  Henry, Senior 
finished his U.S. education at the Columbia Law School.  He entered the New York real estate 
business making a fortune.  A convinced democrat, he actively supported President Wilson’s 
1912 election campaign.  Rewarded with the Turkish ambassadorship, the family without young 
Henry lived from 1913 to 1916 in Constantinople.  
 His report about The Tragedy of Armenia,132 describing the genocide of the Armenian 
people in the Ottoman Empire during World War I, as well as his report, as a special envoy of 
President Wilson, about a Polish pogrom on Jews in Lwów in eastern Poland may have laid the 
foundation for his son’s future reaction to the mass killings of people and especially of Jews by 
Hitler’s National Socialists in Eastern Europe.  Herbert Levy explains in his book, All in a 
Lifetime, Henry Morgenthau, Sr.’s moral and ethical maxim.  Investigating anti-Semitic cases in 
the newly re-created Poland, Morgenthau, Sr. stated to his Polish respondent that he is “to carry 
the flag of an older eighteenth-century, rationalist ideal… ‘in my official capacity [as the 
chairman of a commission appointed by the President of the United States] I was no Jew, was not 
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even an American, but a representative of all civilized nations and their religions.  I stood for 
tolerance in its broadest sense,’”133 disapproving the prevailing latent Social Darwinist 
tendencies.  
 Young Henry enrolled at “the most fashionable WASP boarding school,”134 the Phillips 
Exeter Academy in New Hampshire.  For the WASP, the White Anglo Saxon Protestants, the 
unofficial American nobility, Jews were not accepted as members of their influential circles, they 
were at the time second-class citizens, socially not acceptable.  Henry’s classmates shared the 
prejudice of their parents.  In a letter from September 1904 he writes that he had not “made any 
particular friends yet.”135  His classmates never accepted him as an equal, causing loneliness and 
homesickness.  His academic performance suffered from the psychological stress he endured.  
He left Exeter in 1907.  
 After an interlude at the Sachs Collegiate Institute he attended Cornell University to 
study architecture, the objective set by his father.  However, his failing academic success 
prompted him to leave Cornell University without a degree in 1911.  At a job in Hartford, 
Connecticut he contracted typhus.  After recovery young Henry spent several weeks at a ranch in 
Texas for further recuperation.  At the ranch he got the calling for what his future life should be: 
a farmer on his own farm.  
 A quick stint at Cornell University to study the basics of agriculture convinced his 
doubtful father to buy him a farm in upstate New York.  Despite all of his plans, intentions and 
efforts the farm never paid for itself.  Henry Morgenthau, Jr. was merely a gentlemen farmer like 
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his neighbor Franklin Delano Roosevelt.  Neither was ever reliant on the returns of their farms 
for a living.  
 However, during the life at the farm Morgenthau befriended Roosevelt.  The hard farm 
work made him aware of the hardship and misery farmers suffered in upstate New York.  
Morgenthau acquired in 1922 the magazine The American Agriculturalist, turning it into an 
organ for scientific-based agriculture, for conservation and land rehabilitation, as well as for 
improving the working conditions of farmers.  He became Roosevelt’s specialist for all questions 
related to agriculture, farming and conservation in Roosevelt’s  election campaign for governor 
of the state of New York in 1928, Roosevelt winning the governorship “’by a razor’s edge of 
25,564 votes out of 4,234,822 cast.’”136  
 As governor, Roosevelt appointed Henry, Jr. to the chairmanship of the New York State 
Agricultural Advisory Committee and to the State Conservation Commission.  Governor 
Roosevelt signed into law a cavalcade of agricultural bills proposed by the Agricultural Advisory 
Committee supporting farmers and rural counties.  As a result of all the laws Roosevelt was 
reelected in 1930 with an “enormous majority of 725,000 votes,”137 compared to the 25,564 
votes in the 1928 election.     
 The Morgenthau-induced agricultural legislation in New York State made democratic 
Roosevelt an acceptable candidate for president in the republican-dominated agricultural 
Midwestern states in 1932.  During his time at the New York state government Henry 
Morgenthau demonstrated, as Herbert Levy mentions “unanticipated administrative skills.”138  
John Morton Blum added in Roosevelt and Morgenthau that “Morgenthau had a clear public 
‘philosophy:’ ‘if you care enough about seeing a thing go through, work out a plan, get the best 
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people to help you (here again real ability to know who the best people are) then present it to 
whomever you think has the best chance of putting it through, and forget about yourself.’”139  
Morgenthau’s “talent in selecting expert advisers, his ability to take their advice, and his 
willingness to delegate the authority they needed to do their job,”140 made him, besides his 
outmost loyalty and friendship to the president, an extremely valuable and reliable collaborator 
as demonstrated again during his tenure as Secretary of the Treasury from 1934 to1945.   
 His father’s experience with the Armenian genocide, Henry, Jr.’s experiences at boarding 
school and college/university being treated as inferior by his WASP classmates, together with the 
news of mass killings by Germans may have triggered the idea to preclude further mass murder 
of Jews.  He proposed to eliminate Germany as a powerful country able to dominate its neighbor 
countries and able to wage another war.  However, Morgenthau did not take into account that his 
plan would delay the recovery of Europe for a long time.  His proposal of an agriculture-based 
partitioned Germany also implied the emigration or starvation of more than 25 million Germans.  
 Regardless which reasons motivated Morgenthau, the scope of scholarly judgments about 
his proposal is enormous.  Franklin M. Davis Jr. argues in his book, Come as a Conqueror, “that 
the Morgenthau Plan was based on sheer revenge and was not an attempt to consider the realities 
of postwar power relationships among the Allies within Germany and in Europe.”141  E.F. 
Penrose remembers discussing with Morgenthau the idea of an agricultural Germany.  His 
remark to Morgenthau that the proposed change “was impossible because of the ratio of 
population to cultivable land [Morgenthau brushed aside by offering] that the surplus population 
should be dumped into North Africa.”142  
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 In Die Amerikanische Reparationspolitik gegenüber Deutschland 1941-1945, the German 
scholar Otto Nübel referred to Morgenthau as the “trend-setting person [during 1944] in the fight 
to determine U.S. policies toward Germany.  His close assistant White only reluctantly supported 
Morgenthau’s proposals fearing that the merciless decisions [of Morgenthau’s plan] would have 
abominable consequences.”143  Nübel harshly criticized “the pandemonium of truths, half-truths 
and unfounded assertions [of the Treasury]… [and] the economic dubiousness of the causal 
chains of arguments apparent.  It was the exclusive reason for the Treasury [and its Secretary 
Morgenthau] to enforce the program [called Morgenthau Plan] to eliminate [Germany once and 
for all].”144 
 Herbert Levy moderately judged that the division of Germany “would be [a] simplified 
replica of the politically decentralized Holy Roman Empire… the world… [of] Beethoven, 
Mozart, Haydn, Kant, Goethe, Schiller… the world of idealistic rationalists,”145 averse to the 
derailments of humanity in the 20th century.  However, Levy conceded that Morgenthau’s plan 
“retrospectively–was unfortunately naïve.”146  The German historian, Hans-Peter Schwarz, 
assumes that Morgenthau had a certain desire for revenge, however, he assessed the Morgenthau 
Plan mainly as an example of a policy of reconciliation between British and Soviet national 
interests at the expense of defeated Germany.147  Schwarz’ position seems more rational 
compared with the ‘sheer revenge’ of Davis’ argument and the ‘naïvety’ Levy represented.  
However, Penrose’s and Nübel’s arguments can emphasize the belief that revenge and 
retaliation, conscious or unknowingly, dictated or at least influenced Morgenthau’s actions.  
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 In contrast, Friedrich Jerchow in Deutschland in der Weltwirtschaft 1944-1947 
concentrated on economics.  He contended “one of the substantial reasons of Morgenthau’s plan 
for Germany was the elimination of the German competition at the world market and its 
replacement by the United States.”148  Increasing exports to fight expected unemployment after 
the war was a stated objective of U.S. foreign policy.   
 According to politicians like Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, in his memoirs149 and 
Thomas E. Dewey,150 both stated that the consequences of the Second Conference of Quebec 
would cost dearly in prolonged fighting and of unnecessarily lost lives of Allied soldiers; not to 
mention the victims of Morgenthau’s policies among the Wehrmacht and the German population 
prior to and past the unconditional surrender.  In the end, Morgenthau’s policies particularly 
those regarding deindustrialization would cause the American taxpayers to provide large 
amounts of food to postwar Germany to prevent mass starvation. 
 When President Roosevelt agreed to Marshal Stalin’s objectives of Germany’s 
dismemberment, partition and deindustrialization at Tehran he became, according to John 
Wheeler-Bennett, an easy “target for the rabid views on Germany propounded by his old friend 
and Secretary of Treasury, Henry J. Morgenthau,”151 reinforcing his own negative attitude 
toward Germans in particular.152   
 As of July 1944, Henry Morgenthau had only marginally been concerned with the 
treatment of Germany after victory.  He writes in his book, Germany Is Our Problem, that he 
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“had been led into the whole problem by questions of reparations, currency and financial 
controls.  [In his perception] these could not be divorced from the broader aspects of what to do 
with Germany.”153  However, reiterating Morgenthau’s deficit in knowledge, John Morton Blum 
states, “at the end of July 1944, Morgenthau knew nothing about the State Department 
memoranda or about the planning for Germany that had gone on at Teheran and in London [at 
the European Advisory Commission].”154  
 In Washington, several committees at the State Department studied the issues of a 
defeated Germany occupied by three different national military forces.  Likewise, several 
committees at the War Department considered these issues.  Should there be a harsh and punitive 
peace?  Or should Germany be treated more leniently?  Until Morgenthau’s engagement into the 
case of postwar Germany’s treatment,  
the [State] Department’s postwar committee… recommended against the 
partition of Germany and against a harsh peace, though it accepted the idea of 
zones of occupation. Further, it endorsed a statement on economic policy 
toward Germany by the interdepartmental Executive Committee on Economic 
Foreign Policy… The memorandum advocated a limited control of the German 
economy and the elimination of Germany’s economic domination of Europe, 
but the eventual reabsorption of Germany into the world economy.155  
 
Of the work done by General Eisenhower’s staff at the Supreme Headquarter Allied 
Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), the Secretary of Treasury had no knowledge.       
 During a trip to France and Great Britain in early August 1944, Morgenthau received a 
draft of the Handbook for Military Government in Germany prepared by General Eisenhower’s 
German Country Unit in his Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force.156  The general 
tone of the Handbook assumed that Nazism would be eliminated, the Allied forces invading 
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Germany “should restore as quickly as possible the official functioning of the German civilian 
government in the area for which you are responsible.  German industry must be buttressed to 
support the Germans and keep Europe on an even keel.  Every German must be promised two 
thousand calories of food per day.”157  Judging by his personal opinion and prejudice,158 
Morgenthau felt that the President should not be compelled to support such lenient treatment for 
Germany.  Only with a Germany radically dispossessed of heavy industry, reduced in size and 
partitioned could the peace of the world be guaranteed. 
 The memorandum of the State Department, the policies proposed by the EAC, as well as 
the Handbook for Military Government in Germany raised Morgenthau’s suspicions of a U.S. 
plan to treat Germany in a forgiving manner.  Henry Morgenthau Jr. felt it was his call and duty 
to ensure that defeated Germany should be punished severely.  During a conversation with 
President Roosevelt on 19 August, Morgenthau reviewed his awareness from his preceding trip 
to Europe that “nobody… ‘Has been studying how to treat Germany roughly along the lines you 
wanted.’”159  The President answered Morgenthau’s statement according to John Morton Blum 
as follows: “We have got to be tough with Germany and I mean the German people not just the 
Nazis.  We either have to castrate the German people or you have got to treat them in such a 
manner so they can’t just go on reproducing people…”160  In Morgenthau’s words the President 
“left no doubt whatsoever in my mind that he personally wants to be tough with the Germans.”161  
As Eleanor Roosevelt remembers, “at least a month before the Quebec conference, my husband 
had received memoranda from Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson and Secretary Morgenthau, 
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members of the Cabinet Committee he had set up to recommend a plan for the post-war 
treatment of Germany.  All were carefully considered, so it is fair to surmise that Henry 
Morgenthau’s plan more closely met the needs of the situation as Franklin saw it.”162 
 Despite strong objections from the State and War Departments to Morgenthau’s 
intentions, the President still supported Morgenthau’s ideas.  In a letter to Secretary of War, 
Stimson, Roosevelt pointed out his displeasure with the Handbook for Military Government in 
Germany.  According to his letter, the President was concerned that Germany would be treated 
like the liberated nations of Belgium or the Netherlands.  He uttered that “every person in 
Germany should realize that this time Germany is a defeated nation.  I do not want them to starve 
to death, but, as an example, if they need food to keep body and soul together beyond what they 
have, they should be fed three times a day with soup from Army soup kitchens.”163   
 Morgenthau’s conversation with the President convinced him to draft a proposal for the 
treatment of Germany.  Guided by Morgenthau’s personal supervision, a committee of Harry 
White, John Pehle, and Ansel Luxford incubated a memorandum for the Secretary, later 
infamously known only as the Morgenthau Plan (see Appendix A).    
 On 9 September, during the last meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Germany, before 
the President left for Quebec to confer with Prime Minister Churchill, Morgenthau handed out 
his final plan, the “Program to Prevent Germany from Starting a World War III” to the President, 
the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War.  According to Morgenthau’s plan, all German 
heavy industry and war-related industry would be transferred to liberated countries or be 
destroyed.  The Ruhr area, the industrial powerhouse of Germany, and adjacent industrial centers 
would be stripped of all plants.  All coalmines would be stripped of equipment and the mines 
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closed down completely.  Germany would lose all territory east of the Oder River, as well as the 
Saar region and the area between the Rhine and Mosel Rivers.  The Ruhr area and parts of 
northern Germany, including the Kiel Canal would be internationalized (see Appendix B). 
 The remaining part of Germany had to be divided into an independent North German 
state and a South German state.  The South German state could form a customs union with a 
revitalized Austria.  Agriculture would be the basis for living for the German people and a source 
of employment for the Germans previously working in dismantled industries.  
 At the meeting, President Roosevelt took up one of Morgenthau’s topics scanning the 
memorandum and in a loud voice “It is a fallacy that Europe needs a strong industrial Germany.  
Roosevelt said this was the first time he had seen it stated: All the economists disagree, but I 
agree with that… Furthermore, I believe in an agricultural Germany.”164  As to be expected, 
Stimson, the Secretary of War declared, according to Michael Beschloss, “he was unalterably 
opposed to Morgenthau’s desire that German industry be substantially obliterated.  He also 
derided the eagerness to put so-called arch-criminals to death without trial. [Morgenthau’s Plan] 
would breed war, not peace.”165  
 The severity of punishment toward Germany permitted by the Morgenthau Plan is 
evident.  Germany would be thrown back to a state of affairs a hundred years earlier.  With 
Germany decimated and emasculated, a major competitor in international trade ceased to exist.  
As the Secretary of War remembers, “the mines and mills of the Ruhr had indeed been a 
depressing competitor of Great Britain particularly.”166   
 Closing down the Ruhr industry, Morgenthau argued, would revitalize and energize the 
British coal and iron industries.  Morgenthau “asserted that England had coal enough to supply 
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its present output for five hundred years!  [To the Secretary of War, this statement] certainly is 
contrary to everything I have heard about the mines of Great Britain which have been constantly 
asserted to have been dug so deep as to become almost uneconomic.”167  Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull in his memoirs, put the objective of the Morgenthau Plan in a nutshell claiming, 
“Morgenthau’s plan was out of all reason… [it] would wipe out everything in Germany except 
land, and the Germans would have to live on the land.  This meant that only 60 per cent of the 
German population could support themselves on German land, and the other 40 per cent would 
die.”168  Bluntly stated, Morgenthau designed his plan to destroy Germany once and for all as the 
major power in Europe and as a significant competitor in world trade.  In the same direction, 
aims John Dietrich in his book, The Morgenthau Plan: Soviet Influence on American Postwar 
Policy, citing a senior historian at the U.S. Army Center for Military History claiming that 
The plans made at the highest levels of the US and British governments in 
1944 expressed a determination to destroy Germany as a world power once and 
for all by reducing her to a peasant economy, although this would mean the 
starvation of millions of civilians.169        
 
 Whatever objections the Secretary of War and the Secretary of State made at the meeting, 
President Roosevelt sided with the proposal of the Secretary of Treasury, Henry Morgenthau.  
With Morgenthau’s memorandum on hand the President left for the meeting with Prime Minister 
Churchill, arriving in Quebec in the morning of the 11 September.  
 It is not necessary to go into the details of the conference.  Prime Minister Churchill’s 
attendance was mainly to secure further financial aid from the United States.  He was not 
prepared to discuss German matters.  At the dinner on 13 September, Morgenthau presented his 
plan for the elimination of the German heavy industry.  According to John Wheeler-Bennett the 
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Prime Minister “was violently opposed [to Morgenthau’s proposal]… Had he been brought over 
to Quebec to discuss a scheme such as this… England would be chained to a dead body.”170   
 An interesting aspect of the discussion Michael Beschloss provides, claiming that “the 
Prime Minister was clearly worried that Roosevelt would use the Morgenthau Plan as an excuse 
to reduce future Lend-Lease aid to Britain: If crushing German industry gave new export 
opportunities for Britain, why should Churchill need so much American cash?”171  The 
discussion went nowhere that evening.  President Roosevelt recommended that Morgenthau and 
Lord Cherwell, the Prime Minister’s friend and advisor, should try to come to an agreement 
about the proposed handling of Germany.  Lord Cherwell, according to John Wheeler-Bennett, 
hated Nazi Germany and had “an almost medieval desire for revenge… he saw the matter as 
somewhat in the nature of a Kuhhandel… Mr. Churchill very much wanted financial assistance 
from the United States; Mr. Morgenthau very much wanted his document on Germany 
signed.”172  Along these lines Michael Beschloss argues that a softer language and some 
modifications proposed by Lord Cherwell converted the Prime Minister from his opposition of 
the previous evening.173  
 On 15 September, President Roosevelt signed an agreement providing $6.5 billion 
financial aid to Great Britain.  Prime Minister Churchill himself dictated a memorandum 
supporting Morgenthau’s proposal.  Initialed by the President and the Prime Minister, the 
agreement states: 
 At a conference between the President and the Prime Minister upon the 
best measures to prevent renewed rearmament by Germany, it was felt that an 
essential feature was the future disposition of the Ruhr and the Saar. 
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 The ease with which the metallurgical, chemical, and electric industries 
in Germany can be converted from peace to war has already been impressed 
upon us by bitter experience. It must also be remembered that the Germans 
have devastated a large portion of the industries of Russia and of other 
neighboring Allies, and it is only in accordance with justice that these injured 
countries should be entitled to remove the machinery they require in order to 
repair the losses they have suffered. The industries referred to in the Ruhr and 
in the Saar would therefore be necessarily put out of action and closed down. It 
was felt that the two districts should be put under some body under the world 
organization which would supervise the dismantling of these industries and 
make sure that they were not started up again by some subterfuge. 
 This programme for eliminating the war-making industries in the Ruhr 
and in the Saar is looking forward to converting Germany into a country 
primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character. 
 The Prime Minister and the President were in agreement upon this 
programme.  
                                                                                                  O.K. 
                                                                                                         F.D.R 
                                                                                                  W.S.C. 
                                                                                                          15  9. 
September 16, 1944174     
 
Also at Quebec, the President consented to a switch in the allotted occupation zones.  The British 
would occupy the northern part of Germany, while the United States would get the southern part 
of Germany with an enclave at Bremen harbor to secure lines of communication independent of 
the lines of communication already running through France. 
 There are certainly many good reasons for the results of the Quebec Conference.  
However, there is also ample evidence for negative consequences, as John Dietrich reports: 
That at the Quebec Conference itself the President agreed to a $6.5 billion 
credit to the British in order to gain Churchill’s acceptance of the [Morgenthau] 
plan. It is also possible that the President agreed to an exchange of zones of 
occupation with the British for the same reason. Prior to the conference, the 
President’s advisers had pointed out that the destruction of the German 
economy would lead to a general collapse of the European economy. This 
would require the US taxpayers to provide billions of dollars in financial aid to 
Europe… However, Roosevelt was willing to accept the political fallout… He 
was also informed that it would naturally stiffen German military resistance, 
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leading to increased Allied casualties; yet President Roosevelt and Prime 
Minister Churchill were willing to agree to the plan’s implementation.175  
 
 The results of Quebec proved to be a big victory for the President and especially for the 
Secretary of Treasury.  With the strong support of the President and a looming threat of losing 
financial aid he was able together with Lord Cherwell to convince a reluctant Prime Minister to 
his plan.  Back home from Quebec, Morgenthau reported to his inner circle at the Treasury 
Department that 
The thing at Quebec… was unbelievable good… As far as I want personally, it 
was the high spot of my whole career in the Government…I can’t 
overemphasize how helpful Lord Cherwell was because he would advise me 
how to handle Churchill… Roosevelt was very firm through the whole thing, 
and I imagine the reason he sent for me was he had tried this [the Morgenthau 
Plan] out on Churchill and got nowhere. He then cabled me to come on up.176    
 
 One has to doubt President Roosevelt’s later statement, after the public agitation in the media 
when Morgenthau’s Plan was leaked to the press: Roosevelt said he had not read carefully the 
memorandum drafted in his presence, signed by him and the Prime Minister at Quebec.  
 However, Roosevelt’s persistent and strong support of Morgenthau disclosed his real 
feelings toward a defeated Germany independent of the political, military and economic 
consequences.  James Bacque reinforces President Roosevelt’s support of Morgenthau by citing 
from the Presidential Diary of 11 April 1945 “the president’s last words to him [Morgenthau] on 
policy were, ‘Harry, I am with you 100%.’”177  John Dietrich remarks with some vitriolic that 
“there is no excuse for professional historians accepting Roosevelt’s contention that he initialed 
the Morgenthau Plan ‘without much thought.’”178  
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 The blistering negative response of the media toward Morgenthau’s plan impressed the 
President.  Considering his upcoming reelection campaign, the public response to the plan 
prompted him to openly distance himself from the Morgenthau Plan.  According to John Morton 
Blum, Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, the President declared to his cabinet members 
that there was really “no intention of turning Germany into an agrarian state.”179  Nevertheless, 
whatever Roosevelt said in the public during and after his reelection campaign, he never 
officially renounced the Morgenthau Plan as an official policy.  The utterance from his diary 
referred to above implied President Roosevelt’s core credo with regard to Germany.  This 
impression had in later years Lord Robertson of Oakridge, a commander of the British 
occupation force and later Great Britain’s High Commissioner in Germany stating in an article 
that “the cruel inhumanity of the Morgenthau plan for stripping Germany of all her industry went 
too far even for Roosevelt, but the plan had been shelved rather than dropped.”180  
 Despite opposition and objections, Morgenthau’s Plan unequivocally affected the future 
government policy toward Germany.  As David Rees put it in his book Harry Dexter White, 
Morgenthau’s ideas were not abandoned, neither by the President nor by several cabinet 
members. He states that:  
The public uproar over the Morgenthau Plan and the apparent retreat from the 
Quebec memorandum by Roosevelt and Churchill obscured the fact that in the 
immediate aftermath of Octagon the post surrender “Draft Interim Directive” 
for Germany had been approved by the President and the Cabinet Committee   
before its dissolution. In some of its most important provisions, the Directive, 
an official secret document known as JCS 1067, followed the spirit of the 
treasury proposals for Germany.181 
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3.5. The Joint Chief of Staff Directive 1067: The Morgenthau Plan reanimated 
 Henry Morgenthau wrote his “Program to Prevent Germany from starting a World War 
III” after reading with disgust a draft of the Handbook for Military Government in Germany 
prepared by SHAEF.  In Germany Is Our Problem, he explained his firm conviction that “all our 
hopes and yearning for peace will fade and die unless we build upon a firm foundation, the 
foundation of an assured end to German aggression,”182 and “Germany and the world will be a 
great deal safer and happier if the Reich loses her war potential.”183  
 How is it, that Morgenthau’s recommendations, so harshly scathed by the media when his 
plan became public, were included in the Potsdam Protocol?  Morgenthau asserts in Germany Is 
Our Problem, “the basic principles of [his] program have represented the official position of the 
United States Government… [and the] Allies were seeking to carry out the objectives of that 
policy.”184  One has to remember President Roosevelt distanced himself publicly from 
Morgenthau’s ideas during his reelection campaign and pressured by internal resistance; 
however, Roosevelt never officially renounced the Morgenthau Plan.  E.F. Penrose supports 
Morgenthau’s claim in Economic Planning for the Peace as partially valid.  Nevertheless, he 
restrains Morgenthau’s reasoning by stating “President Roosevelt and other high-ranking 
statesmen gave [Morgenthau’s ideas] considered approval that he [Morgenthau] is distorting 
historical facts.”185  One can argue along the line of Penrose that it was the President’s “failure to 
adjudicate decisively between incompatible views among his cabinet officers that led to a 
‘compromise’ drawn up at ‘lower levels’ which permitted large parts of the Morgenthau plan to 
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creep in.”186  Approved or not by the President, fact is Morgenthau’s ideas not only succeeded to 
be integrated into the Directive JCS 1067, but also via JCS 1067, they infiltrated the Potsdam 
Protocol, too.   
 The draft of the Handbook for Military Government in Germany, which aroused 
Morgenthau’s misgivings, had been formulated in accordance with the guidelines defined by the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff.  It contained, as Warren F. Kimball in Swords or Ploughshares? The 
Morgenthau Plan for Defeated Nazi Germany, 1943-1946, reports inter alia:  
Your main… task is to get things running, to restore as quickly as possible the 
official functioning of the German civil government… Military Government… 
will be concerned [with]: …the promotion of agriculture; the control, supply 
and distribution of food and essential supplies of every kind; the restoration 
and maintenance of public utilities; the provision for the gradual rehabilitation 
of peacetime industry and a regulated economy… 
Military Government officers will… ensure that steps are taken to: (1) Import 
needed commodities and stores. (2) Convert industrial plants from war to 
consumer goods production. (3) Subsidize essential economic activities where 
necessary. (4) Reconstruct German foreign trade with priority for the needs of 
the United Nations. (5) Modify existing German regulations controlling 
industrial and raw material production. 
The highly centralized German administrative system is to be retained… All 
possible steps will be taken to ensure the utilization of German economic, 
material and industrial facilities … to provide such raw materials, goods, 
supplies or services as are required for military and essential civilian needs, 
and… to provide surpluses for international transfer, supplies for reparational 
requisition, and legitimate industrial stock-piling. 
The Agricultural economy will be freed of Nazi discrimination. It will not 
otherwise be changed except where direct advantages are to be gained… 
International boundaries will be deemed to be as they were on 31 December 
1937.187  
 
 The Handbook for Military Government in Germany, not only the draft Morgenthau read, 
but also the final version approved by General Eisenhower in December 1944 did not call for 
Germany’s dismemberment, for partition, for annexations, for internationalization and 
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pastoralization.  Indeed, both versions were much more lenient and realistic than Morgenthau’s 
recommendations.   
 If the Handbook treated Germany too lenient as Morgenthau assumed, the Directive JCS 
1067, ruling Germany’s fate for two years contained a great deal of Morgenthau’s proposals.  In 
September 1944, the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) of the War Department published a draft of 
the “Directive to the Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force Regarding the Military 
Government of Germany in the Period Immediately Following the Cessation of Organized 
Resistance,” better known later under the acronym “Directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
1067,”188 or JCS 1067.  
 The draft, influenced by the ongoing conflicts between the Departments of State, War 
and Treasury and discussions at the highest level of government, became in its finally approved 
version a palingenesis of Morgenthau’s original ideas with minor changes and with conciliatory 
wordings.  Henry Morgenthau notes emphatically in Germany Is Our Problem that his ideas 
concerning the treatment of Germany were, via JCS 1067, introduced into the Potsdam Protocol.  
His objective, as he reasoned in the openings of his book “is not to argue with any specific 
details of the Potsdam Declaration, but to state for the country the philosophy which went into 
the formulation of American policy embodied in the Declaration.”189  
 JCS 1067, infamous like the Morgenthau Plan, aimed to control and regulate occupied 
Germany.  The United States tried to convince the other Allies to adopt JCS 1067, however, the 
realities at the Allied Control Council, the supreme governing authority, the realities on the 
ground in Germany and the differing national interests prevented unanimous acceptance.  Each 
of the Allies had their own objectives and policies, no one intended to pastoralize Germany.  
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 Secretary of War, Henry Stimson–his own department responsible for the directive–made 
a striking judgment of JCS 1067 two years later.  Reading the directive again he “found it a 
painfully negative document.”190  John Wheeler-Bennett even more harshly condemned the 
directive contemplating that JCS 1067 “was, in effect, an official but diluted version of the 
Morgenthau Plan… intended to punish the German people collectively and indiscriminately by 
reducing their standard of living to a drastic degree… The Occupation authorities were specially 
forbidden to take any steps to rehabilitate the German economy except to increase to the 
maximum agricultural production.”191  Robert Murphy, General Eisenhower’s, and General 
Clay’s political adviser on German affairs went a step further.  He cites, in Diplomat Among 
Warriors, Lewis W. Douglas, General Clay’s financial adviser, remembering, “Clay’s advisers 
were shocked by the detailed prohibitions described in JCS 1067.  Douglas exclaimed, ‘This 
thing was assembled by economic idiots!  It makes no sense to forbid the most skilled workers in 
Europe from producing as much as they can for a continent which is desperately short of 
everything!’”192  
 What did the directive JCS 1067 actually express?  In its three parts the directive deals 
with all aspects of German life.  The directive, taking into account the possibility that the Allied 
Control Council – requiring unanimity in its decisions – would neutralize itself, delegated for 
this reason extraordinary and extensive powers to the commander of the U.S. occupation zone.  
The “Directive to the Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the 
Military Government of Germany” required the commander in the preamble to “urge the 
adoption by the other occupying powers of the principles and policies set forth in this directive… 
It is anticipated that substantially similar directives will be issued to the [other commanders].”  
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 The directive’s three parts address the general-political, economic, and financial 
problems of the occupation.  Paragraph 4 in Part I states the essential objectives of 
Military Government in Germany: 
a. It should be brought home to the Germans that Germany’s ruthless warfare 
and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed the German economy and 
made chaos and suffering inevitable and that the Germans cannot escape 
responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves. 
b. Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated 
enemy nation. Your aim is not oppression but to occupy Germany for the 
purpose of realizing certain important Allied objectives. In the conduct of your 
occupation and administration you should be just firm and aloof. You will 
strongly discourage fraternization with the German officials and population.  
c. The principal Allied objective is to prevent Germany from ever again 
becoming a threat to the peace of the world. Essential steps in the 
accomplishment of this objective are the elimination of Nazism and militarism 
in all their forms, the immediate apprehension of war criminals for punishment, 
the industrial disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, with continuing 
control over Germany’s capacity to make war, and the preparation for an 
eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis. 
d. Other Allied objectives are to enforce the program of reparations and 
restitution, to provide relief for the benefit of countries devastated by Nazi 
aggression, and to ensure that prisoners of war and displaced persons of the 
United Nations are cared for and repatriated.   
 
 The economic controls cited in Paragraph 5 strictly limit German economic activities to 
the objectives listed in Paragraph 4.  It gives the commander the authority to permit economic 
activities if they are “essential to protect the safety and meet the needs of the occupying 
forces…”  The following sentence to “…assure the production and maintenance of goods and 
services required to prevent starvation or such disease and unrest as would endanger these 
forces,” however, gave the commander on the ground ample leeway to moderate the harsh 
instructions.  The next phrase of the paragraph demands that the German living conditions 
should not exceed the existing level of its neighbor countries. 
 The Military Government will administer and control the German economy according to 
Paragraph 16 in Part II of the directive.  Paragraph 4 and 5 of Part I dictate the scope and the 
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limits of economic activity.  Paragraph 16 states exclusively that “economic controls will be 
imposed only to the extent necessary to accomplish these objectives [of Paragraph 4 and 5], 
provided that you will impose controls to the full extent necessary to achieve the industrial 
disarmament of Germany.”  The intention of the last phrase of this paragraph unveiled the 
Morgenthauian objective of JCS 1067, ordering the Military Government to “take no steps (a) 
looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany, or (b) designed to maintain or 
strengthen the German economy.”  
 The substance of Paragraphs 27 and 28 again breathe Morgenthau’s spirit, ordering the 
Germans “to use all means at their disposal to maximize agricultural output and to establish as 
rapidly as possible effective machinery for the collection and distribution of agricultural output,” 
and to “direct the German authorities to utilize large-landed estates and public lands… [to] 
increase agricultural output.”  
 Efforts by the Control Council and the Military Governments to avoid or repress inflation 
caused by the economic circumstances of occupied Germany shall not, as Paragraph 34 states 
“constitute an additional ground for the importation of supplies, nor shall it constitute an 
additional ground for limiting removal, destruction or curtailment of productive facilities in 
fulfillment of the program for reparation, demilitarization and industrial disarmament.”  
Financially, JCS 1067 allowed the Allies to flood Germany with hundred of millions of Allied 
Military Marks as legal tender and interchangeable 1:1 to the Reichsmark (Paragraph 45.a.), 
increasing the danger of inflation.  Paragraph 45.c. also authorized the Military Government to 
demand from German authorities “Reichsmark currency or credits free of cost and in amounts 
sufficient to meet all the expenses of the forces of occupation, including the cost of Allied 
Military Government and including to the extent that compensation is made therefor, the cost of 
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such private property as may be requisitioned, seized or otherwise acquired, by Allied authorities 
for reparations or restitution purposes.” 
 The Directive JCS 1067, approved by President Truman was the sixth version drafted by 
the Departments of War, Navy and Treasury.  To be exact it should be cited as JCS 1067/6, 
however, commonly it is cited only as JCS 1067.  (see Appendix C)  Issued as a top-secret 
decree on 14 May 1945, the directive governed Germany for two years until JCS 1779 replaced 
it in 1947.  
 Robert Murphy, John Wheeler-Bennett, as well as the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson 
judged JCS 1067 unfavorably and inferior to the objectives promulgated in the Atlantic Charter 
by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.  Harold Zink in The United States in 
Germany, 1944-1955, judges the directive as “a heavy millstone around the neck of the 
American Military Government.”193  He concedes JCS 1067 as negative and punitive in its 
approach, arguing that the negative aspects hampered the official task of the democratization of 
the German people.  For Zink, the “directive showed the United States as a short-sighted country, 
motivated largely by revenge…”194  Robert Murphy regrets that JCS 1067 reflected “the spirit –
and sometimes the letter – of the Morgenthau Plan… in many mandatory provisions of the top-
secret directive JCS 1067, which haunted Military Government for several postwar years.”195    
 Harold Zink, as well as John H. Backer,196 however, emphasized the flexibility the 
Military Government had in interpreting the directive according to the needs of the German 
people.  John H. Backer alludes to the major difference between the Morgenthau Plan and JCS 
1067.  The directive, as its title implies, was conceived as a short-term directive for a distinct 
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transition period.  The Morgenthau Plan, however, pursued long-term policies intended to 
partition and dismember Germany, as well as to eliminate Germany as a factor of political, 
economic and military power in central Europe and a fierce competitor in international trade.  
Neither Great Britain nor France could fill the power vacuum of a pastoralized Germany.                 
3.6. The Yalta (Crimea) Conference, 4-11 February 1945: The Occupation Zones       
 The Yalta Conference was the second and last of the war conferences the three leaders of 
the war coalition attended.  According to Vojtech Mastny in Russia’s Road to the Cold War, the 
top priorities for President Roosevelt were the United Nations and the war with Japan.  
Regarding the United Nations, President Roosevelt reached consensus with the Soviet Union.  
The voting mechanism in the Security Council concerned Marshal Stalin.  The Marshal wanted 
“to keep the rights of small Powers restricted to a minimum in the world security 
organization,”197 however, the Prime Minister and the President negated the possibility of the 
great powers being manipulated at the Security Council by insignificant third class countries.  
President Roosevelt suggested that the great powers would have the right to veto resolutions of 
the Security Council.  The “Agreement Regarding Japan” stated that the Big Three “agreed that 
in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe is terminated, the 
Soviet Union shall enter into war against Japan on the side of the Allies… ”198  
 Prime Minister Churchill tackled the question of restoring France to its previous status as 
a great power, able to act in conjunction with Great Britain to police western Europe, analog to 
the Soviet intent to use resurrected Poland in the east for a similar purpose.  Regarding the 
restoration of France, the Big Three rejected de Gaulle’s pretension that the Rhine River was the 
natural eastern border of France.  However, in the end the Allies, finally determining their 
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occupation zones at Yalta, also agreed upon a French occupation zone, as well as French 
membership at the Control Council. Article IV of the protocol states  
It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French Forces, 
should be allocated France. This zone would be formed out of the British and 
American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in 
consultation with the French Provisional Government. 
It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to 
become a member of the Allied Control Council for Germany.199  
   
 Regarding the approval of a French zone of occupation it may be of interest to follow up 
the development and the changing expectations of the United States as well as of President 
Roosevelt toward outlining the zones of occupation, its configuration, size and geographic 
location in Germany.  The diverse drafts of the United States, covering from August 1943 to the 
Crimean Conference demonstrate the different stages of attitudes and policies of the U.S. 
administration.  Predetermined by geography, the location of a Soviet occupation zone was never 
questioned.  It also appeared logical that Great Britain eyed Northern Germany for its zone of 
occupation, leaving Southwest Germany for the United States.  The intended force structure for 
the Operation OVERLORD – the planned Allied cross-Channel attack into northwestern France 
– with English forces on the left wing and U.S. forces on the right wing also supported a British 
occupation zone in North Germany.  The United States and Great Britain accepted by mutual 
consent the fate of the German province of East Prussia, separated from the Reich since the 
Treaty of Versailles, annexed by the USSR and by restored Poland.  
 In his proposal to dismember Germany, Henry Morgenthau, too, ceded East Prussia to the 
Soviet Union and Poland.  From Morgenthau’s North and South German States and International 
Zone (see Appendix B) to Prime Minister Churchill’s Danube Confederation of South Germany, 
Austria and Hungary–a notion Marshal Stalin rejected as restoring the Habsburg monarchy–to 
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President Roosevelt’s fifteen or so economically unviable mini-states, Germany would most 
certainly be fragmented.  However, all the different dismemberment proposals are not considered 
here.  The focus of the description concentrates on the question of occupation zones. 
 At the First Quebec Conference, 17-24 August 1943, code-named QUADRANT, the 
military staff to COSSAC (Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander) drafted for the first 
time a plan to divide defeated Germany into Allied occupation zones.  Northwest Germany with 
the Ruhr industrial center, the staff allocated to the British, whereas the Rhine valley from the 
border of Switzerland to the city of Düsseldorf they assigned to the United States.  Eastern 
boundaries toward a Soviet occupation zone were not delineated, and would depend on the Red 
Army’s military success fighting the Wehrmacht in the east.  Likewise, an exact boundary 
separating the British and U.S. Zone were not yet defined.  
 As already mentioned above, the staff had aligned the proposed zonal assignment 
according to the planned force deployment for Operation OVERLORD.  Weeks after the 
QUADRANT conference the British “Armistice and Post-War Committee” provided a plan to 
divide Germany into three zones.  Like the COSSAC draft, the British would take the 
northwestern zone containing the Ruhr area, the port cities of Hamburg and Bremen, as well as 
the Kiel-Canal.  For the United States, the British proposal allotted a southwestern zone, similar 
to the COSSAC plan, with a zone of influence through France protecting the expected lines of 
communication after Operation OVERLORD.  
 President Roosevelt, on his way to Cairo and Tehran aboard the Iowa, also delineated a 
plan for occupation zones.  He claimed northern Germany and its ports for the United States 
because of the need to transfer as quickly as possible U.S. troops after the surrender of Germany 
to the Pacific theatre of war.  For this objective the United States needed close and large port 
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capacities, independent from any lines of communication through France.  According to his 
draft, the United States would get the lion’s share of Germany including the capital Berlin (see 
map Appendix C). 
 The President’s proposal, if accepted, would have forced the military planners for 
Operation OVERLORD either to switch the deployment of forces or to plan for a cross 
movement of the Allied armies into their assigned occupation zones after German surrender.  His 
draft did not take into consideration centuries-old boundaries of existing political entities inside 
the German Reich as the British draft did.  Concretizing the eastern boundaries of their draft, the 
British followed the established frontiers of Hannover, Braunschweig and Hessen-Nassau, a 
borderline roughly 150 miles west of President Roosevelt’s draft and with the German capital 
surrounded by the Soviet zone of occupation.  
 At the European Advisory Commission (EAC) in London the Soviet representative 
offered “a detailed description of the zonal boundaries… match[ing] almost exactly the 
boundaries proposed by the British.”200  At the negotiation table of the EAC they had a finalized 
proposal of President Roosevelt’s draft outlined aboard the Iowa (see map Appendix E) and a 
combined British-Soviet proposal (see map Appendix F).  During the negotiations the Soviets 
proposed in July 1944, to divide the capital Berlin into three sectors, according to the three 
occupation zones, cancelling the planned inter-Allied government of the city.  
 At the Second Quebec Conference in September, the President finally resigned his 
opposition to a southwest German U.S. occupation zone when an agreement was reached with 
the British for U.S. use of the north German ports.  Earl F. Ziemke notes in The U.S. Army in the 
occupation of Germany, 1944-1946, that “the [U.S.] Combined Chiefs of Staff approved [on the 
16th] assignments of the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven [formerly Wesermünde] to the 
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United States together with transit rights across the British zone to Bremen.”201  President 
Roosevelt finally closed the chapter on occupation zones at Yalta when he, according the John 
Wheeler-Bennett, presented a map at the conference showing the U.S. Zone in southwest 
Germany and a U.S. enclave around Bremen and Bremerhaven (see map Appendix G).202            
 The “Protocol of Proceedings of Crimea Conference” attached to the issue of Germany 
four of its fourteen Articles: Article III, Dismemberment of Germany, Article IV, Zone of 
Occupation for the French and Control Council for Germany, Article V, Reparations, and Article 
VI, Major War Criminals.  However, to avoid an embarrassing dissonance at the conference, the 
Big Three referred the subject of Germany’s dismemberment to their foreign ministers.  
 Marshal Stalin put on the agenda the issue of German general reparations and reparations 
in kind–the Soviet perception aimed at about fifty percent of a total of $20 billion.  The Soviet 
Union expected to receive two categories of reparations from Germany: 
(a) extraction in kind from current output from producing industries, and  
(b) general reparations in the form of disassembled plants, transportation equipment like 
ships, railroad assets, confiscated German assets in foreign countries, machinery and 
machine tools.  
However, at Yalta the reparation question could not be settled.  The Big Three installed a 
Reparation Commission to work out an appropriate plan according to the following guidelines: 
(1) Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations 
in the course of the war… 
(2) Reparations in kind is to be exacted from Germany in three following 
forms: 
a) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation 
of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the 
territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, 
machine tools, ships, rolling stock, German investment abroad, shares of 
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industrial transport and other enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to 
be carried out chiefly for destroying the war potential of Germany. 
b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production or a period to be fixed. 
c) Use of German labor. 
(3) For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction 
of reparations from Germany an Allied Reparation Commission will be set up 
in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives–on from the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United 
States of America. 
(4) With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the 
distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German 
aggression, the Soviet and American delegation agreed as follows: 
“The Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial studies as a 
basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum 
of the reparation in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the paragraph 2 
should be $20,000,000,000, and that 50 percent of it should go to the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics.203  
 
 The issue of forced labor – a kindly semantic expression for slave labor, the Soviet Union 
did not want to discuss at Yalta.  One reason for Marshal Stalin’s reluctance Wheeler-Bennett 
believes, seemed to be “that formal acceptance [into the protocol] of forced labor in the Soviet 
Union would deepen anti-Soviet feeling in Germany at a time when the Communists hoped to 
win support from their defeated foes.  In any case, the Soviet Government could hope to utilize 
German prisoners as a work force without any formal agreement.”204  One has to remember at 
Tehran Stalin alluded to a number of up to four million Germans providing forced labor to the 
Soviet Union.  
 Regarding Poland, Marshal Stalin proposed the so-called Curzon Line established after 
World War I as the eastern border of Poland.  He suggested the Oder River from the Baltic Sea 
to the confluence of the Western Neisse River and along this river as the western Polish border.  
The Protocol of the Proceedings of Crimea Conference relates in Article VII, fourth paragraph to 
the Polish border problems, stating  
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The three heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland 
should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five 
to eight kilometers in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive 
substantial accessions in territory in the north and west. They feel that the 
opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be 
sought in due course of the extent of these accessions and that the final 
delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace 
conference.205 
 
 The Polish western border envisioned by Marshall Stalin and the use of forced labor not 
counted against the earmarked $10 billion in reparations, would become an exemplary high bill 
for defeated Germany.  The price to Germany would increase dramatically if any one of the 
proposed plans for the dismemberment, at Yalta and referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers 
became reality.  The results of the Crimean Conference cast a dark cloud on Germany’s future.  
Regardless of Germany’s fate, Yalta boosted the confidence of the Allies greatly. 
 The Big Three expressed the euphoric mood of the attendants in the final days of the 
conference with toasts during dinners on 8 and 10 February.  Marshal Stalin honored Prime 
Minister Churchill “as the bravest governmental figure in the world… Mr. Churchill’s courage 
and staunchness… when [England] stood alone, had divided the might of Hitlerite Germany… 
[Stalin] knew of few examples in history where the courage of one man had been so important… 
he and Mr. Churchill in their respective countries had had relatively simple decisions [to make].  
They had been fighting for their very existence… [Stalin, acknowledging President Roosevelt] 
that there was a third man… [who] had been the chief forger of the instruments which had led to 
the mobilization of the world against Hitler… [furthermore the Marshal] remarked that it was not 
so difficult to keep unity in time of war… the difficult task came after the war when diverse 
interests tended to divide the Allies.”206  President Roosevelt, in answering Marshal Stalin’s 
toast, stated that “he felt the atmosphere at this dinner was as that of a family, and it was in those 
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words that he liked to characterize the relation that existed between our three countries.  
[Looking ahead, the President called] …their objectives here were to give to every man, woman 
and child on this earth the possibility of security and well being.”207  The “supreme exultation,” 
as Robert E. Sherwood characterized the atmosphere of the U.S. delegation, got a boost when the 
overwhelmingly positive public reactions at home to the publication of the conference protocol 
became known.208   
 However, despite the positive reception of the protocol around the world, Yalta proved to 
be, according to Vojtech Mastny, “the least important of the Allied chiefs’ wartime 
gatherings.”209  Mastny asserts that the European landscape would have looked alike without 
Yalta, missing applaudable craftsmanship of the Big Three.  President Roosevelt, representing 
the strongest democracy was a moribund man.  Prime Minister Churchill represented the weakest 
member of the War Coalition.  Both scarified the fate of a democratic and independent Poland 
for Marshal Stalin’s consent to the creation of the United Nations as well as supporting the 
restoration of France to great power status.  Three months after Yalta Hitler’s Drittes Reich 
collapsed.  And again barely three months later the leaders of the wartime coalition congregated 
for their last conference at Potsdam, close to the German capital Berlin, to decide Germany’s 
future.  
3.7. The Potsdam Conference, 17 July-2 August 1945: Finalizing the occupation  
 The Potsdam Conference should have been the final meeting of the leaders of the Allied 
war coalition deemed to put the results of the get-togethers at Tehran and Yalta into final 
agreements for the governing of unconditionally surrendered Germany as a whole and of the four 
distinct occupation zones – a French occupation zone approved at Yalta by the Big Three. 
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 Potsdam was the third and last meeting of the Big Three.  At Tehran and Yalta President 
Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin consented in general about defeated 
Germany.  At Potsdam, Marshal Stalin represented personal continuity, whereas Prime Minister 
Churchill could represent Great Britain only for the first stage of the conference.  He resigned 
when his election defeat became official.  His successor, Prime Minister Clement Attlee from the 
Labor Party took Great Britain’s seat for the final phase of the conference.  President Truman 
succeeded President Roosevelt after Roosevelt’s untimely death on 12 April.  As Vice President, 
Truman did not belong to the inner power circle of President Roosevelt.  As a member of the 
United States Senate during the war, as well as Vice President and President of the U.S. Senate 
he was never directly involved in the conduct of the wars in Europe and the Pacific.  The 
imminent political questions and problems facing the United States after the end of hostilities in 
Europe were new to him.  
 The state of military and political actions in Europe and especially the status of defeated 
Germany regarding its political, military and economic conditions claimed President Truman’s 
attention immediately after taking the oath of office as President.  What legal status did Germany 
obtain with the signing of the unconditional surrender document by the representatives of the 
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht? 
 Professor Hans Kelsen of the University of California, in The Legal Status of Germany 
According to the Declaration of Berlin,210 defined the belligerent occupation of a state when “the 
legitimate government is made incapable of exercising its authority and is only substituted for 
the period of occupation by the authority of the occupant power.”211  Based on this fact, the state 
of war continued between Germany and the Allied Powers as long as the successor government 
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of Grossadmiral Dönitz was in power.  However, with capture and arrest of the Dönitz 
government by the British military, a legitimate German government ceased to exist.  Professor 
Kelsen argues “by abolishing the last Government of Germany the victorious powers have 
destroyed the existence of Germany as a sovereign state. …Germany has ceased to exist as a 
state in the sense of international law.  Germany having ceased to exist as a state, the status of 
war has been terminated, because such a status can exist only between belligerent states.  …and 
the legal status of the territory occupied by the victorious powers cannot be that of belligerent 
occupation.”212  Without a German government, Professor Kelsen concluded by international law 
neither a state of war nor a belligerent occupation between the state of Germany and the Allies 
could legally prevail. 
 To end the condition of legal and political non-existence of Germany, the Allies passed 
the “Declaration regarding the defeat of Germany and the assumption of supreme authority with 
respect to Germany by the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of the French 
Republic,”213 on 5 June 1945 (Appendix H).  The decree states in the first sentence, “the German 
armed forces on land, at sea and in the air have been completely defeated and have surrendered 
unconditionally and Germany, which bears responsibility for the war, is no longer capable of 
resisting the will of the victorious powers.”  The non-existence of a working central German 
government or any other authority able to act according to the demands of the occupiers forced 
the Allied Powers to “assume supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the 
powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command and any state, municipal, or 
local government or authority,” to maintain public order and to conduct the administration of 
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Germany according to the requirements of the Allies.  However, the assumption of supreme 
authority ”does not affect the annexation of Germany.”  The assumption of supreme authority is, 
according to Professor Kelsen “equivalent to the declaration that the occupant powers place the 
German territory [and its population] under their sovereignty.”214  
 The declaration of 5 June 1945 went far beyond in its approach toward unconditionally 
surrendered Germany than the IV. Hague Convention of 18 October 1907, regulating the “Laws 
and Customs of War on Land.”  Article 48 of the convention grants power to the occupying 
authority to collect taxes, dues etc. to the benefit of the occupied territory.  Article 49, however, 
grants power to the occupant to levy money contributions for the needs of the occupying force 
and/or for the administration of the occupied territory,215 thus burdening the Germans with the 
costs of four occupation forces.  
 Article 12 of the 5 June 1945 declaration reserved the right of the occupying powers to 
“station forces and civil agencies in any or all parts of Germany as they may determine.”  The 
supreme authority exercised by the Allies implied their right to “impose on Germany additional 
political, administrative, economic, financial, military and other requirements arising from the 
complete defeat of Germany,” as expressed in Article 13 (b).  The article may have given some 
Germans an idea what to expect from the impending Potsdam Conference when the Big Three 
planned to put into writing their concepts and objectives regarding the future of vanquished 
Germany.  However, not many Germans, trying to survive from one day to the next, could 
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envisage the political, economic and financial burden to be inflicted on the German people by the 
Allies. 
 With regard to the Potsdam Conference, Lord Robertson, the British Military Governor 
concluded with the benefit of hindsight “that the plans which were made for dealing with 
Germany after victory had been won were based on a series of complete misconceptions as to 
what the real problem would be.”216  He confessed that the delegates of the United States and 
Great Britain attending the war conferences from Tehran to Potsdam “had an entirely false 
picture in their minds as to what the situation would be in Germany, and they were aiming at a 
completely wrong objective.”217  Marshal Stalin, present at Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam, seemed 
in Lord Robertson’s memory to be the hardest bargaining realist of the Big Three.  Marshal 
Stalin tried to get as many objectives of Soviet national interests as possible resolved.  
 As the British Military Governor, Lord Robertson realized “the assumptions on which 
our policy had been based were false, and that the objectives chosen were quite irrelevant.  The 
real menace for the future of Europe and to world peace was not Germany, but Russia… We had 
to save Germany physically from starvation, squalor and penury, spiritually from despair and 
Communism.”218  However, the western delegations at Potsdam did not possess the magical 
mirror to reveal the future.   
 Bruce Kuklick in American Policy And The Division Of Germany mentions that of the 
U.S. delegation both, President Truman and Secretary of State Byrnes were new in their offices.  
They were the only ones of the delegation “not violently opposed to the USSR.”219  John 
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Wheeler-Bennett notes a change in perception of the United States policies toward the Soviet 
Union between the conferences of Yalta and Potsdam.  He realized “a sudden flush of alarm in 
some sections of the American leadership about Soviet policies–an alarm which sometimes 
seemed to verge on paranoia.”220  Bruce Kuklick criticizes the lack of knowledge of both in 
foreign policy matters.  According to Bruce Kuklick, President Truman “lacks [the] qualification 
for the office [of the presidency].”221  E.F. Penrose in Economic Planning for the Peace attaches 
to the Secretary of State having “high – and naïve – hopes of settling outstanding differences 
with the Soviet Union by bargaining and give and take after the manners of senators in the 
United States Congress.”222  Penrose concedes, however, President Truman having “more 
influence behind the scenes,”223 at the conference.  
 John Wheeler-Bennett challenges Bruce Kuklick’s negative characterization of President 
Truman, supporting in part E.F. Penrose’s judgment.  For him, he sees the new president “as 
inexperienced but energetic and businesslike… [demonstrating his] capacity to master a brief… 
beyond doubt.”224  Compared with Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill the new 
American president had the advantage of youth and physical fitness and a businesslike 
appearance.  However, to what did the leaders of the war coalition agree upon at the Potsdam 
Conference regarding the fate of Germany?  (Appendix I) 
 The major difference of the Potsdam Conference to preceding conferences (Tehran, 
Yalta) was the unconditional surrender of Germany accepted by the Allies on 8 May 1945.  
While the pressure of actually fighting Germany no longer forced the Allies to unity, the 
different assumptions how to deal with defeated Germany started to divide the Allies on many 
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topics.  At Potsdam the matters of post-war policies and politics concerned the wartime partners.  
In general one can argue that at the Potsdam Conference the three Allies tried to put into writing 
their objectives expressed at the preceding conferences of Tehran and Yalta.  However, on some 
questions they were unable to achieve mutual agreements.  The Allies, par example, could not 
agree on the topics of German reparations and of the future German industrial level.  These 
questions, among others, had to be sent to committees for further evaluation.  
 As major Allied objectives – one has to recall the Morgenthau Plan – the Big Three 
agreed to destroy/dismantle all plants and equipment for war-specific productions.  The protocol 
requires “to eliminate Germany’s war potential, the production of arms, ammunition and 
implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and seagoing ships… Production of metals, 
chemicals, machinery and other items that are directly necessary to a war economy shall be 
rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany’s approved post-war peacetime needs.”225  Also, the 
German heavy industry has to be drastically reduced to prevent forever the rebuilding of war 
capabilities, as well as – not officially admitted – eliminating economic competition from 
Germany.  
 However, at Potsdam the leaders could not agree to deindustrialize the Ruhr area with its 
conglomerate of mines and steelmaking enterprises.  No consensus could be achieved on the 
transfer of the Ruhr area to an international authority.  Only light and peaceful industries would 
be permitted in the future Germany, whoever may determine which categories of industry belong 
to “peaceful industries.”  
 According to the declared intentions, Germany had to be converted to a pastoral state, the 
majority of the people employed in agriculture and related industries.  The highest skilled 
professionals in scientific and industrial accomplishments on the European continent have to be, 
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according to the protocol, re-educated and retrained as farmers, as cattlemen and dairymen.  
Potsdam made the unthinkable a reality, stating, that “in organizing the German economy, 
primary emphasis shall be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic 
industries.”226   
 The Germany of the four occupation zones – all major food producing German territory 
east of the Oder and Neisse Rivers were transferred to Poland and the Soviet Union according to 
an agreement reached at Yalta – should “be treated as an economic unit with central 
administrative agencies for industry, agriculture, finance and banking, transport and 
communication, and exports and imports.”227  Following the conference protocol the Allies 
excluded a central German Government being established immediately.  However, Part II calls 
for, in A. Political Principles, No. 9 (IV), the creation of “essential central German 
administrative departments… in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade 
and industry. …act[ing] under the direction of the Control Council.”228  
 Supreme governing authorities for occupied Germany were, according to the conference 
protocol, the Commanders-in-Chief of the four powers “each in his own zone of occupation, and 
also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as member of the Control 
Council.”229  The Allied Control Council governed by unanimity vote.  France, the fourth 
occupation power was not invited to the Potsdam Conference; as a result of this purported 
disregard, French representatives often did not feel obligated to conform with the other powers.  
France, as Vojtech Mastny reports “vetoed any expansion of the ‘central agencies’ the Russians 
had erected in East Berlin [into the western occupation zones]. …France alone envisaged 
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[Germany’s] partition as a desirable solution… They resolutely opposed [any] Soviet efforts at a 
joint management of the Ruhr [area]…”230  In the first phase of the occupation France vetoed 
many Control Council proposals, preventing, in agreement with the Soviet Union inter alia, 
successfully the installation of central German agencies. 
 Section B, Economic Principles in Part II designed the kind and scope of the future 
German industry level.  The production of any kind of war-related materials and goods, as well 
as all types of aircraft and seagoing ships were prohibited.  The production of metals, chemicals, 
machinery was only permitted to meet the needs of the occupying forces and to meet the needs 
of the approved German peacetime economy.  The focus of the reorganization of the German 
economy would be the development of agriculture and of peaceful domestic industries. 
 The program of industrial disarmament, of demilitarization, of reparations – the level of 
German industry plan to be developed by the Reparations Commission, not ready until March 
1946, and of foreign trade, left wide space for interpretations for the Allied administrations.  The 
clause 15 b, prescribed the desired German living standard – howsoever it may be defined and 
determined – as not exceeding the average of the standards of living of European countries, 
excluding Great Britain and the Soviet Union.  Compared to the directive JCS 1067, predicting 
an average living standard of the German people not higher than those existing in any one of the 
neighboring United Nations, the Potsdam Protocol excluded Great Britain and the Soviet Union 
from the list of countries to calculate the standard.  After all a theoretical improvement not to be 
disregarded by the German people.231 
 Part III of the Potsdam Protocol was devoted to reparations Germany had to provide.  To 
prevent a repetition of the World War I settlement, the Allies intended to forgo monetary 
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reparations.  The Soviet Union claimed reparations in kind and of capital equipment from its 
occupation zone.  Additionally, the USSR claimed to be entitled to 15 per cent of the capital 
equipment earmarked for reparation purposes from the western zones in exchange for food and 
other raw materials, plus an additional 10 per cent free of charge.  Polish reparation claims would 
be settled by the Soviet Union.  Clause No. 5 stated that the amount of equipment to be removed 
from the Western Zones for reparations would be determined within six months from the end of 
the conference at the latest.232  
 The drafters of the clause probably could not imagine the scope of time and work this 
sentence caused to the people executing it.  The already mentioned level-of-industry plan for 
Germany was only approved in March 1946!  Based on this plan the Western Allies could start 
to determine the capital equipment available for reparations.  There is no economic wisdom in 
dismantling factories in Germany, transporting them into a foreign country, reassembling the 
factories and starting production if possible.  For E.F. Penrose, “an industrial area [like the Ruhr 
area] is an organism rather than a conglomeration of small, self-contained units, and the sum of 
the fragments that would be set up would not be equal to the whole that had been torn down.”233  
However, it seems that financial and economic considerations were not investigated while 
drafting the protocol.  E.F. Penrose argues that parts of the Washington administration, aside 
from the Secretary of Treasury, “the FEA group, the War Department group and certain 
members of the reparation group… were interested not in reparations but in the 
deindustrialization of Germany.”234  However, these agents of a United States policy of 
Germany’s dismemberment and deindustrialization – pushing Germany back into pre-industrial 
times – lost ground in the administration, especially after President Roosevelt’s death.  The 
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Potsdam Protocol, the highest Allied directive to govern occupied Germany treated defeated 
Germany severely.  
 However, the harshest provisions of the directive JCS 1067, originating from the 
Morgenthau Plan did not become parts of the Potsdam Protocol.  No one of the Big Three 
proposed a German dismemberment and partition into several independent entities like President 
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill did at Tehran.  Henry Morgenthau’s primary objective, 
the deindustrialization and complete destruction of the Ruhr area, Germany’s economic power-
center, was not discussed, much less voted on.  The Allies no longer considered the 
internationalization of the Ruhr area a worthwhile option.  Even France, the advocate of a 
German dismemberment and partition in the Allied Control Council – at Potsdam France was not 
represented – rejected the internationalization of the Ruhr area fearing growing Soviet influence 
in western Germany close to its borders. 
 The improvement in the German living standard – it was never defined what a living 
standard of a people of 60 millions meant, less than what it meant to the European continent–by 
excluding from its rationalization Great Britain and the Soviet Union was a purely theoretical 
standard.  The living standard approved at Potsdam could have been set at 1,500 calories per 
person and day, or 2,000 calories or even 3,000 calories.  For the next three years the food 
rations actually handed out to the people fluctuated between 800 and 1,500 calories, far below 
the minimum of 2,000 calories to keep the people at a limited health standard.  
 The infamous clause of the directive JCS 1067 requiring the Military Government to 
“take no steps (a) looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany, or (b) designed to 
maintain or strengthen the German economy” the Big Three did not include in the Potsdam 
Protocol.  However, the often missing unanimity requirement of the Allied Control Council 
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prevented common standards of living across Germany.  The Germans in the U.S. occupation 
zone had to suffer for some time under JCS 1067.  
 The Allies divided the German Navy, as well as the Merchant Marine among them.  Also 
all German external assets were divided up.  However, on the question of capital equipment 
reparations the Allies could not reach an agreement.  The Soviet Union’s proposal of reparations 
from capital equipment of $20 billion, from which it claimed 50 per cent, was not accepted at 
Potsdam.  An Allied commission would determine the level of peaceful industries permitted in 
Germany.  All surplus plants and capital equipment would be added to the reparations account.  
From the Western occupation zones several plants were effectively delivered.  How many plants 
and what capital equipment the Soviet Union took from their occupation zone is not known in 
detail.  
 Lord Robertson, the former British Military Governor criticized in the hindsight of 
twenty years the Allied approach vis-à-vis reparations.  He was of the opinion that the reparation 
problem  
[d]efeated the Allies after World War II just as it had done after the previous 
war… [As Military Governor he] did not come across a single case where the 
[British] factory management were ready to admit that they had drawn any 
substantial advantage out of what [equipment] they had received. In more than 
one case the equipment removed from Germany was lying about in the field 
un-erected. Back in Germany, stripped of their out-of-date plant, the German 
steel works and German industry generally were compelled to re-equip with 
modern machinery largely financed from Allied sources.235   
 
Similar to Lord Robertson’s account one can assume happened not only in Great Britain.  It is 
idle to consider almost 70 years later if a shift in the reparation question from capital equipment 
to goods from the current production of the plants to be dismantled had been a wiser and 
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economically healthier decision.  However, anger and some desire for revenge suppressed 
rationality.  
3.8. Aims of Allied policies related to defeated Germany 
 The major objective of the war alliance between the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the 
United States, in 1944 adding the French Republic, was the unconditional surrender of Hitler’s 
Third Reich, called the Großdeutsches Reich.  The extinction of Nazism and German militarism, 
the destruction of the German war industry and heavy industries, and finally the democratization 
of the German people were the accepted and publicized purposes of the Allied war effort.  
However, the varying political intentions of the leading statesmen, President Roosevelt, Marshal 
Stalin, Prime Minister Churchill, and General de Gaulle, as well as the diverse national interests 
of the four countries, allowed a mutual consent only to the least common denominator. 
3.8.1. The Russian national interests  
 Without any doubt Stalin remembered the early days of revolutionary Russia: the 
humiliating peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 3 March 1918, the invasion of French, British, and 
American forces in favor of the white Russian anti-communist forces, the loss of territory to 
Poland as the result of the Polish-Russian war, 1919-20, the exclusion of the Bolshevik 
government from the Paris Peace Conference, as well as the shunning of the USSR by the 
Western Powers after WWI.  For Stalin, territorial security topped the list of Russian national 
interests.  A belt of Communist-dominated East European states united in a common security 
system under Soviet leadership would increase territorial security against a future attack from the 
West.  Hans-Peter Schwarz categorizes Stalin’s ambitions in Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik as 
follows: “it would be good if only the immediate neighboring countries of the USSR could fall 
under Soviet control, if it was possible to unite the whole Slavic world under Soviet leadership it 
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would be better.  If there was the possibility to rope Germany into the Soviet sphere of influence 
it would be so much better.”236  
 The USSR suffered the most of all Allies from the German war machine.  To eliminate a 
future German threat Stalin, as early as December 1941, presented a plan for the dismemberment 
of Germany into several small states to the British Foreign Minister.237  Michael Balfour reports, 
“at Yalta [German] dismemberment was agreed on in principle and a committee set up to work 
out the details.  By the time this committee met, all three governments were beginning to have 
second thoughts,”238 about a partitioned Germany.  
 Stalin publicly stated on 9 May 1945, the Russian departure from the dismemberment 
plan, proclaiming “the Soviet Union celebrates victory, however, she is not prepared to 
dismember or to destroy Germany.”239  Nevertheless, by ceding the German territory east of the 
Oder and Neisse rivers, as well as half of East Prussia to Poland, this action, Stalin calculated 
would “ensure for the Poles the enmity of many Germans… [eliminating] any later risk of a 
Polish-German deal at [the Russian] expense,”240 putting up another layer of territorial safeguard.  
In the best case this situation could prompt Poland to become a reliable Soviet ally.241  
 Besides seeking territorial security, USSR politics aimed in two other directions, first, the 
compensation of the damage done by the German armed forces, and second, a political and 
economic reorganization of Germany.  The latter aim included the elimination of its war 
industries, a reduced industrial level and a “fundamental alteration of Germany’s inner [political] 
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structure… according to [Soviet] perceptions,”242 as far as the Western allies would allow.  If the 
Western Allies objected to a political reorganization of the German Reich the USSR at least 
could reorganize the political and economic system in its occupation zone.   
 A major Russian objective was to extricate as much reparations as possible from defeated 
Germany.  From a total sum of $20 billion for reparations agreed upon at Yalta in February 
1945, the Soviet Union would get fifty per cent.  Unlike after World War I when reparations had 
to be paid cash, this time the reparations would be paid in material assets.  Friedrich Jerchow, in 
Deutschland in der Weltwirtschaft 1944-1947, splits the $20 billion reparation account into $10 
billion in material extractions from Germany’s national wealth such as plants, foreign assets, the 
merchant marine, and the other $10 billion deliveries from current production, at the rate of $1 
billion per year for ten years.243 
 With their territorial, economic, and political postulations, the Soviet Union targeted a 
Germany not at any time in the near future deemed to be a threat.  Furthermore, the USSR would 
be in a position to impose its political and economic system on at least that part of Germany 
under Soviet occupation.  This most western Communist outpost could be of value for future 
expansion plans.  World revolution was still a valid Communist concept.   
3.8.2. The French national interests  
 For a short while Napoleon Bonaparte realized the French dream of ruling the European 
continent.  With Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo, the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War, 
France’s near defeat in World War I and the occupation of France by Germany from 1940 to 
1944, the French claim to be a world power was shattered.  Fighting with the Americans and 
British to liberate their country, the French entered Germany to defeat the “arch enemy.”  France 
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was united in the desire to eliminate Germany as a threat for France once and for all and to 
restore France to a great power status.  
 Charles de Gaulle, the leader of the Free French Forces, presented his concept of a future 
Germany in fall of 1944.244  Basically, he demanded “the abolition of a centralized Reich… there 
would be every likelihood that the federation [of German states] as a whole would not be led to 
subjugate its neighbors.  This would be even more likely if the Ruhr, that arsenal of strategic 
materiel, were given a special status under international control. Further, the Rhineland would… 
be occupied… the Rhine [River]… an international freeway… [and] the Saar, retaining its 
German character, would be transformed into a separate state and united to France by trade 
agreements…”245  Furthermore, in a speech of 5 February 1945, cited by Roy C. Macridis, de 
Gaulle added “that the presence of France from one end of the Rhine to the other–the separation 
of the territories east of the Rhine and of the Ruhr basin from Germany… are conditions that 
France deems essential.”246  
 To restore French international standing and to ban any possible future threat from 
Germany, de Gaulle and his advisers planned, according to Hans-Peter Schwarz, to detach the 
Rhineland and the Ruhr valley from Germany to create a security zone on the French eastern 
border, to partition Germany into several states along traditional lines, and to occupy Germany 
long-term.  During the occupation the Germans would be denazified, demilitarized, democratized 
and re-educated.  The German industrial potential had to be reduced by dismantling plants and 
Germany’s key resources would be exploited to the benefit of France.247 
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 The French occupation zone was carved out of the U.S. and the British zones.  France 
would get, according to an article in The Stars and Stripes, 23 June 1945, “the lower half of the 
Rhine Province, the Saarland, the Palatinate, most of Baden and a narrow corridor through 
Württemberg and Bavaria down to include Vorarlberg, in western Austria.”248  
 During the next months the French pushed their concept of Germany at all levels.  At 
French-U.S. talks in Washington in November 1945, French agents proposed again “to strip the 
Ruhr and Rhineland from Germany… to put the Ruhr under international control and to occupy 
the Rhineland themselves,”249 exerting pressure on their Allies by refusing to agree to Potsdam-
mandated central German administrations.  Maurice Couve de Murville, from the French Foreign 
Office, pointed again to the importance for France, “of a separate sovereign nation in the German 
Rhineland”250 as a prerequisite for France’s security.   
 The Stars and Stripes report on 19 February 1946, noted: “Georges Bidault [the French 
Foreign Minister] states German peace is amputation… Now… we must decide the future of 
western Germany after having decided that of eastern Germany [ceding all German territory east 
of the Oder and Neisse rivers to the USSR and Poland].”251  By answering to a request of the 
Secretary of State, Byrnes, Bidault reiterated the French stipulation “that the Ruhr and Rhineland 
be excluded from German sovereignty.  [It] must be effected before central administrative 
agencies could be considered.”252  Later in March 1946, in anticipation of the meeting of the four 
foreign ministers in Paris in May, the French position seemed to soften up on the Rhineland 
separation by “insist[ing] on strong restraints on economic production in the Ruhr, with 
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particular emphasis on increased shipments of coal to France.”253 
 If de Gaulle’s plans for Germany succeeded, Germany would have lost its status of a 
major European economic power, which was his intent.  The proposed restrictions in steel 
production and in chemical production as well as the total elimination of its machine tool 
industry would prevent the German successor states from becoming even medium economic 
powers.  They would be greatly dependent on France.  The far-reaching French concept met 
strong resistance of the United States and Great Britain, fearing they had to support the 
economically unviable parts of Germany for a long time.  However, despite the rejections of 
many of their ideas, the French succeeded in “making [its] occupied zone pay for itself.  [France] 
has managed to achieve an ‘equilibrium’ between imports and exports, making it unnecessary for 
her to pump in food and other supplies, as both the United States and Great Britain have to 
do.”254   
3.8.3. Great Britain’s national interests 
  Unlike the Soviet Union and France, the United Kingdom had no territorial claims 
against Germany.  With the advance of the Red Army into Germany the Soviet Union would 
replace Germany as the major continental power.  With a Germany dismembered and partitioned 
and a devastated weak France the centuries-old British policy of balance of power on the 
continent lost its importance.  Additionally, the benefit of the insular position, protecting Great 
Britain from direct attacks for centuries, succumbed to modern technology, to airplanes and 
rockets, proving its newly emerging vulnerability.  This new reality reduced, respectively, British 
influence on continental European matters and minimized Great Britain’s power status.  
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 Prime Minister Churchill, Hans-Peter Schwarz observed, recognized “already during the 
last year of the war… the power and political contradictions to the politic of the Soviet Union… 
determining his idea of an anti-Soviet coalition in the western world and in Europe.”255  
Churchill’s original reaction to Morgenthau’s plan for a deindustrialized Germany fits in this 
context.  With his remark “England would be chained to a dead body,”256 he tried to brush aside 
the U.S. plan.  However, as a supplicator for more financial and material aid he had to accept 
grudgingly the Morgenthau proposal for the time being.  
 Totally dependent on the economic and financial performance of the United States during 
the war, Churchill intended to restore British economic interests as much as possible after the 
end of hostilities.  Limiting German trade competition in the world market through Allied control 
arrangements became the guiding principle of British economic policy.  They disagreed with 
Morgenthau’s recommendation to shut down the German heavy industries.  Except for the 
removal/destruction of purely armaments-producing plants, only few sectors of the German 
industry should be dismantled (e.g. plants for the production of synthetic rubber and fuel).  These 
relatively few economic limitations would restore Germany as a market for British exports again.  
Reparations from current German production should be limited to prevent Germany from getting 
a foothold in markets important for British trade.  Furthermore, Allied economic controls should 
regulate German foreign trade as a means to reduce or eliminate competition for the British 
external trade.  
 To an outside observer, however, it was apparent that Great Britain would never be able 
to regain its former status as a world power or as a referee in international affairs.  Although 
being a victor, the United Kingdom inevitably would lose the war.  The British owed a major 
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part of its status to their worldwide Empire.  Special trade agreements with all dominions formed 
the base of its economic power, exacerbating most outside competition.  
 The protection of the Empire trade system aimed against a major objective of the U.S. 
foreign policy.  For the postwar world the State Department proposed the elimination of all trade 
restrictions, may it be customs duties, quotas, or exchange restrictions constraining free trade.  
Particularly, the U.S. called for the abolishment of the British Empire Preference System.257  The 
British leaders had to acknowledge their complete dependence on U.S. aid.  Only in a close 
partnership with the United States could Great Britain restore some of its political and economic 
power.  Colliding British interests had to be sacrificed for the national survival.  The end of the 
British Empire loomed.  During the following two decades, both, the British and French colonial 
empires collapsed. 
3.8.4. National interests of the United States      
 The geographic situation of the United States, protected by the Atlantic and Pacific 
oceans sheltered it from direct hostile actions on its mainland.  When actively engaged in the 
fighting, the war ultimately eliminated a pressing problem dating from the Great Depression: the 
staggering rate of unemployment that government actions so far had not contained.  The 
increased war materials production and other commodities, as well as the extraction of millions 
of soldiers from the job market, largely reduced the pool of the unemployed.  However, even in 
1944 with 12 million people absorbed in the armed forces and war production at its height, 
unemployment was still at 1.2 per cent.258  Government officials feared a severe depression after 
the end of hostilities when millions of demobilized soldiers would compete in a job market with 
a workforce already increased by the addition of women as well as the growth of the working-
                                                
257 Jerchow, Deutschland in der Weltwirtschaft 1944-1947. 85. 
258 Ibid., 81. 
 104 
age population.  The Assistant Secretary of State for Economics, Will Clayton, stated in a speech 
on 21 May 1945, “we have enormously increased our productive capacity during the war, 
especially in capital and producers’ goods – machinery, equipment, tools, and technical 
knowledge.  This productive capacity is now far beyond our domestic requirements.  If we are to 
reach a satisfactory level of post-war employment we must find markets abroad for this surplus 
production.”259  With such a scenario looming ahead, foreign trade policy became the focus of 
national interest for the post-war U.S.  
 Cordell Hull, Secretary of State since 1933, was a proponent of free international trade.  
From 1916, and throughout his twelve years as Secretary of State, Hull’s gospel was that 
“unhampered trade dovetailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and unfair economic 
competition, with war… If we could get a freer flow of trade… the living standards of all 
countries might rise, thereby eliminating the economic dissatisfaction that breeds war…”260  
During a radio broadcast on 12 September 1943, the secretary repeated his credo, defining 
national interests as he saw them.  “Beyond final victory, our fundamental national interests are–
as they always have been–the assuring of our national security and the fostering of the economic 
and social well-being of our people,”261 expressively stating the importance of international 
trade.  
 For this reason Hull was strongly dissatisfied with the point four of the Atlantic Charter 
concluded between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.  Point four expressed a 
vision of the future international trade by stating that the two nations, with due respect to their 
existing obligations, further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of 
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access, on equal terms, to the trade and the raw materials of the world.  For Hull, however, “the 
phrase ‘with due respect for their existing obligations, deprived the article of virtually all 
significance since it meant that Britain would continue to retain her Empire tariff preferences 
against which [Hull] had been fighting for eight years.”262   
 For the Secretary of State “to compromise on the essential principle of breaking down the 
Sterling Bloc [of the Empire tariff preferences], for that was the key to the reconstruction of the 
world economy after the defeat of the Axis.”263  During long and complicated negotiations 
between the U.S. and Great Britain, on the Lend-Lease program, Washington forced the British 
to accept, in Article VII, a language stipulating U.S. economic objectives clearly and precisely.  
The British finally agreed upon an Article VII stating “…to promote mutually advantageous 
economic relations between them and the betterment of world-wide economic relations.  [They 
agreed] to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, 
and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers; and, in general, to the attainment of all the 
economic objectives [of the Atlantic Charter]…”264  The Lend-Lease Agreement was signed on 
23 February 1942.  To Hull, “the agreement [was] a long step toward the fulfillment, after the 
war, of the economic principles for which I had been fighting for half a century… The 
foundation was now laid for all our postwar planning in the economic field,”265 giving him and 
the principle of free trade the upper hand. 
 President Roosevelt, while backing the foreign trade policy of his Secretary of State, 
focused on two major objectives of the United States foreign policy expressed in the Atlantic 
Charter.  Point six and eight stated the necessity of the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny and 
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of the disarming of aggressor nations.  To keep a future world peace Roosevelt and Churchill 
envisioned “the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security,”266 of the 
United Nations.  
 Vital national security interests prompted the President to engage the United States in 
European affairs to prevent a Nazi-dominated continent.  “When American security was at 
stake,” Robert E. Osgood verifies in Ideals and Self-Interest in America’s Foreign Relations, “it 
was enlightened self-interest that called the tune.”  The President on 17 July 1941 stated 
uncompromisingly the overwhelming importance of national security writing, “our policy is not 
based primarily on a desire to preserve democracy for the rest of the world.  It is based primarily 
on a desire to protect the United States and the Western Hemisphere from the effects of a Nazi 
victory upon ourselves and upon our children.”267  A Nazi-dominated Europe did not fit into his 
design of a peaceful world with free trade and equal access of all nations to the resources of the 
world as explained in the Atlantic Charter. 
 The noble expectations aroused around the world by the sublime ambitions of the 
Atlantic Charter soon collided with the different national interests of the victorious powers.  The 
principles declared in the Atlantic Charter as well as the national security interests of the United 
States allowed the President to ally both signatory powers with Stalin’s Soviet Union.  The two 
western democracies needed the USSR urgently to defeat the Axis powers.  Intense government 
propaganda served, as Hans-Peter Schwarz observed, the purpose to paper over the ideological 
cracks between western democracy and the Communist ideology of the new ally USSR.268  The 
end to defeat Hitler’s Germany justified the means of an alliance with Stalin.  
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 Robert I. Gannon, S.J., mentions in The Cardinal Spellman Story, a memorandum of the 
Archbishop, written after a confidential 90 minutes conversation with President Roosevelt on 3 
September 1943.  During the conversation the President offered his intimate thoughts to the 
Archbishop about the future of the world regardless of restrictions, public opinion, and Allied 
interests, demonstrating his skills of pure-blooded power politics.  Some “’outstanding points of 
the conversation,’” Spellman wrote in the memorandum, “throw a rather interesting light on the 
thought process of his host, the most influential man alive at the time.”269 
The gist of the conversation, according to Gannon, is that President Roosevelt opined that 
the world would be dominated by the collaboration of the Big Four with their corresponding 
spheres of interest. China will dominate the Far East, the United States will rule the Pacific, 
while Britain and Russia will get Europe and Africa.  Europe, the President assumed, will be 
dominated by Russia, whereas Great Britain with its colonial empire will concentrate on Africa.  
As territorial aggrandizement, Russia would receive Finland, the Baltic States, the eastern half of 
Poland [as Hitler already had conceded] and Bessarabia.  The President accepted the possibility 
of Communist initiated and controlled governments in Germany, Austria and other countries, 
refusing any western attempts to stop the expected Communist advance.  “It is natural,” the 
Archbishop noted, “that the European countries will have to undergo tremendous changes in 
order to adapt to Russia, but [Roosevelt] hopes that in ten or twenty years the European 
influences would bring the Russians to become less barbarian… He hopes that out of a forced 
friendship [with Russia] may soon come a real and lasting friendship.  The European people will 
simply have to endure the Russian domination, in the hope that in ten or twenty years they will 
be able to live well with the Russians… Germany will be divided into several states… under the 
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domination of the Big Four, mostly Russia.  There will be no peace treaty, but simply a decree of 
the Big Four… Germany would be divided into the following states: Bavaria, Rhineland, 
Saxony, Hesse, Prussia.  Wurttemberg would become part of Bavaria, Saxony would take parts 
of Prussia.  Hannover would become an independent state; Germany would be disarmed for forty 
years.”270  Misunderstandings between the four great powers, the President believed, would be 
solved by direct negotiations among the leading statesmen.  And he thought, as Hans-Peter 
Schwarz formulates, “to be the great champion at face-to-face negotiations.”271  Truly not an 
impressive future the President crafted for Europe, and especially for Germany during the 
conversation with the Archbishop.  
 Accepting a Russian-controlled European continent instead of a German one, Roosevelt 
automatically invalidated the centuries-old successful British policy of a European balance of 
power.  Hans-Peter Schwarz recognized Roosevelt’s grand design, a global balance of power.  
Roosevelt preferred, he writes, “instead of permanent interventions in the affairs of the European 
continent, to play Great Britain off against the Soviet Union, reserving for himself the function 
of a global referee.”272  The financial and economic power of the United States supported 
Roosevelt’s perception of the United States as the sole global arbitrator of a postwar world.  
 For the defeated Axis powers, especially for Hitler’s Germany, the real intentions of the 
one-purpose war alliance slowly emerged during the course of the war.  Did the Atlantic Charter 
speak only of the final defeat of the Nazi tyranny, an objective the British and Americans 
tightened at Casablanca to the unconditional surrender of Germany being at the sole mercy of the 
victorious powers?  The Conference of Tehran furthermore darkened the future fate a defeated 
Germany had to expect.  Several proposals for partition of Germany, including internationalizing 
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parts of it, were on the table.  Agreement could not be reached at Tehran.  The European 
Advisory Commission got the tricky task to solve the problem.  
 At Tehran, Stalin, although not an original signer of the Atlantic Charter, demanded the 
amputation of East Prussia and of all German territory east of the Oder and Neisse rivers from 
the Reich, blatantly violating the basic principles promised in the Atlantic Charter.  However, the 
most severe attack on German statehood, territory, economy and living conditions for the 
German people came from the country that is given the most credit for the recovery of Germany, 
the plan offered by the United States Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau Jr., at the 
Second Quebec Conference.  Churchill’s memorandum, based on the Morgenthau’s plan, and 
signed by both the Prime Minister and the President, asked for “the elimination of the war-
making industries in the Ruhr and in the Saar areas.”273  It proscribed turning Germany, the 
country of Europe with the highest standard of industrialization, into an agriculture-based 
economy. 
 At Quebec the Allies finally agreed upon zones of occupation for their forces.  The 
Morgenthau Plan, after scorching public criticism, reemerged in large parts of the U.S. Joint 
Chief of Staff Directive 1067.  The U.S. Government’s hope that the Directive 1067 would be 
accepted by France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union as the general basic document for 
governing occupied Germany failed.  The Potsdam Conference Protocol set the tone for Allied 
activities in Germany.  Consent among the four Allies became the prerequisite for all-German 
actions.  However, the different national interests of the Allies prevented in many important 
cases the required consensus.  And it set the stage for the final division of Germany.  
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3.9. Summary                
 It took a coalition of nations to defeat Hitler’s Germany.  Nation-states that would never 
have been allies were drawn together by one force – fear of Nazi Germany.  Once the threat was 
defeated, the special interests of each major state quickly reasserted themselves causing conflicts 
on how to make peace, how to restructure Germany, how to preclude a third World War.  
Germany ultimately benefitted from the divisions between the Allies, and the rise of the Soviet 
Union soon became the new primary enemy of the West.  However, it would be wrong to 
attribute the final plan for Germany to enlightened, liberal democracy or universal principles for 
the treatment of humanity.  Anger, hate, rage, passion and self-interest influenced the actions and 
decisions of all the major players, including the United States, which advanced initially, the most 
drastic plan of all–the Morgenthau Plan.   













Chapter 4: The U.S. Military Government of Württemberg-Baden 
4.1. Planning for Military Government 
 Early on in the war, the United States Army began training Civil Affair Officers for 
possible Military Government duties should a postwar military occupation of Germany occur.  
Already in April 1942, the military installed a School of Military Government at the University 
of Virginia in Charlottesville, later adding a second school at Fort Custer in Michigan.  Twelve 
Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS) located at universities throughout the United States 
complemented the two basic schools. 
 The officer-students selected to attend the schools were officers recruited from regular 
Army units, as well as increasing numbers of “officers commissioned direct from civilian life on 
the basis of their professional qualifications”274 needed in the future to govern Germany.  The 
month-long training the students received at Charlottesville and Fort Custer covered general 
aspects of the future Military Government.  After the basic course the officer-students transferred 
to different Civil Affairs Training Schools for two months of instruction.  General military 
subjects, as well as instructions “in the history of military government, the mission of military 
government, public administration, and the people, geography, and institutions of the people of a 
certain area: Germany, Italy, France, and so forth,”275 filled the schedule at the Civil Affairs 
Training Schools.  
 Harold Zink, a professor of political science at Ohio State University, with firsthand 
knowledge of the program as a member of the Military Government in Germany from 1944 on, 
judged in American Military Government in Germany the results of the training program as 
generally positive.  However, he criticized that “the great majority of the officers never acquired 
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enough of any foreign language to be able to use it with any degree of facility.”276  Zink regarded 
it disadvantageous to the students that they could not specialize in a single country from early on 
in the program.  Instructions about West European history and nation states in broad general 
terms did not provide the students with “the detailed knowledge that was so widely needed to 
handle concrete German problems.”277  Actually, the most important aspects of the training–
current events and up-to-date facts and information about Germany since Hitler’s rise to power 
in 1933, and especially after the outbreak of the war in 1939, were not available during the 
training program.    
 After finishing the program in the United States the students destined for duty in 
Germany were assigned to the British national academy at Shrivenham.  At the academy roughly 
150 American and British officers designated for Germany organized in January 1944 the so-
called German Country Section.  A few weeks later, in the middle of February, “the Civil Affairs 
Division G5 of the Supreme Headquarter[s], Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) brought into 
being a country unit for Germany (German Country Unit, respectively German Country Section), 
later called by historians the predecessor of the Office of Military Government U.S. in Germany 
[OMGUS].”278  
 The composition of the German Country Section reflected the structure of the highest 
German administrative authorities.  As its major objective, the section prepared the U.S. 
occupation’s administrative structure for Germany corresponding to the Reich level down to the 
county and community level, established procedures for supervision and management of the 
Displaced Persons, of the German economy, the public services, feeding, labor, post and 
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communication services, finance, justice, interior, traffic, and property control.279 (see 
organizational charts of the Military Government in the Western Military District of the U.S. 
Zone pages 124-127) 
 In August 1944, members of the German Country Section relocated to SHAEF 
Headquarters in France.  The major task of the section prior and past D-Day became the writing 
and editing of the Handbook for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender.  
However, interventions by the Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, stopped the 
printing of the third draft of the handbook, already approved by the Chief of Staff of SHAEF. 
Several months passed before the handbook, with acceptable alterations could be printed in 
December 1944 and distributed to the members of the future military government.  
 In Paragraph 5, Chapter I of the Handbook, General Eisenhower, the Supreme 
Commander of SHAEF, outlined the primary objectives of the Military Government for 
Germany: 
(a) Imposition of the will of the Allies upon occupied Germany. 
(b) Care, control and repatriation of United Nations displaced persons and 
minimum care necessary to effect control of enemy refugees and displaced 
persons.  
(c) Apprehension of war criminals. 
(d) Elimination of Nazism, Fascism, German militarism, the Nazi hierarchy 
and their collaborators.  
(e) Restoration and maintenance of law and order, in so far as the military 
situation permits.  
(f) Protection of United Nations property, control of certain properties and 
conservation of German foreign exchange assets.  
(g) Preservation and establishment of suitable civil administration to the extent 
required to accomplish the foregoing objectives.280  
 
 SHAEF requested on 5 August 1944 the creation of another planning element, the United 
States Group Control Council (USGCC).  Parallel to the German Country Section, this element 
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would plan and develop policies and directives for Military Government on a national level 
because of Soviet disinterest in creating a Tripartite Control Machinery for Germany at that 
time.281 
4.2. The Structure of the United States Military Government in Germany 
 The War Department announced on 31 March 1945 the assignment of General Lucius D. 
Clay as the Deputy Military Governor of Germany under the governorship of General 
Eisenhower, the Commander of SHAEF.  With the same order, General Clay took over USGCC 
as Commanding General.  The combination of both offices in the person of General Clay would 
eliminate competition with tactical commanders and guarantee the uniform development of 
policies and directives, as well as the uniform application of regulations and guidelines 
throughout the Military Government in the U.S. occupation zone.  
 In June 1945, the USGCC became the top-level administrative agency of the U.S.  
Military Government, later known as OMGUS, made up of the Office of the Deputy Military 
Governor (Executive Office) with several major divisions and numerous branches and 
sections,282 located at Berlin.  At the same time, the European Theater of Operations, United 
States Army (ETOUSA), the successor of SHAEF, renamed as United States Forces European 
Theater (USFET), became the command authority for all U.S. forces throughout Europe, 
headquartered in Frankfurt/Main.  The Civil Affairs Division G5 of USFET converted into the 
Office of Military Government, U.S. Zone, “placed under a military governor who also served as 
the commanding general of the American Forces in ETO (European Theater of Operations) as 
well as the American representative on the Allied Control Council for Germany,”283 as Harold 
Zink summarized up the duties of the top military U.S. officer in Europe.  
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 It is not the intention to follow up on all the internal and external organizational changes 
the Military Government underwent during the years of occupation.  It is equally not an objective 
to describe the organizational development of the U.S. Forces in Germany from a fighting force 
to an occupation force, from a several millions man army to an occupation army of less than 
200,000.  However, operational reasons forced the military to divide the U.S. Zone into two 
Military Districts.  The state of Bavaria became the Eastern Military District with the Third 
Army initially in charge as the operational command.  The Western Military District covered the 
state of Hessen, and the northern parts of the states of Baden and Württemberg with the Seventh 
Army as operational command.        
 In addition to the Handbook for Military Government Prior to defeat or Surrender, 
Headquarters USFET issued in July 1945 a directive to the commanding generals of the Military 
Districts of the U.S. occupation zone: The Administration of Military Government in the U.S. 
Zone in Germany.  This text detailed the operations and duties of the Military Government 
Organization.  
Military Government detachments will be provided by Military District 
Commanders as units for use in the exercise of Military Government in their 
Districts… 
(1) [A] Military Government Regional Detachment will be located at the 
capital of each Military Government Region. [It] will be responsible for 
controlling the activities of German civil administration… in the region on 
behalf of the Military District Commander… the Regional Military 
Government officer will command all Military Government Detachments 
within the region. 
(2) [A] Military Government Detachment will be located at each 
Regierungsbezirk capital… [It] will be responsible directly to the Regional 
Military Government Officer for the Administration of Military Government 
throughout the Regierungsbezirk. 
(3) [A] Military Government Detachment will also be located at the 
headquarters of the principal Stadt- and Land-Kreise and will be responsible 
directly to the appropriate Regierungsbezirk Detachment for the administration 
of Military Government throughout the Stadt- or Land-Kreise.  
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(4) Military Government control will therefore run in a direct line upwards 
from Stadt- or Land-Kreise Detachment, to Regierungsbezirk Detachment, to 
Regional Detachments, and thence to the Military District Commander.284 
 
 The Military Government Organization covered the U.S. occupation zone with a closely 
meshed net, able to detect even small aberrations from policies forced on the Germans by the 
occupation authorities.  The size of the detachments varied according to the size of the 
Stadt/Land-Kreis, its population and its economic infrastructure.  Par example, the Liaison and 
Security (LSO) Detachment for the Landkreis of Öhringen had a strength of two officers and 
seven soldiers, whereas the city of Heidelberg attracted a LSO Detachment of sixteen officers 
and thirty-one soldiers as of 26 August 1945.285  
 The sweeping powers given to the Military Government Detachments is listed in No. 6.c. 
(1)-(3) of the USFET regulations.  
[The Military Government Detachments] serve as the primary agency for the 
control, direction and supervision of the German civil authorities… [and] to 
conduct the operations of Military Government concerned with the direction 
and control of the German civil government at the appropriate Detachment 
level; with the care, control and repatriation of United Nations displaced 
persons; with the operation of Military Government courts; with the execution 
of financial control policies; with the execution of policy with respect to 
reparations, deliveries and restitutions; with the preservation of documents, 
fine arts and archives; and with the execution of de-Nazification and de-
militarization programs in the agencies they are supervising.286     
 
 The Handbook for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender 
specified in Paragraph 38 that the German regional system would be the base of the U.S. Military 
Government.  Units of Military Government would be installed at four levels of the German 
administrative system.  “Mil. Gov. officers will work at [the] Ministerial, Provinz 
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[Province]/Land [State]/Reichsgau [since 1933 newly established districts], Regierungbezirk 
[Government District] and Kreis [county level].”287  
 The university-educated personnel designated for the Military Government of Germany 
formed into three Military Government Regiments.  The 2nd Military Government Regiment 
covered the Western Military District and the 3rd Military Government Regiment the Eastern 
Military District.  The Office of Military Government (Western District) was assigned to the 
Headquarter 7th U.S. Army at Heidelberg, whereas the five companies of the 2nd Military 
Government Regiment controlled and supervised the state of Württemberg-Baden as well as the 
state of Hessen, both created by General Eisenhower’s Proclamation No. 2, 19 September 1945.  
 The five companies A-E of the 2nd Military Government Regiment represented the U.S. 
military governing authorities for the administrative subdivisions of the Western Military 
District.  Detachment E-1 of Company A became responsible for the Württemberg Section, 
Detachment E-3 of Company B monitored the Regierungsbezirk Hessen-Darmstadt, Detachment 
E-4 of Company C policed the Regierungsbezirk Kassel, Detachment E-5 Company D managed 
the Regierungsbezirk Wiesbaden, and Detachment E-7 of Company E controlled the North 
Baden Section.  Regarding the state of Württemberg-Baden the detachments of the Military 
Government were attached analog to the political and regional organization of the new state (see 
chart).  Detachment E-1 of the Württemberg Section was responsible for the Liaison and 
Security offices (LSO) for three Stadtkreise (city county), eighteen Landkreise (county), and one 
warehouse operation.  The Detachment E-7 of the North Baden Section had fourteen LSOs for 
four Stadtkreise, eight Landkreise and two warehouse operations under its wings.288   
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4.3. Personnel problems of Military Government  
 Most of the officers commissioned from civilian life and trained at Charlottesville and 
Fort Custer were highly motivated specialists looking forward to beginning their tours in 
Military Government.  Initially attached to the combat troops, their detachments tried to restore 
some resemblance of civilian life for the German population and to establish a denazified 
administration in occupied cities, towns and villages.  
 After the hostilities ended, numerous Military Government-trained specialists were 
reassigned to non-Military Government duties, while “officers from combat units and service 
troops joined the Military Government… shortly [if at all] prepared for their jobs in Romilly, 
(France), Bielefeld or in Bad Homburg.”289  Lieutenant Colonel Marshall Knappen, Rhodes 
Scholar and Professor of History and Political Science at Michigan State University served as the 
Chief of the religious Affairs Section and Deputy Chief of the Education Section at the Office of 
Military Government.  In his book And call it Peace, he alleged “that the tables of organization 
[of Military Government] of its various agencies could be expanded in such a way as to 
accommodate many high-ranking officers for whose services there would no longer be a need in 
the combat and supply phases… None of these new men, so far as is known, had attended the 
military government training schools, and almost none of them had any knowledge of German or 
Germany.”290  And Harold Zink, a ‘man of the first hour’ regarding Military Government, for  
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example, criticized the quality of officers, assigned for duty in Military Government, because 
many had “little self-control, indifferent moral standards, and a record of failure in their domestic 
relations and social groups at home.”291  It is to be expected that the active combat units kept the 
best officers, releasing the officers of mediocre quality.   
 Yet another reason for the increasing personnel turnover were the mandatory discharges 
of many officers and enlisted because their time of service ended in September 1945.  Beginning 
in September 1945, the Military Government units faced increasingly grave problems in 
replacing discharged personnel with qualified ones. Through discharges, the Military 
Government of Württemberg-Baden went down from 1,462 officers and enlisted on 27 February 
1946 to 601 on 1 June 1946,292 caused by President Truman’s rapid redeployment program and 
his domestic policies requiring the return of soldiers to civil life to support retooling the 
American non-war economy.  
 Several authors judged the questionable standards of members of the Military 
Government and of members of the occupation troops critically.  Frank Ninkovich objected to 
the attitudes of “higher ranking officials often requisition[ing] the most desirable German 
housing stock and land, mak[ing] generous use of German servants… Frequently the imperial 
standard of living so far exceeded that which would have been possible in America that it 
bordered on the obscene.”293  The U.S. diplomat, George F. Kennan, wrote with disgust about his 
fellow countrymen during his two visits to Germany after the fighting ended.  “…I had come 
away with a sense of sheer horror at the spectacle of this horde of my compatriots and their 
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dependents camping in luxury amid the ruins of a shattered national community, ignorant of the 
past, oblivious to the abundant evidence of present tragedy all around them… setting an example 
of empty materialism and cultural poverty before a people desperately in need of spiritual and 
intellectual guidance…”294  Supporting the arguments of Ninkovich and Kennan, Eugene 
Davidson enumerates that “that four Germans serv[e] every American soldier in some form: 
maids for every American household; service battalions for the troops; secretaries, technicians, 
chauffeurs – all paid for by the Germans.”295  Further, he mentions “30,000 brassieres used by 
DP women, a ton of water bugs for the pet fish owned by an American general, a bedspread of 
white Korean goatskin… cigarette cases worth 288 marks each were presented to [the generals] 
guests and charged to occupation costs.”296   
 In a letter of 5 March 1947, General Eisenhower, Chief of Staff of the Army, took the 
same line as Frank Ninkovic and George F. Kennan.  He asked General Clay, the Deputy 
Military Governor, to clarify “following allegations… that many officers have an excessive 
number of servants, often fed from Army rations; that “country homes” are assigned to certain 
officers in addition to their regular billets… that many persons make high profits from black-
market or barter transactions with Germans who, by force or circumstances, trade their 
possessions for essential food…”297   
  These cases darken the glowing picture painted by many scholars of the U.S. occupation 
in their objective to bring democracy to defeated Germany, indicating that too many U.S. Army 
leaders did more to impede than to help.  In his article, Did the United States Create Democracy 
in Germany? James L. Payne cites Michel Ignatieff at the Kennedy School of Government at 
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Harvard, Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, scholars of democratic 
development and others all supporting the notion that the post-WW II U.S. occupation of 
Germany imposed democracy on the country.  However, James L. Payne concludes after 
surveying contemporary literature, “a close look reveals that, from the standpoint of democratic 
nation building, the U.S. occupation of Germany is actually a lesson on what not to do.”298   
 The negative impacts of years of anti-German propaganda, of official policies expressed 
as “no steps looking toward economic rehabilitation of Germany are to be undertaken except as 
may be immediately necessary in support of military operations,” and “no relief supplies are to 
be imported or distributed for the German population… beyond the minimum necessary to 
prevent disease and such disorder as might endanger or impede military operations,”299 prevailed 
at many U.S. leaders.  Additionally, paragraph 11 of the handbook stated that “full use will be 
made of indigenous resources for supplies and equipment.”  The handbook’s paragraphs fit 
neatly into the directive 1067 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  The directive stated the official 
ambitions of the United States to punish defeated Germany by forcing it back into a country 
based mainly on agriculture with light domestic industries.  And personal resentment against 
Germans existed among the three million U.S. forces in Germany in 1945.  A good example is 
General Smith, General Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff’s answer to Colonel Andrew Stanley “don’t 
get too worked up and concerned about these Germans; the policy is to make it hard on these 
SOB’s to get going again.”300   
 One has to assert that the official U.S. policy was to punish the German people and to 
prevent the resurrection of a strong Germany.  U.S. leaders at all levels supported the official 
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policies by impeding a German recovery during the first two years of the occupation.  The first 
indication of a change of attitude toward Germany was Secretary of State Byrnes’ speech on 6 
September 1946 in Stuttgart.  General Clay summarized the speech in Decision in Germany that 
“while the major requirements of JCS 1067 remained, the punitive tone was replaced with 
constructive purpose.  The German people were promised the opportunity and assistance to 
rejoin the family of nations.”301  At least some leaders, including Secretary of State Byrnes and 
General Clay feared that hunger rations, poverty and a lack of hope for the future would push the 
people of the three western occupation zones to Communism.  Nonetheless, despite the negative 
aspects of government policies like the JCS 1067 and the misbehavior of officials of all ranks, 
one can state that the majority of the people in Military Government were trying to do the best in 
their assigned jobs.    
4.4. Summary  
 The U.S. Army undertook intensive preparations to train and educate officers intended to 
represent the Allied forces on-site in Germany after victory and to enforce the Allied war 
objectives.  Very few of the men had sufficient knowledge of the German language and of the 
specific political and bureaucratic structures, aside from recent political developments, making it 
difficult to deal with the local problems.  The high turnover of personnel starting in September 
1945, the influx of less qualified men, as well as a fifty per cent reduction in strength by the end 
of 1946 hampered the efficiency of the organization at all levels. Aside from some examples of 
misbehavior of officials up to the highest ranks, the members of the Office of Military 
Government U.S. organization were highly motivated to do their jobs.  Experiencing the 
situation on the ground, they often circumvented the official policy of punishment put into 
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writing in JCS 1067, by implementing the “disease and unrest clause” of the document 
preventing starvation and instituting hope in the Germans for a better life.    







Chapter 5: Stuttgart, capital of Württemberg-Baden in the U.S. Zone 
5.1. Introduction 
 Stuttgart, the capital of the recently by decree created South German state of 
Württemberg-Baden welcomed newly arriving U.S. family members in 1947, according to the 
booklet, An Introduction to Germany for Occupation Families, as “a city of almost half a million 
population… [Stuttgart] had the misfortune… of being one of the most important engineering 
communities in Germany… After Allied bombers hit Stuttgart in the fall of 1944, it burned for 
two weeks, and when the fire finally was brought under control, the city was 70 per cent 
destroyed.”302  What had the occupation families to anticipate “after a thirteen-hour ride from 
Bremerhaven to Frankfurt”303 by military train, with a 130 miles drive by car still ahead?  
 Certainly, the newcomers would experience a Stuttgart different from the city Lieutenant 
Robert Franklin lived to see when he arrived in Stuttgart on 23 April 1945. Franklin and his team 
were the first Americans entering the city after Free French Forces occupied Stuttgart between 
20 and 22 April.  The entire city core you can look at as a pile of debris, he described.  Burned 
out walls are the only remains left of the city center.  Most streets are blocked for trucks by heaps 
of rubble.  Seven or eight large buildings are still burning.304  A U.S. Liaison Officer Team from 
Wiesbaden left for Stuttgart at the end of April. Travelling by car, the team needed for the 
distance of approximately 140 miles one and a half days, compared to today’s average travel 
time of less than two hours.  Their impression of Stuttgart is depressing: women trying arduously 
to clear the streets from rubble and ashes without adequate tools, equipped only with buckets, no 
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electricity, no running water, debris and ruins all over the city.305   
    Eighteen months after the end of the war most of the incoming occupation families 
were confronted with lodging in duplexes lacking many commodities like furniture and flatware.  
However, the U.S. families could enjoy recreation facilities like “tennis courts, hunting lodges, 
golf courses, bowling alleys, riding stables, an indoor swimming pool with steam baths and 
massages, several theaters, a snack bar, service clubs, a Red Cross Club and a library,”306 making 
the newcomers feel a little bit like at home. 
5.2. Stuttgart in April/May 1945   
 However, in the city of Stuttgart of May 1945 and later none of the remaining 266,067 
residents of formerly 458,429 in 1939 thought of tennis courts, a hunting lodge, a golf course, 
bowling alleys and riding stables.  The peoples’ main objective was to survive, to find shelter, 
clothing and food.  What happened to the capital of the new state of Württemberg-Baden created 
by the Americans,307 during the war?  
 Stuttgart, the capital of the former Kingdom of Württemberg and of its successor, the 
People’s State of Württemberg during the Weimar Republic lost its political functions during the 
Third Reich.  The city became the major economic and cultural center of the NS Gau of 
Württemberg-Hohenzollern in the highly centralized Third Reich.  During the war Stuttgart 
suffered heavily to an extent never experienced over its lifetime as a city since 1219.  
 American and British airplane formations raided Stuttgart fifty-three times between 
August 1940 and April 1945, Stuttgart being a primary target for “Bombers over Axis 
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Industry.”308  The Allied air forces attacked seventeen times during the day and thirty-six times 
during the night.  The night-time air raid of 12 September 1944 brought the worst for the city. 
The U.S. Bomber Group No. 5 assaulted the city, according to Jörg Friedrich in Der Brand, 
Deutschland im Bombenkrieg 1940-1945, from 22:59 to 23:30 with five hundred planes. During 
1943, the Allied air forces shifted the focus of the air attacks from mainly industrial centers and 
plants to the carpet-bombing of the residential areas of cities to break the moral of the German 
people.  Carpet-bombing achieved the highest effectiveness in the densely built-up centers of 
cities with half-timbered frame houses and narrow alleys dating back to the Middle Ages.  
Sophisticated attack patterns with incendiary bombs penetrating through all levels of dwellings, 
igniting fires from the basements to the housetops.  Blockbuster bombs crushed windows and 
stripped houses of their roofs as far as 500 meters away fanning the fires tremendously. 
 Illuminating the target area with flares as bright as daylight during the night of 12 
September 1944, the airplanes dropped “75 blockbusters, 4,300 high explosive bombs and 
180,000 incendiary [bombs] in an area of narrow streets and densely spaced blocks around the 
Hegel-, Hölderlin- and Schwabstrasse.  Stuttgart’s location in a narrow deep valley reinforced 
the firestorm covering an area of five square kilometers.  The rapidity of the developing 
firestorm prevented residents from reaching air raid shelters, increasing the death rate.”309 
Surprised, Jörg Friedrich notes the relatively low number of one thousand people killed during 
the raid.  Most incurred suffocation from carbon monoxide in the basements of their dwellings.  
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The rapidly developing firestorm kept them away from the better protection of professionally 
built air raid shelters.310  
 Lieutenant Robert Franklin with his men, as well as the U.S. Liaison Officer Team from 
Wiesbaden, got the first impression on the effects of the fifty-three allied air attacks with the 
objective to eliminate the city as a war-material producing center supporting Hitler’s war efforts.  
What did the fifty-three air attacks with a German-estimated 6,100 airplanes achieve between 25 
May 1940 and 19 April 1945?  What did the 21,246 tons of Allied bombs destroy in a city spread 
out over 81.3 square miles?  With this amount of bombs of all kinds “Stuttgart belonged to the 
most heavily bombed cities after Berlin, Essen, Duisburg, Köln and Frankfurt.”311  
 Overall, the attacks killed 4,477 people, thereof 3,618 residents, 770 foreign nationals, in 
this case probably forced or slave laborers and 89 non-residents.  Additionally, 8,909 people 
were injured and 85 people were missing.  Of all of the fifty-three attacks the attack of 12 
September 1944 was the deadliest with 957 people killed, 1,600 injured and 14 people missing.  
 Of the fifteen bridges across the Neckar River, Allied air attacks were able to destroy 
only one bridge, the Rosenstein Brücke between the inner city and Bad Cannstatt during a raid of 
250 airplanes, lasting about forty-five minutes on 19 October 1944.  The retreating German 
forces blew up thirteen of the fifteen bridges on 21 April 1945, thereof seven road bridges, three 
railroad bridges, and three pedestrian bridges.  The lightly damaged Volta Steg (a Steg is a small 
bridge for pedestrian traffic only), close to the Münster power plant and the undamaged Berger 
Steg were the only connections left to the inner city with its major industrial district of Bad 
Cannstatt on the right bank of the Neckar River.  Unlimited access across the river the city only 
achieved when the last destroyed bridge, the Obertürkheimer Brücke, reopened on 5 September 
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1956.  The preservation of the Berger Steg with its water mains saved Stuttgart’s potable water 
supply, a major advantage for the devastated city. 
 Apart from the bridges, the Allied air attacks were much more efficient in damaging and 
destroying residential buildings, plants, agricultural operations, hospitals, churches, schools, and 
other public buildings.  Of the 48,000 dwellings Stuttgart had in 1945, 32,549 sustained damages 
of more than five percent, representing 67.8 per cent of all housing.  From the 14,000 
commercial and agricultural edifices 4,648 were damaged, a third of the inventory. Of the 3,000 
public buildings, including hospitals, schools, and administrative offices 1,048 were damaged, a 
rate of 34.9 per cent.  The remaining real estates of 3,000 edifices, 2,120 were unharmed, they 
had the lowest destruction rate of 29.3 per cent.  
 The religious communities of Stuttgart possessed one hundred church buildings.  Only 
twenty-one survived the air attacks undamaged.  Nineteen churches were completely destroyed, 
twenty-six were heavily and sixty-six lightly damaged.  Of the seventy-five elementary schools 
(Volksschulen, Mittelschulen, Sonderschulen) eighteen were completely destroyed, thirty-nine 
damaged and eighteen, equaling 24 per cent undamaged.  
 Movie theaters provided in 1939 9,363 seats for the residents of the city.  Enemy actions 
reduced the seat capacity to 2,991 by 1945.  The Allied air attacks hit especially hard the lodging 
industry.  The thirty-four hotels of the city offered 2,390 beds in 1939.  Twenty-six of the hotels 
were destroyed, eliminating 76.5 per cent of the capacity.  Only four hotels were undamaged, 
respectively lightly damaged, providing a maximum of 326 guest beds, reducing the overnight-
stay capacity to 13.6 per cent.312  Not a very promising state of affairs for the future seat of the 
United States Military Government for the state of Württemberg-Baden. 
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5.3. The French occupation of Stuttgart  
 It was merely the blink of an eye in Stuttgart’s history – the intermezzo of the city’s 
occupation by French forces from 21 April to 8 July 1945.  In opposition to the Allied plan of 
operation for the 6th U.S. Army Group, the attached 1st French Army headed east after crossing 
the Rhine River, instead of advancing south through the Rhine valley toward the Swiss border. 
After traversing the Black Forest and capturing the city of Tübingen on 19 April, the French 
turned north toward Stuttgart.  They occupied the city on the left bank of the Neckar River on 21 
April.  Forces of the 7th U.S. Army advancing upstream through the Neckar River valley arrived 
hours later and occupied the parts of Stuttgart on the right bank of the Neckar River. The Neckar 
bridges, blown up by the retreating German forces prevented the French from taking over the 
whole city.  
 Although Stuttgart, as well as the city of Karlsruhe, belonged to the agreed upon U.S. 
Zone of occupation, the southern border being the Reichsautobahn Karlsruhe-Stuttgart- 
München, the French remained in Stuttgart not withstanding strong U.S. objections.  A telegram 
from de Gaulle, 29 March 1945, urged the commander of the 1st French Army to cross the Rhein 
and to take the cities of Karlsruhe and Stuttgart ahead of his U.S. neighbor, General Patch.  For 
de Gaulle, capturing both cities was a matter of highest national interest.313 According to General 
de Gaulle in a letter of 2 May, General Eisenhower conceded to him, understanding the French 
position.314  The U.S. forces pulled out of the districts of Stuttgart on the right bank of the 
Neckar River.  French forces occupied these districts on 4 May, extending their occupation to the 
whole city.315  Later, threats by the Americans to cancel all U.S. supply for the French forced de 
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Gaulle to submit to U.S. pressure to hand over the city on 8 July.316  Seventh U.S. Army ordered 
units of its VI Corps to take over the areas of the Länder Württemberg and Baden “designated 
for the United States Zone.”317  To save face, de Gaulle claimed in his memoirs that “in 
exchange for the French evacuation of Stuttgart”318 the French occupied the areas of 
Saarbrücken, Trier, Koblenz, Mainz, and Neustadt west of the Rhein River.   
 Without delay the French revealed to the population what they had to expect for the 
future.  The first proclamation of the French commandant instructed the people that: 1. Twenty-
five Germans will be executed if someone tries to kill a French soldier; 2. Curfew for the people 
is from 22:00 in the evening to 06:30 in the morning; 3. All weapons, ammunition, radios, 
cameras, and binoculars had to be turned in at police posts; 4. Saloons and inns, as well as public 
buildings are closed; 5. All members of German military units in the city have to be extradited to 
the French commandant; 6. It is prohibited to leave the city, and to ride a bicycle; 7. Every 
resident has to have an identity card or an Arbeitsbuch; and 8. Male residents born between 1890 
and 1929 and able to work have to report to police posts not later than 22 April 1945, 10:00 with 
proper tools for the removal of anti-tank barriers.319  Edgar Lersch, H.H. Poker and P. Sauer 
mention a curfew starting two hours earlier at 20:00.  They also report that the “city 
administration had to compile lists of all members of the NSDAP, of all food storage sites, of all 
foreign forced laborers, of all plants, and of all male residents of the city.”320 
 The French Military Government appointed Dr. Arnulf Klett, incarcerated as an 
adversary of the Nazi regime, as the new mayor.  He replaced Dr. Strölin from the NSDAP, who 
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surrendered the city to the French, preventing further fighting and destruction mandated by 
Hitler’s Nero Order of 19 March 1945.321  As mayor, Dr. Klett navigated Stuttgart through the 
difficult times of occupation.  Several times reelected he died in office in 1974, a godsend for the 
city. 
 The French occupation was, as H. Vietzen remarks in Chronik der Stadt Stuttgart 1945-
1948, ambiguous.  The Ernährungsamt, the city department responsible for the procuration and 
distribution of the food rations for the people, had been able to provide food through April 1945 
at a daily ration of 1,739 calories.322  According to an order of the 1st French Army, the rations 
had to be cut to the level the French people received during the German occupation.  The four 
week ration for an adult contained 6,000 grams of bread (211.6 ounces), 400 grams of meat (14.1 
ounces), 210 grams of fat (7.4 ounces), 160 grams of cheese (5.6 ounces), 80 grams of coffee 
substitute (2.8 ounces), and if available 8,000 grams of potatoes (282.2 ounces).  The daily ration 
added up to approximately 800 calories.  Only children and adolescents received processed food 
stuffs, as well as sugar.323  
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 As rigorously as the French acted in food rationing, they were kinder in providing the city 
with sixty carriages and 102 horses from one of their mule companies324 to mitigate the 
transportation needs because of lack of trucks as well as fuel.  They acted also much less 
stringent than the Americans in the process of denazification.  During the French occupation 
period the city had to discharge 550 employees325 because of their active involvement in the 
NSDAP.  Unlike the Americans strictly prohibiting any German owner/renter to reenter their 
requisitioned houses/apartments, the French were generous in allowing the owner/renter to live 
in basements, storage rooms or attics of their requisitioned property.326  The French Military 
Government even asked the city administration “to let the people of Stuttgart know in an 
appropriate manner which residents would be willing to provide suitable rooms for French 
officers…”327  
 However, in economic matters the French were less generous.  Willi A. Boelcke 
mentions, in Die Kosten von Hitlers Krieg, that unlike the Americans and the British the French 
and the Soviets started immediately to “requisition large quantities of booty of all kinds a well as 
nonmilitary private property.”328  Likewise, E. Lersch describes that the French instantly started 
to requisition products, machines, cars and trucks to be sent to France.  He mentions the 
requisition of 109,183 pairs of shoes of all kinds at a value of 4,800,000 Reichsmark (RM).329  A 
report of the Besatzungskostenamt  (Department for Occupation Costs) from 9 November 1948 
lists the occupation costs the city had to pay to the French Military Government at 39,689,822 
RM.  From this amount the report calculates that 21,215,000 RM were costs “declared by the 
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occupation power as occupation costs, however were improper demands of goods and services.  
The sum of 21,215,000 RM did not cover the extraction of wine and hard liquor at 9,000,000 
RM, as well as requisitioned animals for slaughter and cars respectively trucks.”330 
 The requisitions including machines, factory equipment, raw material, as well as shoes, 
clothing, tobacco products and cleaning agents were shipped to France.  A directive of 22 June, 
just 15 days prior to their departure, the French Army ordered every German family to provide a 
complete suit, a shirt, underwear, two handkerchiefs, a pair of socks, a tie, and a pair of shoes, all 
in excellent condition.331  No wonder that the bombed out residents reacted angrily.  No one 
could see a need of the occupation force for civilian male clothing in excellent condition.  
 A report of the mayor to the French Military Government, 31 May 1945, stated 1,770 
trucks of all kind were registered in Stuttgart.  Of these trucks, the city had available 546 in 
running condition, 671 defect, 437 trucks requisitioned by the occupation authority, and 116 
were relocated out of the city.332  Getting smart from all the French requisitions, German car and 
truck owners often drove their vehicles toward the end of the French occupation time into the 
U.S. occupation zone to prevent the loss of important means of transportation to the city’s 
economy.  However, what could be done with operational trucks, one could not do with 
requisitioned maintenance shops. In his 6 June 1945 report, the Beauftragter für das 
Verkehrswesen (Trustee for Transportation) expressed misgivings that “warehouses of repair 
parts and tools, requisitioned and guarded by the French will be taken by them when leaving 
Stuttgart, furthermore decreasing the ability to maintain the few cars and trucks the city 
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operates.”333  The French attitude regarding requisitions was demonstrated in a letter from the 
city’s Engineering Division.  When the French left on 8 July, they removed from the residence of 
General Schwartz, the French Military Governor, the complete furnishing of his office and 
bedroom, as well as all new carpets, a crucifix and a sculpture.334  
 At the administrative level the French Military Government appointed the city 
government with Dr. Klett as mayor.  An administration above the city level did not exist after 
the start of the occupation.  At the urging of city governments, the 1st French Army/Military 
Government Stuttgart decreed to create higher administrative agencies for the interior, the justice 
system, for culture, education and art, for finance, for agriculture and alimentation, for labor and 
social insurance, and for the postal and railroad systems.  These regional government authorities, 
without being a state government, had the responsibility according to the decree for the whole 
state of Württemberg, including the northern part belonging to the U.S. occupation zone.  
Published in the Nachrichten der Militäerregierung für den Stadtkreis Stuttgart,335 it is 
questionable if actions of the new French-appointed authorities had any impact on Stuttgart and 
U.S. occupied Württemberg.   
 With the U.S. taking over the city on 8 July the French era with its pretension to govern 
Württemberg ceased.  However, as requested in a letter of 13 June 1945, the French Military 
Government ordered the city to establish an administrative position or agency responsible for the 
timely and prompt fulfillment of French requests.336  One can assume that the French request 
eventually led to the Besatzungskostenamt (Department for Occupation Costs) of the city 
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administration, an important link between the occupation forces and the German administration 
during the period of occupation.   
 The life of the Stuttgart population eased a little bit in the course of the French 
occupation.  U.S. Army engineers finished on 9 May a temporary railroad bridge across the 
Neckar River, replacing the German blasted Rosenstein Brücke.  The temporary bridge 
connected the city with the operational German railroad network easing transportation needs.  
The first few lines of streetcars were running again on 11 May, and respectively on 13 May in 
the districts on the right banks of the Neckar River.  The Market Hall opened on 17 May for the 
trade in fruit and vegetables.337  The Nachrichten der Militärregierung für den Stadtkreis 
Stuttgart, publicized since 1 June, announced the immediate opening of restaurants and taverns, 
however with restricted opening times from 11:00 to 14:00 and from 17:00 to 19:30 hours.  
Conditions for reopening included available stocks of foodstuff and fuel.  The opening of four 
movie theaters on 24 June was likewise announced.338   
 The situation of Stuttgart changed for the better from the initial situation of the 
occupation.  However, the permanent requisitions and the detentions of male residents for forced 
work in France caused much trouble among the residents.  The people of the city expected the 
rumors of an occupation change to be true.  Most of them looked positively forward to a change 
from the French to a U.S. occupation, hoping for general improvements especially in the food 
situation.  
5.4. Stuttgart and the American rule       
 The official transition from the French occupation to the occupation of the United States 
of Stuttgart took place on 8 July at noon.  In a radio message via Radio Stuttgart, a station of the 
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U.S. Army on the air since 3 June, Colonel William W. Dawson, the head of the Military 
Government for Württemberg-Baden spoke to the residents of Stuttgart.  He explained the 
administrative organization of the U.S. occupation zone.  The zone will be divided into two 
military districts.  The eastern military district covers the state of Bavaria as it existed during the 
Third Reich.  The western military district covers the northern parts of Württemberg and Baden, 
as well as parts of Hessen and Kur-Hessen.  The parts of Württemberg and Baden of the U.S. 
Zone will form an administrative region, Hessen and Kur-Hessen will form the second 
administrative region of the western military district of the U.S. occupation zone.  The southern 
boundary of the Württemberg-Baden administrative region will follow the county borders south 
of the Autobahn Karlsruhe-Ulm.  The southern border of the U.S. occupation zone did not 
consider any regional historical or institutional borderlines. The major reason for cutting 
Württemberg and Baden with the French was the U.S. Army requirement to have an 
uninterrupted line of communication along the Autobahn from Frankfurt via Karlsruhe, Stuttgart 
and Ulm to Munich and even farther to the U.S. occupation zone in Austria.  
 Besides the major objective of eradicating Nazism, Col. Dawson mentioned the most 
pressing tasks of Military Government was to provide modest and orderly living conditions, to 
assure a fair distribution of food, to adjust the food rations to the same level across the U.S. 
occupation zone.  He recommended taking care of the harvests of all kind of crops to prevent 
famine in winter.339  Further, the official U.S. policy required that Germany feed itself.  An 
article in The Stars and Stripes of 21 May underlined the policy by stating in the headline, 
“German Food Outlook Black, But U.S. Plans No Charity.”340   
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 The same edition of the Nachrichtenblatt named on page 2 the members of the U.S. 
Military Government for the city of Stuttgart: Chief Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. Jackson, 
deputy is Major Edwin A. Norton, and administrative officer Major Donald W. Cunningham. 
They reside in the office building of the Staatstheater.  The Military Government offices were 
open to the public from Monday to Saturday from 09:00 to 12:00 and from 13:30 to 17:00.  
 The softer U.S. approach toward the people was first demonstrated by the increase in the 
calorie amount of the different food ration periods.  The 1st French Army ordered the general 
calorie amount reduced from 1,046 calories for the previous period to 852 calories for the 76th 
ration period of 28 May to 24 June 1945.  Under U.S. occupation the calorie amount for the 77th 
to 83rd ration period increased from 970 calories to 1,752 calories by the end of the year.341  
 The Americans expressed a more laid-back attitude with a directive of 19 July that the 
Germans did not have to salute U.S. military personal.342  Under the French rule the German 
people had to salute general officers, as well as their officially marked cars.343  The U.S. Military 
Government also extended the German leisurely time to 22:30 in the evening.  The shortened 
curfew now lasted from 22:30 to 05:00.344  
 However, the American strictness did eventually become evident in Colonel Dawson’s 
article “The Objectives of the Military Government” in the Nachrichtenblatt der 
Militärregierung für den Stadtkreis Stuttgart, Nr. 9, 1 August 1945.  Colonel Dawson defined in 
the article the seven objectives the Military Government faced:  
1. Occupied Germany had to bow to the intentions of the Allies; 2. To assist, 
supervise, and repatriate displaced persons of the United Nations. The Military 
Government would support enemy refugees and expelled Germans only as far 
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as it became  necessary; 3. To detain all war criminals; 4. To exterminate 
Nazism, Fascism, German militarism, and of the Nazi “fat cats;” 5. To restore 
and maintain law and order; 6. To protect the properties of the United Nations, 
and to monitor certain rights of ownership; 7. To create and maintain a proper 
civil administration.345  
 
Five principles, Colonel Dawson explained, would guide the Military Government to achieve    
 
 these objectives: 
 
1. The economic rehabilitation of Germany had to be consistent with its 
essential needs, 
2. The German people cannot expect assistance from the outside with the 
exception of assistance to prevent epidemics and unrest,  
3. Under no circumstances should active Nazis and fanatics be kept in their 
jobs, 
4. The administrative bureaucracy of disbanded Nazi organizations like health 
and medical services can be used, however without Nazi staff and Nazi 
methods,  
5. Germany will always be treated as a defeated country, not as a liberated 
one.346 
 
 The seven objectives to be achieved under the guidance of the five principles may have 
given the people of Württemberg-Baden an idea what to expect in the future from the eagerly 
anticipated U.S. Military Government.  However, as the residents of Stuttgart quickly had to 
discover, the Americans came not as liberators to Germany, they came as conquerors, as General 
Eisenhower’s Proclamation No. 1 stated.347  And the Directive JCS 1067–reanimating parts of 
the notorious Morgenthau Plan–setting the tone of U.S. occupation policy for at least two years 
“was a harsh document that reflected the unforgiving state of American [policy makers].”348  
This policy document “aimed to punish Germany… [and] emphasized not reconstruction or 
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democracy, but harsh treatment of the Germans.”349  It may be of interest to throw a glance at 
Stuttgart’s situation in 1945.  The daily fight for food demanded the full attention of the 
residents.  The people were less informed of, and less concerned with the financial situation of 
the city.  The occupation costs the city had to pay in advance (to be reimbursed by the state) did 
not directly affect the residents.  How severe was the situation the city faced?      
5.5. Keeping the conquered alive?350 
 According to the Potsdam Protocol, Germany ought to be governed as an economic and 
financial unit.  However, as Byron Price noticed in his report to President Truman, 9 November 
1945, “the obstructions raised by the French Government which have deadlocked the four-power 
Control Council… are to be permitted to defeat the underlying purposes of [a common] Allied 
policy [toward defeated Germany].”351  So, already during the year 1945 the four occupation 
zones developed into segregated political and economic entities.   
 The most pressing needs the average German faced after the war was to secure food, 
shelter and clothing to survive in his respective occupation zone bombed to rubble.  The 
necessity to procure sufficient food for sheer survival became the most important task while 
living under Allied occupation rule.  The German states of the U.S. Zone were never able 
historically to produce enough food to feed its peoples.  The states were always dependent on 
food imports from other parts of Germany, especially from the lost territories east of the Oder 
and Neisse Rivers, as well as from foreign sources. 
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 Additional to the indigenous population of the U.S. Zone General Eisenhower reports in a 
letter to the President, 8 October 1945, that “the U.S. Zone of Germany will be required to house 
[and feed] more than twice their normal population. One million and a half German air raid 
refugees who were evacuated into Southwestern Germany, together with some 600,000 
Germans, Volksdeutsche and Sudetens who fled from Poland, New Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
Yugoslavia before the advancing Red Armies… at this moment the U.S. Zone is under orders to 
absorb 152,000 more Germans from Austria.”352 
 Under such circumstances and the preconditions of the Joint Chief of Staff Directive 
1067 not to support the Germans353 it soon became clear that, as Byron Price acknowledged the 
“food supply [for the German people was] rated by medical standards well below the level of 
subsistence.”354  Colonel Stanley Andrews, a uniformed agricultural specialist from Arkansas 
transferred in July 1945 from the Italian theater of war to the U.S. Military Government in 
Frankfurt, Germany. He put the JCS 1067 policy in a nutshell by stating “in the postwar period 
Germany and former enemies of the United States and European Allies would stand at the end of 
the line so far as food supplies were concerned. At a time of world-wide food shortage that 
meant that ‘if anyone starved, the former enemies would starve first.’”355   
 On his flight from Salzburg, Austria to Frankfurt on 28 July he admired “in Southern 
Germany the peaceful fields glowing with ripening wheat, green meadows, the patches of pine 
trees always perched high on the hills and the doll-like picture book villages below.”356  
However, he soon had to learn the limitations of his job in “finding out the status of the wheat, 
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barley, sugar, potato, oil seed and rye crops”357 in the U.S. Zone most of it still waiting to be 
harvested. 
 Disenchanted by the totality of defeat and destruction, the German economy in the U.S. 
Zone “had come to a virtual standstill. Nothing moved or was undertaken by the Germans 
themselves except by permission of the military,”358 Colonel Andrews observed.  Briefing 
General Smith, the chief of staff of General Eisenhower, he proposed activities of the military 
“on loosening up transportation, labor, materials, opening factories, setting machinery, binder 
twine, horseshoes and releasing prisoners so that the harvest could be gotten in promptly.”359  
General Smith took cognizance of Colonel Andrews’ suggestions and replied to him “don’t get 
too worked up and concerned about these Germans; the policy is to make it hard on these SOB’s 
[sons of bitches] to get going again.”360   
 Thank God for the Germans most members of the Military Government on site did not 
share General Smith’s opinion.  For instance, Colonel Dawson, the governor of Württemberg-
Baden indicated difficulties to feed the people in the future in his radio message of 8 July 1945.  
He conceded “in view of the scarcity of food and in view of the transportation situation a famine 
in late 1945 can only be avoided if all consumers and all public authorities are following the 
directions issued by the Food Department of the state of Württemberg-Baden.  At present it is 
especially important to pay particular attention to the collection of the crops and to the 
preservation of all stocks of provisions.”361  The already meager food rations could not have been 
scaled down without very serious consequences for the health of the people.   
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 According to official numbers of the Food Department of the city of Stuttgart, the 
average amount of the daily caloric food ration provided for the average adult consumer during 
the months of January to April 1945 was 1,548 calories.  During the French occupation from 22 
April to 7 July 1945 the daily caloric food value decreased to 852 calories per day at the 76th 
ration period from 28 May to 24 June.  The amount of calories per day increased slightly to 970 
calories during the 77th ration period from 25 June to 22 July 1945.  Official U.S. sources present 
for the 77th ration period an average daily ration of 1,240 calories per day for the residents of 
Württemberg, whereas the people of Baden had to be content with 750 calories per day.  
However, the 750 calories are misleading, they are based only of the numbers from the city of 
Mannheim like a footnote explains.362  With the American takeover of Stuttgart on 8 July the 
daily caloric food value for the average adult consumer rose from 1,145 calories per day during 
the 78th ration period to 1,752 calories per day during the 83rd ration period lasting from 10 
December 1945 to 6 January 1946.363  The average amount of the daily caloric food value 
decreased from 1,548 calories per day prior to defeat to an average of 1,228 calories per day for 
the rest of the year 1945.  These daily rations of the calculated calories could only be guaranteed 
if the Food Departments throughout the U.S. Zone had the necessary supplies available.  Often 
lacking supplies caused reduced rations, decreasing the caloric intake of the average consumer 
further to the starvation level. 
 Colonel Andrews remarks highly sarcastically that during a dinner for the former 
President Hoover on his famine mission, hosted on 14 April 1946, by General McNarney, the 
successor to General Eisenhower, “that the food was excellent… One member of the party 
remarked that he had never eaten better food in his life than what he had been served at this 
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‘famine tour.’”364  Taking note that in April 1946 the daily caloric level for the Germans was still 
1,280 calories per day (the Stuttgart Food Department calculated a daily value of 1,277 calories 
per day for April, 1,270 for May and 1,207 for June 1946365), he reports that “absenteeism from 
the important rail shops and the few industries allowed to operate was running as high as 60 
percent as workers took off to scrounge for food.”366  It was a characteristic attitude to be 
expected from a starving people.  An attitude, this author and his brothers, all in the age range 
from 6 to 10 years, shared with most Germans. The four-week food ration for this age group 
contained 10,500g/370.4 ounces of bread, 1,200g/42.4 ounces of meat, 600g/21.2 ounces of 
butter, 135g/4.8 ounces of cheese, 600g/21.2 ounces of nutriment, 200g/7.1 ounces of coffee 
substitute, 16,000g/564.4 ounces of potatoes and 62g/2.2 ounces of curd cheese. Providing that 
all the groceries listed on the ration card were in stock, a 6 to 10 year old child would get 
250g/8.8 ounces of bread, 400g/14.1 ounces of meat and 200g/7.1 ounces of butter more during 
the 82nd ration period (12 November to 9 December 1945) than an adult consumer of the age of 
18 years and over.367  
 With this amount of food in mind we kids tried to “organize” additional foodstuff.  After 
the wheat and rye harvests, we, in competition with many other people, searched the fields 
systematically for lost ears to collect and grind to flour. The mayor of Stuttgart announced in the 
newspaper of the Military Government that people could apply for grinding permits at the Food 
Department.368  For several weeks after the potato harvest we walked across the fields looking 
for missed potatoes.  Potatoes were harvested with horse-drawn potato spinners.  A plow blade 
loosened the potatoes and rotating forks threw the potatoes to the side where people collected 
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them into sacks.  Many potatoes were missed because they were covered by soil.  The potato 
hunt was especially successful after a heavy rain washed the potatoes out of the soil.  
 We kids jumped slowly moving freight trains throwing potatoes, sugar beets or coal to 
the ground to be collected by other members of the team.  Despite police protecting trains and 
train stations, “organizing” food was a popular and essential employment among the hungry. 
Today, nobody can imagine the time it took to collect a bucket of beechnuts in the woods. This 
bucket of beechnuts mutated into seventeen to twenty fluid ounces of cooking oil, a rare scarcity 
in the postwar years, a treasure one could trade for other needs.  The author remembers very well 
helping the women cooking molasses from “organized” sugar beets during the day.  At night 
under the cover of darkness the adults brewed moonshine from the beets.  
 This kind of illegal food procurement found a specific name in 1946–“fringsen,” after the 
name of the cardinal Josef Frings of Cologne.  During a sermon on 31 December 1946 he 
virtually legalized the theft of food by telling his parish that “we are living in times of misery. 
An individual should be allowed to take what is essential to keep him alive and healthy if he is 
not able to obtain it through his own work or through appeal to others.”369  However, in a second 
sentence at the sermon the cardinal thought that in many cases the “organizing” of goods went 
far above of the needs of the individual.  There is only one way he stated to come clear with God 
to return the unethically acquired goods. 
 To spin the food story to an end, despite all efforts and not withstanding the import of 
hundreds of thousands tons of foodstuff, of fertilizer and seeds, the food situation never reached 
a daily caloric value of 2,000 calories.  In 1946, the monthly ration periods fluctuated between a 
daily minimum of 1,207 calories and the maximum of 1,653 calories per day, with an average of 
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1,406 calories per day throughout the year.  It was a rate of improvement of 178 calories per day 
compared with the 1945 caloric amount received at the start of the occupation. 
 Instead of a further improvement of the alimentation for the Germans, the year 1947 
entailed a setback to an average of 1,318 calories per day.  The maximum amount of 1,542 
calories per day in January followed the minimum of 914 calories per day at the 101st ration 
period of April/May.370  The official U.S. data for the 97th to 104th ration period, covering the 
time from 3 March to 17 August 1947 specifies the “total caloric value of ration scales for 
German civilians [normal customer] in [the] U.S. Zone [between] 1,550 and 1,560 [calories per 
day].”371   According to a footnote the scarcity of food stocks “permitted [only] reduced amounts 
of food to be actually issued to the normal customer: 1,330 calories during the 99th ration period, 
1,180 during the 100th, 1,080 during the 101st, 1,165 during the 102nd, 1,260 during the 103rd and 
1,390 during the 104th ration period.”  These numbers correspond closely with the calories per 
day the Stuttgart Food Department presents. The city numbers range from 1,321 calories in 
March, 1,296 in April, 1,208 in July and 1,406 in August.  The numbers of May and June elope 
the pattern. Stuttgart could provide for May a minimum of 914 calories per day and for June of 
1,021 calories per day.372   One could notice a remarkable improvement in 1948.  The daily 
caloric value of the rations increased to 1,680 calories per day over the year with a minimum of 
1,397 calories per day in February/March (112th ration period) and a maximum of 1,979 calories 
per day in June/July (116th ration period).   
 Especially striking is the difference in the daily caloric value in the months prior to the 
currency reform of 20 June 1948 and afterwards. During the six ration periods before the 
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currency reform the daily caloric value was 1,490 calories per day for the standard customer.  
This amount increased to an average of 1,870 calories per day during the six ration periods after 
the currency reform, with a minimum of 1,819 calories per day and a maximum of 1,979 calories 
per day. There are many explanations possible for this jump in the nutrition value.  Trust in the 
new currency replacing the valueless Reichsmark freed in all likelihood stockpiled goods, 
increasing the supply.  
 The Verwaltungsbericht (Administrative Report) 1949 of the Stuttgart Food Department 
reported that since the currency reform “the increasing production, the growing food rations –
especially the increased fat rations – and the end of rationing of several foods nearly eliminated 
the Black Market… Rationed commodities like cigarettes, chocolate, coffee, cacao in high 
demand a year earlier and offered by black marketeers are now available in discretionary 
amounts [eliminating the necessity of a Black Market].”373  The end of rationing for potatoes at 
the 122nd ration period in January 1949 characterized the improving food situation in the three 
western occupation zones.374  During the first five postwar years the Food Department of 
Stuttgart served (not including DP’s and special cases) in 1946 an average of 384,780 qualified 
customers, in 1947 430,582, in 1948 458,742 and 471,519 in 1949375, a truly impressing balance 
sheet.  
5.6. Denazification in Stuttgart 
 A major task of the Allied Powers first stated in the Atlantic Charter under objective six 
called for the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny.376  General Eisenhower’s Proclamation No. 1 
reiterated the task to “overthrow the Nazi rule, dissolve the Nazi Party and abolish the cruel, 
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oppressive and discriminatory laws and institutions which the Party has created.  [Added to the 
objectives of the Atlantic Charter] we shall eradicate that German militarism which has so often 
disrupted the peace of the world.”377  The Handbook for Military Government in Germany Prior 
to Defeat or Surrender obligated inter alia the Military Government officer to be responsible 
“(a) …for enforcing the law relating to dissolution of the Nazi Party, (c) for ensuring that official 
positions in the German Administrative agencies and units… are filled by persons who have 
been carefully investigated and are non-Nazis.”378  
 Colonel Dawson, the U.S. Military Governor of Württemberg-Baden stated in an article 
published in the Nachrichtenblatt der Militärregierung für den Stadtkreis Stuttgart as the fourth 
objective of the Military Government “the extermination of Nazism, Fascism, German 
militarism, and of the Nazi ‘fat cats.’”379  Lieutenant Colonel Jackson, the U.S. city commandant 
explained via Radio Stuttgart his intentions.  “We are determined to eliminate the impact and the 
control exercised by the Nazis and their policies.  [As a consequence] every person in public 
office having supported Nazi policies had to be removed from their positions forever… We will 
remove from the city administration all officers who could stain the city administration as being 
Nazi.”380 
 However, the denazification process started way before the U.S. took over Stuttgart from 
the French on 8 July 1945.  The French Military Government demanded on 3 May that all 
officeholders of the Party, all members of the Schutzstaffel SS, including the Waffen-SS, all 
members of the Sturmabteilung SA, as well as all members of the Geheime Staatspolizei Gestapo 
and Sicherheitsdienst SD had to be reported to the Chief of Police.  From the NS-Fliegerkorps 
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NSFK and the NS-Kraftfahrerkorps NSKK officeholders from squad leader up, just as all 
officeholders of the NS Frauenschaft, all higher ranking Hitler Jugend HJ leaders and the factory 
representatives of the Deutsche Arbeitsfront were on the list to be reported.381  Additionally, 
every officer of the city administration had to answer the questionnaire of the French authorities 
about earlier political activities.  The Nachrichtenblatt der Militärregierung für den Stadtkreis 
Stuttgart published the results of the French actions on 29 June 1945.  The paper reported that 
the city had dismissed more than 550 officers, clerks and employees, among them seven of the 
ten full-time council members.382   
 The city took the initiative for denazification, too.  On 8 May 1945 the mayor issued a 
decree suspending for the time being all public servants holding ranks as leaders of the SA or SS, 
as well as party members holding the rank of local group leader and up. A second decree 
broadened the suspension to all party members who joined prior to 1 April 1933.383  
 With the United States taking over Stuttgart from the French, the denazification process 
became more aggressive and general.  Denazification was an important prerequisite and a 
keystone of the U.S. occupation policy.  Hypothesizing a ‘collective guilt’ of all Germans – one 
needs only to recall the ‘Crusade in Europe’ mindset – they “planned to screen the whole 
population and hold them accountable.”384  The denazification with the U.S. standard, the 
strictest of the four Allied Powers, was not successful.  The British and the French, even the 
Russians, demonstrated a much more practice-oriented and rational approach than the 
Americans.   
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 Lieutenant Colonel Jackson, the head of the Military Government for the city, informed 
the residents on 27 September 1945, about the success so far of the denazification.  He claimed 
the denazification of the city administration as almost complete with 2,532 officers 
discharged.385  Another source mentions 2,438 discharged members of the city administration–
1,037 public officers, 1,091 white-collar workers and 310 blue-collar workers. The proportions 
of the three groups of dismissed personnel demonstrated the increasingly elevated Party 
membership among higher qualified professionals.  The Technische Werke Stuttgart, a critical 
public utility company of the city, attested that Party membership was high among public 
officers and white-collar workers, while blue-collar worker Party membership was low among 
the 353 people dismissed.386 However, Lieutenant Colonel Jackson pointed out the 
denazification would continue until the United States was convinced that all Nazis and Nazi-
principles were eliminated from German life.  
 The Military Government Law No. 8, 26 September 1945, extended the denazification 
process to all branches of commerce and industry, as Lieutenant Colonel Jackson had announced 
in his article in the Nachrichtenblatt.  The key provision of the law demanded that Party 
members or members of the party-affiliated organizations be employed only as common manual 
workers.  Any supervising or managerial activities were strictly prohibited for these people.387  
All people concerned had to complete a questionnaire of the Military Government.  The Military 
Government Law No. 8 had to be enforced by the particular employer.  Violations of the 
provisions of the law by both, employer and employee, would be punished.  The law provided 
the possibility to the discharged people to appeal to a review board.  
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 The drastic enforcement of the law did not cause much damage to the industry in the U.S. 
Zone as had been suspected as there was not much industrial activity at all.  However, the law 
affected considerably the health and related services, food production, et cetera.  The Military 
Government soon amended the law allowing former Party members to stay temporarily in their 
profession as long as the appeals procedure took.  The amendment applied to all businesses 
processing, distributing and selling food, as well as thirty-five other occupations ranging from 
pharmacies and physicians to dental care,388 to prevent the collapse of the more than fragile 
supply system of the city.   
 Law No. 8 resulted in examining more than one million questionnaires by the Military 
Government.  The Military Government reported “a cumulative total of 260,000 active Nazis… 
had been removed… Nearly 150,000 of this number were removed or excluded from public 
service alone, more than 71,000 from private industry, and some 39,000 from other fields.”389  
To these numbers one had to add “…approximately 80,000 persons in the mandatory arrest 
categories… detained [in the U.S. Zone]… estimat[ing] that approximately 35,000 more who are 
temporarily held as prisoners of war will be added to this total,”390 already in custody.   
 Ex-President Herbert Hoover on The President’s Economic Mission to Germany and 
Austria lamented in his report that “the 90,000 Nazis held in concentration camps and the 
1,900,000 others under sanctions by which they can only engage in manual labor comprise a 
considerable part of the former technical and administrative skill of the country,”391 now 
excluded from the work to revive and rebuild Germany according to their skills, adding to the 
blood-letting of talent and knowledge through the war.   
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 The U.S. Transportation Section noted that the denazification process resulted in the 
discharge of 1,043 officials (non-manual workers) of the Reichsbahndirektion (Railroad District) 
Stuttgart from a total of 12,898 officials as of 30 November 1945.  The dismissals did not cause 
severe service disruptions.392  However, the Military Government realized in its Monthly Report, 
March 1946, that “a critical deficiency of supervisory personnel and men with technical training, 
such as electro-technicians, yardmasters and workshop foremen, is being felt.  Meanwhile, 
efforts to train replacements [for discharged Nazis] have been delayed by shortages of teachers, 
books, and classroom space.”393   The U.S. Trade and Commerce Section complained in 
November, that the Regional Statistical Agency in Stuttgart could not “operate at present because 
of the removal of a number of key officials under the denazification program… Trained 
scientific statisticians are needed to get the Agency working again.”394  Also the U.S. Food and 
Agriculture Section bemoaned, in its report No. 5, 20 December 1945, that the “continued 
application of the denazification program has virtually removed all persons with talent… from 
the staff of agricultural organizations in the U.S. Zone,”395 hampering efforts to improve the 
agricultural situation.  A month earlier, the Section noted that “the food rationing program was 
temporarily hindered in Wuerttemberg where the dismissal of Nazis employed by the statistical 
office left the organization with few personnel having knowledge of nutritional aspects of food 
rationing and the efficient determination of ration scales.”396  The examples demonstrated the 
negative effects of the U.S. Denazification Program.  Ex-President Herbert Hoover also 
underscored this pervasive problem in his report to President Truman in February 1947.   
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 The Military Government examined, by April 1946, 1,531,000 questionnaires from 
former Party members and Party affiliated organizations.  Of these, “92 percent had been 
processed and action had been completed.”397  In the U.S. Zone, with a population of roughly 
17.5 million, more than ten per cent of the adult population had been removed from office, not 
counting the inmates of the internment camps. 
 The next step of the U.S. denazification program was a German law.  The Gesetz zur 
Befreiung von Nationalsozialismus und Militarismus (Law for Liberation from National 
Socialism and Militarism) of 5 March 1946, required all German citizens 18 years and up, to 
answer a comprehensive Meldebogen (Registration Form) and to be examined and judged by 
special courts, so-called Spruchkammern (Trial Tribunals).  The law (Article 4) classified all 
adult Germans into five categories: I. Hauptschuldige (major offenders); II. Belastete 
(offenders); III. Minderbelastete (lesser offenders); IV. Mitläufer (followers); and V. Entlastete 
(exonerated).  The Military Government estimated that the 397 Trial Tribunals would receive 
13.2 million registration forms, 3 million from Hessen, 3 million from Württemberg-Baden, and 
7.2 million from Bavaria.398  In August 1946, with the Youth Amnesty, the Military Governor 
amnestied all young people born after 1 January 1919 not belonging to the categories of major 
offenders and offenders from the provisions of the Law of Liberation.  Additionally, in 
December 1946, he amnestied “persons in the low income groups and those more than 50 
percent physically disabled,”399 except major offenders and offenders, reducing the load of the 
trial tribunals.  Low income meant, according to an article in the Information Bulletin of the High 
Commissioner for Germany, an annual earning of less than RM 3,600 in 1943-45 and owning 
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property of less than RM 20,000 on January 1, 1945.400  It was calculated, that 800,000 members 
of the low-income group and 40,000 disabled profited from the December amnesty, also known 
as the Christmas amnesty.401  The fourteen Trial Tribunals of the city of Stuttgart processed circa 
360,000 Registration Forms.  As of March 1947, the prosecutors handed down 82,750 
exonerated judgments and quashed 5,004 cases.  5,625 residents received fines.402     
 In June-July 1947, the Military Government Denazification and Public Safety Report 
stated 
As of 31 July, 92 percent, or approximately 11,000,000 of the total number of 
12,000,000 persons who have had to register under the Denazification Law in 
the U.S. Zone have had their status legally determined, and necessary action 
has been taken to implement the decision.  Most of these persons 
(approximately 8,735,000) were found to be not chargeable, or amnestied 
(1,999,000) and the reminder have undergone court action.  Approximately 
one-half of the persons indicated as not being heavily incriminated and one-
fourth of those indicated as heavily incriminated have already been tried.  The 
work that lies ahead of the Trial Tribunals consists of approximately 738,000 
cases of more heavily incriminated and 244,000 cases of less heavily 
incriminated Nazis, making a total of approximately 982,000 Nazis still to be 
tried.403   
 
 The final and impressive numbers of the denazification efforts in the U.S. Zone strike an 
interesting balance.  From the total 13,416,101 Germans registered, 9,746,862 were not 
chargeable per definition.  Of the 3,669,239 chargeable cases, the Public Prosecutor amnestied 
and/or quashed 2,709,606 cases.  At Trial Tribunals 1,698 persons were convicted as major 
offenders, 22,598 as offenders, and 487,996 as followers.  18,571 people were exonerated and 
320,713 amnestied.  30,781 people were sentenced to special labor, 27,587 lost their properties 
by confiscation, 23,616 were permanently banned from holding public office, 125,510 were 
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restricted in employment, and 572,993 people were fined.404  The dismissal of scientific 
technical, administrative and entrepreneurial talent and skills brought about the denazification 
program could not really hurt an economic situation in Germany as it was already functioning at 
the minimum.  No numbers exist to quantify the consequences of the bloodletting caused by the 
denazification.  However, if the denazification did not hamper the incentives to revive the 
German economy, it certainly did not boost the economic revival.  
5.7. Summary  
 Having suffered from Allied bombings, the surviving residents of Stuttgart welcomed the 
end of the fighting.  The occupation by French forces on 22 April 1945 was less welcome.  Soon 
the residents were waiting for the Americans to replace the French, hoping for improvements.  
With the arrival of the U.S. forces the food situation improved, but stayed below the 2,000 
calories subsistence level.  The Military Government made it clear that denazification, 
demilitarization, and democratization were key objectives of their policy.   
 The Military Government further announced their intent to improve living conditions and 
the equal distribution of food rations throughout the U.S. Zone.  Germany had to feed itself, so 
the official U.S. policy.  However, the food situation got so bad during the winter of 1945 to 
1946 that the U.S. had to provide food for the population to prevent mass starvation.  Hundred of 
thousand tons of foodstuffs had to be imported from the U.S. to keep the Germans alive at a 
subsistence level.   
 The denazification forced many highly qualified personnel to take on manual jobs for 
survival. The dismissal of scientific, technical, administrative and entrepreneurial talent could 
not further hamper the German economy–an economy already operating on a minimum scale by 
Allied restrictions.      
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Chapter 6: How Stuttgart dealt with the consequences of war 
6.1. Stuttgart’s financial situation in 1945  
 Stuttgart with its diversified and versatile industries was one of the most potent cities in 
Germany regarding its tax base.  Before the war Stuttgart had the second highest tax potential 
among all German cities with estimated tax revenues of 80,599,456 Reichsmark.  During the war 
the city paid war contributions to the Reich government starting in 1939 in the amounts of 
10,779,098 RM and of 33,235,026 RM in the fiscal year (1 April to 31 March) 1944.  Overall, 
the Reich government received from Stuttgart a sum of 134,550,877 RM of war contributions 
during the war years.  The city paid additional war related costs of approximately 65,000,000 
RM for the family support of drafted soldiers, for the set up of war hospitals, for the 
establishment and running of children’s homes, for air raid protection procedures and other 
expenses caused by the war–centered economy and for war-related public welfare.  
 These war costs the city bore during the years 1939 to 1944 totaled roughly 200,000,000 
RM.  This sum represented nearly forty three per cent of all tax revenues during the war; the 
city’s war contribution consumed two thirds of all tax revenues in the fiscal year 1944.405  That 
was the financial situation the city administration faced at war’s end. A city with its housing in 
ruins, with its industrial base partially destroyed, with collapsed traffic facilities, with failing 
public utilities, facing returning evacuees, released displaced persons and refugees competing for 
shelter and food.  The occupation forces also competed for housing, however, with their absolute 
power they requisitioned what prime housing they wanted.  
 The chief of the city’s Treasury Department described the situation in his report Die 
Finanzlage der Stadt Stuttgart (The Financial Situation of the City of Stuttgart) in a special 
edition of the Nachrichtenblatt der Militärregierung für den Stadtkreis Stuttgart published on 31 
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December 1945 without palliation.  The sad state of affairs inherited from the Nazis he 
demonstrated by the sheer enormity of numbers he presented in his account summarized below. 
 Of the 63,000 structures within the city, 14,370, or circa 23 per cent, were completely 
destroyed, 9,620 edifices or 15.3 per cent were so heavily damaged they could not be used for 
housing, 18,710 or 29.7 per cent received medium damages and 18,300 buildings were lightly 
damaged.  Approximately 2,000 structures, roughly 3 per cent, were not harmed. The destruction 
and damage of the building portfolio would result in a likely reduction of the Grundsteuer 
(property tax) from 13,000,000 RM to 5,000,000 RM, a decline of 60 per cent, the chief of the 
Treasury Department explained.  He also proposed that the revenues the industry and skilled 
crafts and trades paid in the form of the Gewerbesteuer, (local business tax) declined from 
52,400,000 RM in the fiscal year 1944 to a bare tenth of 5,200,000 RM.  A rough estimate 
calculated the expenses for the reconstitution of structures to 6.2 billion RM, damages to 
industrial property to 820,000,000 RM, losses of private properties and supplies, as well as 
mobile equipment to 5.35 billion RM and 40,000,000 RM for damage to public utilities, resulting 
in the total sum of 12.41 billion RM.406  
 The chief of the Treasury Department expected for the fiscal year 1945 a sharp decline of 
city revenues altogether to 81,000,000 RM, mainly caused by the loss of contributions of the 
local business tax, estimated at 47,000,000 RM.  Stuttgart’s tax collection during the first half of 
the fiscal year 1945, 1 April to 30 September, amounted to 19,078,000 RM.  The bills the city 
paid during this time accumulated to a total of 22,150,000 RM.407  In addition, the chief expected 
a steep increase for the city in welfare expenditures, especially since the Reich payments for the 
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family support for drafted soldiers and the financial support for evacuated families ceased to 
exist. 
 The occupation costs, first for the French occupation from 22 April to 7 July 1945 and 
from 8 July for the U.S. occupation, further burdened the city budget.  As of 31 December 1945 
occupation costs had accumulated to more than 17,000,000 RM.408  A letter of 11 July 1945 
expressed the intention of the Württembergische Landesverwaltung für Finanzen (Financial 
Administration of Württemberg) that in representation of a non-existing central German 
government the state of Württemberg would pay 75 per cent of the costs demanded by the 
occupation authorities for the accommodation and subsistence of their troops.409  However, the 
tax revenues of the Württembergische Landesverwaltung during the first six months of the fiscal 
year 1945 amounted to 86,000,000 RM, a decline of twenty nine per cent compared with the 
revenues of fiscal year 1944.410  With the take-over of the occupation cost by the state (since 
1949 the Federal Government took over this duty) the financial burden for the residents of 
Stuttgart was lightened.  With this decision, all residents of Württemberg-Baden had to bear their 
share of the occupation costs.  However, the decision did not change the basic truth that the 
common residents/taxpayers had to bear the burden of the lost war.  
 The decision to compensate initially only 75 per cent of the occupation costs directly 
related to the accommodation and subsistence of the troops put the city in a no-win situation.  
The city had no chance to refuse the fulfillment of requests of the occupation authorities.  The 
occupation authorities exercised “supreme legislative, judicial and executive authority and power 
within the occupied territory…,”411 according to General Eisenhower’s Proclamation No. 1.  In 
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addition, the Proclamation No. 1 of the Military Government – Germany, United States Zone 
stated in Article III “all Military Government and other orders… issued by or under the authority 
of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, are continued in full force and effect in 
the United States Zone of Occupation…”412 leaving the administrative quarreling about 
payments to the Germans. Under these circumstances the Germans had to pay whatever the 
occupation troops requested, paid by the city or the state, even the improperly requested goods 
and services such as the French requests mentioned earlier in chapter 5.  The French requested 
among others, par example, clothing for men, women and children, fabric and sewing material at 
a value of 2,252,000 RM or 740 pieces of machine tools valued at a price of 4,042,000 RM.413  
 To alleviate the financial restraints the city looked for relief.  To increase revenues for the 
communities all over Germany, the Allied Control Council enacted a tax law on 20 October 
1945.  Article I of the law increased the payroll tax 25 per cent from 1 October to 31 December 
1945.  According to Article II the income tax and the corporate income tax climbed at a rate of 
6.25 per cent for the year 1945.414  As an example to further increase government revenues the 
Military Government raised “telephone rates on 1 April 1946 as follows: 50 percent over existing 
rates for all kinds of telephone services, 87½ percent for local telegrams, 33⅓ percent for inter-
urban telegrams and double rates for urgent telegrams.”415  To this rise in state taxes, the city 
council raised community taxes, too.  Stuttgart increased the rate of assessment for the property 
tax by 50 per cent, retroactive to 1 April 1945.  The beverage tax and entertainment taxes were 
doubled.416   
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 Furthermore, the city council considered several more options to increase revenues.  The 
city council rejected a continued increase of the property tax – out of fear that the owners would 
charge the tenants for the additional amount.  An increase of the local business tax was 
disapproved because of the state of the city’s economy.  The city council increased the dog 
license fee from 42 RM to 60 RM for every dog, however, these additional revenues were 
limited because of the few dogs in the city.  The city proposed to the state the introduction of a 
general tax for radios. A monthly tax of 1 RM would generate about 780,000 RM from the 
existing 65,000 radios in the city.  Also, the city considered raising fees and establishing new 
fees for services provided, as well as raising the prices for public utilities like gas, water and 
electrical energy supply.  
 In his article of 31 December, the chief of the Treasury Department proposed to petition 
the state to declare for Stuttgart a state of financial emergency. He also suggested a burden-
sharing program with all communities for the expenses generated by the municipalization of the 
Reich police force ordered by the Military Government.  The new city administration reduced the 
Reich police force for the Stuttgart area from 6,375 officers to about 1,400 officers,417 so 
reducing the financial burden from the municipalization considerably.  The expenses caused by 
the ceased Reich payments for the family support of drafted soldiers and evacuated families were 
to be included in the burden-sharing program, too.  Equally, the city called for a pledge to the 
state to take over the remaining 25 per cent of the incidental occupation costs and to pay for the 
construction of temporary bridges over the Neckar River, including the removal of debris from 
roads.418  It was a bleak picture the chief of the Treasury Department drafted.  Even with utmost 
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thriftiness the city would not be able to cover the expected shortfall of 40,000,000 RM for the 
fiscal year 1945.   
 Stuttgart, together with the cities of Heilbronn and Ulm, as well as the county 
governments, achieved some relief when the Württemberg Treasury Department agreed in a 
letter of 7 January 1946 (Finanzministerium Nr. XIV B9-1117/45) the taking over by 
Württemberg-Baden of the 25 per cent of the occupation costs to date paid for by city and county 
governments.419  As already mentioned, the complete takeover of the occupation costs by the 
state made it easier for cities like Stuttgart.  However, the ordinary taxpayers, may they be from 
heavily damaged cities like Stuttgart, Heilbronn or Pforzheim or from small towns like the one 
this author lived in, or from villages not at all directly affected by the war destruction, had to 
bear the burden of increased state and community taxes.  It was a solidarity forced on all 
residents of the U.S.-created state of Württemberg-Baden, a solidarity necessary for the survival 
of all. 
6.2. Stuttgart’s occupation costs at a glance 
 The basis for levying occupation costs from the inhabitants of an occupied territory is the 
“Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land,” commonly known as the 
Hague Convention (II) of 29 July 1899.  Article 52 of Section III – On Military Authority over 
Hostile Territory states in plain language in the first sentence “neither requisition in kind nor 
services can be demanded from communes or inhabitants except for the necessities of the army 
of occupation.”420  According to Article 42 enemy “territory is considered occupied when it is 
actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.”421  The Hague Convention (II) implies 
that a government in power exists when a capitulation of forces is agreed upon.  Article 35 
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demands “capitulations agreed on between the Contracting Parties must be in accordance with 
the rules of military honor.  When once settled, they must be scrupulously observed by both 
parties.”422  
 Article 35 assumes that a functioning government exists able to act as contracting party.  
This case, however, did not exist after the unconditional surrender of 8 May 1945, and the 
imprisonment of the Dönitz government later that month.  The Declaration Regarding the Defeat 
of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority by Allied Powers of June 5, 1945 stated 
in its preamble the non-existence of a “central Government or authority in Germany capable of 
accepting responsibility for the maintenance of order, the administration of the country and 
compliance with the requirements of the victorious Powers… [therefore the four Allied 
Representatives] assume supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers 
possessed by the German Government, the High Command and any state, municipal or local 
government or authority.”423  With these conditions in mind, all requirements of the occupying 
power became legal; the Allies exercised the highest legal and executive powers in Germany.  
The staff of the Department for Occupation Costs at the University Tübingen described 
Germany’s situation clear-cut. Germany’s unconditional surrender and the non-existence of a 
central government, they noted, left it “entirely to the Occupying Powers to determine what 
goods and services must be supplied to the Occupation Forces… the German authorities herein 
act[ed] merely as pay offices for the supply measures of the Occupation authorities.”424  
 Back from the brief commentary on the Hague Convention and the Declaration of the 
Allied Powers, to the demands the city of Stuttgart faced from the occupation.  Stuttgart’s Amt 
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für Besatzungsleistungen (Department for Occupation Costs) listed carefully every month the 
cost for goods and services the occupying power requested, what goods and services the city 
could provide and what the city, respective of the state, had to pay for.  
 The official form listed under the headline generic occupation costs 
- the costs for the confiscation of existing goods in stock (for the purpose of housing and 
subsistence of occupation troops) and the costs for the manufacture of new articles (production 
and supply of consumer goods and devices for the occupation troops), 
- the costs for rebuilding and alterations of structures, including requisitioned housing,  
- the costs for the maintenance of military equipment, 
- the expenditures for DP camps including consumer goods when approved,  
- billet compensation for requisitioned living space with ancillary expenses, 
- wages and salaries for the civilian workforce employed by the occupying power,  
- reparations (confiscation and supply of goods not marked for the immediate housing 
  and subsistence of the occupation troops), and finally 
- a category for services not covered by the other classifications.425 
All the services added up to an average monthly bill of 5,263,932.91 RM for the period 8 May 
1945 to 20 June 1948, the time of the currency reform.  
 Table 1 may give the reader an impression of the sums the city had to deal with 
representing the goods and services Stuttgart had to provide.  With the exception of the months 
of September and November 1945 the total sums of the occupation costs leveled off to almost 4 
million Reichsmark.  The differences in the amounts in the various columns are surprising.  They 
can be explained partially by reason of relocating troops, increase or decrease of unit strengths 
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and of the changing structure of the Military Government organization, as well as the fluctuating 
numbers of civilians employed by the occupying power.   
 Particularly interesting is the steep increase in the amount of billet pay, the compensation 
for requisitioned fully furnished and equipped houses, duplexes and apartments in March 1946 to 
110,400.25 RM.  The U.S. housing office together with the city housing office requisitioned 
houses for the arrival of U.S. family members.  The first transport of family members arrived in 
April 1946.   
 For the anticipated long occupation period General Eisenhower referred already in a letter 
to General Marshall, the Secretary of War, to “the possibility of enunciating some  
policy whereby certain personnel in the occupation forces could bring their wives to 
[Germany].”426  However, Lee Kruger realized in her dissertation, Logistics Matters: the Growth 
of Little Americas in Occupied Germany, that “U.S. military government regulations prohibited 
American families from living in the same buildings as German families.”427  This regulation 
forced many more Germans than necessary out of the already scarce living quarters.   
 The wages and salaries paid by the German government to the civilians employed by the 
occupation power varied highly, too.  These sums fluctuate between a half and one and a half 
million Reichsmark.  The fluctuation can be charged to the changing numbers of U.S. forces, as 
well as changing tasks like clearing waterways, repairing bridges and the like.  
 During the seven months Table 1 covers, the occupation costs added up to 24,510,042.37 
RM, correlating with an average amount of 3,501,434.62 RM per month the city had to provide 
goods and services to the occupying power.   
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 To make the financial obligations obvious for everybody, the Department for Occupation 
Costs itemized all costs in a report of 8 November 1948. The report Kritische Stellungnahme zur 
Entwicklung der Besatzungskosten und Kosten für Zwangsverschleppte im Stadtkreis Stuttgart428 
(Critical Statement about the Development of Occupation Costs and of the Expenses for 
Displaced Persons in Stuttgart) lists the expenditures for the occupation from 8 May 1945 to 20 
June 1948.  The currency reform of 20 June 1948 replaced the Reichsmark by the Deutsche 
Mark.  Furthermore, the department reports the Deutsche Mark expenditures of the III. Quarter 
1948.  The quarter lasted exactly from 21 June to 30 December 1948.  
During the Reichsmark period of the occupation of 39 months (see Table 2) the city spent 
200,029,450.66 RM on occupation costs, a monthly average of 5,128,960.27 RM.  The most 
significant part of the total sum, namely 142,895,921.10 RM was spent on the requirement of the 
U.S. forces, with a monthly average of 3,663,979.98 RM.  One has to remember that a city of 
226,067 residents on 30 April 1945 and of 461,064429 in 1948, was charged by the occupying 
powers with goods and services according to the sums in Table 2.  A calculation of the first 
Deutsche Mark quarter from 21 June to 30 September 1948 reveals that the sum of 
11,284,573.28 DM for 104 days means an average of 3,255,165.40 DM per month for U.S. 
occupation costs, nicely fitting into the monthly pattern of occupation costs presented in Table 1. 
The sum of 3,255,165.40 DM covered the needs of the 69 U.S. agencies in Stuttgart.  The 
agencies employed on average 6,875 civilians, Germans and Displaced Persons; the Military 
Government employing 637 civilians and the U.S. Military Post employing 6,238 civilians.  The 
critical report of the Department for Occupation Costs listed for August 1948 6,879 civilian 
employees. From this number 773 people were employed in guard duties, 823 people as drivers  
                                                
428 Stadtarchiv Stuttgart, Bestand 14/1, Hauptaktei Gruppe 0, Signatur 362, Leistungen für die Besatzungsmacht. 




Table 1: Accounting figures of the city of Stuttgart regarding occupation costs 
from 9/45 to 3/46 
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and airport personnel, 1,515 in workshops, 1,352 in offices, 219 worked as engineers in 
workshops and offices, 1,581 in property management (cleaning, heating and caring for U.S. 
living quarters), 487 in kitchen and dining facilities, 85 worked in education and health service 
and 44 dealt with press and politics.430 
 
    Table 2: Costs of Goods and Services demanded by the Occupying Powers 1945-1948 
 
Fiscal year French Occ. Costs 
(RM) 
Expenses for DP’s 
(RM) 




8 May 45-31 Mar 46 10,824,169.11 3,011,451.44 18,091,492.12 31,927,112.67 
1 Apr 46-31 Mar 47 3,459,782.10 5,332,193.25 46,953,983.16 55,745,958.51 
1 Apr 47-31 Mar 48 15,027,693.67 4,966,854.54 51,241,598.11 71,236,146.32 
1 Apr 48-20 Jun 48 10,378,177.34 4,133,208.11 26,608,847.71 41,120,233.16 
Total (RM) 39,689,822.22 17,443,707.34 142,895,921.10 200,029,450.66 
     
 DM DM DM DM 
21 Jun 48-30Sep 48 402.06 1,260,217.69 11,284,573.28 12,545,193.03 
 
Source: Stadtarchiv Stuttgart, Bestand 14/1, Hauptaktei 0, Signatur 362. Leistungen für die Besatzungsmacht.    
Kritische Stellungnahme zur Entwicklung der Besatzungskosten und Kosten für Zwangsverschleppte im 
Stadtkreis Stuttgart.   
 
  The author of the report suspects that half of the people employed in property 
management were working for U.S. families. He also suspects that a considerable number 
of people employed as drivers and airport personnel were used as drivers of privately owned 
vehicles,431 service members were allowed to ship to Germany.  U.S. families in occupied 
Germany received services free of charge – they could not have dreamt of such services in the 
United States. 
 From the currency reform of 20 June 1948 up to 31 March 1950, the state of 
Württemberg-Baden remitted 133,606,070.23 DM to the city of Stuttgart, who paid bills in a 
                                                
430 Stadtarchiv Stuttgart, Bestand 14/1, Hauptaktei Gruppe 0, Signatur 362. Leistungen für die Besatzungsmacht. 13. 
431 Ibid., 14. 
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total amount of 133,418,825.82 DM for occupation costs accrued during this time, resulting in an 
average monthly payment for occupation costs of 6,353,277.42 DM (see Table 3 as an example).    
 With denazification and demilitarization close to being finished, re-education going  
 
 
      Table 3: Stuttgart’s Occupation Costs from 4/49 to 3/50 
 
 














ahead, and the democratization process on its way to statehood, one would expect a decreasing 
demand for occupation costs.  The newspaper, Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 23 September 1948, 
reported that the Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, General Lucius D. Clay ordered a rate 
ceiling for occupation costs.  As a consequence, the Military Government of Württemberg-Baden 
had to release 1,500 wage-earners by 1 December 1948.432 
 The “Critical Statement about the Development of Occupation Costs and of the Expenses 
for Displaced Persons in Stuttgart” displayed an interesting detail as a consequence of General 
Clay’s occupation cost reduction order.  The number of people in Stuttgart employed by the U.S. 
reached 6,825 in May 1948.  In August the number peaked at 6,879 people and dipped to 6,860 
in September.  The report cites as an example the Stuttgart PX, located at the Mittnachtbau: The 
                                                
432 Stadtarchiv Stuttgart, Bestand 14/1, Signatur 362. Stuttgarter Nachrichten Nr. 117 vom 23. September 1948.  
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PX employed in May 756 people, earning a total of 166,677.28 Mark.433434  From the 756 
employees 48 were paid a wage sum of 9,098.50 Mark by the Germans through occupation costs.  
The remaining 708 employees paid by the PX, earned a total of 157,578.78 Mark. 
 In September, the number of employees dropped to 595 people, a reduction of 161 people 
or 21 per cent.  From the remaining 595 people, 339 or 57 per cent of the workforce shifted to be 
paid by the Germans.  They earned a wage sum of 85,506.71 Mark.  That is more than nine times 
what Germany paid in May.  The PX followed the order to reduce personnel, but instead of 
decreasing the occupation costs like General Clay intended, this U.S. employer increased the 
burden on the Germans.435  However, the newspaper article reports that the overall occupation 
costs for Württemberg-Baden decreased from 20 to 22 million prior to the currency reform to 
10.4 to 14.1 million436 in July/August 1948.  
 Already in a memorandum of 21 December 1942, John Maynard Keynes articulated that 
a thoroughly demilitarized Germany should be required to contribute “to the cost of preserving 
world peace at least equal to the burden which we [Great Britain would] be assuming 
ourselves.”437  One could substantiate Keynes’ argumentation – Germany paying for the 
guarantee of external security – only when a sovereign Germany demanded it.  Few Germans 
would accept the argument that occupied Germany should view occupation costs as its 
contribution to preserve external security by keeping peace.  An occupied territory, with foreign 
powers exercising supreme authority cannot conclude such an agreement.  Occupied Germany 
                                                
433 Stadtarchiv Stuttgart, Bestand 14/1, Hauptaktei Gruppe 0, Signatur 362. Leistungen für die Besatzungsmacht. 16-
17.  
434 The author of the “Critical Statement about the Development of Occupation Costs and of the Expenses for 
Displaced Persons in Stuttgart” used, in his report, the term Mark instead of Reichsmark or Deutsche Mark.  He 
equalized Reichsmark and Deutsche Mark by arguing that the delivery of goods and services, as well as rent at 
compulsory prices would be compensated at the same nominal value in Reichsmark or Deutsche Mark.   
435 Stadtarchiv Stuttgart, Bestand 14/1, Hauptaktei Gruppe 0, Signatur 362 Leistungen für die Besatzungsmacht. 
436 Interestingly, the article of the Stuttgarter Nachrichten mentions neither Reichsmark nor Deutsche Mark. 
437 Donald Moggridge, ed., The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Vol. XXVI Activities 1941-1946, 
Shaping the Post-War World, Bretton Woods, and Reparations. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980). 341.  
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could be forced to pay occupation costs of any amount.  “Occupation costs” changed names to 
“stationing costs” only when the Federal Republic of West Germany, established on 20 
September 1949, became a NATO member in May 1955. 
 National interests trumped a Germany governed by a unanimous Allied Control Council.  
Frictions within the Allied Control Council led to the Blockade of Berlin and finally to the break-
up of the war coalition.  The tensions with the USSR prevented a further cut in U.S. troop 
strength. Additionally, the rising numbers of U.S. family members arriving in Germany forced 
the building of living quarters, of schools, movie theaters, kindergartens and hospitals, as well as 
an expansion of service infrastructure like commissaries, PX-stores, garages and recreational 
services to be paid for by Germany. 
6.3. The Reichsmark budgets 1945 to 1948 
 In 1945, Stuttgart became the capital of the artificially created entity of Württemberg-
Baden, one of the three states of the U.S. occupation zone, disregarding the U.S. sector of Berlin 
and the Bremen enclave.  Stuttgart was not the largest city, nor was it the most severely damaged 
city in the U.S. occupation zone.  The U.S. sector of divided Berlin, the cities of München and 
Frankfurt had more pre- and post-war residents than Stuttgart.  The cities of Nürnberg, 
Würzburg, Kassel, and Pforzheim suffered more damage and destruction from the Allied 
bombing campaigns, as well as from battles on the ground than Stuttgart. 
However, Stuttgart will be used as an example of how cities dealt financially with the 
war-caused damages, destruction, with the influx of refugees, expellees, with returning evacuees, 
and with the hundred of thousands displaced persons, the heritage of Hitler’s and his party’s 
twelve years in power.  The problems Stuttgart faced after the war all communities in Germany 
faced, whether located in the U.S., the British, the French, or the Russian occupation zones.  
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  The highly centralized governing structure of the Third Reich fell apart after the defeat.  
The absence of a functioning Reich government, as well as the non-existence of state-level 
governing entities, increased the difficulties the cities and communities faced.  Stuttgart was on 
its own throughout the occupation regimes of the French forces between 22 April 1945, and from 
8 July 1945 on, of the American forces during the first months of the occupation.  Stuttgart had 
to satisfy the legal, sometimes illegal438 requests, of the occupiers, relying only on its own 
personnel, material and financial resources, lacking the backing of a state or Reich government.  
However, aside from the relatively short time at the beginning of the occupation, the city had to 
pay the incidental costs caused by the French and later on by the American troops stationed in 
Stuttgart, as well as the costs of the U.S. Military Government for Württemberg-Baden and of 
the U.S. city government. The Württembergische Landesverwaltung für Finanzen, the 
predecessor of the treasury department of the state of Württemberg-Baden agreed upon for the 
time being to pay seventy-five per cent of the incurred occupation costs439, later covering the 
total sum by proxy of a non-existing Reich government.440   
 Aside from the state-paid occupation costs, Stuttgart faced numerous financial challenges 
Stuttgart had to shoulder on its own without remedy from outside.  The city needed to provide 
food and shelter for its bombed-out residents and returning evacuees, to reestablish the 
semblance of normal life in a devastated city without peacetime amenities like running water, 
gas and electricity, without public transportation and without a working public infrastructure.  
 To these pressing needs the city administration had to cope with the requests of the 
occupier, with confiscations and requisitions, with detentions and the denazification, and with 
                                                
438 Article 52 of the Hague Convention (II) of 29 July 1899 states in Article 52 “neither requisition in kind nor 
services can be demanded from communes or inhabitants except for the necessities of the army of occupation.” 
439 Stadtarchiv Stuttgart, Bestand 14/1, Signatur 362. 
440 Letter of the Treasury Department, 7 January 1946, Finanzministerium Nr. XIV B9-1117/45. 
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the request to house and feed the numerous displaced persons released from forced labor in the 
city’s many industrial plants, now roaming the streets and countryside on their way home.  The 
requests and decrees of the Military Government superseded all the needs of the residents, 
refugees, and evacuees.  The French and U.S. military forces had the power and they used the 
power to get what they wanted and what they deemed necessary.   
 During such times of crisis the city administration had no time and resources to prepare a 
city budget for the fiscal year 1945, lasting from 1 April 1945 to 31 March 1946.  Only toward 
the end of 1946, when the newly elected state government of Württemberg-Baden provided the 
legal base for the final state approval of the budget plan,441 did the city administration fix budget 
plans for the years of 1945 and 1946, publicizing the plans on 9 January 1947.  The following 
Reichsmark budget for the fiscal year 1947 was late, as well as the Deutsche Mark budget for 
1948.  For the year 1948, the city prepared two budgets, a budget based on the Reichsmark 
currency and a budget based on the Deutsche Mark currency because of the currency reform of 
20 June 1948 in the occupation zones of the three western Allies.  The 1948 Reichsmark budget 
covered the fiscal year from 1 April 1948 to 31 March 1949, whereas the 1948 Deutsche Mark 
budget covered the time from 21 June 1948 to 31 March 1949.  
 It is not the intention to calculate the financial burden the city faced as consequence of 
the war to the Reichsmark and Pfennig.  Rather, the chapter demonstrates the dimension of 
financial liabilities the war caused to the residents of Stuttgart.  Accurate sums of 
Reichsmark/Deutsche Mark of war-caused financial strains one cannot extract from the city 
budgets as a whole, much less what the single resident had to shoulder on his own account.  
 War-caused charges are listed in the budget in every of the ten general sections under 
subsections and titles.  However, the summing-up is not a representation of completeness, it is 
                                                
441 Haushaltssatzung der Stadt Stuttgart für die Rechnungsjahre 1945 und 1946. V. 
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the result of one’s personal and probably subjective judgment.  To demonstrate the scope of the 
burden, the added costs of seven major groups of unmistakably and directly war-related causes 
are summarized: 
1. The sum allocated to repair war damaged public buildings, as well as to replace equipment and 
furniture; 
2. Money allocated for the removal of debris from streets, public places and private property, as 
well as clearing waterways; 
3. The money allocated to repair/rebuild the fourteen destroyed Neckar River bridges separating 
the city; 
4. Money allocated by the city to rebuild/repair war-damaged public housing, as well as 
supporting the reconstruction of private housing; 
5. The money allocated to the rubric “public aid” summarizes all kinds of aid to war-disabled, 
surviving dependents of killed soldiers, prisoners of war, refugees, evacuees, displaced persons, 
politically haunted, the remaining needy, as well as building and running camps for refugees and 
homeless, for Wärmestuben (warming stations) and Volksküchen (soupkitchen), barter offices for 
shoes and clothing and the like; 
6. Expenses allocated for war-related offices like the Besatzungskostenamt (Department for 
Occupation Costs), the Kriegsschädenamt (Office for War Damage), the 
Strassenverkehrsamt/Fahrbereitschaft (Department for Road Traffic/Motor Pool), the 
Wirtschaftsamt (Department for Economy and Commerce), and the Ernährungsamt (Department 
of Food);  
7. Expenses allocated for the acquisition of destroyed office space and office equipment; 
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 To analyze the amounts of allocated money it seems opportune to differentiate between 
the Reichsmark budgets and the Deutsche Mark budgets.  The seven years covering the time span 
from 1945 to 1951 the city prepared eight budgets, four Reichsmark budgets from 1945 to 1948 
and four Deutsche Mark budgets from 1948 to 1951, with two budgets for the fiscal year 1948.  
The 1943 budget was the last complete ordinary budget of Stuttgart.  For the fiscal year 1944, as 
well as for the fiscal year 1945 supervisory authorities directed the city to follow the trend of the 
1943 budget by implementing necessary changes.442  Stuttgart’s 1943 budget of a total of 
206,648,075 RM closed with a surplus of 13,841,232 RM.443  The 1944 balanced budget of 
190,600,000 RM faced expenses for general welfare and youth welfare serviced of 61,000,000  
     Table 4: Stuttgart’s financial burden of the war: 1945-1948 (Reichsmark) budgets444 
Year       1945         1946          1947       1948 
Population445 367,193 414,072 443,095 465,794 
1. Public buildings 3,002,600 5,585,700 8,660,610 7,639,080 
2. Debris removal 4,000,000 5,490,000 6,915,000 6,240,000 
3. Bridge repair 220,000 1,407,000 1,900,000 1,290,000 
4. Public housing 743,800 895,000 300,000 150,000 
5. Public aid 11,040,700 12,672,400 9,740,900 9,524,600 
6. War-related offices 5,158,300 5,780,200 5,965,700 5,914,200 
7. Acquisition of office space 1,023,000 1,354,000 793,000 375,000 
Sum of war-related expenses 25,188,400 33,184,300 34,275,210 31,132,880 
City budget  94,226,700 110,775,420446 116,883,800 111,900,100 
% of city budget        26.7            30           29.3         27.8 
 
 
RM, family support for drafted soldiers of 45,500,000 RM – the Reich government reimbursed 
the city government 42,000,000 RM, the city’s contribution to the war efforts of 33,000,000 RM, 
                                                
442 Haushaltsatzung der Stadt Stuttgart für die Rechnungsjahre 1945 und 1946. V. 
443 Ibid., VI. 
444 Numbers extracted from the city budgets of Stuttgart 1945 to 1948. 
445 Hermann Vietzen. 232. 
446 Haushaltsatzung der Stadt Stuttgart für die Rechnungsjahre 1945 und 1946. IV. 
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as well as expenses of 48,000,000 RM for air-raid protection, Hilfskrankenhaeuser (auxiliary 
hospitals), additional war administrations etc., eating up sixty four per cent of the revenues447.   
  Due to the defeat, the total occupation, the chaos of the first few months of occupation, 
and the creation of new political and administrative units, the city could finally present budgets 
for the fiscal years 1945 and 1946 on 9 January 1947.  The budgets strongly deviated from the 
1943 budget, the last approved wartime budget in revenues and expenses by 98,580,143 RM in 
1945, respectively 82,031,423 RM in 1946.  In 1943 the city achieved a surplus of 13,841,232 
RM by expenses of 192,806,843 RM, in 1945 the city ended up with a deficit of 18,458,130 RM 
while spending accounted for 94,226,700.  The deficit of the 1946 budget amounted to 
18,517,820 RM.448   
 The population of Stuttgart increased between 1945 and 1948 by roughly 100,000.  The 
increase explains the nearly constant expenditures of about ten million RM per year for public 
aid with a peak of twelve and a half million RM in 1946 caused by the influx of the expellees 
from southeastern Europe.  Also, the expenses for war-related offices449 stayed steady over the 
four years, oscillating between five and six million RM.  The city allocated for public buildings, 
debris removal, bridge repair and public housing in 1945 7,966,400 RM, equal to 8.5 per cent of 
the budget, in 1946 13,377,700 RM, equal to 12.1 per cent of the budget, in 1947 17,775,610 
RM, equal to 15.2 per cent of the budget, and in 1948 15,319,080 RM, equal to 13.7 per cent of 
the budget.  The spending for rebuilding the city – topped in 1945 and 1946 only by the 
expenditures for public aid – advertised the efforts of the administration to normalize the public 
life by trying to provide minimum housing, improved traffic infrastructure, and basic public 
                                                
447 Hermann Vietzen. 586. 
448 Ibid., III. 
449 Haushaltsatzung der Stadt Stuttgart für die Rechnungsjahre 1945 und 1946. 34-41. Haushaltsatzung der Stadt 
Stuttgart für die Rechnungsjahre 1947 und 1948. 39-45. 
 179 
services.  With the exception of 1945 the sum of war-related expenses leveled off between thirty 
one and thirty four million RM, consuming close to thirty per cent of the yearly budgets.  
6.4. The Deutsche Mark budgets 1948 to 1951  
 Between 1948 and 1951 the population grew to approximately fifty thousand people, due 
to the end of the ethnic cleansing in eastern and southeastern European countries.  Still, a steady 
influx of refugees fled from the Russian communist occupation zone.  Eye-catching for the four 
Deutsche Mark budgets during these years is the total increase of the budgets from 86 million 
DM in the 1948 nine-months budget to the 167 million DM in 1951.   
 The availability of loans from ERP (European Recovery Program) funds and GARIOA 
(Government Aid and Relief in Occupied Areas) funds provided the means to import food and 
raw materials.  The U.S. Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), executing the ERP funds 
approved for the fiscal year 1949 for West Germany loans of $332.9 million, $100.6 million 
earmarked for food, $207 million allotted for industrial imports, and $25.3 million for 
transportation costs.  Furthermore, GARIOA approved $389.2 million for food and agriculture, 
and $18.5 million for the economy, mainly POL products, freight included.  A total sum of $ 
740.6 million450 approved, a value of 3,110,520,000 DM, at an exchange rate of $ 1=4.2 DM.451  
The ERP loans to West Germany made it possible to build 200,000 apartments in 1949.  For the 
fiscal year 1950 German plans projected to build additional 250,000 apartment units at the 
expense of 2.5 billion DM.  The object was to construct in six years 1.8 million apartments,452 to 
alleviate the lack of apartments caused by Allied bombing.    
                                                
450 Stadtarchiv Stuttgart, Bestand 21/1, Signatur 21. Erster Bericht der Deutschen Bundesregierung über die 
Durchführung des Marshallplanes, 1. Oktober 1949 bis 31. Dezember 1949. 29. 
451 http://www.history.uscb.edu/faculty/marcuse/projects/currency.htm#tables. accessed 2015-08-23 
452 Stadtarchiv Stuttgart. Bestand 21/1, Signatur 21. Erster Bericht der Deutschen Bundesregierung über die 
Durchführung des Marshallplanes, 1. Oktober 1949 bis 31. Dezember 1949. 13. 
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 Stuttgart’s continuous budget growth and the more or less constant expenses for war-
related causes decreased their share of the budget from twenty six per cent in 1948 to close to 
thirteen per cent in 1951.  The charges for war-related offices dropped from 3.3 million DM in 
1948 to 379,000 DM in 1951, signaling the coming end of the period.  The increases in 
Stuttgart’s repair and reconstruction of public buildings–first and foremost hospitals and school 
buildings–and of public housing, demonstrates the availability of money, material and labor.  
   Table 5: Stuttgart’s financial burden of the war: 1948-1951 (Deutsche Mark) budgets453 
 
Year        1948        1949       1950       1951 
Population 465,794 472,068 488,741 509,053 
1. Public buildings 10,212,830 9,810,190 10,949,510 12,057,760 
2. Debris removal 3,917,000 4,040,000 1,350,000 2,482,000 
3. Bridge repair 1,190,000 1,700,000 1,050,000 600,000 
4. Public housing 886,500 715,000 5,920,000 2,910,000 
5. Public aid 2,032,500 3,018,500 2,896,470 3,203,490 
6. War-related offices 3,369,600 2,965,900 1,395,900 379,000 
7. Acquisition of office space 717,780 763,440 623,230 – 
Sum of war-related expenses 22,326,210 23,013,030 24,185,110 21,632,250 
City budget 85,990,100         112,985,200 126,569,300  167,474,400         
% of city budget          26          20.3          19.1          12.9 
 
6.5. Summary 
 Defeat confronted the city of Stuttgart with a situation nobody had imagined.  Destroyed 
and occupied, the former local government by Nazi authorities disappeared, the city had to bow 
to the will of the victors.  The newly appointed city government, screened of party members, had 
to fulfill the demands of the Military Government.  Trying to revive the community they 
attempted to reestablish a functioning administration by providing essential services like 
housing, food, clothing, and medical care aside from putting back into operation critical services    
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like public safety, running water, electricity, gas, and basic public transportation.  Lacking 
revenues from taxes, the lack of goods, services and material for the residents aggravated the 
situation.  The average labor force – the able-bodied were killed during the war or prisoners of 
war – living on a 1,500 calorie diet could not perform the necessary heavy work.  Taking into 
account all the drawbacks, including the occupation costs paid by the state with taxes from every 
citizen, one has to admire what the residents of Stuttgart accomplished in five, six years starting 
from a pile of rubble.  The burden of the consequences of the war the residents had to bear for a 
long time.  The last Neckar River bridge was completed in the late fifties, the new castle was re-





Chapter 7: Württemberg-Baden’s war-related expenditures 
 As one may remember, before the Third Reich’s centralization approach, replacing states 
by Gaue (districts), the states of Württemberg and Baden of the Weimar Republic and the former 
Kingdom of Württemberg and Grand Duchy of Baden were independent states for a long time, 
pre-existing the German unification of 1871.  The northern parts of the two states, cut into half 
by strategic deliberations to keep the Autobahn Mannheim-Karlsruhe-Stuttgart-München-
Salzburg in U.S. hands, were forced into the new entity of Württemberg-Baden by order of 
General Eisenhower’s Proclamation No. 2, 19 September 1945.454     
 It took several years for the residents of the forced unification of the two parts of states to 
develop a feeling of togetherness.  After the founding of the Federal Republic of West Germany 
in 1949, the residents of the state of Württemberg-Baden of the U.S. zone and the French-
occupied southern parts of Baden and Württemberg and of Württemberg-Hohenzollern decided 
in a public vote on 16 December 1951 to join together in 1952 into the new federal state of 
Baden-Württemberg.   
 A public vote for a government of the state of Württemberg-Baden did not happen in 
1945; rather, the U.S. appointed a temporary parliament on 21 December 1945.  A constitutional 
council, elected on 30 June 1946, drafted a constitution for Württemberg-Baden.  Approved by 
the Military Government, the electorate affirmed the constitution on 24 November 1946, and 
also elected the first state parliament of Württemberg-Baden.  The Landesbezirk (regional 
district) of Württemberg and the Landesbezirk (regional district) of Baden represented the two 
parts of the new state.  Their regional governments sat in Karlsruhe for Baden and in Stuttgart for 
Württemberg.  One sees the differing traditions and usage of Württemberg and Baden not only in 
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the separate budget plans but also in the different structure of the budget plans, the different 
classifications of expenditures, even in the different scripts the two regional districts used.   
7.1. The budget for fiscal year 1946 
 For the fiscal year 1946 the Landesbezirk Württemberg prepared a budget, as well as the 
Landesbezirk Baden.  Both were added up and presented as the 1946 budget plan for 
Württemberg-Baden.455  It is not easily detectable which assets of the budget plans are incurred 
as a result of the war.  However, one can assume as the author does that the following 
enumeration of assets of the budget plans for 1946 are war-related.  
 Without doubt one can count the occupation costs and related costs as consequences of 
the war.  And it is not questionable that the expenses for repairing and reconstructing of war-
damaged buildings, bridges, roads and waterways as well as railroad infrastructure are effects of 
the war.  Equally, one can consider the expenses for refugees, the emergency support for 
surviving dependents and for the dependents of prisoners of war, as well as the pensions for war-
disabled as follow-up costs of the war.  It is also assumed that the expenses attributed to the 
reorganization of the German public life ordered by the Allied Control Council/Military 
Government are considered to be war-related. The Departments for Political Liberation tasked in 
the frame of the denazification process to screen the total adult population of the U.S. Zone 
incurred major expenses in this field.  The costs incurred through the representation of 
Württemberg-Baden at the Allied Control Council and at the Länderrat (Council of States) are 
less tangible.    
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 The following table shows the sums paid by the government of Württemberg-Baden as 
war-related costs in the fiscal year 1946, lasting from 1 April 1946 to 31 March 1947.  All 
numbers of the table are derived from the budget plan of Württemberg-Baden for 1946.456   
Table 6: Payments of occupation costs and war-related expenses of the regional districts of Württemberg 
and Baden, fiscal year 1946 
 
Expenses (RM) Württemberg Baden Württemberg-Baden 
Occupation costs / related costs 300,000,000 200,500,000 500,500,000 
Repair / reconstruction 17,541,950 22,320,000 39,861,950 
Refugees, disabled, dependents 91,125,000 201,018,100 292,143,100 
Political costs 37,669,100 36,207,400 73,876,500 
Sum of war-related expenses 446,336,050 460,045,500 906,381,550 
State / district income457 1,269,607,800 897,244,200 2,166,852,000 
Share of occ. costs / rel. costs 23.6% 22.3% 23.1% 
Share of war-related expenses 35.2% 51.3% 41.8% 
 
       Source: Budget Plans of the regional districts of Württemberg and Baden of 31 July 1947.  
 The 300,000,000 RM of occupation costs and related costs the regional district of 
Württemberg paid in the fiscal year 1946 was 23.6 per cent of its total budget.  The regional 
district of Baden paid 22.3 per cent of its total budget for occupation costs and related costs.  
Both districts together spent 23.1 per cent of their budget for these expenditures.   
 As an example, the sum of Württemberg’s 300,000,000 RM consists of 75,000,000 RM 
for requisitions, 5,000,000 RM for requests and material, 80,000,000 RM for wages and salaries 
of people employed by the forces, 30,000,000 RM for goods and services, 80,000,000 RM for 
the services of the Reichsbahn and Reichspost used by the Military, 2,000,000 RM for 
restitutions, 3,000,000 RM for reparations, and 25,000,000 RM for displaced persons.  Adding 
up all war-related expenses, the regional district of Württemberg spent 446,336,050 RM, the 
                                                
456 Gesetz Nr. 504 über die Feststellung des Staatshaushaltsplans der Landesbezirke Württemberg und Baden für das 
Rechnungsjahr 1946 (Staatshaushaltsgesetz für 1946) vom 31. Juli 1947.   
457 Ibid., 1, and Staatshaushaltsplan von Württemberg-Baden für 1946 nebst Anlagen. 
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regional district of Baden 460,045,500 RM, and both together 906,381,550 RM in fiscal year 
1946.  The share of war-related expenses amounted to 35.2 per cent in Württemberg, 51.3 per 
cent in Baden, and to 41.8 per cent for Württemberg-Baden.  Under political costs (line 5 of 
Table 4) the following costs are subsumed: the Department for Political Liberation, the Bureau 
of Compensation, as well as the costs incurred through the representation of Württemberg-Baden 
at the Allied Control Council and at the Council of States. 
 By order of the ACC the centralized police force of the Third Reich had to be 
decentralized down to the level of municipalities.  To support the communities financially the 
states had to provide money for the municipalized police force.  The regional district of Baden 
included in its 1946 budget a grant for the local police force of 4,900,000 RM.  The regional 
district of Württemberg included the grant for the local police force in its budget for the police of 
15,689,000 RM.  The question arises if one can count these new expenses at the community level 
as war-related costs.  The centralized police force was paid for by general taxes.  The states, per 
procurationem of a non-existent Reich government collected the taxes for the Reich.  Supporting 
the community-based new police force by the state, respectively by the regional districts does not 
create additional costs to the taxpayer.  Ergo one cannot count these expenses at the state level as 
war-related costs.  
7.2. The budget for fiscal year 1947 
 In the budget of fiscal year 1947 the occupation costs and related expenses decreased by 
58,500,000 RM.  The percentage of the total budget, however, did not decline, it increased from 
23.1 per cent in 1946 to 28.5 per cent in 1947 due to a reduction of the state income from 
2,166,852,000 RM to 1,552,259,350 RM.  As in 1946, the budget of 1947 does not list separately 
the expenditures for the war-disabled, for the surviving dependents, and for the dependents of 
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German soldiers in captivity.  Only the assistance for the refugees from the East and for the 
expellees from Southeastern Europe are listed as expenses in the extraordinary budget with 
75,000,000 RM, as well as the assistance for repatriated prisoners of war of 5,000,000 RM.  The 
contribution of 2,500,000 RM for the Hoover meal program in 1947, the author appreciated very 
much during his school attendance in the first grade.  He remembers very well the place in the 
basement of the school building where volunteers dished out mouth-watering soup, milk and 
other foodstuffs.  
 With the statehood of Württemberg-Baden in late 1946, the two Departments for Political 
Liberation were merged into one, saving a considerable amount of money.  The Bureaus of 
Compensation, negligible in 1946 were budgeted for 20,000,000 RM, expecting an increase in 
compensation cases.  The regional district of Württemberg itemized the 266,000,000 RM of 
occupation costs and related expenses of 1947 (in parentheses the numbers for 1946) to 
demonstrate the changes of particular items from fiscal year 1946 to 1947.  Württemberg paid for 
wages and salaries of people employed by the occupying force 60,000,000 RM (80,000,000 
RM), for Military Government requisitions it paid 90,000,000 RM (75,000,000 RM), for the 
services of the Reichsbahn and Reichspost 30,000,000 RM (80,000,000 RM), and for the 
provisioning of displaced persons 40,000,000 RM (25,000,000 RM). 
7.3. The budget for fiscal year 1948 
 The budget of Württemberg-Baden for the fiscal year 1948, 1 April 1948 to 31 March 
1949, was announced with the Law No. 522 of 25 June 1948.  The state parliament enacted the 
budget five days after the German currency reform of 20 June 1948.  The reform replaced the 
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Source: Gesetz über die Feststellung des Staatshaushaltsplans für Württemberg-Baden für das Rechnungsjahr 1947 
(Staatshaushaltsgesetz für 1947). Regierungsblatt der Regierung Württemberg-Baden, Nr. 4 vom 8. März 1948. 27-
39.  
 
obsolete Reichsmark with the newly created Deutsche Mark.  In the budget, all revenues and 
expenditures are declared in Reichsmark.  Taking the currency reform into account, Article 8 of 
the Law No. 522, Paragraph 1 prohibits for three months after the currency reform the hiring and 
promotion of any public officers, employees and workers.  Paragraph 2 and 4 blocked twenty 
five per cent of all approved expenditures of the budget.  From the remaining seventy five per 
cent, only one twelfth can be allocated per month.  The government did not publicize a separate 
budget plan for the Deutsche Mark period.    
 The estimated expenses for the budget for fiscal year 1948 see a decline of 11,000,000 
RM for the occupation costs and related costs compared with 1947.  The amount of money for 
repair/reconstruction of roads, Autobahnen, and other infrastructure stayed nearly the same.   
 
  
Expenses (RM) Württemberg Baden Württemberg-Baden 
Occupation costs / related costs 266,000,000 176,000,000 442,000,000 
Repair / reconstruction 17,709,000 19,297,300 37,006,300 
Refugees assistance 45,000,000 30,000,000 75,000,000 
Department for Political Liberation 50,786,000  50,786,000 
Bureau of Compensation 10,107,500 10,078,600 20,186,100 
Assistance for repatriated Prisoners of War 3,000,000 2,000,000 5,000,000 
Contribution to Hoover meal program 1,500,000 1,000,000 2,500,000 
Sum of war-related expenses 394,102,500 238,375,900 632,478,400 
State / district income 927,021,150 625,238,200 1,552,259,350 
Share of occupation costs / related costs 28.7 % 28.1 % 28.5 % 
Share of war-related expenses  42.5 % 38.1 %  40.7 % 
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      Table 8: Payments of occupation costs and war-related costs of Württemberg-Baden, fiscal year 1948  
Expenses (RM) Württemberg Baden Württemberg-Baden 
Occupation costs / related costs 251,000,000 180,000,000 431,000,000 
Repair / reconstruction 24,301,400 14,025,900 38,327,300 
Refugee assistance 28,786,000 23,232,600 52,018,600 
Department for Political Liberation 27,310,000  27,310,000 
Bureau of Compensation 28,478,500 22,303,700 50,782,200 
Sum of war-related expenses 359,875,900 239,562,200 599,438,100 
State / district income 839,620,100 593,620,000 1,433,240,100 
Share of occupation costs / related costs 29.9 % 30.3 % 30.1 % 
Share of war-related expenses 42.9 % 40.3 % 41.8 % 
 
Source: Gesetz Nr. 522 über die Feststellung des Staatshaushaltsplans in Württemberg-Baden für das 
Rechnungsjahr 1948 (Staatshaushaltsgesetz für 1948). Regierungsblatt der Regierung Württemberg-Baden, Nr. 
11 vom 17. Juli 1948. 77-88. 
 
The assistance for refugees decreased almost 23,000,000 RM from 75,000,000 RM to 
52,018,600 RM.  Likewise, the expenses for the Department for Political Liberation were cut by 
nearly fifty per cent, from 50,786,000 RM to 27,310,000 RM, signaling the upcoming end of the 
denazification program in the U.S. occupation zone.  The Bureau of Compensation more than 
doubled its budget from 20,186,100 RM to 50,782,200 RM.  The assistance for repatriated 
prisoners of war from countries other than the United States and Great Britain, as well as a 
contribution to the Hoover meal program are no longer listed separately in the budget.  These 
expenditures were covered by other budget posts and no longer especially itemized in the general 
state budget.  The share of the occupation costs and related costs of the budget increased slightly 
from 28.5 per cent to 30.1 per cent and the share of war-related expenses rose from 40.7 per cent 
in 1947 to 41.8 per cent in 1948 for Württemberg-Baden.  
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7.4. The budget for fiscal year 1949  
 The budget of fiscal year 1949, the first Deutsche Mark budget of Württemberg-Baden, 
surprised with a decline in the occupation costs and related costs of 80,340,000 DM by a total 
budget increase of 285,167,450 DM compared with 1948.  However, the war-related 
expenditures for repair/reconstruction increased more than threefold from 38,327,300 RM to 
129,823,750 DM. This amount of repair/reconstruction includes all expenditures subsumed 
regarding to the repair or construction of buildings and apartments, new settlements, road 
construction and water engineering, as well as the repair and reconstruction of the Autobahn.  
The increase advertised two facts.  First, the inauguration of the currency reform of 20 June 1948 
– Reichsmark were exchanged to Deutsche Mark in the ratio of 10:1 – opened up a supply of 
goods.  The Military Governor reported that on Monday, 21 June, suddenly “for the first time 
since the close of the war shops in all the principal cities of the U.S. Zone showed textiles, 
household and electrical goods, furniture and a variety of other previously scarce items at fairly 
reasonable prices.”458  With the currency reform, the U.S. Military Government abandoned the 
war-induced price freeze, maintained by the Allies partially, stimulating the German economy.  
Second, beginning in late 1948, dollar-based loans of the European Recovery Program (ERP) –
known as the Marshall Plan – enabled the German economy to import essential raw materials to 
produce goods for the internal consumption, as well as for export, to finance further imports.  
The increase of funds for repair/reconstruction to 129,823,750 DM proved the availability of 
loans for urgent public projects through the ERP.   
 The phase-out of the Department for Political Liberation is clearly visible by a budget 
reduced from 27,310,000 RM to 4,481,900 DM.  Remarkable is the significant reduction in the 
share of the occupation costs and related costs from 30.1 per cent of the total budget to 20.4 per 
                                                
458 Monthly Report of the Military Governor U.S. Zone, No. 36, June 1948. 2. 
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cent, as well as the reduction of the share of war-related expenses from 41.8 per cent to 32.4 per 
cent.   
    Table 9: Payments of occupation costs and war-related expenses of Württemberg-Baden, fiscal year 1949 
Expenses (DM) Württemberg Baden Württemberg-Baden 
Occupation costs / related costs 206,450,000 144,210,000 350,660,000 
Repair / reconstruction 80,601,200 49,222,550 129,823,750 
Refugee assistance 26,695,250 19,120,000 45,815,250 
Department for Political Liberation 4,481,900 - 4,481,900 
Bureau of Compensation 16,861,000 9,838,000 26,699,000 
Sum of war-related expenses 335,089,350 222,390,550 557,479,900 
State / district income 1,041,759,050 676,648,500 1,718,407,550 
Share of occupation costs / related costs 19.8 % 21.3 % 20.4 % 
Share of war-related expenses 32.2 % 32.9 %  32.4 % 
 
Source: Gesetz Nr. 541 über die Feststellung des Staatshaushaltsplans für Württemberg-Baden für das 
Rechnungsjahr 1949 (Staatshaushaltsgesetz für 1949). Regierungsblatt der Regierung Württemberg-Baden, Nr. 
13 vom 30. Juni 1949. 89-101.  
 
7.5. The budget for fiscal year 1950 
 The establishment of the Federal Republic of West Germany in September 1949 
dramatically impacted Württemberg-Baden’s budget of the fiscal year 1950 as with the budgets 
of all other federal states of the new republic.  The Federal Republic, claiming to be the legal 
successor of the Third Reich government, demanded its share of the tax revenues collected and 
administered so far by the states.  The state income of Württemberg-Baden decreased by about 
655 million DM from 1949 to 1950. 
 According to section XXV of the federal budget, “Haushalt der Besatzungskosten und 
Auftragsausgaben der Auslaufzeit für das Rechnungsjahr 1950,” the federal government and the 
state governments agreed “that effective 1 April 1950 the cumulative expenses for the 
occupation, as well as the tax revenues necessary to cover these expenses, will be transferred to 
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the federal government.”459  This explains the reduction of the state income, as well as the drastic 
cutback in the occupation costs/related costs in the state budget from 350,660,000 DM in 1949 to 
37,500,000 DM in 1950.  The share of occupation costs/related costs dropped from 20.4 per cent 
to 3.5 per cent in 1950 and the share of war-related expenses dropped from 32.4 per cent to 9 per 
cent.  
        Table 10: Payments of occupation costs and war-related expenses of Württemberg-Baden, 1950 
Expenses (DM) Württemberg Baden Württemberg-Baden 
Occupation costs / related costs 22,500,000 15,000,000 37,500,000 
Repair / reconstruction 22,383,100 12,441,300 34,824,400 
Dep. for Pol. Liberation, out-phasing 1,153,800 340,800 1,494,600 
Department of Compensation 14,284,000 7,132,250 21,416,250 
Sum of war-related expenses 60,320,900 34,914,350 95,235,250 
State / district income 700,940,550 361,980,450 1,062,921,000 
Share of occupation costs / related costs 3.2 % 4.1 % 3.5 % 
Share of war-related expenses 8.6 % 9.6 % 9 % 
 
Source: Gesetz Nr. 558 über die Feststellung des Staatshaushaltsplans von Württemberg-Baden für das 
Rechnungsjahr 1950 (Staatshaushaltsgesetz) vom 3. August 1950. Regierungsblatt der Regierung 
Württemberg-Baden, Nr. 15 vom 8. September 1950. 71-87.  
 The drop of the occupation costs/related costs in the state budget did not deem a decline 
in the total amount charged by the Military Government.  The liability to pay these costs only 
shifted from nine different state governments to the federal government.   
 Section XXIV of the federal budget for 1950 did not differentiate between the occupation 
costs/related costs for each state, it cites only the total expenses for the federal budget.  The 
budget section XXIV defined:  
a. Occupation costs as the expenditures necessary for the maintenance of the 
Allied forces stationed in West Germany; 
b. Mandatory expenses Class I as those expenditures to be generated as 
consequences of the capitulation, some may benefit the German economy; 
                                                
459 Stadtarchiv Stuttgart, Bestand 14/1, Signatur 362. Haushalt der Besatzungskosten und Auftragsausgaben der 
Auslaufzeit für das Rechnungsjahr 1950. Einzelplan XXV. 2.   
 192 
c. Mandatory expenses Class II are the expenditures, which from the outset on 
or from the final results may benefit the German people.460    
 
The total sum of expenditures for the Allied forces in West Germany for the fiscal year 1950 of 
4,048,558,500 DM is subdivided in the federal budget into  
a. Occupation costs at 3,263,112,200 DM, 
b. Mandatory expenses Class I of 323,830,000 DM, and 
c. Mandatory expenses Class II of 461,616,300 DM.461    
To give the reader an impression of the scope of services the Allies demanded, a consecutive 
enumeration as in the federal budget follows.  The 3,263,112,200 DM occupation costs are 
composed of: 
-Wages/salaries for people employed by the Allies  DM 1,229,690,000  
-Rent for living quarters, furniture, house keeping  DM    846,327,800 
-Communication services     DM    112,946,900 
-Transportation services     DM    359,467,600 
-Expenses for material, equipment    DM    526,379,000 
-Cash payments for occupation needs   DM    180,300,900 
The mandatory expenses Class I of DM 323,830,000 are composed of: 
-Support for displaced persons    DM   116,816,000 
-Demilitarization      DM     35,051,000 
-Reparations and restitutions     DM     71,493,000 
-Transfer of war victims home    DM       2,612,000 
-Damage caused by Allied forces    DM     93,555,000 
-Payments for requisitions made by another occupier DM       1,800,000 
-Expenses for civilian internees    DM          353,000 
-Expenses for resettling caused by requisitions  DM       1,800,000 
                                                
460 Stadtarchiv Stuttgart, Bestand 14/1, Signatur 362. Haushalt der Besatzungskosten und Auftragsausgaben für das 
Rechnungsjahr 1950, Einzelplan XXIV. 3. 
461 Ibid., 4. 
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-Loss of money      DM            50,000 
-Repair of ships      DM          300,000 
The mandatory expenses Class II of DM 461,616,300 are composed of 
-Control organization for trade/traffic   DM    10,622,300 
-Civil aviation       DM    19,953,000 
-Capital for Allied construction program   DM  413,966,000 
-Cultural purposes      DM         912,000 
-Out-phasing of zonal structures/organizations  DM         803,000 
-Expenses for prisoners of war    DM      5,518,000 
-German emigration      DM      1,253,000 
-German pay offices subordinated to Allies   DM      4,270,000 
-Airlift Berlin       DM      4,179,000 
-Research       DM         140,000462 
 The “Capital for Allied Construction Program” of 413,966,000 DM is the first rate of a 4-
year construction program for the U.S. forces paid for by Germany.  The United States Army 
Europe’s (USAREUR) total of the program is listed at 2,364,230,400 DM.  The five major parts 
of the construction program are troop housing at 832,683,600 DM, dependent housing at 
658,837,200 DM, storage facilities at 225,598,800 DM, community facilities at 166,765,200 
DM, and medical facilities at 100,455,600 DM.463   
 The 4-year construction program for the U.S. occupation forces was only a part of a 
collective construction agenda for the occupation forces in West Germany.  The city association 
of Württemberg-Baden reported on 21 February 1951 that the federal government agreed to a 
construction program of approximately eight billion DM for the Allied forces in Germany.  The 
major parts of the program were first, an overhaul program for the barracks already used by the 
                                                
462 Ibid., 8-10. 
463 Headquarters United States Army, Europe, Historical Division. The U.S. Army Construction Program in 
Germany (U) 1950-1953. 163. 
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Allied forces, second, new construction of barracks for the Allied forces, third, a residential 
housing program for the dependents of the occupation forces, fourth, an Allied housing program 
for displaced persons, and fifth, a housing program for German people pushed out of barracks by 
Allied demands.  The U.S. part of the program centered around the cities of Stuttgart and 
Heidelberg, as well as the regions Wiesbaden-Frankfurt-Würzburg-Darmstadt and the region of 
Nürnberg-München.464    
 However, there is one more category of expenses paid by the federal government, the so-
called “other consequences of war burden.”  Section XXVII of the federal budget, the Haushalt 
der Sonstigen Kriegsfolgelasten für das Rechnungsjahr 1950 deals with this category.  The total 
of 150,800,000 DM is subdivided into 
-The U.S. employer’s contribution to social insurances DM    95,145,000 
-Guard services, fire protection and police services  DM     2,646,000 
-Sanitary services      DM        980,000 
-Services related to Allied jurisdiction   DM     1,055,000 
-Services of special planning commissions   DM     6,249,000 
-Repair/reconstruction of traffic infrastructure etc.  DM     7,400,000 
-Services related to reparation/restitution procedures DM     2,350,000 
-Services related to demilitarization procedures  DM   32,205,000 
-Services related to requisitions    DM     1,970,000 
-Hospital services for homeless foreigners   DM    118,000 
-Food and shelter for homeless foreigners   DM           82,000 
-Quarantine services for emigrants    DM         600,000 
 With the discharge of the state budgets the liability to pay the expenses for all germane 
occupation costs shifted to the federal government.  To render this possible, the states had to 
forgo the appropriate amounts of tax revenues to the federal government. For the fiscal year 1950 
                                                
464 Stadtarchiv Stuttgart, Bestand 14/1, Signatur 379.  
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the federal government budgeted for all occupation-related expenses comprehending the 
occupation costs, the mandatory expenses Class I and II, as well as the other consequences of 
war burden a total of 4,199,358,500 DM, the equivalent of $ 999,847,262 based on the 1950 
exchange rate of $ 1 = 4.20 DM.465      
7.6. Summary  
 To interpret the expenditures of Württemberg-Baden’s occupation costs/related costs as 
well as the sums of war-related costs is difficult because of several inconstancies.  First, one can 
assume, that the amount of 550,500,000 RM for occupation costs/related costs for the 1946 
budget includes the bills for many services generated in 1945.  Because of the lack of clarity of 
the requisitioning and billing procedures on the American and German side many claims from 
1945 were brought to the Besatzungskostenamt in 1946 to be reimbursed. A major factor for late 
claims for reimbursement was the high personnel turnover caused by the reduction of U.S. forces 
in Germany from over three million after VE-Day to close to 188,000 at the end of 1946.466  The 
whopping number of 114,087 requisitioned and 4,232 confiscated properties under U.S. control 
on 31 July 1947467 may also explain late claims.  Second, the 1949 budget one cannot count, it 
was the first budget based on the new currency Deutsche Mark.   Third, the budget for fiscal year 
1950 is out of line because of the acquisition of the responsibility for the payment of occupation 





                                                
465 http;//www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/marcuse/projects/currency.htm#tables accessed 2015-08-07. 
466 Linda L. Kruger, Logistics Matters: the Growth of Little Americas in Occupied Germany. 163-4. 
467 Headquarters United States Army, Europe, Historical Division. The U.S. Army Construction Program in 
Germany (U) 1950-1953. 2.  
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Table 11: Occupation costs/related costs and of war-related expenses of Württemberg-Baden for the 
fiscal years 1946-1950 
Year Occ. costs / related 
costs 
Sum of war-related 
expenses 





1946 RM 550,500,000 RM 906,381,550 23.1 % 41.8 % 
1947 RM 442,000,000 RM 632,478,400 28.5 % 40.7 % 
1948 RM 431,000,000 RM 599,438,100 30.1 % 41.8 % 
1949 DM 350,660,000 DM 557,479,900 20.4 % 32.4 % 
1950 DM 37,500,000 DM 95,235,250 3.5 % 9 % 
 
The remaining two budgets of the fiscal years 1947 and 1948 are very similar in their expenses 
for the occupation costs/related costs and for the sums of war-related expenses.  The same result 
can be established by comparing their per cent fractions from the total budget. It is probable that 
a sum of 430 to 440 million RM for occupation costs/related costs would become normal for the 
state of Württemberg-Baden, during the military occupation assuming a stable political scenario 
among the four Allies.   
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Chapter 8: Policies versus realities: The U.S. financial and material support 
8.1. Introduction 
 Viewed purely economically one can distinguish two clearly different phases of the 
United States occupation policies toward Germany.  Revenge and punishment of defeated 
Germany identified the first phase, encouragement and assistance the second phase.  The 
attitudes of the members of the Allied Control Council, especially of the Soviet Union and 
France, based on their different national interests, prompted the United States to replace the JCS 
1067 directive with the more conciliatory one of JCS 1779.  
 The core elements of JCS 1067 can be reduced to “tak[ing] no steps (a) looking toward 
the economic rehabilitation of Germany, or (b) designed to maintain or strengthened the German 
economy,”468 and to “use all means at [the Germans] disposal to maximize agricultural output 
and to establish as rapidly as possible effective machinery for the collection and distribution of 
agricultural output,”469 as well as “to utilize large-landed estates and public lands… [to] increase 
agricultural output.”470   
 The directive further states that the Allied Control Council/Military Commander will 
control the German economy, permitting only “the production and maintenance of goods and 
services required to prevent starvation or… disease and unrest… No action will be taken in 
execution of the reparations program or otherwise which would tend to support basic living 
conditions in Germany or in your zone on a higher level than that existing in any one of the 
neighboring United Nations.”471  Permitting imports into Germany “are confined to those 
                                                
468 Directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1067. Part II, § 16. 
469 Ibid. Part II, § 27: You will require the Germans to use all means at their disposal to maximize agricultural output 
and to establish as rapidly as possible effective machinery for the collection and distribution of agricultural output. 
470 Ibid. Part II, § 28: You will direct the German authorities to utilize large-landed estates and public lands in a 
manner which will facilitate the accommodation and settlement of Germans and others or increase agricultural 
output.  
471 Ibid. Part I, § 5. 
 198 
unavoidably necessary to the objectives [of the occupation].”472  German exports were to be 
limited to United Nation countries according to § 41 (c).  Paragraph 45 (c) in Part III of the 
directive promulgated that there would be no established exchange rate between the Reichsmark 
and the U.S. Dollar or any other currency.  Germans were prohibited from possessing and 
dealing in gold, silver, and foreign currency.  All foreign exchange transactions were strictly 
outlawed.473    
 The designated industrial disarmament of Germany found its expression in the “Level of 
Industry Plan” of 29 March 1946.  The basic assumption of the plan was a 1949 German 
population of 66.5 million in the four occupation zones, the treatment of postwar Germany as 
one economic entity, and Germany’s ability to sell the products of the permitted “light 
industries” on the world market to pay for the necessary imports of food and raw materials.  The 
plan estimated German industrial production targets for the year 1949 based on the German 
industrial production numbers of the years 1936 and 1938, enumerating three categories: 
prohibited industries, unlimited industries, and industries with limited output. 
  However, the first phase did not last long thanks to the developing disagreements 
between the members of the Allied Control Council.  The conflicts of interests prevented 
common actions in many cases.  Unanimity could not be obtained in many critical questions 
portraying the ACC’s partial insignificance, increasing the powers of the respective military 
commanders in their occupation zone.   
 The second phase was heralded by the speech of the Secretary of State, J.F. Byrnes on 6 
September 1946.  In his speech at Stuttgart, he attenuated the tone toward Germany, stating “that 
the German people throughout Germany, under proper safeguards, should now be given the 
                                                
472 Ibid. Part II, § 41 b.  
473 Ibid. Part III, § 49 b. 
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primary responsibility for the running of their own affairs… [and] to win their way back to an 
honorable place among the free and peace-loving nations of the world.”474   
 Contrary to former President Roosevelt’s intention to pull back the U.S. Forces after a 
short occupation of one or two years, Byrnes remarked that “as long as there is an occupation 
army in Germany, the American forces will be part of that occupation army.”475  His further 
addition “we do not want Germany to become the satellite of any power or powers or to live 
under a dictatorship, foreign or domestic,”476 changed the American approach toward Germany 
in the light of the developing contradictions between East and West.  He blamed the Allied 
Control Council for failing to enact “the necessary steps to enable the German economy to 
function as an economic unit.”477  As a consequence of the failure of the Allied Control Council, 
he offered to the other occupation powers “to unify the economy of its own zone with any or all 
of the other zones willing to participate in the unification.”478  However, if the Allied Powers 
failed to treat Germany as an economic unit according to the Potsdam Protocol, the Secretary of 
State postulated, “there should be changes in the level of industry agreed upon by the Allied 
Control Commission [in the Level of Industry Plan of 29 March, 1946].”479  
 Secretary of State Byrnes’ offer of economic unification led to the creation of the U.S.-
British Bi-Zone in January 1947.  The French joined the Bi-Zone after the currency reform of 
June 1948 and before statehood of West Germany in September 1949.  The creation of the Bi-
Zone may have stimulated the industrial recovery.  However, bureaucratic restrictions placed by 
the Allies on production, imports and exports, as well as the non-convertibility of the Reichsmark 
                                                
474 Speech by J.F. Byrnes, United States Secretary of State Restatement of Policy on Germany, Stuttgart, September 







prevented a fundamental improvement of the immediate situation, further hampered by two 
extraordinarily long and cold winters of 1945/46 and 1946/47.  The currency reform, 
bureaucratic relaxations and the prospect of Marshall Plan aid profoundly changed the economic 
situation of Germany.  
8.2. From Stunde Null forward  
 How did the German situation look on the ground six months after the unconditional 
surrender?  One can transcribe the general attitude of the Reports of the Military Government for 
the U.S. Zone to the other three occupation zones.  The Monthly Reports did not whitewash the 
actual economic status of Germany by indicating in its report No. 4 from October 1945, 
The general economic condition of Germany, however, continues 
unsatisfactory.  The food situation, although slightly improved for the present, 
has even less favorable prospects for the future than previously reported.  Coal 
production, under continued stimulation, continues to increase; but will still fall 
short of meeting requirements for Germany, and for exports to liberated 
countries.  Transportation continues to be a major economic bottleneck, 
especially to the coal program; and industry remains at levels far below those 
needed to produce the really essential requirements for the German civil 
economy.480                 
 
The bleak picture of the general economic situation gets even worse when reporting about food 
and agriculture.  The Monthly Report relentlessly recognizes,  
…that the previous estimates of food production had been too high, and 
consequently that Germany’s paramount economic problem–that of supplying 
its own food–is even more pressing than had been anticipated.  Current 
measures to alleviate critical shortages of seeds, fertilizers, agricultural 
machinery, and skilled labor will be consummated too late for the planting of 
the 1946 crops; it can be anticipated that the 1946 harvest will be even less than 
the inadequate return of this year. …but prospects for 1946 yields are poorer 
because of the lack of proper fertilizers.481      
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The Monthly Report of October 1945 conceded that a fully functioning German agriculture is 
necessary “to avoid expenses to the American Treasury.”482  However, to avoid starvation and 
disease, American responsibility “requires imports of food and other items, without positive 
assurance that the economically weakened German nation can ever pay for them.”483  Could it 
have been a surprise for the U.S. leadership that Germany was not able to feed itself in peace, 
less than under the aspects of a lost war?   
 The attempt to quantify and qualify the official and private material and financial support 
the United States provided for occupied Germany is to say the least, cumbersome.  For the first 
years of the occupation no exhaustive reports or book keeping of the amounts and value of food 
and other supplies delivered by the U.S. Army or other government agencies exist.  The most 
elaborate sources for this kind of information are probably the Monthly Reports of the Military 
Governor, U.S. Zone.   The series of reports start with the Monthly Report No. 1 of 20 August 
1945, describing the activities of the Military Government in July, up to the Monthly Report No. 
50, (Final Issue), of August/September 1949 with the inception of the statehood of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, ending the military occupation regime.  Besides the Monthly Reports, 
more than twenty special reports were repeatedly issued, covering all aspects of the German life. 
However, energy, transportation, housing, food and agriculture were the critical bottlenecks of an 
efficient revival of the German economy, supervised and restricted by the Allied Powers.    
 Information about material and financial support are scattered unevenly across the single 
and special reports.  In a laborious process the fragmented data provided in the reports was 
collected and put together in a puzzle game adumbrating the dimensions of the whole picture of 
the aid to the western occupation zones.  The big picture may not be a complete one, 
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nevertheless, it will give a realistic impression of the tasks the U.S. Military Government faced 
in its occupation zone to keep the Germans alive.  With the same problems, perhaps different in 
scale, the other Military Governments dealt with in their respective occupation zones.  
May to December 1945 (Reports No. 1-6)  
 As of 1 June 1945 the estimated combined food stocks located in the three Western 
occupation zones added up to 1,201,600 t.484  Of this amount 688,300 t were located in the U.S. 
Zone and in the French Zone.  The supply of the British Zone was reported at 513,300 t.  The 
U.S. and French food stock on 1 June comprised of 343,200 t of bread grain, 317,900 t of 
potatoes, 13,900 t of sugar, 1,600 t of pulses, 7,400 t of fat and oil, and 4,300 t of cheese.485  It 
sounds like a lot of food, however, for a population of 17,174,400 in the U.S., 22,324,600 in the 
British, and 5,878,400 in the French Zone on 29 October 1946, for a combined population of 
45,377,400486, 1,201,600 t of food stuff will not last long, even with a reduced diet of 1,150 
calories/day, varying in the U.S. Zone from 750 cal./day in Baden to 1,240 cal./day in 
Württemberg.487 Already in July 1945 the U.S. and British Military Governments released 
20,000 t of imported wheat to increase the daily food ration for miners in the Ruhr area.488   
 In order to produce a 2,000 calories/day ration for the adult non-farm population, 
Western Germany needed “1,310,000 t of fertilizer; 70,000 t of pesticides; 406,000 t of farm 
                                                
484 If not especially mentioned the Monthly Reports in general used metric tons, abbreviated tons or t.  
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equipment and spare parts; 16,000 tractors, 31,800 farm wagons; 35,000,000 sacks; 102,000 t of 
Diesel fuel, coal for food processing and use on farms 7,800,000 t”489 for the 1945/46 crop year.    
 Based on a 2,000 calories per day ration490 for the normal customer and an estimated 
harvest of 992,000 t of wheat, 793,000 t of rye, 595,000 t of barley, 775,000 t of oats, and 
6,381,000 t of potatoes in the U.S. Zone,491 the Military Government calculated a need to import 
approximately four million tons of bread grain equivalents to feed the German population of the 
three western zones during the crop year 1945/46 (1 October 1945–30 September 1946).  The 
official Washington policy of “Germany feeding itself” did not last long.  Less than three months 
after the German capitulation, the United States had to concede that large food imports were 
needed to prevent mass malnutrition and starvation.  In August, the deviations from the official 
1,550 cal./day ration were considerable ranging from 640 calories in the city of Pforzheim to 
1,100 calories in Bavaria.492  For the time span from June to September 653,676 t (643,350 long 
tons) of foodstuff were imported to Western Germany to feed the indigenous population.  The 
U.S. Zone received 232,946 t (229,266 long tons), whereas the British Zone obtained 303,810 t 
(299,011 long tons).  A special allocation of 10,567 t (10,400 long tons) went to the Saarland493 
in the French Zone.      
 As in other occupation zones, the economic situation in the U.S. Zone did not improve as 
expected.  The 1945 grain harvest in the U.S. Zone realized only 2,326,000 t, twenty six per cent 
less than estimated, and seventeen per cent less than the six-year average 1939-44.494  Wheat 
imports from the United States increased to nearly 701,075 t (690,000 long tons) in September.  
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The Monthly Report for September noted the food scarcities in the U.S. Zone, stating a 
discrepancy from the official ration of 1,550 cal./day of 200-520 cal./day for adults and 700-
1,000 cal./day for children older than ten years.495 
 U.S.-imported flour would complement the German diet in the U.S. Zone during 
November and December to keep the 1,345 cal./day approved for the 81st ration period.  
Indigenous food supply and imported food could not support the official 1,550 calorie ration.  
“That no coal is allocated for heating of German homes [during winter] in our zone”496 forced 
the cities to organize mass feeding programs for large parts of their population.  
 The Monthly Report for December 1945 did not encourage hope of betterment.  The 
report estimated a requirement of food imports of 1,147,690 t, including 980,200 t of bread grain 
to keep the normal customer ration up to 1,550 cal./day until 30 September 1946.497   
 According to the Monthly Report on Food and Agriculture for August, from 1 June to 12 
August 1945, 528,279 t of wheat arrived in Germany.  For the time span June through September 
the report mentioned 653,676 t (643,350 long tons), whereas the Monthly Report for September 
claims 701,075 t (690,000 long tons)498 imported.  H.G. Schmidt in his Food and Agricultural 
Programs in West Germany 1949-1951 recounts the release by the U.S. Army of 630,000 t of 
wheat in summer 1945 to bridge the food gap to the harvest.  Further, he mentions the “issue of 
flour, wheat, and other foodstuffs… from Army surplus stocks,”499 without referring to a distinct 
amount.  Friedrich Jerchow reported in Deutschland in der Weltwirtschaft 1944-1947, the import 
of 399,000 t of wheat and 262,000 t of flour into the British Zone and of 60,000 t of wheat and 
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221,000 t of flour into the U.S. Zone from SHAEF stocks between June and December 1945,500 a 
total of 942,000 t of foodstuffs.  The Monthly Reports of October through December do not 
mention continuing foodstuffs imports.  None of the sources added a monetary value in dollar 
numbers to the imports of food into Germany.  However, the food imports allowed the Military 
Government to increase the food rations.  The actual issued rations to the residents of Stuttgart, 
par example, increased from 1,137 cal./day in September for the normal customer to 1,426 
cal./day in October, to 1,652 cal./day in November, and to 1,752 cal./day in December 1945.501  
The amounts of food imported ranged from 528,299 t over 701,075 t to 942,000 t for 1945, 
according to different sources.  The Monthly Report of December 1948 gives in “Summary 
Value of Exports and Imports Bizonal Area, 1945-1948” an account of $96 million for all 
imports without any differentiation.502  Conceding the Germans received 942,000 t of food aid in 
1945, a price tag of $101.91 should be attached to a ton of imported food. 
8.3. 1946, the second year of occupation 
January 1946 (Report No. 7)  
 The year did not begin on a promising note for an economic revival. The output of the 
4,700 operating industrial plants in the U.S. Zone improved a bit, however, output did not meet 
the low targets set by Military Government.  The production of agricultural machinery and 
equipment stayed at the December level with 1,500 t and 500 t of spare parts, ten per cent of 
demand.503 German fertilizer plants in the U.S. Zone “are only capable of satisfying total 
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fertilizer requirements for the oilseeds, sugar beet, and vegetable crops, and for about 35 per cent 
of the potatoes crop to be grown in 1946.”504  
 To mitigate seed shortages the U.S. War Department provided $2,100,000 for seed 
purchases.  For $1,000,000 400 t of vegetable seeds were bought. For the first time in January 
1946 the U.S. Zone exported 1,500 t of hops to the United States and Belgium at a value of 
$3,750,000.505   
February 1946 (Report No. 8)  
 In 1945, the food imports were only listed quantitatively.  The Monthly Report for 
February 1946 listed for the first time the dollar value of import commitments for Germany since 
August 1945. The dollar value of all food imports since the start of the occupation, including 
food from Army stocks, was recorded at $43 million in the graphic of the February report.  This 
price cannot be correct.  The author either had partial or incorrect information.  A $43 million 
price for 701,075 t (690,000 long tons),506 meant that a ton would be priced at $63.33, less than 
half of the price of $136.93 per ton the Monthly Report of December 1948 calculated. Further the 
graphic listed imports of raw cotton at $5,000,000, POL (Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants) products at 
$1,400,000, and other imports not specified at $1,800,000.  The total sum of imports added up to 
$51,200,000.  German exports from the U.S. Zone accumulated to $4,500,000, barely nine per 
cent of the imports.507508 
 Industrial plants producing in the U.S. Zone increased to 5,500, of which roughly the half 
were engaged in the production of consumer goods.509  Consumer good production was affected 
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by the shortage of raw materials, “particularly sheet metal, seasoned wood, raw textiles, 
processing chemicals and coal.”510  
 In February, the Allied Control Council approved tax increases to boost the revenues of 
the Länder and to siphon off purchasing power caused by the ballooned amount of money in 
circulation.511  
March 1946 (Report No. 9)  
 In March the industrial production of the U.S. Zone increased to twenty per cent of the 
existing capacity.512  The zone industries “are hampered [in their production] by basic shortages 
of [hard] coal and steel.”513  The coal and steel deficits limited the production of the U.S. Zone in 
“chemicals to 25 percent of capacity, building materials to 20 percent, steel products to 14 
percent and ceramics to 5 percent.”514   
 The shoe production rose to 1,800,000 pairs of shoes of all sizes and types in the first 
quarter.  This gain was adequate to provide every person in the zone with a pair of shoes every 
second year.515  The report did not mention how many shoes produced had wood soles.  
Sneaking around quietly was difficult, as one could hear us kids from far away wearing these 
wooden sole shoes!  
 The U.S. Military Government signed an export contract for building lumber for Great 
Britain with a face value of $14,300,000 on 2 April 1946.  Prior to the war, Germany had been a 
timber importing country.  This contract, the Monthly Report states, will deplete German timber 
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resources to an extent to “be replaced only by long term forestry development over perhaps a 
century.”516  
 The timber contract with Great Britain increased the export volume of the U.S. Zone to 
$19,800,000.  Compared with the $58,200,000 of imports and import commitments to that time 
of the occupation the export value was barely a third of the imports.  “Food has constituted 82 
percent of the estimated $58,200,000 imports and import commitments including deliveries from 
Army stocks.”517  Eighty two per cent of $58,200,000 implies that the United States so far spent 
$47,700,000 on food for Germany.  That was an increase of $4,700,000 above the $43,000,000 
accounted for in February.  Based on a price of $136.93 per ton518 the $4,700,000 accounted for 
an additional 34,324 t of food to be imported during March/April, increasing the food imports to 
a total of 735,399 t at a value of $47,700,000.519  
April 1946 (Report No. 10) 
 To keep the daily ration of 1,550 calories for the normal customer, the United States 
calculated shipping 495,000 t of food from 1 April to 30 September 1946.  The food supplies on 
hand and en route to Germany, as well as the food produced by German farmers of the U.S. Zone 
would guarantee only a daily ration of 915 calories.  However, the worldwide shortage of bread 
grain forced the United States to cut the 495,000 t commitments to three shipments of 50,000 t 
per month for April, May, and June.  The depleted food supply coerced the Military Government 
to reduce the daily ration to 1,275 calories520 in April and then to 1,180 calories on 27 May.521  
The data of the Stuttgart food office mirrored the escalating scarcity of food.  From a 1,619 
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calories diet in March, the caloric value of the furnished food went down to 1,277 calories in 
April, to 1,270 calories in May, and 1,207 calories in June.  The 90th ration period, covering most 
of the month of July saw a little upswing to 1,318 calories.  From the low of 1,251 calories 
during the 91st ration period and 1,215 calories of the 92nd ration period, the caloric value soared 
over 1,278 calories to 1,635 calories by the end of 1946.522   
 The April 1946 report highlights the difficulties to account for exact numbers, may it be 
the imported food tonnage and its dollar value, or the exact export numbers and value.  
According to this report, up to 30 April 1946, 500,000 t of food supply were imported primarily 
for the Germans living in the U.S. Zone.523  Report No. 3 for September 1945 accounted already 
for the delivery of 701,075 t (690,000 long tons) of foodstuffs.  Also, the previously calculated 
number of a total of 775,289 t of foodstuffs does not fit with the numbers of Report No. 10.  It is 
not apparent if the 500,000 t of food supply mentioned in Report No. 10 included the supplies 
from Army stocks given to the Germans.  Have different departments provided data without 
previous adjustments?  Or can the discrepancies be explained by the remark of Report No. 10, 
that the amount of 500,000 t “does not include quantitative receipts issued for exports in the 
early day of occupation?”524 
 The same confusion appears when looking at the monetary value of imports and exports.  
Can the expression “incomplete preliminary estimates”525 of Monthly Report for April 1946 
explain the differences between the numbers presented in Monthly Report for March 1946?  The 
dollar numbers mentioned in Report No. 10 were unsatisfactory.  From Report No. 9 to the next 
Report the import volume rose from $58,200,000 to amazingly high import and import 
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commitments of $100,000,000 without explaining the growth.  The export and export 
commitments Report No. 10 listed at $7,500,000, when the March report already added up 
exports and export commitments to $19,800,000.526  The differences in tons and dollars 
mentioned above describe the difficulties in establishing an accurate calculation of the support 
Germany, and especially the U.S. Zone received during the military occupation from the United 
States.   
May 1946 (Report No. 11) 
 The results of the local elections may have surprised the Military Government.  For sure 
the results contradicted the statement that “to date there is little evidence to indicate that most 
Germans have yet acquired a basic understanding of democracy.”527 The May report recognized 
that voter “participation was high in all areas and in fact was higher than in most democratic 
nations… [and accounted for] the high democratic spirit.”528  However, it was premature to 
assume a basic understanding of democracy by the Germans living on a diet of less than 1,500 
calories per day.  
 The cuts in the food rations of 1 April and 27 May to 1,275 cal./day, respectively to 1,180 
cal./day affected not only the health of the people but also the economy.  “Industrial workers 
cannot produce on a starvation diet,”529 a simple truth, forced the authorities to find solutions.  
For the intended increase of the agricultural production sufficient seeds, fertilizers, agricultural 
machinery and equipment, as well as labor had to be provided.  
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 Through May 1946, the United States delivered 563,000 t of foodstuffs530 for the German 
food ration, of which 45,000 t were imported during May from the United States and 15,700 t 
were released from Army stocks.  The amount of 563,000 t seemed to match very close the April 
amount of 500,000 t plus the 45,000 t imported from the United States during May and the 
15,700 t released from Army stocks at the same time.  42,000 t of fish were contracted from 
Denmark and Norway to be delivered between 1 June and 31 October.531  With all the actions 
initiated, the outlook for June got better, even better – with the outlook to the planned arrival of 
36,000 t of wheat and flour and 29,000 t of corn.  In addition, 35,000 t of canned vegetables were 
scheduled to arrive in June, as well as the remnants of the 150,000 t of bread grain agreed upon 
in April.  The sale of cattle to the Soviet Zone provided 7,000 t of sugar and 5,000 t of 
molasses.532   
 Two conditions handicapped the light upswing of the economy during May and further 
progress: “(1) a low level of interzonal trade in the face of the heavy U.S. Zone dependence on 
the remaining three zones for raw material such as coal, oil, steel, buna [synthetic rubber] and 
crude coal tar; and (2) inability of the current low production rate to stay abreast of continuing 
wear and tear of machinery, rolling stock and automotive equipment–to say nothing of 
compensating for the wartime damage to, and destruction of manufacturing and transportation 
facilities,”533 a short but comprehensive analysis of the general economic situation of occupied 
Germany and of the U.S. Zone especially.  For the first time, the Monthly Report of June cited as 
an additional impediment for economic revival, “the need for some kind of financial reform to 
reduce excessive purchasing power and to consolidate Germany’s vast [war induced] internal 
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debt.”534  Germany’s economic and food situation remained precarious after twelve months of 
occupation. 
June 1946 (Report No. 12) 
 Industrial production increased slightly in the U.S. Zone in June to twenty nine per cent 
of capacity, but too little to close the gap between demand and supply. The U.S. offered the 
Allied Control Council to “enter into administrative agreements with any or all of the other 
occupying powers in the fields of finance, transport, communications, industry and foreign trade 
for the purpose of effecting a united economic policy with the Zones which would desire it.”535  
However, it took six months from the offer to the creation of the Bi-Zone, the joint British-
American occupation zone, on 1 January 1947. 
 Meanwhile the food situation in the U.S. Zone improved somewhat due to the import of 
166,632 t (164,000 long tons) foodstuffs.  The imports “included the unfilled portions of earlier 
allocations as well as the June quota.”536  Based on this kind of information there is no way to 
calculate accurate and exact numbers of quantities of food supplied to the German population of 
the U.S. Zone.  E.F. Ziemke in The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946, 
mentions a dollar value of all food imports from the United States from August 1945 to 30 June 
1946 of $242,285,000, without reporting quantities.537  The June imports, nevertheless, improved 
the food situation enabling the authorities to raise the caloric value of the daily ration from 1,180 
calories to 1,225 calories.  That amount was far ahead of the British ration of 1,050 calories and 
of the French ration of 1,014 calories.538  The undernourishment of children prompted a 
supplemental feeding program.  In Hessen, seventy per cent of children and in Württemberg-
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Baden, seventy eight per cent of children were underfed.539  Started in June the program 
provided a meal of additional 400 calories per day for 82,000 children540 between the age of six 
and fourteen years.   
 The tense food situation caused many people to replenish their meager diet through theft 
and on the Black Market.  Marauding crops from the fields became widespread,541 despite July 
imports of 167,648 t (165,000 long tons) of food from the United States and 16,896 t of fish from 
Norway, Denmark, and Sweden.542 
July 1946 (Report No. 13) 
 Availability of sufficient coal and steel met “the demands of certain high-priority 
programs such as the manufacture of agricultural equipment, the processing of food and the 
rehabilitation of transport.”543  The gains in productivity in some fields were compensated by 
losses in others.  “Production of plaster fell 32 percent during the month, [and] truck production 
dropped 31 percent,”544 leaving the total July production at twenty nine per cent of capacity like 
in the preceding month. 
 According to the Monthly Report of July 1946, Bavaria, Hessen, and Württemberg-Baden 
calculated for their budgets with revenues of RM6,236,000,000 for the fiscal year 1946 (1 April 
1946-31 March 1947).  From this total, the Länder expected expenditures of RM1,413,000,000 
for occupation costs (twenty three per cent of the total) and RM770,000,000 for refugee camps 
(twelve per cent of the total).545  Welfare recipients received RM27,134,383 in aid in July 1946 
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in all U.S.-controlled areas.546  Calculating precautious with an average of RM20,000,000 per 
month without Bremen and Berlin, the total added up to RM250,000,000 for 1946, four per cent 
of the revenues expected for fiscal year 1946.  Occupation costs, costs for refugee camps, and 
welfare expenses accumulated to RM2,433,000,000, equal to thirty nine per cent of the budget 
total.  Occupation costs for the first quarter of the fiscal year 1946 amassed to RM253,000,000 in 
the U.S. Zone, compared with the occupation costs of the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1945 of 
RM245,000,000.547  How the author of the July report concluded a RM22,000,000 increase from 
RM 245,000,000 of the IV. Quarter 1945 to RM253,000,000 for the I. Quarter 1946 is a secret 
not to be solved.  
 A compelling chapter of the generosity and helpfulness of the American people opened 
up by the permission to send relief packages to Europe and occupied Germany.  In June 
American Relief Organizations started to ship needed supplies.  The first shipments of relief 
supplies arrived in Germany in July.  The Council of Relief Agencies Licensed for Operation in 
Germany (CRALOG) provided 6,228 t of relief supply in July, most of it foodstuffs.  The 
Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe (CARE) shipped 36,000 packages of supplies 
in July.  Military Government expected 100,000 relief packages in early August 1946.548  
August 1946 (Report No. 14) 
 August witnessed an increased industrial production of five per cent,549 however, 
handicaps still existed.  Firms of farm machinery had no reserve stocks of raw material “which 
are so scarce in the U.S. Zone that manufacturers have resorted to making end-products such as 
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hand tools, building trims, and toys out of steel shells.”550  Estimates of the 1946 crop production 
in the U.S. Zone were less than expected, not exceeding the 1945 harvest, and being twenty to 
twenty-five per cent below the 1939 to 1944 average.  Bread grain and sugar beet yields would 
be larger than 1945, whereas oilseed crops would not exceed fifty per cent of 1945.551  Food 
imports from the United States constituted 22,861 t (22,500 long tons), an amount much smaller 
than in previous months.552   
 The value of the imports of twelve months, August 1945 to August 1946, accounted for 
$160,000,000.  Of this total sixty six per cent were food imports, valued at $105,600,000.  The 
food imports did not include, according to Report No. 14, canned goods, dehydrated potatoes and 
other special food.  Seeds were imported for $12,800,000, whereas the Germans should pay for 
“unserviceable but repairable Army trucks and trailers”553 more than $11,000,000.  The import of 
chemicals, POL, cotton, fish, sulphate pulp, hemp fibre, clothing and shoes, and medical supplies 
amounted to $30,400,000.554  Although no costs accrued against Germany, CRALOG had 
provided so far 11,327 t of food and 3,591 t of clothing for the U.S. Zone.  160,445 CARE 
packages arrived in Bremen, ready for distribution in Bremen, the western sectors of Berlin, and 
in the U.S. Zone.555  
 To increase the dollar amount available to Germany to pay for imports, freight transient 
charges across Germany had to be paid in dollars.  A fixed exchange rate of thirty cents per 
Reichsmark was established.  The zone of exit of the transport determined the collecting Military 
Government.  The proceeds would be split according to their share.556   
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 Starting in August 1946, the Military Government had to report all major expenses for, 
and caused by Military Government.  “The principal categories of expenses [to be reported] 
consists of pay and incidental expenses for the entire staff of OMGUS, both military and 
civilians, displaced persons and civilian internees.”557  Because of the many agencies involved, 
Military Government at this time could only provide “quantitative figures on acquisition and 
disposition,”558 – a monetary value Military Government was unable to submit at the time.   
 According to the chart, Military Government issued to German civilians the following 
items without adding a dollar value: 1,283,865 t of grain, food and similar products; 59,219 t of 
agricultural supplies and fertilizer; 118,855 t of petroleum and petroleum products; 12 complete 
hospitals and related supplies; 8,500 vehicles and trailers; and 9,418 t of textiles.559  Adding up 
the tonnage of food imports listed in previous reports, it is impossible to calculate a food import 
of 1,283,865 t stated in the chart on page 27 of the Monthly Report No. 14, August 1946.  
 U.S. civilians and Allied nationals employed by the Military Government earned wages 
and salaries of $5,138,000.  The military persons on duty in Military Government received 
$23,349,000 in salaries.  These numbers are presumably the amounts paid from the beginning of 
the occupation.560  
September 1946 (Report No. 15) 
 Economic activities continued to increase during September, however at a modest rate of 
growth.  September was, according to report No. 15, a time of “wait and see” concerning 
industrial production.  With stockpiles considerably more depleted “and with no immediate 
prospect of overcoming the handicap of obsolete machinery and irregular supplies of raw 
                                                





material and fuel, September production suggests that the uninterrupted expansion of industrial 
production in the U.S. Zone has definitely tapered off.”561  To increase the jewelry production 
Military Government loaned twenty tons of silver bullion to the jewelry industry of the U.S. 
Zone.562   
 Exports during August, September totaled $1,200,000.  Formerly, Germany was a high-
tech exporter, now seventy five per cent of the exports of August, September were raw materials 
like salt, cement, bauxite and soda ash.  The rest were semi-fabricates and finished products.563  
Raw cotton totaling 25,000 t, one half of a 50,000 ton contract, arrived at Bremen from the 
United States.  The import was a so-called self-liquidating import program, by which the raw 
cotton was paid for by the higher valued finished products.564   
 The food situation as reported in September (Report No. 15) was confusing.  During the 
month roughly 50,000 t of food were imported into the U.S. Zone.565  The same paragraph stated 
“about 940,000 t of imported food have been provided for German civilians in U.S.-occupied 
areas from VE-Day through 30 September 1946.”566  A side remark explained that the 940,000 t 
were “based on known shipments, and is not yet fully documented to show receipt by 
Germans.”567  How did Military Government manage to account for the 1,283,865 t of food 
imports listed in the chart of the August report?568   
 The chart in report No. 15 itemized 926,519 t of food.  Disregarding the food question, 
the chart in report No. 15 gave detailed information about all kinds of supply the United States 
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provided: from 92,186 pieces of clothing to 9,569 t of raw cotton, from twelve hospitals to 
1,026,569 vials of vaccine, to 294,422 t of petroleum and petroleum products, from 45,575 t of 
fertilizer, 3,106 t of binder twine, and 22,085 bales of burlap to 14,721 t of grain seeds, from 
1,106,333 grain sacks to 25,183 trucks, trailers, spare parts, and miscellaneous commodities not 
listed here.569  Additionally, the chart listed food and items issued to displaced persons and 
civilian internees, increasing the amount of support the United States provided. 
 Expenses for military and civilian employees of the Military Government added up to 
$24,405,600 for the military members and $6,235,000 for the civilians.  Based on the assumption 
that the wages and salaries were added up every month, the United States spent in September on 
U.S. civilians and Allied nationals employed by the Military Government $1,097,000, as well as 
$1,056,600 for the military employees.570  
October 1946 (Report No. 16) 
 To provide heating fuel for the Germans during the approaching winter, miners of the 
western zones agreed to work on Sundays.  The Sunday work yielded 28,000 t of hard coal and 
147,200 t of brown coal.571  Industrial production did not change much in October.  The furniture 
industry grew moderately due to the demand of the Military Government for furniture for the 
arriving family members, taking over three quarters of the production.572. 
 The demand for transporting coal and crops increased from 206,000 t per day in 
September to 237,000 t per day in October/November, putting enormous strain on the 
Reichsbahn.  The inadequate railway and road transport capacity prompted Military Government 
to allow the U.S. Army to “offer the use of 30 organized truck companies to supplement German 
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rail transport and up to 20 percent of unit organizational vehicles to supplement German highway 
transport,”573 to haul harvest and wood for space heating. 
 Occupation costs for the first quarter of 1946 summed up to RM231,000,000, during the 
second quarter they rose to RM252,000,000, and the third quarter presented a bill of RM 
313,000,000.  Besides the costs caused by the arriving family members, the transfer of the 
salaries of the Polish Guard units to be paid by occupation costs caused the strong increase of the 
third quarter.574  
 October exports amounted to $2,217,000, “the bulk of the sales consist[ing] of semi-
fabricats or finished products,”575 resembling more the prewar exports of Germany. October food 
imports from the United States for German civilians totaled 51,000 t.576  The amount of food, 
according to Report No. 16, imported from the United States and released from Army and 
Theater stocks from VE-Day to October 1946 amounted to 80,000 t, based on known shipments 
and receipts from German authorities,577 an incredibly low number.  800,000 t would be more 
credible, as Report No. 3, for September 1945, already noted 701,075 t (690,000long tons) on 
page 8.  In addition, 40,000 t of fish were imported from other countries.  To feed the Germans 
on a 1,550 cal./day diet through 30 June 1947, additional imports of 1,108,000 t of food were 
needed.   
 Once again the confusion starts.  The 80,000 t of October food imports may be a typing 
error.  However, even 800,000 t contradicted the 940,000 t of imported food reported in 
September.578  The chart “U.S. Supplies Furnished by Military Government” for October 
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reported 952,772 t of food issued to German civilians in U.S.-occupied areas, 26,253 t more than 
the September chart showed.  The 26,253 t difference to the September chart questions the 
51,000 t of food imports cited on page 16 of the October Report.  It seems the reporting and book 
keeping of the respective agencies, U.S. or German, did not play from the same sheet of music.   
 The chart of the October Report described further increases of supplies for Germany: for 
example, the 16,927 t of petroleum and petroleum products, and minor increases in binder twine 
and truck/trailer repair parts.579  
 Expenses for civilian and military employees of Military Government rose to $7,318,800 
for civilians, and to $25,428,600 for the military members in October.580  U.S. civilians and 
Allied national earned $2,180,800 in October, whereas the military personnel earned $2,079,600, 
paid by Uncle Sam.  
November 1946 (Report No. 17) 
 During November, the industrial production stayed at forty four per cent of the 1936 
production numbers, the level of October.  Increases and declines balanced themselves.581  
However, the export of businesses of the U.S. Zone added up to $3,300,000, “the largest two-
month total since March-April.”582  The exports tended toward the prewar German export 
composition for high-end products; more than half of the exports were finished products, 
dwarfing the export of raw materials.583    
 Continuing support with Army trucks backed the transport of perishable harvest to 
storing/processing facilities584.  The critical condition of the German road transportation 
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demonstrated the number of 68,755 passenger cars and of 68,294 cargo trucks of all kind in 
service, while 33,160 passenger cars and 11,371 trucks were waiting for major repairs.585  These 
cars had to serve a population of more than seventeen million people with their demands.  As of 
1 December only thirty seven per cent of the estimated amount of fuel wood for space heating 
was delivered.586   
 CRALOG supplies for the U.S. Zone in November added up to 469 t of food, 96 t of 
clothing, 33 t of soap, and 4.5 t of medical supplies.  93,822 CARE packages arrived in 
November in the U.S. Zone.  The International Red Cross, acting as agent enabled the delivery of 
307 t of goods, valued at $750,000 to the U.S. Zone.587  
 The bill for goods and services demanded by the occupying authorities added up to 
RM102,700,000 in October.588      
 According to the chart, “U.S. Supplies Furnished by Military Government” on page 26 of 
Monthly Report No. 17, food issued to Germans amounted to 1,000,258 t, compared with the 
October number of 47,486 t of food and 31,704 Army rations issued in November.589   
 A slight improvement of the food situation, the start of working of bi-zonal agencies, a 
constant industrial production level, the import of 47,486 t of food and occupation costs of RM 
102,700,000 for October characterize the month of November 1946.  
December 1946 (Report No. 18) 
 How did the future looked like for the German people in the U.S. Zone after more than 
eighteen months of occupation?  The Monthly Report No. 18 covered December, the last month 
of 1946. The economic fusion of the American and British Zones started, effective 1 January 
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1947.  The fusion “provides for a pooling of the indigenous resources of the area and imports 
into the area, stipulating that the two Governments will become equally responsible for the costs 
of these imports after 31 December 1946.”590  A Joint Import-Export Agency (JEIA) would be 
responsible for foreign trade relations and the removal of internal bureaucratic trade barriers. The 
Bi-Zone agreement stipulated that proceeds from German exports will only be used to buy and 
import raw materials “to maintain and increase production of exportable goods.”591  Food 
imports under the “disease and unrest” clause of the JCS 1067 will “be financed primarily, 
though in decreasing amounts, from appropriated funds.”592   
 The industrial production fell from forty four per cent in November to thirty nine per cent 
of the 1936 average.  During the first three weeks of the month production was kept at the 
November level.  However, the cold period of the last part of December forced many plants to 
close.  “As a result [of the cold and holidays] most manufacturing activity in the U.S. Zone was 
at a standstill in the final week of December.”593  
 In December, German exports, valued at $1,712,381, made a turn-around from semi- and 
finished products to raw materials, with hops leading the list at $1,118,409, followed by 
industrial salt at $432,000, and pencil clay at $11,800.  Finished/high-end products were sold at a 
value of $112,695, only seven per cent of the total exports.  
 The financial situation of the three Länder proved to be very good after eight months of 
the fiscal year 1946 had passed.  Revenues of RM3,876,000,000 exceeded expenses by 
RM1,648,000,000.  German authorities paid, since the start of the occupation through November 
                                                
590 Monthly Report of the Military Governor U.S. Zone, No. 18, 1-31 December 1946. 1. 
591 Ibid. 13. 
592 Ibid. 
593 Ibid. 7. 
 223 
1946 RM1,262,400,000 for occupation costs, for goods and services provided to the occupier.594   
 During December 112,000 t of bread grain were imported into the U.S. Zone, an amount 
never reached before. The forecast for January 1947 expected even more imports, calling for 
438,000 t of bread grains and flour.595  The December report detailed the direct imports of food 
(including food for displaced persons), of fish, and of POL at $24,366,000.  “Cumulative imports 
and import purchases from 1 August 1945 to 31 December 1946, including deliveries from U.S. 
Army stocks, accounted to $395,461,000.”596  The import figures are not complete, final figures 
may be much higher, the report states. Starting in December 1946 the food and supplies for 
displaced persons were made “chargeable to the German economy and are ultimately to be 
repaid out of the proceeds of German exports.”597  
                                Table 12: U.S. Food imports 1946 
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 The Monthly Report No. 30, December 1947, shows the amount, the composition, and 
the price of food imports for the U.S. Zone during the year 1946.  One can expect that the data 
used were final figures.  
In December 38,893 CARE packages were delivered in the U.S. Zone and 6,755 in 
Bremen.  So far, the U.S. Zone received a total of 132,715 packages and Bremen got 14,832 
since the program started.  105,000 food packages for needy individuals arrived in the U.S. Zone 
from Switzerland in December.598   
 The chart “U.S. Supplies Furnished by Military Government” in the December 1946 
Report listed as food issued to Germans 1,077,695 t, concluding that 77,437 t were issued to 
Germans in November.  
8.4. 1947, the third year of occupation 
January 1947 (Report No. 19) 
 In January most of the new bi-zonal agencies began work.  The Military Governor 
promoted the enclave of Bremen to statehood in January.599   
 The new Executive Committee for Food and Agriculture agreed on a standard ration 
scale for both occupation zones.  Winter grain and oilseeds sowing were less than proposed in 
the plan for 1946/47.   
 The extreme cold weather in January caused a twenty per cent decline of the industrial 
production in January, producing only at thirty one percent of the 1936 average production.  The 
main reason for the decline was the “disorganized transportation, increased cold-weather 
absenteeism, and exhausted industrial supplies of coal.”600  Cold weather and fuel shortages 
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caused temporary shut downs of 1,557 plants in the U.S. Zone between 13 and 25 January.601  
However, to put a positive touch to the bad January reporting, the report compared January 1947 
with the production of January 1946.  The January 1947 report concluded, that “despite the 
paralyzing effects of the cold wave, over-all industrial output in the Zone during January 1947 
amounted to about one-third higher than that of January 1946.”602  
 To save food Military Government reduced the beer production, resulting “in a decline of 
revenues from the beer tax from RM41,000,000 in September to RM7,000,000 in December.”603 
Goods and services rendered for the occupation force amounted to RM103,600,000 in 
December, “a 12.5 percent decline from average monthly payments of RM118,400,000 made in 
the period July-November 1946.”604  Bavaria paid RM31,700,000 in December, Hessen paid 
RM33,470,000, Württemberg-Baden paid RM24,920,000, and Bremen paid 13,570,000 on 
occupation costs in December.   
 The January exports yielded $874,000.  The dollar account for the import of raw 
materials for export production increased to $5,474,000.  The new “combined British and U.S. 
Joint Export-Import Agency (JEIA) supervised the German foreign trade, handled by a 
department of the German Office for Economic Administration.605  The major objective of the 
economic unification was the “self-sustaining bizonal economy by 1949 by means of the pooling 
of imports and resources, the combining of export proceeds, and the joint financing of 
appropriate imports.”606  
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 The food imports of the two-month period December 1946-January 1947 rose to 392,000 
t, a quantity never seen before.  The value of the imports reported at $113,000,000, at an average 
price of $288 per ton of mixed food, independent from the composition.607  The price of $288 for 
a ton of food was more than two times higher than the $136.93 per ton of food calculated earlier 
and probably based on inaccurate data.  The commercial imports “of which more than half 
represented coal and coke from Czechoslovakia for use in the Bavarian chinaware export-
production program,”608 accounted for $598,000.   
 During January, CRALOG supplied 474 t of relief material to the U.S. Zone, the 
International Red Cross initiated the shipment of 512 t.  The CARE program delivered 55,095 
packages.  Since September 1946, CARE delivered a total of 198,696 packages.  At a price of 
$10 per package, the American people spent close to $2,000,000 to support the German 
people.609    
  The monthly chart, now called “Summary of U.S. Supplies Furnished by Military 
Government (Balances as of 31 January 1947)” listed under the rubric, food furnished to German 
civilians, an amount of 993,523 t.  The December chart already listed 1.077,695 t, and the 
November chart 1,000,258 t. It is incomprehensible how the authors of the January report could 
come up with the amount, 993,523 t, despite higher quantities in earlier months.  Even adding up 
the 91,962 t food imported for displaced persons cannot solve the discrepancies.  May it be like it 
is, some numbers are clear: 392,000 t of food were imported at $113,000,000, resulting in an 
average food price of $288 per ton.  
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February 1947 (Report No. 20) 
 During February the economic situation worsened due to the persistent bad winter 
weather.  The industrial production reached twenty nine per cent of the 1936 production 
average.610 Production of heating stoves, life-saving equipment declined from close to 45,000 
units to 34,000 during the month.611   
 The February food rations continued to be at 1,550 cal./day with the food “deficient not 
only in total calorie content, but in essential nutrients as well,”612 because bread and potatoes 
made up eighty three per cent of the normal ration.  Farm deliveries declined. People believed 
farmers would sell their products on the black market to buy products and tools the legal market 
could not supply that they needed on the farm.613 
 Occupation costs “for supplies furnished and services rendered to U.S. Forces in the U.S. 
Zone (including Bremen and U.S. Berlin Sector) totaled RM139,400,000 in January,”614 a 
progression of fifteen per cent. 
 The export of German goods in February generated proceeds of $7,559,633.  These 
proceeds were essential for the procurement of raw materials needed to produce exportable 
goods.615  To increase export production, the first shipment of a raw material from the United 
States, one hundred forty pounds of gold at $71,000 on a loan basis arrived for the decoration of 
chinaware.616  
 The food imports of February consisted of 270,000 t.  Of this amount the U.S. Zone 
received 34,000 t, and the British Zone 236,000 t.  The import, almost completely bread grain 
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was valued at $33,00,000.617  The price of $33,000,000 included all transportation charges.  
However, even with the transportation charges the price for a ton of import would be $140, less 
than fifty per cent of the price calculated for the imports of the December/January period.   
 To the end of the month 6,287,000 gift parcels arrived in Germany since June 1946, from 
all countries, except from Japan and Spain.  The U.S. Zone received 3,460,000 parcels, the 
British Zone 2,130,000, the French Zone 460,000, the Russian Zone 183,000, and Berlin 
54,000.618  CRALOG supplies consisted of 120 t of food, 91 t of clothing, and 9 t of soap and 
household goods.  CARE packages numbered 50,000 in February.619  
 The chart “Summary of Supplies Furnished by Military Government, Balanced as of 28 
February 1947,” listed 1,100,195 t of food issued to German civilians, 106,672 t more than the 
questionable January amount of 993,523 t. Other materials issued according to the chart were 
490,980 empty bags and sacks, 2,530 vehicles/trailers, and 800 tires and automotive parts.620   
 The “accrued pay of U.S. civilians and Allied nationals employed by Military 
Government through 28 February 1947 totaled $13,410,234.  Approximately $28,279,500 has 
been expended for the purpose of maintaining military personnel assigned to Military 
Government duties.”621  
March 1947 (Report No. 21) 
 The severe winter weather ended in March, initiating a general upswing in industrial 
production across the spectrum.  The growth reached thirty five per cent of the 1936 baseline.  
However, the upswing was far below the peak production rate of October/November 1946.622  
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The precision and optic instrument production “more than doubled, from 11 percent of the 1936 
rate in February to 25 percent in March.”623  Despite the increases, the issue of only forty-nine 
pair of shoes per thousand people in February described the sad state of economic affairs.  
 The bad weather did not cause an increase of public welfare recipients.  The amount 
disbursed for welfare climbed from RM36,489,797 in February to RM36,503,191 in March, 
mainly caused by applications of refugees for public support.624   
 The “payments by German authorities for U.S. requisitions and indigenous employees in 
February totaled RM122,000,000,”625 an increase of RM19,000,000 above the January charges 
of RM103,000,000.626  Military Government did not explain the raise of more than eighteen per 
cent in one month. 
 The food import program for the combined zones provided 913,000 t for the first quarter 
1947.627  To calculate the March food import one has to subtract from the 913,000 t the January 
and February amount.  In February, 270,000 t of food were imported.628  For January the 
situation was less clear.  The food imports of the two-months period December/January were 
393,000 t.629  Assuming an equal partition, the January import was 196,000 t.  March imports 
minus January and February imports showed a net March food import of 447,000 t, an enormous 
amount.  
 Nine months of CRALOG support amounted to the shipment of 9,374 t of supplies, of 
7,104 t of food, 2.024 t of clothing, and 246 t of miscellaneous supplies.  55,000 CARE 
packages, addressed to individuals arrived in March.  Added were 8,000 so-called free packages 
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for needy families.  The International Red Cross provided 132 t of supplies, and relief supplies 
from the Vatican added 264 t.630  
 Despite all food imports to keep a daily diet of 1,550 calories, the imports could not 
prevent that the people were “in poorer nutritional condition than at the same time last year.”631  
Across the population weight losses between one and one and a half pounds were observed.632 
Ex-President Herbert Hoover’s Report No. 1 German Agriculture and Food Requirements, from 
28 February 1947, emphasized this critical point calling for additional food for children.633  The 
child feeding program would “provid[e] a ration-free meal of 350 calories per day while schools 
are in session for approximately 3,550,000 school children from 6 to18 tears of age in the 
combined area.”634  To this day I remember the warm meals I received in elementary school.  
With eyes closed I would be able to find the way from the classroom to the room in the basement 
where the meals were issued.  Hoover also proposed to man U.S. Liberty Ships for the transport 
of food imports from the United States to Germany, to save scarce dollars for the import of 
essential raw materials for the export economy.635  One has to keep in mind that all support, may 
it be food, seeds, fertilizer, or fuel, Germany had to pay for.  
 German exports from the U.S. Zone generated a total dollar credit as of 31 March of 
$8,731,944.06.  During the month $773,077.08 were spent for crucial imports.636   
 According to the chart “Summary of U.S. Supplies Furnished by Military Government, 
Balanced 31 March 1947” during the March reporting period, 20,948 t of food were issued to 
German civilians.  The chart offered a new category called “other food,” with varying units.  As 
                                                
630 Monthly Report of the Military Governor U.S. Zone, No. 21, 1-31 March 1947. 28. 
631 Ibid. 25. 
632 Ibid. 26. 
633 Herbert Hoover, The President’s Economic Mission to Germany and Austria, Report No. 1 German Agriculture 
and Food Requirements. 28 February 1947. 10-11. 
634 Monthly Report of the Military Governor U.S. Zone, No. 21, 1-31 March 1947. 14. 
635 Ibid. 3. 
636 Ibid. 11. 
 231 
many as 28,462 units of this category of food of unknown quantities were issued, including 
1,760,000 noon meals.  The Germans received 38,655 t of POL (Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants), 
as well as 1,624 t of asphalt, tar and waste oil.  5,167 vehicles and trailers were transferred to the 
Germans.  These vehicles, in all likelihood were in no better conditions than the 518 sedans of 
the Wehrmacht issued in March, vehicles “of salvage value only.”637   
 According to the chart 734,358 t of seeds were issued in March. The February chart, 
however, listed only 17,945 t of seeds.  
April 1947 (Report No. 22)  
  A little mental experiment may give the reader some ideas of the dimensions and 
quantities of food needed to feed the people of the U.S. Zone.  The calorie amount of the 94th 
ration period for the normal customer was 1,546 cal./day, very close to the official 1,550 
calories.  The census of October 1946 determined the population of the U.S. Zone at 17,174,400, 
an area housing 14,257,600 in 1939,638 an area, “even before the war, was not sufficient in food 
production.”639  To make the calculation easier we assume that all residents were normal 
consumers.  A year had thirteen ration periods at twenty-eight days.  A normal consumer would 
receive, if available, for the 94th ration period 8,000 g of bread, 2,000 g cereal, 200 g 
Ersatzkaffee, 1,000 g of meat, 1,000 g of fish, 302 g fat, 125 g cheese, 3,000 g milk, 250 g sugar, 
12,000 g potatoes, 2,500 g vegetables, 580 g canned vegetables, 125 g dried fruits, and 225 g 
peanut crème, a total of 31,307 g,640 or 31.3 kg or 69.1 pounds.  31.3 kg times 13 ration periods 
times 17,174,400 residents produce 6,988,263,369 kg or 6,988,263 metric tons of food.  At a 
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hunger diet of 1,550 cal./day the people of the U.S. Zone would consume 6,988,263 t of food per 
year. Who can imagine seven million tons of food in train or shiploads? 
 The critical food situation prompted General Clay to state at a meeting with the Minister 
Presidents, that the Germans must press ahead with the indigenous food collection.641  
“Unknown amounts of foods… [are lost] through unauthorized livestock feeding, illegal sales, or 
barter with city people in exchange for the limited farm supplies, equipment… which are 
available.”642  
 Report No. 22 enumerated food imports of 890,000 t during the time 1 January 1947 to 
30 April 1947 and “126,000 t of pulses, dried milk, and other foods,”643 a total of 1,016,000 t.  
However, the report stated that the food shipments from February to April were “more than 
100,000 metric tons (in terms of flour) per month short of the amount required to maintain a 
1,550 calorie ration level.”644  Subtracting 913,000 t of food for the first quarter, an April net 
import of 103,000 t can be calculated.  To ship this amount by rail, close to 7,000 rail cars, 
carrying 15 t each were necessary.   
 During April, CRALOG shipped, 252 t of food, 191 t of clothing, and 16 t of 
miscellaneous supplies to the U.S. Zone.  CRALOG shipments from April 1946 to March 1947 
were valued at $ 15,000,000.  CARE sent 50,000 packages to the U.S. Zone.  The International 
Red Cross (IRC) imported 271 t of relief supplies in April.645  
 Supplies issued according to the chart “Summary of U.S. Supplies Furnished by Military 
Government, Balances as of 30 April 1947,” amounted to 6,530 t of food, and 326,395 units of 
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other food, including 2,087,086 noon meals.  Besides other minor supplies issued, 1,467 trucks 
and/or trailers were given to the Germans.646   
 Occupation costs from U.S. Army requisitions and civilian labor in fiscal year 1946 
added up to RM1,535,000,000, whereas the March occupation costs amounted to 
RM145,800,000, again an increase of RM23,800,000 from the previous month.647   
 Pay for civilian employees of Military Government was $17,721,296 through April, 
military pay totaled $29,592,300, in April civilians earned $1,557,151, and the military members 
$643,500.648 
 Net proceeds from exports amounted to $48,824.86, adding up to a total dollar credit of 
$8,780,768.92.  Import payments of essential raw materials were $773,110.82 through April. 
 One of the many handicaps the economy of the U.S. Zone faced was bureaucracy. When 
a German firm needed access to international telephone and telegraph service, the firm had to 
apply for it to the Economic Ministry of the Land.  After approval the Land submitted the 
application to the particular branch office of the Joint Export-Import Agency (JEIA).  The 
approved application was sent to the Reichspost.  And the Reichspost would “issue a permit 
authorizing the applicant to use international telecommunication facilities.”649    
May 1947 (Report No. 23) 
 Favored by good weather, industrial production in the U.S. Zone increased to forty-six  
per cent of the 1936 rate650 in May.  However, actual hard coal output in the Ruhr area could still  
not support industrial growth, exports to the liberated countries, stockpiling for winter heating, 
and replacing exhausted stocks.651  The U.S. Zone export recorded a profit of $1,808,389.92 in 
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May, adding up to a total of $10,589,158.84, while for Category B imports of essential raw 
materials $838,068.89 had to be paid .652  
 Imports were split in two categories, A and B.  Category A included imports of food, 
fertilizer, seeds, and petroleum products, to keep the Germans alive.  They were paid for by 
appropriated funds of the U.S. Government.  Category B imports were regulated by the Joint 
Export-Import Agency of the U.S./British Military Governments.  Category B imports were all 
imports of raw materials and manufactured goods necessary for the production of export 
products.  “The [JEIA] organization started with a certain working capital and all exports of coal, 
and other commodities are credited to this fund until the export exceed the raw material imports, 
when the surplus will be applied to the cost of Category A,” to pay for food imports.653 
 Due to the desperate food situation, the food ration had again to be cut.  During the 101st 
ration period (28 April -25 May), the normal consumer received only 1,040 cal./day, a starvation 
diet.  Food imports for May into the Bizone reached 341,000 t.  Of this amount 302,000 t were 
bread grain and 16,000 t of other food provided by the United States. 23,000 t were shipped from 
Great Britain, Norway, and other countries.  From 1 January to 31 May 1947 the food imports to 
Germany added up to 1,482,000 t at a price tag of $180,000,000, a calculating price of the food 
of $121.46 per ton.654  The imports were paid by the U.S and British governments.  Military 
Government also imported 3,450 t of field and vegetable seeds in May at $839,000, as well as 
60,000 t of seed potatoes valued at $3,200,000.  The import of the seed potatoes added 60,000 t 
of indigenous potatoes to the meager food rations issued in the Bizone.655   
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 The shortage of skilled and unskilled labor persisted, giving organized labor bargaining 
power.  “Very large numbers of manufacturers are utilizing a portion of their production to keep 
their labor,” complained General Clay.  It was a way to keep the workers.656  On the other hand, 
a court in Stuttgart imposed jail sentences up to four months for seventy-two unemployed who 
refused several times assigned jobs they were fit to work.657   
 From 10,710 unserviceable U.S. Army trucks transferred to the Germans in 1945/46, 
6,000 were operational in May.  618 of the 2½ t trucks were converted to solid fuel use and 25 to 
Diesel fuel.658 The tendency of liberated countries not to return rail cars to the U.S. Zone 
increased the transportation bottleneck.  Czechoslovakia and Austria had to be threatened with 
cessation of rail transport if they did not return 2,000 rail cars, respectively 4,000 to the U.S. 
Zone.659  
 During May, CRALOG relief supplies contained 334 t of food, 33 t of clothing, and 20 t 
of other material.  The International Red Cross sent supplies of 23 t of clothing, and 173 t of 
household goods.  40,000 CARE packages arrived, bringing the total to 380,000 packages for the 
U.S. Zone and Berlin.660  400,000 gift parcels per week from individuals in the United States 
arrived in Germany, adding up to 1,600,000 in all four zones in May. Germany received a total 
of 10,500,000 parcels from the United States since June 1946.  The Reichspost received 
$1,957,000 for their part of the delivery process in accordance with international postal 
regulations. This money was added to the export account to buy Category B materials.661    
                                                
656 Ibid. 4. 
657 Ibid. 17. 
658 Ibid. 18. 
659 Ibid. 19. 
660 Ibid. 33. 
661 Ibid. 22. 
 236 
 Up to 31 May 1947, the United States paid a total of $17,867,024 for civilian employees 
of Military Government and $30,180,600 for the military members.  In May, civilians earned 
$1,145,728 and the members in uniform earned $588,300.662   
 Food issued according to the chart “Summary of U.S. Supplies Furnished by Military 
Government, Balances as of 31 May 1947,” amounted to 16,374 t.  3,257,770 units of “Other 
Food” were issued in April, the May number listed 3,226,170 units, a minus of 31,600 units to 
April.  85,545 blankets, bedding and beds were issued, as well as 336,600 pieces of clothing.663  
 June 1947 (Report No. 24) 
 Industrial production slowed down in June.  Lack of electricity due to drought and coal 
shortages caused by the food situation stopped the March to May upward trend.  “The revised 
index of industrial production shows that over-all output in June was slightly under 49 percent of 
the 1936 rate as compared with slightly over 49 percent in May.”664  Analyzing the situation 
Report No. 24 concluded “the industrial capacity for sustained expansion is available, but further 
industrial recovery is contingent upon improvements in the supply of food, transport, and 
coal.”665    
 The bread ration was cut from 10,000 g to 6,000 g demonstrating the severity of the food 
crisis, mitigated only a bit by local supplies of not-rationed foods like vegetables from 
gardens.666  Daily calories for the normal consumer did not exceed 1,100, a slight upgrade from 
the 1,040 cal./day ration of May.   
 During June the highest amounts of food were imported.  The imports included 483,000 t 
of bread grains and flour, and 17,000 t of pulses, milk, and other foodstuffs from the United 
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States, a total of 500,000 t.  European countries delivered 11,000 t of fish and vegetables to the 
Bizone in June.  The imports cost the U.S. and British taxpayer $67,656,000.667  The combined 
zones received food imports from 1 January to 30 June of approximately 2,000,000 t at a value 
of $257,000,000, an average price of $128.5 per ton.  The imports were split 25:75 between the 
U.S. Zone and the British Zone.668  Bizonal authorities contracted the shipments of 5,700 t of 
lard, 7,000 t of whale oil, 1,730 t of coconut oil, and 1,270 t of soya oil for July/August.669  
Radio stations broadcast information about the “great extent of American aid” and tried to 
convince German authorities and the public to “increase indigenous food production and 
expedite its distribution.”670 
 An export contract was signed for the production and shipment of 20,000 cases of 
Bavarian beer per month, each case with 24 twelve-ounce bottles to the United States.  However, 
the barley needed for the beer production had to be replaced by the importer “pound by pound.”  
The contract represented a value of $700,000 plus the barley replacement.671  Export goods were 
shipped from the U.S. Zone at a value of $1,700,000, and from the British Zone of $840,000 
(excluding coal and timber).672  Category B imports amounted to $929,000 for the production of 
export goods. 
 Besides the import of foodstuffs, further Category A goods were imported.  For $219,000 
the Bizone imported 424 t of field and vegetable seeds in June.  For the crop year 1946/47 (1 
July1946-30 June 1947) seeds imported into the bizonal area amounted to $42,000,000.  In 
addition 200 t of sugar beet seeds, 800 t of fodder beet seeds, and 899 tons of vegetable seeds 
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were purchased via interzonal trade from the Soviet Zone, without charging dollar accounts.  The 
outlook for the crop year 1947/48 called for seed procurements of approximately $22,271,000 
for vegetable seeds and seed potatoes, relying on an increased production of indigenous seed 
potatoes.673  
 Occupation costs for goods and services requisitioned by the U.S. occupation authorities 
amounted to RM119,000,000 in May.  The payments made in April added up to RM92,000,000.  
The April low was supposedly caused by late presentation of bills.  The monthly occupation 
costs for 1947/48 were close to the 1946/47 average of RM113,000,000 per month in the U.S. 
Zone.674  
 Total payments to civilian employees of Military Government through 30 June 1947 were 
$19,664,789, whereas military employee pay amounted to $30,642,900.  Civilian salaries for 
June were $1,797,765 and for military members $462,300.  The increase in civilian pay and the 
decrease in military pay could be attributed to an increase of civilian employees and a decrease 
of uniformed members.675 
July 1947 (Report No. 25) 
 The Bipartite Board Bizone approved in July an “export incentive program” to increase 
exports from the bizonal area.  The program would permit five per cent of the export proceeds to 
be “available to industrial management through an ‘Exporter’ Fund,’” and another five per cent 
would be available for general labor incentives.676  Furthermore, the Bipartite Board approved an 
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import program for Category B commodities like non-ferrous metals, paper and pulp, textiles, 
chemicals, stones and earth, steel and iron, and electrical industry for a total of $7,411,600.677 
 At fifty-three per cent of the 1936 rate, the industrial production increased close to four 
per cent in July, compared with June.  The building industry received orders to produce 1,000 
pre-fabricated housing units for miner housing in the Ruhr area.  Further 100 units had been 
ordered for the Frankfurt housing program, with follow-up orders of 300 expected.678  
Production of household equipment increased, with sewing machines at the top.  
 Shoe production for seventeen million residents reached 761,000 pairs in July679. The 
ceramic industry production in July reached ninety eight per cent of the 1936 rate, with an 
average increase between eleven and twenty per cent.680  
 Industrial exports from the Bizone in July amounted to $22,375,790.  This sum included 
the exports of coal, timber and invisibles, like the export of gas and electricity, transportation 
charges, and port charges.  Category B imports of raw materials needed for export production 
made up a sum of $1,686,445.681  
 The critical food situation improved in July.  The food ration could be increased to 1,320 
cal./day for the normal consumer due to food imports and vegetables harvested from home 
gardens and farms.682  Category A imports, food imports amounted to $63,200,000 in July, a 
little less than in June with $67,656,000 food imports.  The July imports of bread grains hit 
455,000 t valued at $51,100,000, and a price tag of $112.31 per ton.  Imports of other foodstuffs 
like pulses, dried milk, and lard added up to 33,500 t at a cost of $10,500,000, with an average 
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price tag of $313.4 per ton.  Fish imports and other miscellaneous food imports from different 
countries amounted to 9,400 t at $1,600,000.  A total of 497,900 t of food were imported into the 
Bizone in July at a total price of 63,200,000, with an average price tag per ton of $126.9.683  The 
fish imports of July were 6,400 t at $969,000, adding up the total fish imports from January to 
July to 85,700 t at $9,146,000, a price tag of $106.72 per ton of fish. 
 A price per ton calculation for the January to June 1947 food imports of 2,000,000 tons at 
a value of $257,000,000 puts a price of $128.5 per ton on average, very close to the $126.9 per 
ton for the July imports.   
 The Bizone imported 884 t of field seeds at $317,000 and 413 t of vegetable seeds at 
$165,000.  A total of 1,297 t of seeds for $482,000 were imported from various European 
countries for the crop year 1947/48. 
 The civilian salaries at Military Government accrued to $21,644,558, while the military 
members earned $31,105,200.  The July earning for civilian employees amounted to $1,979,769 
and for the military employees to $462,300.684  
August 1947 (Report No. 26) 
 The industrial production declined slightly from fifty-three per cent to fifty-one per cent 
of the 1936 baseline in August.685  The exports of the U.S. Zone rose to $15,457,286.61, while 
expenses for Category B imports, essential imports to produce export commodities, amounted to 
$1,176,358.70.  The export proceed balance of August added $337,235.82 to the total of 
$14,280,927.91.686   
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 The issued food rations for the standard consumer for the 104th ration period (21 July-17 
August) remained with 1,390 cal./day below the official 1,550 calorie ration.  Food imports from 
the United States in August reached 533,000 t, valued at $59,939,000. The imports contained 
523,000 t bread grains and flour and 10,000 t of dried mil, pulses, lard, and other food items, a 
price tag of $112.45 per mixed ton.  9,000 t of fish and other food imports from European 
countries at $1,580,000 added up to total imports in August to 542,000 t at a cost of $61,519,000, 
or, as report No. 26 mentioned, $61,500,000.  The imports were distributed at sixty two per cent 
to the British Zone and thirty eight per cent to the U.S. Zone. Since 1 January 1947, 2,778,000 t 
of bread grains and flour, as well as 300,000 t of other foodstuffs were imported into the Bizone 
at a total cost of $368,000,000.687  For the total of 3,078,000 t the price tag per ton was $119.56. 
 During August, the American Red Cross sent 1,476 t of food and comfort items.    
CRALOG shipped 500 t, increasing the total to 10,842 t.  The International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) participated with 155 t.  CARE packages numbered 47,140, thereof 32,947 for 
the U.S. Zone and 14,193 for the U.S. Sector of Berlin.  Since July 1946, a total of 787,286 
CARE packages arrived in Germany.688  
September 1947 (Report No. 27)          
 The drought caused a drop of the industrial production from fifty-one per cent in August 
to forty-eight per cent in September.689  
 Bizonal exports for September amounted to a value of $28,000,000.690  Exports from the 
U.S. Zone reached a high of $15,913,426.62, while for Category B imports $1,176,358.70 had to 
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be paid.  The account for export proceeds increased by $456,140.01 to a total of 
14,737,067.92.691   
  Rations were raised to 1,430 cal./day. September food imports from the United States 
were at 453,000 t of bread grains and flour and 1,570 t of pulses, dried milk, rolled oats, and 
miscellaneous items.  The price of the 454,570 t was $50,000,000, bringing the price tag to $110 
per mixed ton.692  Together with the British contribution of 1,545 t of salted fish and 800 t of 
food, the total food imports added up to 456,915 t at $50,500,000, representing a price tag of 
$110.5 per mixed ton.  The British’ 1,545 t of salted fish cost $258,000, and the 800 t of food 
$242,000.  
 The people of the United States continued with their care for Germany.  In September, 
over one million gift parcels arrived693 adding up to 16,500,000 parcels since June 1946. Based 
on a survey the average weight of a parcel was seventeen pounds, yielding 280,000,000 pounds, 
equaling 126,840 t of gifts for Germans.  With a calculated ninety per cent being foodstuffs, 
114,156 t of additional foodstuffs arrived in Germany.  CRALOG shipped 93 t of food, 68 t of 
clothing, and 31 t of miscellaneous items.  CARE sent 84,656 packages to the U.S. Zone.  The 
American Red Cross joined with a shipment of 80 t of food, clothing, and medical items.694 
  September experienced a dramatic setback in industrial production.  A cold and long 
winter and the summer drought killed the upswing.  Food problems increased the negative trend.  
October 1947 (Report No. 28) 
 Coal, iron and steel production increased substantially in October.  Insufficient 
transportation hampered increases across the board.  The general level of industrial production 
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rose minimally from forty eight per cent to forty nine percent of the 1936 basis.  Export goods 
delivered from the Bizone amounted in October to $1,500,000. 
 The 1,550 calorie rations could not be issued. Shortages limited the rations to 1,425 
cal./day for the standard consumer.695  Urban people did all they could do to get food.  To 
prevent foraging expeditions by train, so-called Hamsterfahrten, “rural police [of Württemberg-
Baden] established controls to check the large crowds [at train stations]…”696 
 October food imports amounted to 285,788 t.  The imports consisted of 269,793 t of 
bread grains and flour, 5,098 t of pulses, and 1,436 t of fat and oil at a grand total of 
$36,359,903.697  The reported amounts did not match up.  Calculating with the total import 
would give a price tag of $127.2 per mixed ton.  During the month 4,270 t of fish at $673,000 
were imported.  
  More than 1,200,000 gift parcels from the United States arrived, containing circa 10,000 t 
of food, clothing, and medical supplies.  175,000 parcels per month from other countries arrived, 
too.698  The CRALOG shipment included 327 t of food, 89 t of clothing, and 45 t of 
miscellaneous items.699  The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) shipped 215 t of 
bulk relief supplies in October.  The League of Red Cross Societies (LICROSS) provided 1 t of 
clothing and 23 t of comfort items. 55,000 CARE packages were distributed among the residents 
of the U.S. Zone, 22,220 were shipped to the U.S. Sector of Berlin,700 an amazing show of 
sympathy for Germany. 
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November 1947 (Report No. 29) 
 U.S. zonal industrial production increased from forty nine per cent to fifty one per cent in 
October, limited by transportation shortages.701  Export proceeds of the U.S. Zone industry 
during occupation rose to $16,403,709.45.  For imports of Category B materials  
JEIA had to pay $1,879,533.84.  The export proceed balance increased to $14,524,175.61, with a 
November amount of $1,156,328.55702 added.  Total exports of the Bizone were $28,700,000 in 
October, while Category A and B imports amounted to $54,000,000, and food imports 
accounting for $36,400,000 of the total.703   
 The normal consumer had to be satisfied with a 1,425 cal./day food ration. The United 
States imported 212,600 t of bread grain/flour at $25,278,000.  Food from various countries 
added up to 45,190 t, ranging from sugar from Cuba to pulses from Belgian Congo, 
supplementing the imports.  The total costs of 257,790 t of food ran to $33,300,000, a $129.17 
price tag per mixed ton and $118.9 for the ton of bread grain/flour.  Including November, 
4,034,100 t of food of all kinds for $478,843,000 were imported into the Bizone in 1947, at a 
price tag of $118.7 per mixed ton.704     
 The CRALOG relief supply amounted to 254 t, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross added 149 t, while League of Red Cross shipped 84 t to Germany.  Together it amounted 
to 268 t of food, 128 t of clothing, and 92 t of miscellaneous supplies.  CARE shipments to 
individuals reached 57,000 packages for U.S. Zone and its Berlin sector.  A shipment of 20,000 
CARE packages arrived intended for distribution to needy persons or families.705    
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December 1947 (Report No. 30) 
  The Christmas season caused a drop of the industrial production from fifty-one per cent 
to forty-nine per cent.  However, calculated on a daily base the December output equaled that of 
the previous month.706  Industrial progression did not meet expectations. The severe winter and 
the summer drought, as well as a missing currency reform and thereby missing economic 
incentives707 hampered progress.  December exports amounted to $28,000,000, while 
commercial November imports were at $1,000,000.  Preliminary figures of total Bizone imports 
for 1947 were $660,000,000, while exports accounted for $225,000,000.  The U.S. imports of 
$537,000,000 exceeded the Bizone exports to the United States by $531,000,000.  However, to 
European countries, the Bizone generated an export surplus of $114,000,000.  The bizonal coal 
export accounted for $108,000,000. The price of coal increased from $10 per ton to $15 per ton 
in September.  Coal exports of 6,500,000 t from January to August 1947 yielded $65,000,000.708  
A handicap for faster economic progression was the missing currency reform and a fixed 
exchange rate of a German currency.709 
 The December food ration stayed at 1,425 cal./day.  December food imports were 
300,245 t at $37,569,500, paid for by the U.S. and British governments, at a price of $125.13 per 
ton.  The 1947 total food import amounted to 4,334.350 t at a price tag of $516,412,500.  The 
average price per ton for the total import was $119.14.  The December imports were composed 
of 231,050 t of bread grain/flour, 8,330 t of dried milk, 7,970 t of pulses, 35,140 t of sugar, 320 t 
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whale oil, 480 t coconut oil, 4,000 t fish, 340 t dehydrated potatoes, and 12,245 t of fresh 
potatoes, adding up to a total of 299,875 ton, 370 t less than the 300,245 t.710  
 The December report presented the amount, the composition, and the price of the food 
imports for the U.S. Zone 1947.  The 1947 imports were 1,156,500 t above the imports of 1946. 
                                                                Table 13: Food imports 1947 
  
Kind of food       t 















Source: Monthly Report of the Military Governor U.S. Zone, No. 30, December 1947. 40. 
  
 The CRALOG December shipments included 9 t of food, 16 t of clothing, and 28 tons of 
miscellaneous items.  The League of Red Cross Societies sent 155 t of food and clothing.  CARE 
transferred 150,000 packages to the U.S. Zone and the U.S. Sector of Berlin.   
8.5. 1948, the fourth year of occupation 
January 1948 (Report No. 31)    
 Industrial activity gained slightly in the Bizone in January due to the mild winter without 
snow.711  Unsatisfactory food distribution, especially in the highly industrialized areas led to 
work stops throughout the Bizone.  The food rations for the residents of Stuttgart, par example, 
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went down during the first three ration periods of 1948 (110th to 112th period) to 1,407 calories, 
1,399 calories, and 1,397 calories.712  However, the production index in the U.S. Zone rose about 
three per cent to fifty-one per cent of the 1936 baseline.713  The export deliveries of the Bizone 
amounted to $27,100,000.  Raw materials like coal and timber accounted for $16,300,000 of 
exports. The “First Quarter Import Program” called for $100,000,000 imports from January to 
March without providing a sum for January imports.714 
 The January food imports into the Bizone amounted to 308,740 t at a price of 
$40,063,400.  The composition of the imports differed somewhat from earlier deliveries.  
260,193 t of bread grain/flour were amended by 1,818 t of pulses, 14,520 t of sugar, 1,590 t of 
milk, 13,405 t of fats and oils, 10,900 t of fish, 1,510 t of fresh potatoes, 3,525 t of dehydrated 
fruits, and 1,280 t of miscellaneous food items.715  This mixed food ensemble led to a price tag of 
$129.76 per ton. 
 United States residents’ private support of Germany did not waver in January.  CRALOG 
shipments consisted of 2,395 t of food, 154 t of clothing, and 70 t of household goods, while the 
batch of the International Committee of the Red Cross included 298 t of food, 115 t of clothing, 
and 195 t of medical supplies and household goods.  The League of Red Cross Societies 
participated with 15 t of clothing.  The city of Worthington, Minnesota sent 3 t of shoes and cloth 
to the city of Crailsheim in Württemberg-Baden.  CARE shipped 82,000 packages to the U.S. 
Zone and the American sector of Berlin.  Swiss welfare agencies mailed 30,000 parcels to 
Germany.  A 1947 review stated 7,160 t of bulk relief went into the U.S. Zone and the U.S. 
Berlin Sector, with CRALOG leading with 3,387 t at $2,076,920, followed by league of Red 
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Cross Societies with 1,703 t at $2,000,000, the International Committee of the Red Cross with 
1,085 t.  The 1,130,000 CARE packages were valued at $11,000,000.  The Vatican Relief 
Mission sent 985 t supplies and Swiss welfare agencies sent 400,000 packages to Germany. 
February 1948 (Report No. 32) 
 The increase in industrial production in the Bizone continued in February, due to good 
weather and sufficient energy supply.  The production in the U.S. Zone went up to fifty-four per 
cent of the 1936 average.  No work stoppages were reported in February.716  For the procurement 
of raw material $500,000,000 could be spent in 1948.717  
 The food rations declined from 1,425 cal./day in January to 1,410 cal./day in February, 
locally a decline to 1,311 cal./day was possible.718  The Category A food imports reached 
358,896 t at a value of $47,740,000, a price tag of $133.02 per mixed ton.  The imports consisted 
of 199,288 t of bread grains/flour, 35,835 t of fresh potatoes, 56,500 t of fish, 34,744 t of sugar, 
19,640 t of fat and oil, 6.902 t of pulses, 3,528 t of dehydrated fruits, 356 t of milk, and 2,103 t of 
miscellaneous food items.719   Further Category A imports included 1,619 t of field seeds and 
3,972 t of vegetable seeds720 for $2,300,000 and fertilizer for $ 2,900,000 in February.721  
$700,000,000 for the purchase of food during the time July 1948 to June 1949 were approved,722 
based on funds of the European Recovery Program.  Category B import contracts were signed 
with Sweden and Luxembourg for the delivery of 1,800,000 t of high quality iron ore.723   
 The 1,030 t CRALOG shipment contained 580 t of food, 378 t of clothing, and 72 tons of 
miscellaneous items, while the International Committee of the Red Cross sent 5 t of food, 55 t of 
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clothing, and 25 t of miscellaneous items.  The League of Red Cross Societies added 18 t of 
food.  The CARE organization shipped 85,214 packages to the U.S. Zone and the U.S. Sector of 
Berlin.724  
March 1948 (Report No. 33) 
 Industrial production bettered sturdily in February-March.  The U.S. Zone saw the   
production climb from-fifty four per cent to fifty-eight per cent from February to March with a 
promising prospect for the future.  February exports of finished goods reached $9,000,000 of a 
total of $26,000,000.725  Category B imports amounted to $9,000,000 and power imports from 
Austria cost $5,400,000.726  Final export numbers for February reached a total of $37,214,000. 
Finished products counted for $8,900,000 and coal for $17,074,000.  Category B imports in 
February amounted to $7,454,000.727  An export incentive program based on an exchange rate of 
1RM for $.30 allowed the producer to use forty per cent of his export proceeds to buy goods 
abroad after approval from JEIA. The Bizone became an official participant of the European 
Recovery Program creating much hope for the future.728  The new central bank for the Bizone, 
the Bank Deutscher Länder, founded on 1 March 1948, succeeded the Reichsbank, determined to 
become an important part within the European Recovery Program for the Bizone.   
 The official March food ration of 1,400 cal./day could not be issued across the Bizone.  
In some parts the caloric value went down to 1,180 cal./day.729  Bizonal food imports in March 
amounted to 482,614 t, valued at $63,000,000 at a price per mixed ton of $130.54 for the U.S. 
and British Governments.  The imports were composed of 293,406 t of bread grains/flour, 12,418 
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t of pulses, 77,451 t of sugar, 21,708 t of fats and oil, 10,540 t of fish, 40,072 t of fresh potatoes, 
35,304 t of dehydrated fruits, and 1,715 t of miscellaneous food items.  Added Category A 
imports were 1,775 t of vegetable seeds, 1,355 t of field seeds, and 41,989 t of seed potatoes in 
March.730   
 A medical supply depot valued at $2,700,000 was turned over to the Germans.  The 
CRALOG supplies for the U.S. Zone and Berlin consisted of 2,000 t of food, 267 t of clothing, 
and 48 t of miscellaneous items.  The League of Red Cross Societies shipped 17 tons of clothing, 
12 t of school supplies, and 1 t of sugar.  The League will also spend $75,000 for furnishing 
sewing rooms and classrooms.  The U.S. Zone received 134,091 CARE packages in March.731  
April 1948 (Report No. 34) 
 The industrial recovery of the Bizone continued during April at the pace of the previous 
month.  The bizonal level of industrial production hit fifty per cent of the 1936 baseline. It 
represented an increase of four per cent.732 Exports from the Bizone amounted to $51,413,000 in 
April, with a total of $88,840,000 for the first quarter 1948.  April Category B imports counted 
$18,476,000, the first quarter imports added up to $93,385,000.733 
 The central banks of the three Länder of the French occupation zone affiliated with the 
Bank Deutscher Länder on 1 April, acting now as the central bank of the western occupation 
zones.734  General Robertson, the British Military Governor, represented the Bizone at Paris at 
the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).   
 The food ration issued in April rose to 1,560 cal./day, a one time high since the 
occupation started.  However, the actual distribution in the Bizone area fluctuated from 1,310 
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calories in Schleswig-Holstein to 1,565 calories in Hamburg.  A contract was signed with Italy to 
import Category A food for $10,000,000 into the Bizone.  The import was paid for by funds 
provided by the ERP administration.735  April food imports amounted to 577,403 t at a total value 
of $86,500,000, at an average price of $149.81 per mixed ton.  The imports consisted of 316,364 
t of bread grains/flour at $40,500,000, a price tag of $128.02 per ton of bread grain, 127,063 t of 
sugar at $14,612,000, 24,026 t of pulses, 1,870 t of milk, 36,299 t of fat and oil, 65,578 t 
dehydrated fruits, and 6,202 t of miscellaneous food items.736  Category A seed imports added up 
to 15,698 t of field seeds, 4,907 vegetable seeds, and 109,721 t of seed potatoes.737  
 CRALOG imported 437 t of food, 263 t of clothing, and 74 t of miscellaneous supply into 
the U.S. Zone, and Berlin received 87 t of supplies.  Swiss agencies added 103 t of food, 29 t of 
clothing, and 68 t of household item to the import.  During the first quarter the Swiss agencies 
supported the U.S. Zone with 117,197 gift parcels at 700 t and valued at $400,000.  The League 
of Red Cross Societies sent 44 t of cloth and 9 t of educational supplies.  79,318 CARE packages 
went into the U.S. Zone, while 28,006 went to the U.S. Sector of Berlin.  The U.S. Army 
transferred 3,300,000 pieces of shoes, clothing and textiles from surplus stocks to German 
authorities for distribution.738 
May 1948 (Report No. 35) 
 In May, a month with fewer working days, the bizonal industrial production declined to 
forty-six per cent of the 1936 rate.  However, the productivity related to a single working day did 
not decline.  Additionally, the expected currency reform triggered a lack of industrial and 
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business undertakings,739 as well as a hesitancy of manufacturers to sell their products, causing 
artificial shortages.740  Export deliveries of all goods amounted im May to $47,400,000, with 
finished goods at $9,900,000.  Category B material of $58,600,000 was imported in May.  
Category A imports, paid for by U.S. and British governments, amounted to $79,500,000, of 
which $58,000,000 accounted for food imports and $1,200,000 for POL imports. As of 1 May, a 
fixed exchange rate of 1RM=$.30 was established for all export and import activities, except the 
import of staple food.741  
 Food rations were increased to 1,593 calories, however in some areas rations were cut 
due to low farm deliveries, leading to labor unrests with 165,000 workers participating in the 
U.S. Zone.742  Food imports reached 564,085 t in May, at a value of $73,000,000, a price of 
$129.41 for a mixed ton.  The food import was comprised of 301,259 t of bread grains/flour, 
15,641 t of pulses, 47,158 t of sugar, 18, t of milk, 18,828 t of fat and oil, 34,535 t of fish, 
100,704 t of fresh potatoes, 18,912 t of dehydrated fruits, and 27,030 t of miscellaneous food 
items.  5,952 t of field seeds, 991 t of vegetable seeds, and 16,585 t of seed potatoes were 
imported in May.743  
 Additionally, CRALOG shipped 520 t of food, 200 t of clothing, and 60 t of 
miscellaneous items.  CARE sent 85,904 packages and Swiss agencies sent 455 t of cloth, 74 t of 
clothing, and 134 t of household goods.  The League of Red Cross Societies imported clothing 
and medical supplies worth $63,259.  The gift parcels sent from the U.S. during two years 
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represented a value of $150,000,000 of food, clothing, and medical supplies to individual 
Germans.  U.S. residents spent $10,000,000 per month for gift parcels to Germany.744 
June 1948 (Report No. 36) 
 Industrial production of the Bizone rose to fifty per cent of 1936 standard in June.  
Looking at the output per working day, the production remained at the same level the last three 
months.  Report No. 36 mentioned no export and import figures due to the currency reform, the 
major event in June,745 replacing the Reichsmark by the Deutsche Mark 10:1.  Parallel to the 
currency reform a tax reform was introduced. The currency reform prompted the Soviets to cut 
off the access to Berlin.  Labor efficiency increased with the currency reform, while absenteeism 
decreased.  
 The food ration went up to 1,655 cal./day.  Category A food imports of 714,910 t arrived 
in June, representing a value of $90,500,000.  The price tag for a mixed tons was $126.59.  The 
import consisted of 439,501 t of bread grains/flour, 8,306 t of pulses, 74,515 t of sugar, 97 t of 
milk, 9,060 t of fat and oil, 25,991 t of fish, 86,013 t of fresh potatoes, 25,853 t of dehydrated 
fruits, and 45,574 t of miscellaneous food items.  Seed imports of 1,762 t of field seeds and 268 t 
of vegetable seeds completed the June imports of Category A products.  For the crop year 
1947/48 a total of 41,820 t of field seeds, 15,476 t of vegetable seeds, and 252,584 t of seed 
potatoes were needed for the sowing.  
 CRALOG sent 229 t of food, 205 t of clothing, and 34 t of miscellaneous items in June, 
Swiss welfare agencies added 363 t of food, 21 t of clothing, and 32 t of household items, while 
CARE participated with 62,509 packages supporting Germans. 
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July 1948 (Report No. 37)   
 Industrial production of the Bizone increased to sixty per cent of the 1936 basis.  Food 
rations hit 1,990 cal./day in July, 275 calories above the planned ration because of the ample 
potatoes harvest.  Food imports for July were 625,720 t at a price tag of $76,000,000.  The 
imports were composed of 486,603 t of bread grains/flour, 13,542 t of pulses, 27,056 t of fresh 
potatoes, 289 t of sugar, 17,253 t of fats and oil, 20,766 t of fish, 10,966 t of dried fruits, 28,576 t 
of fresh vegetables 191 t of dried vegetables, and 20,166 tons of miscellaneous food items.  
Category A imports totaled 749,400 t at $80,300,000, with food accounting for $75,900,000, 
seeds $1,000,000, fertilizer $1,300,000, and POL $2,000,000.  Category B imports reached 
$53,700,000 in July.  European Recovery Program funds allocated for the Bizone for the annual 
budget of 1948/49 were $922,000,000 for Category A products (food, feed, seeds, fertilizer, 
POL) and $868,000,000 for imports of Category B products (industrial products and raw 
materials), as well as $45,000,000 for invisibles and capital costs.  The budget will be paid by 
$728 million of GARIOA funds, $661 million from JEIA export proceed funds, and $446 million 
of ERP funds. 
  CARE sent 70,000 packages to the U.S. Zone and Berlin.  During the second quarter 
Swiss welfare agencies supported the Germans with 139,107 gift parcels containing 789 t of food 
at a value of 1,764,000 CHF.746 
August 1948 (Report No. 38) 
 The industrial level of the Bizone rose to sixty-seven per cent of the 1936 rate.  Black 
market and barter trade vanished.  For the third quarter 1948, the Economic Cooperation 
Administration (ECA) allocated to the Bizone $51,256,000 for Category A imports and 
$20,998,000 for Category B imports. 
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 The August food ration for the normal consumer provided 1,830 cal./day.  The food 
imports during the month amounted to 916,530 t with a value of $107,300,000, composed of 
697,486 t of bread grains/flour, 8,922 t of pulses, 18,433 t fresh potatoes, 116,261 t of sugar, 
6,133 t of fat and oil, 16,716 t of fish, 286 t of dried milk, 2,232 t of dried fruits, 25,581 t of fresh 
vegetables, and 21,480 t of miscellaneous food items.  The price for a mixed ton of food imports 
was $117.07.  Seed imports accounted for 1,105 t of field seeds and 55 t of vegetable seeds at 
$326,000, fertilizer at $2,100,000, and POL products at $1,900,000. 
 Category A imports for August totaled 1,068,100 t of food, seeds, fertilizer and POL 
products, valued at $111,600,000.  Category A imports for the time January to August 1948 
added up to 5,826,200 t at $652,800,000. 
 August export proceeds from the Bizone amounted to $58,000,000, while for Category B 
imports $41,000,000 had to be paid.  For the eight months January to August the exports totaled 
$336 million and Category B imports $258 million. 
 CRALOG shipped 700 t of supplies in August, consisting of 450 t of food, 200 t of 
clothing, and 50 t of miscellaneous items, a total of 24,100 t since January.  The American Red 
Cross participated with 5 t of clothing, while CARE sent 47,915 packages to the three western 
zones.  From January to July CARE shipped a total of 1,121,561 packages.   Swiss welfare 
agencies reported 48,553 gift parcel shipped, with a three months total of 187,660 parcels of 
approximately 1,200 t of supplies.747 
September 1948 (Report No. 39) 
 Imports and bountiful crops made it possible to increase the food ration for all consumers 
to 2,250 cal./day.  Food imports reached 795,950 t in September.  The imports were a mix of 
581,767 t of bread grains/flour, 5,178 t of pulses, 13,123 t fresh potatoes, 97,894 t of sugar, 2,206 
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t of fat and oil, 27,731 t fish, 589 t dried milk, 37,673 t of dried fruits, 19,995 t of fresh 
vegetables, and 9,794 t of miscellaneous food items.  Seed imports were 2,969 t field seeds and 
622 t vegetable seeds.  The September Category A imports, including the import of seeds 
amounted to $105,900,000, making it impossible to calculate a price for the ton of food.   
 The September exports at $61 million were $2,900,000 higher than the August exports, 
while Category B imports counted at $52 million.  The sum of Category A and B imports stand 
at $158 million for September. 
 To support the Berlin airlift the Bizone had to raise DM 50 million per month for 
industrial supplies and to pay unemployment benefits for affected workers. 
 Private and individual support for Germans provided CARE with 64,881 packages, the 
League of Red Cross Societies with 886 t of supplies, the Swiss welfare agencies with 72 t of 
clothing, furniture, and medical supply.  The American Red Cross sent 5t of clothing, while 
CRALOG participated with 261 t of food, 102 t of clothing, and 31 t of miscellaneous items in 
September.748   
October 1948 (Report No. 40) 
 To raise the money for the support of the Berlin airlift special taxes were imposed.  Both 
Military Governments paid on credit basis for food, fuel, medical supplies, seeds, newsprints, 
and fertilizer, all other expenses the Bizone had to cover.  The Notopfer Berlin, an emergency aid 
program imposed surcharges on wages, salaries, income, corporation taxes, and postage.  I still 
remember the small blue special stamp with a denomination of two Pfennig, which had to be put 
on every piece of mail.    
 To adapt the Reichsmark era taxes to the Deutsch Mark currency, excise taxes had to be 
lowered.  Par example, the tax on 1.1 pound of coffee was reduced from DM 24 to DM 12, for a 
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liter beer from DM 2.50 to DM 1.00, for 0.7 liter hard liqueur from DM 30 to DM 8, par 
example.   
 The food imports of 386,499 t for $44,023,735 were paid for by ECA funds of 
$2,287,050, by GARIOA/Military Government funds of $32,964,268, by IRO funds of 
$1,017,498, by United Kingdom funds of $3,070,877, by JEIA export proceeds of $1,056,190, 
and by participating ERP countries of $1,470,350.  Adding up the parties results in a total of 
$41,866,233, $2,157,502 short of the total of $44,023,735.  An average price of $113.90 per 
mixed ton can be calculated.  The import composed of 250,343 t of bread grains/flour, 4,356 t of 
pulses, 35,112 t of sugar, 3,566 t of fat and oil, 18,313 t of fish, 1,050 t of dried milk, 9,860 t of 
dried fruits, 25,165 t of fresh vegetables, 27,033 t of fresh fruits, and 11,057 t of misc. food 
items.   
 The exports of October amounted to $62,800,000, while Category A imports stood at $52 
million and the Category B imports at $32 million.   
 Swiss welfare agencies donated 76 t of supply, consisting of 39 t of food, 2 t of clothing, 
and 35 t of miscellaneous items, as well as 42,631 gift parcels.  CARE contributed with 64,039 
packages, while CRALOG sent 894 t of supplies, consisting of 711 t of food, 102 t of clothing, 
and 81 t of miscellaneous items. The League of Red Cross Societies handed over 32 t, with 14 t 
of food, 12 t of medical supplies, and 35 t of miscellaneous items.749          
November 1948 (Report No. 41) 
  November convinced with an increase of one per cent of the industrial production to 
seventy-five per cent of the 1936 level.  The Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) 
approved Category A imports for the time April to December 1948 of $197,293,000 and 
$141,964,000 for Category B imports.  November exports from the Bizone accounted for $68 
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million, while the imports added up to $103 million.  The November food imports amounted to 
515,000 t, at $58,677,000, thirteen per cent paid for by the Joint Food Procurement Office, five 
per cent by Great Britain, and eighty-two per cent by the United States.  The price of a ton of 
mixed food from the November imports was $113.94.  Total food imports January-November 
1948 amounted to 6,363,000 t, the share of the United States being 4,219,000 t.  
 Category A imports including food, feed, fertilizer, and POL decreased to $51 million in 
October.  The total tonnage received from January to October was 7,942,365 t at a value of 
$822,300,000.  The United States sold products to the Bizone for $574 million, followed by 
Cuba with $70.7 million, and Argentina with $15.7 million.  Category B imports from the United 
States amounted to $106.2 million, thirty-one per cent of all Category B imports, and Great 
Britain sold Category B imports for $72.8 million, a twenty-one per cent share.  
 CARE sent 49,323 packages, while CRALOG contributed 771 t of supplies in November, 
consisting of 659 t of food, 86 t of clothing, and 26 t of other things.  Swiss welfare agencies 
contributed 547 t, containing 55 t of food, 1 t of clothing, and 491 t of miscellaneous items.  The 
League of Red Cross Societies donated 29 t of supplies, 110 sewing machines, and $75,000.750  
December 1948 (Report No. 42) 
 December contracts based on the availability of ERP funds amounted to $245 million.  
Deliveries of merchandise will be at $99 million at the end of the month.  The June currency 
reform acted like a blood transfusion into the economy, freeing hoarded raw materials, finished 
and half-finished products.  Work efficiency increased while absenteeism sharply declined and 
black markets, as well as barter trade vanished.  Imports of food, machines, equipment, and raw 
materials boosted the economy.  The general morale of the people got a jump start. 
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 The December food ration, like the November ration, consisted of 11,000 g of bread, 
1,625 g of cereal, 400 g of meat, 800 g of fish, 625 g of fat, 3,000 g of skim milk, 125 g of 
cheese, 1,500 g of sugar, and 400 g of dried fruits.  A Christmas present was the issue of 125 g of 
cookies for all consumers and of 500 g of sugar for all children up to six years.  In general, the 
rations were issued except for local shortages of meat, fat, and skim milk.   
 The December food imports amounted to 472,314 t at $56,794,000.  GAROIA paid 
$33,978,000, ECA $13,901,000, JEIA $3,470,000, British agencies paid $4,858,000, and IRO 
paid $587,000.  The imported food consisted of 320,724 t of bread grains/flour, 5,133 t of pulses, 
9,868 t of sugar, 29,469 t of fat and oil, 15,055 t of fish, 7,029 t of dried milk, 21,306 t of fresh 
vegetables, 3,501 t of fresh fruits, and 60,229 t of miscellaneous food items. The average price of 
a ton of mixed food was $120.25.  
 The complicated financial structure as to who paid what and which amount in December 
1948 is illustrated by the following numbers.  GAROIA funds paid for Category A imports 
(foods, seeds, fertilizer, POL) $55million.  The import of food, seeds, and fertilizer for $18 
million, as well as further Category A imports of $15 million, together $33 million, were 
financed from ERP resources.  In total, imports of food, seeds, fertilizer, and POL of $88 million 
were financed by U.S. and British furnished funds.  Subtracting the rounded up $57 million of 
the December food imports in table 12 leaves $31 million for the import of seeds, fertilizer, POL.  
Category B imports of $41 million, together with all Category A imports amounted to $129 
million.  
 The following table illustrates the amounts of food imported into the Bizone in 1948, as 
well as the money both the United States and Great Britain spent for this critical endeavor.  
 260 
 The total tonnage for 1948 calculated from the single Monthly Reports added up to 6,718,661 t.  
The sum is 117,069 t less than the January-December total reported on page 75 of the Monthly 
Report No. 42 of 6,835,730 t.  A missing marge of 1.7 per cent was probably acceptable under 
the conditions of the occupation.  One has to look at the dollar price per ton of mixed food 
imports as a fictitious unit.  The composition of the monthly imports vacillated with the kinds of 
food as well as with the quantities.  However, despite changing composition and quantities, the 
margin of fluctuation in the price/ton does not seem large.  
CRALOG shipped 228 t relief supplies in December consisting of 38 t of food, 179 t of clothing, 
and 11 t of other items.  CARE participated with 59,770 packages.  Swiss welfare agencies 
contributed with 59,370 gift parcels and 8 t of food, 19 t of clothing, and 43 t miscellaneous 
items.  Less than one ton of sewing supplies sent the League of Red Cross Societies.751       
 The 1948 total of food, seeds, fertilizer, and POL imports peaked at $988 million, 
financed by the governments of the United States and Great Britain, whereupon the British part, 
one can argue, was obliquely financed by the U.S., too.752   
 The data presented in the Monthly Reports do not always fit together, nor do they make 
sense.  It is not possible to state with certainty the exact quantity of food imported or the dollar 
value attributed to the imports.  One cannot determine if the 701,075 t of food imported/issued in 
1945 are included in the numbers of the 1946 reports.  The 701,075 t represented less than five 
per cent of all food imported from 1946 to 1948.  However, the sheer numbers of Table 15, 
composed of data from Tables 12, 13, and 14 highlight the dimension of the food problem the 
United States and Great Britain faced in their occupation zones.    
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* including the import of field and vegetable seeds of unknown quantity and price 
Source: Monthly Reports of the Military Governor U.S. Zone, No. 31-42, January –December 1948. 
 
The table shows an impressive amount of food imported into the U.S. Zone, into the 
combined U.S. and British Zones, and a little bit into the French Zone.  Which country, except 
for the United States could spend $1.8 billion to keep a defeated people alive?  Which country 
was able to transfuse billions of dollars to rebuild a continent in shambles after six years of war?  








   Month metric ton         $    $/t 
January 308,740 40,063,400 129.76 
February 358,896 47,740,00 133.02 
March 482,614 63,000,000 130.54 
April 577,403 86,500,000 149.81 
May 564,085 73,000,000 129.41 
June 714,910 90,500,000 126.59 
July 625,720 76,000,000 121.46 
August 916,530 107,300,000 117.07 
September 795,950 105,900,000* 133.05* 
October 386,499 44,023,735 113.90 
November 515,000 58,677,000 113.94 
December 472,314 56,794,000 120.25 
total 6,718,661 849,498,135 126.44 
Year        t         $ 
1946 4,334,300 476,000,000 
1947 3,177,800 516,000,000 
1948 6,718,661 849,498,135 
Total 14,230,761 1,841,498,135 
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8.6. 1949, the final year of occupation 
January 1949 (Report No. 43) 
 All 1948 imports added up to $1,415,138,000, the bizonal exports reached $599 million, 
causing a deficit of $816 million.753   The Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), in short 
the Marshall Plan, funded $98,886,000, or 6.9 % of the 1948 import deliveries.  Of the $1,415.1 
million imports for 1948, Category B (industrial materials) imports amounted to $558 million of 
the total of which ECA and JEIA paid $76.9 million.754  The bizonal industrial production kept 
rising in January to eighty per cent of the 1936 standard, gaining one per cent from the previous 
month of December.755  Since the currency reform the industrial production increased thirty per 
cent.  Shortages of electric power and of skilled labor – a disproportionate number of trainees 
filled the ranks – retarded further growth.756  
 The January food ration equaled the December ration: 10,000 g of bread, 1,625 g of 
cereal, 400 g of meat, 800 g of fish, 625 g of fat, 3,000 g of skim milk, 125 g of cheese, 1,500 g 
of sugar, 200 g dried fruit, and 500 g citrus fruit.  Potatoes were no longer rationed food items.757 
However, even with the increased food rations, no one had to fear obesity.   
 The Bizone imported 557,040 t of food in January at a price of $70.5 million,758 resulting 
in a price of $126.56 per mixed ton.  The imports were composed of 337,305 t of breads 
grains/flour, 14,912 t of pulses, 29,439 t of fat and oil, 28,713 t of fish, 5,259 t of dried milk, 
33,059 t of fresh vegetables, 7,115 t of dried fruits, 24,833 t of fresh fruits, and 76,405 t of 
                                                
753 Ibid. 86. 
754 Ibid. 88. 
755 Monthly Report of the Military Governor U.S. Zone, No. 43, January 1949. 54.  
756 Ibid. 58. 
757 Stadtarchiv Stuttgart, Bestand 21/1, Signatur 9, Ernährungsamt, Anlage 48 
758 Monthly Report of the Military Governor U.S. Zone, No. 43, January 1948. 63. 
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miscellaneous food items.  The January imports matched very closely the average monthly 
imports of 1948.759  
 The import price of $70.5 million was paid through GARIOA funds of $38 million, ECA 
funds covered $15 million, JEIA export proceeds paid $14 million, various UK agencies paid 
$3million, and IRO funds paid the difference.760  GARIOA funds and ECA funds were U.S. 
appropriated funds.  JEIA funds were proceeds from bizonal exports, exceeding the demands for 
Category B imports.  One can guess that the UK funds and IRO funds were probably indirect 
U.S. funds. 
 Starting in January, Category A imports (food, seeds, fertilizer, medical supplies) had to 
be paid in Deutsche Mark from JEIA export profits at a conversion rate of $.30 = 1DM.  The 
Military Governments would buy import products with dollars/sterling funds and sell the goods 
to the German importer for Deutsche Mark.761   
 CRALOG shipped 450 t of supplies in January, consisting of 108 t of food, 224 t of 
clothing, and 118 t other supplies.  The League of International Red Cross Societies participated 
with 30 t of medical supplies, clothing, and gift boxes.  CARE delivered 73,767 packages and 
Swiss welfare agencies donated 24 t of supplies, 7.25 t of food, 8 t of clothing, and 0.25 t of 
other supplies, as well as 38,675 gift parcels.  Relief shipments between June 1946 and 
December 1948 totaled $35,850,260.  CARE contributed $14,898,775, CRALOG $13,954,981, 
the League of International Red Cross Societies $4,297,826, and Swiss welfare agencies 
2,698,678.762 
 
                                                
759 Ibid. 64. 
760 Ibid. 63. 
761 Ibid. 73. 
762 Ibid. 20. 
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February 1949 (Report No. 44)     
 The index of industrial production did not change considerably from January.  
Notwithstanding the increase in the production of goods of all kinds since the currency reform, 
customers still had less merchandise to buy.  With a production deficit of twenty per cent to the 
1936 standard and a population increase of twenty-five per cent, the “February rate of output per 
capita was about 35 percent less than in 1936.”763  The February production rates ranged from 
sixty-four per cent for the Stone & Earth industries to 172 per cent for Electrical Equipment 
Industries.764   
 The food ration composition did not change in February.  According to the 
Ernährungsamt Stuttgart, the average food ration for 1949 provided 1,811 cal./day, with January 
at 1,774 calories, February at 1,685 calories, and March at 1,764 calories.765  The food imported 
in February amounted to 497,535 t, a decline of 59,505 t from January.  The value stood at $67.2 
million.  The price tag for a ton of mixed February import accounted for $135.07.  The $67.2 
million cost was divided among GARIOA with $32.9 million, ECA with $13.8 million, JEIA 
$18.1 million, UK agencies with $0.3 million, and IRO with $2.1 million.766  
 February exports from the Bizone amounted to $82 million.  The preliminary import 
deliveries (Category A and B) reached $113.4 million.  The payments were split between 
GARIOA funds, JEIA funds, and ERP funds.  GARIOA funds paid $40.4 million for foods and 
seeds and $3 million for POL products, a total of $43.4 million, JEIA funds covered $45 million, 
and the ERP paid $25 million.767  Subtracting from the GARIOA sum of $40.4 million for food 
and seeds the GARIOA part of $32.9 million for the food import, the remaining $7.5 million had 
                                                
763 Monthly Report of the Military Governor U.S. Zone, No. 44, February 1949. 62.  
764 Ibid. 63. 
765 Stadtarchiv Stuttgart, Bestand 21/1, Signatur 9, Ernährungsamt, Anlage 48.  
766 Monthly Report of the Military Governor U.S. Zone, No. 44, February 1944. 76. 
767 Ibid. 100. 
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to be paid for seed imports.  Considering the spring sowing season, the $7.5 million seemed 
appropriate.  Arriving relief supplies in February consisted of 733 t CRALOG supplies, 48 t 
League of Red Cross Societies, 94,714 CARE packages, and 116 t of supplies from Swiss 
welfare agencies.768 
March 1949 (Report No. 45) 
 The twenty-seven working days of March pushed the industrial production to eighty-nine 
per cent of the 1936 rate.  Based on the number of working days per month the industrial output 
remained constant during the first quarter, abandoning the path of rapid growth since the 
currency reform.769 
 “Notable improvements were made in the food rations…,”770 according to Report No. 45.  
The fat ration increased from 625 g to 750 g, and the meat ration from 400 g to 600 g.  One has 
to remember these were the amounts of fat and meat of four weeks for a normal adult consumer, 
not for a day! 
 The food imports into the Bizone counted 544,276 t, at a price tag of $63,770,000, 
resulting in a price per ton of mixed food of $117.16.  The monthly bill was split among 
GARIOA with $34,130,000, ECA funded $14,790,000, and JEIA with $12,020,000. British 
agencies contributed $870,000 and the IRO paid $1,960,000.771   
 The March shipment of CRALOG consisted of 438 t of food, 207 t of clothing, and 24 t 
of other supplies.  62,002 Care packages found their beneficiaries.  The League of Red cross 
                                                
768 Ibid. 19. 
769 Monthly Report of the Military Governor U.S. Zone, No. 45, March 1949. 61. 
770 Ibid. 73. 
771 Ibid. 
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Societies took part with 52 t of supplies and Swiss welfare agencies delivered 24 t of food, 5 t of 
clothing, and 386 t of miscellaneous supplies, as well as 27,175 gift parcels.772  
April 1949 (Report No. 46) 
 The industrial output per working day did not change from January to April 1949.  The 
value of ECA-financed April imports into the Bizone amounted to $19.13 million for different 
kinds of food and $24.13 million for industrial goods used to produce exportable products.773 
 The monthly food imports added up to 662,380 t in April.  The bill of $83,062,736 was 
charged to Germany’s ballooning debt.  The price for a ton of mixed food imported was $125.40.  
The bill was shared between GARIOA paying $30,700,929, ECA paying $32,986,878, JEIA 
contributing $14,679,544, while the British part amounted to $3,583,082 and IRO paid the 
balance of $1,112,313.774 
 Starting in May the food rations would be equalized between the Bizone and the French 
Zone.  Uniform ration cards were issued for the month of May.  Also a three zones program for 
food, seeds, and fertilizer procurement was drafted for the fiscal year 1949/50. The programs 
expenses were estimated at $945,037,000 for the Bizone and $110,915,000 for the French 
Zone.775   
 During April CRALOG donated 1,519 t of food, 64 t of clothing, and 97 t of other 
supplies.  Swiss welfare agencies contributed 89 t of food, 1 t of clothing, and 6 t of other things 
and delivered 38,588 gift parcels.  CARE packages numbered 65,018 in April.  The League of 
Red Cross Societies sent 26 t of supplies.776   
 
                                                
772 Ibid. 18. 
773 Monthly Report of the Military Governor U.S. Zone, No. 46, April 1949. 63. 
774 Ibid. 83. 
775 Ibid. 90-1. 
776 Ibid. 22-3. 
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May 1949 (Report No. 47) 
 The May industrial production climbed to eighty-seven per cent. The industrial index 
stayed constantly above eighty per cent of the 1936 base line for 1949.777  ECA- financed 
imports from April 1948 to May 1949 accounted for a total of $248,663,000.  Food and 
agricultural imports cost $150,601,000, sixty per cent of the total, whereas the industrial imports 
accounted for $98,062,000, a forty per cent share.778  However, ECA’s financed June imports 
summed up to a total of $20,604,000.  The industrial imports nearly doubled the 
food/agricultural imports with $13,225,000 and $7,379,000, a desired tendency.779    
 Uniform ration cards were issued in the Bizone and the French Zone, a first step for West 
Germany.  Fruits were derationed in May like the potatoes in December 1948, while meat and 
cheese rations were increased.  556,500 t of food were imported in May into the Bizone at a cost 
of $73,762,900, with an average price of $132.55 per ton of mixed food.  GARIOA shouldered 
$32,857,700 of the price, ECA paid $10,769,800, and JEIA’s share amounted to $28,111,700.  
Great Britain’s bill was $1,368,500, while the IRO paid $655,200.780  
 The quantity of the May food import was comparable to the January-May average of 
565,100 t, as well as with the 1948 monthly average of 569,600 t.781  The May exports of the 
Bizone of $96 million consisted of $57.4 million for general exports and $30.6 million for staple 
exports.  Invisible exports amounted to $8 million.782 
 CRALOG shipped 480.5 t of supplies, with 278.5 t of food, 142 t of clothing, and 60 t of 
miscellaneous items.  CARE supplied 80,449 packages and Swiss welfare agencies brought in 
                                                
777 Monthly Report of the Military Governor U.S. Zone, No. 47, May 1949. 77. 
778 Ibid. 76. 
779 Ibid. 72. 
780 Ibid. 89. 
781 Ibid. 90. 
782 Ibid. 114. 
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27.5 t of supplies, consisting of 12 t of food and 14.5 t of miscellaneous items.  The League of 
Red Cross Societies sent 6.5 t of bulk supplies.783 
June 1949 (Report No. 48) 
 According to the number of working days in June, the production slowed down to eighty-
six per cent, three percentage points less than in May.784  However, the mining industry (without 
coal), the vehicle manufacturing, the stone & earth industry, and the chemical industry recorded 
gains.   
 The monthly food imports impressed with 603,170 t, having a price tag of $77,777,195 
attached.  The price of $128.95 per ton of mixed food was in the price range of earlier imports.  
GARIOA paid $38,477,774, the ECA share added up to $8,613,913, JEIA took over with 
$27,812,908, British agencies shelled out $1,703,115, and the IRO share amounted to 
$1,169,485.785  The imports consisted of 323,700 t of bread grains, 84,000 t of coarse grains, 
33,900 t of fat and oil, 15,700 t of oilseeds, 15,400 t of fodder, 700 t of meat, 3,000 t of cheese, 
3,300 t of dried and condensed milk, 14,900 t of fish, 6,400 t of dried fruits, 15,000 t of fresh 
fruits, 1,900 t of pulses, 43,600 t of sugar, 10,800 tons of fresh vegetables, 18,200 t of potato 
flour, and 12,670 t of miscellaneous food items.786  
 The bizonal exports of June had a value of $103 million, with general exports at $54 
million and coal exports at $33 million.787  Imports reached $164.2 million.  They were financed 
by JEIA funds of $96.2 million, by ECA funds of $24 million, and by other appropriated funds 
                                                
783 Ibid. 20-1. 
784 Monthly Report of the Military Governor U.S. Zone, No. 48, June 1949. 68. 
785 Ibid. 85-6. 
786 Ibid. 86. 
787 Ibid. 109. 
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of $44 million.788  The ratio of ECA financed imports in June was sixty-five per cent for 
industrial goods and thirty-five per cent for food and agricultural needs.789  
 The ECA-financed import program for July 1948 to June 1949 for food, agricultural 
needs, industrial goods, as well as freight charges totaled $502,287,000.  From this amount 
$489,746,000 were authorized.  Contracts were made for $382,538,000.  Up to 30 June 1949 
goods of $290,965,000, fifty-eight per cent of the programmed amount was delivered.790   
 Private people, represented by CRALOG spent 364 t in June, 189 t of food, 120 t of 
clothing, and 55 t of miscellaneous items.  Swiss welfare agencies spent 70 t, with 55 t of food, 4 
t of clothing, and 11 t of miscellaneous items.  CARE provided 57,617 packages in June.  For 
Berlin, CARE sent 10,000lbs of lard, 16,400lbs of milk powder, 2,000lbs of sugar, 600lbs of 
margarine, and 500lbs of cocoa.791 
July 1949 (Report No 49.)  
          Financial and sales difficulties caused the leveling off of the industrial upswing initiated 
by the currency reform and the Marshall Plan aid.  Material factors for the leveling did not exist, 
nor bottlenecks in power supply and transportation.  However, with eighty-seven per cent of the 
1936 standard the month of July was one per cent ahead of June. 
          With minor ups and downs of the amounts of different foods, the food ration did not 
change in July.  The food import of 663,784 t increased the German debt by $70,267,000.  With 
a price tag of $105.86 per ton of mixed food it was on the lower end of the price range of 
imported food.  Of the bill GARIOA paid $34,006,000, ECA’s part was $17,626,000, and JEIA 
                                                
788 Ibid. 111. 
789 Ibid. 64. 
790 Ibid. 65. 
791 Ibid. 17. 
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shouldered $16,636,000.  British agencies paid $1,308,000 and IRO took the rest of $691,000.792  
Major shares of the food import consisted of 294,100 t of bread grains/flour, 194,200 t of coarse 
grains, 10,300 t of fish, 23,100 t of pulses, 53,200 t of sugar, and 32,100 t of fresh vegetables.  
Other food items with less than 10,000 t added up to 46,700 t.793  
          More than 70,000 German families in the U.S. Zone enjoyed CARE packages in July.  The 
residents of Bloomfield, Nebraska bought 100 CARE packages to be sent to Kamen, a city in the 
British Zone Bloomfield had “adopted”794 as a sister city.  
August/September 1949 (Report No. 50)  
          The Report No. 50 covered the last weeks of the regime of the U.S. Military Government.  
With Konrad Adenauer taking the chancellorship on 21 September 1949, the rule of the three 
High Commissioners began.  In August the industrial production level arrived at ninety-one per 
cent of the 1936 rate, a postwar production peak.  Several industrial branches surpassed the 1936 
standard with indexes between 104 percent and 168 per cent.795 
          The August food rations changed regionally a little bit.  Dry milk and condensed milk, as 
well as dried fruit and bananas were taken off the rationed food list.  However, the prices asked 
for these goods were too high, the normal customer could not afford to buy them.  The August 
food imports reached a high of 813,800 t, with major shares of bread grains/flours of 392,100 t, 
and coarse grains of 202,800 t.  The imports had a value of $87,422,400.  The price of a ton of 
mixed food of this import was $107.42.  The invoice was paid by GARIOA funds of 
                                                
792 Monthly Report of the Military Governor U.S. Zone, No. 49, July 1949. 87. 
793 Ibid. 88. 
794 Ibid. 11. 
795 Monthly Report of the Military Governor U.S. Zone, August -20 September 1949. 78-9. 
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$54,799,200 and by ECA with $10,262,600.  JEIA added $19,584,000 to the bill, while British 
agencies paid $2,171,300 and IRO paid $605,100.796 
          From April 1948 to August 1949 ECA-financed imports of food/agriculture for 
$176,616,000 and industrial imports valued at $157,354,000.  Over the time span of seventeen 
months food/agricultural imports amounted to fifty-three per cent and the industrial imports 
accounted for forty-seven per cent.797  During August 1949, the ECA financed imports of 
$36,386,000.  The share of food/agricultural imports went down to twenty-eight per cent, while 
the share of industrial imports rose to seventy-two per cent.798  This shift was in compliance with 
the policy of the Marshall Plan to be of “self-help and mutual aid,”799 by increasing the 
capacities of the export producing industries so West Germany might soon be able to pay itself 
for the necessary food imports. 
          In August 1949 CRALOG shipped 208 t of food, 151 t of clothing, and 75 t of 
miscellaneous items to the U.S. occupied areas.  CARE provided 39,954 packages.  The League 
of Red Cross Societies sponsored 15 t of supplies and Swiss welfare agencies offered 2 t of food, 
one ton of clothing, and 14 t of other supplies, together with 19,499 gift parcels.800   
8.7. Summary 
           The Monthly Reports of the Military Governor began enumerating the payments for food 
imports by different agencies with Report No. 40.  The U.S. congressionally approved funds, 
Government Aid and Relief in Occupied Areas, providing between thirty-four and eighty-two 
per cent of the money for the eleven months listed in Table 16, was the major contributor.  
Marshall Plan aid through ECA ranged from 2.4 per cent to thirty-eight per cent.  Both agencies, 
                                                
796 Ibid. 98. 
797 Ibid. 77. 
798 Ibid. 75. 
799 Theodore A. Wilson, The Marshall Plan 1947-1951, 31. 
800 Monthly Report of the Military Governor U.S. Zone, August – 20 September 1949. 17. 
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funded by Congress, allocated more than three times the dollar amount the remaining three 
agencies, the German-funded Joint Export-Import Agency, the United Kingdom’s share and the 
International Refugee Organization IRO, could account for.   
          For the eleven months from October 1948 to August 1949, GARIOA and ECA dedicated 
$550,966,252 compared with the share of $182,956,247 JEIA, United Kingdom and IRO spent.  
The above mentioned decrease of ECA’s financing of food imports is not clearly visible by the 
data of Table 16, however, one can notice the general tendency of JEIA’s share to grow.   
           The economic situation in the Bizone improved enormously after the currency reform and 
the infusion of the Marshall Plan aid through the European Recovery Program.  Food rations 
across the Bizone and the French Zone hovered around 2,000 calories per day.  Stuttgart’s 
residents enjoyed September 1949 rations at 2,247 calories.  Potatoes, fish, as well as dried fruits 
and dry milk were removed from the list of rationed foods.  The industrial production increased 
to more than ninety per cent of the 1936 base line, with several branches surpassing the limit by 
far.           
The amount of U.S. taxpayer dollars spent on food imports was incredible.  Even when 
subtracting the sum of $198,664,672 paid by non-U.S. parties during October to December 1948, 
and in 1949, the U.S. share totaled $2,236,595,694.  Adjusted for inflation, the $2.2 billion of 
1949 would be $22.3 billion in today’s dollars.801  The sum of $2,236,595,694 was the money 
the United States spent solely on food for the U.S. and British occupation zones, including the 
U.S. and British Sectors of Berlin from the start of the occupation to August 1949.  From June 
1945 to December 1946 the U.S. imported 4,334,300 t of food.  On average, one can assume 
228,121 t of food were imported per month during the 19 months period.  In 1947 the monthly  
 
                                                






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   





















   
   

















   
   
   



































































































































































































average increased to 264,817 t.  The 1948 monthly average jumped to 559,888 t, and in 1949 to 
even higher 612,311 t per month.  The 1945/46 food imports one could attribute to the punishing 
phase of the U.S. policy toward Germany.  Secretary of State Byrnes’ speech initiated the change 
from punishment to encouragement, followed by the creation of the Bizone and the new JCS 
Directive 1779.  However, the real push to Germany’s economic revival started with the aid 
infused by the European Recovery Program and the currency reform of 1948.   
         The German Government reported that $848.7 million in Marshall Plan aid in form of 
credits was agreed upon up to 30 December 1949.  Delivered imports to this date amounted to 
$563.2 million, with Category A imports of $273.5 million, Category B imports of $242 million, 
and freight charges of $46.8 million.  The total dollar amount approved for the time span 1 April  
                                                  Table 17: U.S. taxpayer dollars spent on food imports 
    Year          t            $ Amount paid by  
JEIA,UK, IRO 
1946* 4,334,300 476,000,000 - 
1947 3,177,800 516,000,000 - 
1948** 6,718,661 849,498,135 15,708,425 
1949*** 4,898,485 593,762,231 182,956,247 
Total 19,129,246 2,435,260,366 198,664,672 
 
* including 1945 
** for October to December JEIA, UK, and IRO contributors 
*** January to August 1949, JEIA, UK, and IRO contributors 
Source: Data from Monthly Reports No. 1 – No. 50 
 
1948 to 30 June 1950 (the Marshall Plan year was the U.S. fiscal year, 1 July to 30 June) added 
up to $945.7 million.802  To the Marshall Plan aid of $945.7 million one had to add to the amount 
of $2,236.6 million (Table 17 total dollars minus JEIA, UK, IRO payments) for food imports 
                                                
802 Stadtarchiv Stuttgart, Bestand 21/1, Signatur 21, Erster Bericht der Deutschen Bundesregierung über die 
Durchführung des Marshallplanes, 1. Oktober 1949 bis 31. Dezember 1949. 29. 
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from 1945 to August 1949.  German liabilities grew to more than $3 billion to the United States 








Chapter 9: The big picture: Occupation costs versus Allied aid 
9.1. Introduction 
 It is difficult to get a general idea about the amounts of money, goods and services 
Germany paid as occupation costs for the Allied Forces stationed in their occupation zones, for 
the dismantling of plants for reparations, and for forced exports of timber and hard coal.  The 
Allied failure to treat Germany as an economic unit resulted in four economically separated units 
with four different occupation concepts, and therefore with differing standards concerning 
occupation costs, reparations, looting and requisitions, and other expenses levied.  Reliable data 
from the Soviet occupation zone were not available for the early years, estimates had to complete 
the big picture of Germany’s liabilities.  The earlier data presented in chapter 6 and 7, regarding 
the city of Stuttgart, as well as the single state of Württemberg-Baden, do not necessarily 
represent the U.S. Zone, nor the British or French zones.  For a bigger picture of occupation 
costs data, one must examine zonal and bizonal data, and later West German data.  
 The authors presented in the chapter approached the question of reparations and 
occupation costs of the Allied governments from different angles.  Costs and categories admitted 
by one author, another author refuses to take into account.  Adding to the confusion, as well as 
computing differing amounts of money are pegged in similar accounts or categories.  Further 
difficulties are the results of using various exchange rates between Reichsmark/Deutsche Mark 
and Dollar, or not mentioning an exchange rate or the value of a currency related to time.   
 Based on these differences it will be difficult or even impossible to make comparisons of 
exact amounts of money.  However, related to the large dimensions of costs and of aid, general 
appraisals are possible.  Such appraisals can present an image of the burden West Germany bore 
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and of the aid Western Allies were willing to provide.  If the aid was given for humanitarian 
reasons or forced by political changes is not the question to be answered here.   
9.2. A German balance sheet       
 The Senator for Economy of the city-state of Bremen published in 1948 a comprehensive 
memorandum as to the state of the German economy.  The memorandum, ordered by the 
Länderrat of the U.S. Zone, was the first official effort to compile a list of German postwar 
liabilities in favor of the Allies and liberated countries. The expertise, a collective attempt of 
experts, of scientific institutions, of public administrations, and private organizations like 
chambers of commerce, of trade and of industry, tried to set up a balance sheet of Germany’s 
situation and losses after the war.803  The memorandum covered all occupation zones.  The lack 
of reliable official data from several occupation zones, caused in many cases gaps to be closed 
by estimates, emphasizing the subtitle of the memorandum “attempt of an economic balance.”  
Based on prewar economic data, the memorandum described the postwar economic situation, the 
planned deindustrialization, the level of industry permitted and the reparations Germany had to 
deliver.  Attachment XII of the memorandum enumerated the goods and services Germany had 
delivered so far.  The calculations were predominantly based on prewar prices and an exchange 
rate of Reichsmark 2.50 to one dollar (1938). Attachment XII differentiated the generated goods 
and services into four groups: a. extractions from German national wealth, b. benefits from 
current production, c. other extractions, and d. loss of assets of expelled ethnic Germans.  
The general objective of Senator Harmssen’s memorandum was to demonstrate that 
Germany had generated more reparations than requested by the Allies and would not be able to 
 
                                                
803 G.W. Harmssen, Reparationen, Sozialprodukt, Lebensstandard. Versuch einer Wirtschaftsbilanz. Heft 1 bis 4. 
Bremen: Friedrich Trüjen Verlag, 1948. 
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      Table 18: Previous goods and services provided for the benefit of the Allies by Germany 
a. Extractions from national wealth Billion RM Billion $ 
Confiscated foreign assets 9.75 3.9 
Value of Eastern Germany and of the Saar region  70.00 28.0 
Removed industrial equipment 12.50 5.0 
Forced export of timber 1.00 0.4 
Skimming of taxes caused by veiled reparations in the Soviet Zone 4.50 1.8 
Loss of public assets 1.00 0.4 
Confiscated German gold portfolio 0.75 0.3 
Confiscated Merchant marine 0.50 0.2 
b. Goods/services from current production   
Reparations from current production (French/Soviet Zone) 5.00 2.0 
Forced export of hard coal 0.50 0.2 
Skimming of taxes by veiled reparations in the Soviet Zone 4.50 1.8 
c. Other services   
Value of German patents, production methods 12.50 5.0 
Labor of German prisoners of war 5.00 2.0 
Packing and shipping of reparation material 8.00 3.2 
Losses through currency manipulations 1.75 0.7 
d. Other losses   
Loss of assets of expelled ethnic Germans 40.50 16.2 
Total 177.75 71.1 
 
Source: G.W. Harmssen, Reparationen, Sozialprodukt, Lebensstandard, Versuch einer Wirtschaftsbilanz, Anlage 
XII, Heft 1. 89. 
 
deliver more.  It was the understandable situation in which a debtor tried to convince the creditor 
of his further inability to provide more reparations.  However, some listed categories and 
numbers were questionable and seemingly exaggerated.  Reparations, as defined by Jörg Fisch, 
in his Reparationen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, means that the “defeated are working for the 
victors… putting the products of their work at the victors disposal.”804  According to Jörg Fisch, 
annexations of territories of the defeated are not counted as reparations.  The people of the 
                                                
804 Jörg Fisch, Reparationen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, (München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1992.) 18. 
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annexed territory805 are no longer citizens of the defeated Germany and cannot produce 
reparations for the account of the defeated.  If the population was expelled perhaps part of their 
belongings left behind could be counted as reparations, as well as the goods they would/could 
produce in their home state.   
 Willi A. Boelke, Professor of Social and Economic History,806 also carefully 
differentiated between annexations and reparations in his book, Die Kosten von Hitlers Krieg.  
However, he estimated the losses of privately owned assets of the nine million expellees/refugees 
settled in West Germany at RM 75 billion, nearly twice as high as the loss of assets of the 
expelled ethnic Germans Senator Harmssen listed.807  In an early review of Senator Harmssen’s 
memorandum, the reviewer, J. Herbert Furth sharply criticized the admission of the value of the 
ceded territories, as well as the admission of the value of the “property of ethnic Germans who 
were not German citizens,”808 in the calculation, altogether reducing Senator Harmssen’s bill by 
RM 110.5 billions, respective $44.2 billion.  Additionally, all three, Fisch, Boelcke, and Furth 
criticized the overly generous estimates of the value of patents and production methods, of the 
removed industrial equipment, and of the confiscated foreign assets.  
 However, numbers and categories listed in the memorandum provided a prospect of the 
dimension of Germany’s liabilities face to face with the Allies and the liberated countries.  In the 
memorandum the senator did not touch on the problem of occupation costs, of the goods and 
services, sometimes cash payments the occupation forces requested.  The categories listed in 
Table 18, as well as the goods and services provided to the forces stationed on German soil, 
made up the total bill presented to the Germans after the war. 
                                                
805 Annexed territories were East Prussia, Silesia, and parts of Pomerania and Brandenburg 
806 Willi A. Boelke, Die Kosten von Hitlers Krieg. (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1985). 161.  
807 Ibid. 166. 
808 J. Herbert Furth, review, “Reparationen, Sozialprodukt, Lebensstandard: Versuch einer Wirtschaftsbilanz,” by 
G.W. Harmssen, The American Economic Review, Vol. 38, No. 5 (Dec., 1948). 928. 
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 It had to be expected that victors and defeated defined the term occupation costs, 
differently.  The in-depth analysis of the Institut für Besatzungsfragen at the University of 
Tübingen titled Occupation costs, are they a defence contribution? (1951) defined occupation 
costs as,  
the total amount of payments made by Western Germany with respect to the 
occupation and met from the public budget… Such payments, as a rule, 
represented by payments of compensation to Germans, who are under an 
obligation to deliver goods or render services to the Occupation authorities, for 
the discharge of such obligations.  It is only to a relatively small extent that the 
Occupation Powers have demanded payments in cash.809  
 
According to the analysis, the Allies did not recognize the protective provisions of Article 52 of 
the Hague Convention of 1907 (see Chapter 6.2., Stuttgart’s occupation costs at a glance), based 
on “the special nature of the present occupation of Germany.”810  Table 19 presented the 
occupation costs the three western occupation zones paid for goods and services from fiscal year 
1945 to 1949, with an estimate for the occupation costs for fiscal year 1950. 
 The analysis broke down the occupation costs into two major categories, into straight 
occupation costs accepted by the Allies, and into mandatory expenditures the German authorities 
counted as occupation costs, too.  Occupation costs for 1949 (approximately DM 4 billion) were 
further subdivided into thirteen subgroups and as a share of the total amount.  Interestingly, the 
major expense of the occupation costs were paid for wages and salaries of 445,000 Germans 
employed by the occupation authorities, amounting to DM 1.33 billion in fiscal year 1949.  
Allied forces were, well into the 1950s, the largest employer in West Germany.  At the regional 
level, as well as at the federal level, the expenditures for the occupation forces acted as a 
 
                                                
809 Institut für Besatzungsfragen, Occupation costs, are they a defence contribution? (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1951). 
5. 
810 Ibid. 6. 
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              Table 19: Occupation costs up to 31.3.1950  (in RM/DM) 
 
Fiscal Year British Zone U.S. Zone French Zone West German Territory 
1945 1,258,000,000 653,000,000 117,000,000 2,028,000,000 
1946 2,462,000,000 1,604,000,000 1,007,000,000 5,073,000,000 
1947 2,785,000,000 1,968,000,000 773,000,000 5,526,000,000 
1948 2,056,000,000 1,995,000,000 544,000,000 4,594,000,000 
1949 1,855,000,000 1,661,000,000 510,000,000* 4,027,000,000 
Total 10,416,000,000 7,882,000,000 2,950,000,000 21,248,000,000 
1950 Estimate    4,557,000,000 
 
* Cash payments amounting to DM 81 million are not included 
Discrepancies in these sums are due to adjustment to approximate round figures. 
Source: Institut für Besatzungsleistungen, Occupation costs, are they a defence contribution? 7. 
 
stimulus for the West German economy.811  This argument was valid even more so from 1945 to 
1948, when the U.S. Military Government alone employed more than 500,000 German nationals 
and Displaced Persons when the German economy could not offer adequate employment.  
 Senator Harmssen’s memorandum referenced reparations and confiscations, based on 
partially unrealistic categories and overrated assessments grounded on the few reliable data 
available in 1947.  The analysis of the Institut für Besatzungsfragen, in contrast, used officially 
provided Allied and German numbers and data, leaving little tolerance for differing 
interpretations.      
            
  
                                                
811 Hubert Zimmermann, “Der Konflikt um die Kosten des Kalten Krieges: Besatzungskosten, Stationierungskosten, 
Devisenausgleich,” in Die USA und Deutschland im Zeitalter des Kalten Krieges 1945-1990, Ein Handbuch, 
herausgegeben von Detlef Junker, Philipp Gassert, Wilfried Mausbach, David B. Morris. (Stuttgart: Deutsche 
Verlags Anstalt, 2001). 517.  
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           Table 20: Classification of Occupation Costs in Fiscal Year 1949 
 
       DM 
(Million) 
% of Occupation Costs or 
Mandatory Expenditures 
I. Occupation Costs   
1. Labor services 1,333 40 
2. Provisions, maintenance, accommodations 341 10 
3. Stores, Supplies, Services 1,097 33 
4. Transportation 228 7 
5. Communications 93 3 
6. Occupation damage (claims) 13 0 
7. Cash payments 248 7 
Total I 3,354 100 
   
II. Mandatory Expenditures   
1. Care/maintenance of DPs 321 48 
2. Prisoners of War 13 2 
3. Civil internees 2 0 
4. Subsidiary costs in connection 
    with reparations/restitutions 
126 19 
5. Subsidiary costs of demilitarization 63 9 
6. Other mandatory expenditures 147 22 
Total II 672 100 
   
Total I and II 4,027  
 
            Discrepancies are due to adjustment to the approximate round figure 
            Source: Institut für Besatzungsleistungen, Occupation costs, are they a defence contribution? 10. 
 
 How did other authors and sources approach the relation between Senator Harmssen’s 
RM 177.75 billion of reparations and the RM/DM 21.248 billion of occupation costs of Table 
19?  How did they correlate Germany’s liabilities and the aid the western occupation powers 
provided during the occupation, not only “to prevent disease and unrest,”812 but also to prevent 
                                                
812 Directive to the Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces of Occupation regarding the Military Government of 
Germany, JCS 1067/6, April 26, 1945, Part I, No. 5a.  
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starvation and to initiate the delayed quick start of the German economy by the currency reform 
and the infusion of the Marshall Plan aid?     
 The economist, Henry C. Wallich, described the dilemma of Allied policies toward 
Germany.  In Mainspring of the German Revival, he stated,  
while they added resources to the German economy through foreign aid, they 
also withdrew them through reparations, restitutions, occupation costs, and 
other channels.  While they pushed counterpart investment they also 
dismantled.  They stimulated trade through liberalization but at the same time 
put tight controls on East-West trade.  Moreover, with the shift in the goals of 
occupation and in the balance of power the importance of some of these 
policies and purposes also changed.  Reform, which originally had had high 
priority, lost ground as compared with reconstruction.813  
 
 The “Level of Industry Plan,” March 1946, targeted about 1,500 plants for dismantling.  
With the changing political climate, the number decreased to less than 700 plants.  The Inter-
Allied Reparation Agency (IARA) attached a price of DM 708.5 million at 1938 prices to the 
dismantled plants.814  Wallich argued that “allowing for a near doubling of prices since 1938, for 
an especially severe depreciation schedule applied by the Allies, for the loss of some buildings, 
and for original installation costs, one arrives at an estimate of the order of 2 billion DMark,”815 
for the West German reparations. 
 Under external assets he enumerated all German property in foreign countries “such as 
branches of German firms, patents and trademarks, merchant vessels, and German participation 
in local enterprises.”816  The value of external assets he estimated at $260 million in 1938 prices.  
Price increases since 1938, as well as assumedly under reporting of the respective governments 
to IARA, Wallich assumed $1 billion as an appropriate value of the German foreign assets. 
                                                
813 Henry C. Wallich, Mainsprings of the German Revival. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955). 354.   
814 Ibid. 358. 
815 Ibid. 370. 
816 Ibid. 359. 
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 For external restitutions from the U.S. Zone alone, he calculated $70 million in 1938 
prices, or accordingly $140 million in postwar prices.  The losses of $4-5 per ton from forced 
coal exports of 23 million tons added up to at least $100 million he concluded.817  Concerning 
occupation costs, Wallich did not mention occupation costs from 1945 to 1949.  He only noted 
the occupation costs of 1950, paid by the federal government.  The total of DM 7.2 billion per 
year, was unilaterally set by the Allies.  Without the occupation costs from 1945-1949, and the 
1950 charge, Wallich calculated the German liabilities at $3.240 billion. 
 The three Western Allies spent $4.4 billion on aid to West Germany.  Great Britain’s 
share amounted to £200 million, or $800 million, and the French government participated with 
$15 million.  Of the $4.4 billion of foreign aid, $1.7 billion from the United States, as well as the 
£800 million and $15 million from France were used to import under the GARIOA program, 
Category A supplies.  Category A supplies, mentioned before, were foodstuffs, small amounts of 
seeds and fertilizer, as well as some POL products.  These imports from 1945 to 1948 kept the 
Germans alive without the means to import the essential food by its own exports.  The total 
Marshall Plan aid and post-Marshall Plan aid up to October 1954 amounted to $2 billion.     
 Sir Alec Cairncross, the British economist, reported in The Price of War, British Policy 
on German Reparations, that the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency (IARA) allocated to the 
recipients reparations valued at $502.3 million from the three western occupation zones.  He 
emphasized that the IARA figures were considerably understating the value of reparations, citing 
in a footnote a remark to write “down the average real monetary value of industrial capital 
equipment, even on a 1938 basis, by at least two-thirds.”818  In addition, he noted, the Allies took 
“war booty, armaments of all kinds (including what survived of the German Navy), gold, stocks 
                                                
817 Ibid. 362. 
818 Alec Cairncross, The Price of War, British Policy on German Reparations 1941-1949. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1986.) 190. 
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of raw materials, patents and trade secrets, German external assets held in the belligerent 
countries, the services of prisoners of war and a good deal of miscellaneous research 
equipment,”819 without applying a monetary value to it.  Germany, according to Cairncross, 
estimated its foreign assets at RM 10 billion, approximately $3 billion.  Of this amount the 
Western Allies claimed to have taken “$400 million, IARA distributed $269 million and the 
USSR seized at least as much.  But the total reported falls short of $3 billion and this may be due 
in part to undervaluation.”820  
                                
                                           Table 21: Reparations from Western Zones allocated by IARA   
 
 $ Million 
German external assets (in neutral hands) 269 
Industrial capital equipment 143.5 
Shipping 44.1 
Captured enemy supplies 14.7 




                                  Source: Alec Cairncross, The Price of War. 190. 
 
 In addition, Alec Cairncross, without attaching a monetary value, mentioned expressly 
the forced exports of timber and hard coal to Allied and liberated countries for “some 
considerable time without payment and eventually at an export price far below of alternative 
supplies.”821  Starting in mid 1946, the German exporter received $8 per ton of hard coal.  Alec 
Cairncross calculated that the labor of the 400,000 to 500,000 British and Commonwealth 
prisoners of war, the French prisoners of war numbered close to one million, by “adopt[ing] 
                                                
819 Ibid. 189. 
820 Ibid. 190. 
821 Ibid. 192. Also Werner Abelshauser, Wirtschaft in Westdeutschland 1945-1948. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags 
Anstalt. 1975). 143. 
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Keynes’s assumption of £40 per head per year [of earnings],”822 the value of the labor would 
reach if not surpass the value of the reparations in kind.  However high the value of reparations 
had been, Alec Cairncross was convinced that the outside aid for Germany, listed by him at $4 
billion, dwarfed the reparations, the lost money from coal and timber exports, as well as the 
hypothetical earnings of the German prisoners of war, without considering the burden of 
occupation costs. 
 Michael Balfour, a British historian and a former member of the British Military 
Government in Germany, summarized the German survival and revival as the product of “hard 
work and generosity [by] the Americans, [who] had given $11,300 million [in aid] to Europe 
before the Marshall Plan came into operation, while US relief agencies spent $29 million from 
private sources between 1946 and 1948.”823  Balfour argued that the Marshall Plan aid of $1,389 
million given to western Germany triggered the unprecedented revival of the bizonal economy 
during four crucial years following the currency reform of June 1948.  Of an economy whose 
“industrial equipment was less seriously affected by the war and the reparations programme than 
was popularly supposed.”824  Balfour supported Werner Abelshauser’s conclusion that prior to 
the currency reform the economy of the Bizone was shaped by two upswings.  Transportation 
limits and infrastructure damage killed the first upswing during the hard winter 1946/47, while 
the second upswing 1947/48 proved to be successful despite little outside support.825 With the 
infusion of the Marshall Plan aid the West German economy started its lasting success. 
 Michael Balfour claimed the invalidity of the argument that West Germany’s economic 
success was due to the non-existence of defence expenditures during the early years.  However, 
                                                
822 Alec Cairncross, The Price of War. 193.  
823 Michael Balfour, West Germany, a Contemporary History. (London: Croom Helm, 1982). 134-5.   
824 Ibid. 145. 
825 Werner Abelshauser, Wirtschaft in Westdeutschland 1945-1948. 168. 
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according to Balfour, the United States, Great Britain, and France charged West Germany for 
their protection by levying non-negotiable occupation costs.  The charges amounted in 1950 to 
“37.5 per cent of [West Germany’s] budget and 4.6 per cent of her GNP [Gross National 
Product], while in 1951 the figures rose to 42.6 per cent and 6.4 per cent respectively.”826  The 
federal budget of fiscal year 1950/51 closed with expenditures of DM 12,294 million.  A share of 
37.5 per cent of DM 12,394 million amounted to DM 4,648 million in occupation costs, the so-
called defence contribution of West Germany, rising in the next year to 42.6 per cent and DM 
7,776 million of a budget of DM 18,253 million,827 contradicting the argument that missing 
defence contributions enabled the growth of the West German economy by the Marshall Plan 
aid.  
Table 22: Dismantling in West Germany 1945-1950 
 
Year Million RM per cent 
1945 25 3 
1946 96 11 
1947 155 17 
1948 148 16 
1949 188 21 
1950 288 32 
Total 900 100 
 
                                                        Source: Gerd Hardach, Der Marshall-Plan. 85.  
 
Gerd Hardach reported in Der Marshall-Plan about reparations through dismantling of 
industrial capital equipment of RM 900 million.  More than fifty per cent of the sum was 
dismantled in the last two years of the occupation.  He assumed that especially the British took 
so-called competitive reparations to eliminate Germany as a competitor on the world market. To 
                                                
826 Michael Balfour, West Germany, a Contemporary History. 145-6. 
827 Wilhelmine Dreissig. “Die Abschlussergebnisse des Bundeshaushalts für die Rechnungsjahre 1949/50 bis 
1954/55,” in Finance Archiv/Public Finance Analysis 16.3 (1955): 382. 
 288 
the RM 900 million at 1938 prices of dismantled capital equipment Hardach added RM 100 
million for reparations by the Soviets in West Berlin and the value of the merchant marine at RM 
173 million.828  He did not mention occupation costs at all. 
                                     
                                     Table 23: United States aid for West Germany (in million dollar) 
 
Year ERP-Funds ERP-Imports GARIO-Imports 
1946/47 - - 263 
1947/48 - - 580 
1948/49 614 388 579 
1949/50 457 416 198 
1950/51 385 479 - 
1951/52 130 277 - 
Total 1,585 1,560 1,620 
 
                                         Source: Gerd Hardach, Der Marshall-Plan. 221. 
     
Comparing the sum of RM 1.173 billion for the reparations Hardach listed, the dollar amounts of 
Table 23 demonstrated that the outside aid by far surpassed the reparations West Germany had to 
deliver.  However, how the picture will change when occupation costs are added will be seen 
later.  
 In Die Kosten von Hitlers Krieg, Willi A. Boelcke, a social and economic historian, 
analyzed in depth Germany’s postwar economic situation.  In a general résumé he listed as losses 
the ceding of territories – East Prussia, Silesia, parts of Pomerania and Brandenburg in the East 
and the Saar territory in the West, the damages caused by air and land warfare, requisitions and 
confiscations, reparations, the overexploitation of the agriculture, the decapitalisation of the 
economy, the decrease of human productivity thereby the reduction of profitability, however, 
                                                
828 Gerd Hardach, Der Marshall-Plan. (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1994). 84-5. 
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without attaching a monetary value, as well as the forfeiture of German foreign assets estimated 
at RM 10 billion.  Furthermore, Germany had to pay imposed occupation costs. 
 The occupation costs stressed the public budgets of the Länder in the four occupation 
zones differently.  Boelcke calculated occupation costs per resident of RM 122 in the U.S. Zone, 
of RM 124 in the British Zone, of RM 194 in the French Zone, and of RM 145 for the city of 
Berlin.829  At the beginning the imposed occupation costs exceeded by far the frame of the 
Länder budgets.  To increase the revenues of the Länder the Allied Control Council raised taxes.  
Starting in April 1946 the income tax increased drastically, followed a little bit later by the 
increase of the most important excise taxes, making Germany “the highest taxed country in the 
world,”830 according to Boelcke. 
 Willi A. Boelcke’s calculations of occupation costs and mandatory costs are very close to 
the figures calculated by the Institut für Besatzungsfragen of the University of Tübingen in Table 
19.  Boelcke split the year 1948 in the first quarter paid in RM and in the second to fourth quarter 
paid in the new currency DM. 
                 Table 24: Occupation costs and mandatory costs of the occupation zones (Million RM/DM) 
     
Year U.S. Zone British Zone  French Zone Total 
1945 653.2 1,257.9 116.8 2,027.9 
1946 1,604.1 2,462.2 1,007.0 5,073.3 
1947 1,967.9 2,784.9 772.8 5,525.6 
1948 (I) 779.3 425.5 113.0 1,317.8 
1948 (II-IV) 1,154.8 1,530.3 368.9 3,054.0 
1949 1,577.0 1,666.0 506.0 3,749.0 
Total 7,736.3 10,126.8 2,884.5 20,747.6 
 
                          Source: Willi A. Boelcke, Die Kosten von Hitlers Krieg. 163. 
 
                                                
829 Willi A. Boelcke, Die Kosten von Hitlers Krieg. (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1985.) 163. 
830 Ibid. 167. 
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 Interestingly, Boelcke specified some expenditures of the demilitarization program–in 
Table 20 classified as subsidiary costs of demilitarization.  He itemized the expenses for mine 
sweeping in German coastal waters 1945/46 at RM 140 million; payments for disarmed German 
forces and units in the British Zone at RM 536.2 million; and for the detection of unexploded 
ordnance devices RM 29.7 million, a total of RM 705.7 million from 1945 to 1947.  
                          Table 25: West German import funding by external aid 1945-1948 
 
Year Import ($ million) External aid ($ million) %-Share of external aid 
1945           96              64                66 
1946           689              468                68 
1947           843              600                71 
1948           1,588              1,026                64 
 
 
                 Source: Willi A. Boelcke, Die Kosten von Hitlers Krieg. 184. 
 
 With reference to outside aid, W. Boelcke stated that the “lions share of imports into the 
U.S. Zone, the British Zone, and the French Zone were desperately needed foodstuffs.”831  The 
trade balances of the American and British occupation zones were negative at roughly $300 
million for both countries in 1945/46.  The French Zone reported a surplus of $165.2 million for 
the same period. W. Boelcke’s figures listed in Table 25, however, differ in details from the 
numbers presented above in Tables 12 and 15.    
 In contrast to W. Boelcke, who assigned a monetary value of RM 10 billion only to 
Germany’s foreign assets, Bernd Josef Fehn listed explicit RM figures to West German 
reparation and restitution efforts.  However, at first he stated that the value of war booty, of 
confiscated coins, precious metal bars, as well as of foreign money cannot be determined, an 
unknown for the total bill.  For the dismantled industrial equipment and the confiscation of the 
merchant marine, he calculated RM 4.8 billion (all RM figures are in 1938 prices).  To the forced 
                                                
831 Ibid. 184. 
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exports of coal and timber he attached a value of RM 400 million, less than a third of what 
Senator Harmssen calculated.  For copyright losses, Fehn estimated RM 100 million, while he 
attached RM 20 billion to the value of patents and production methods, way above Senator 
Harmssen’s projection of RM 12.5 billion.  He attached to the losses in the ceded territories RM 
1.3 billion, while he valued German assets in foreign countries at RM 13 billion, RM 3.5 billion 
more than Harmssen’s memorandum attached to foreign assets.832  The varying values attached 
to the same categories demonstrate the difficulties and the inability to agree upon a final sum for 
a judgment of Germany’s liabilities. 
 Christoph Buchheim in Die Wiedereingliederung Westdeutschlands in die Weltwirtschaft 
1945-1958 analyzed the German liabilities from the lost war toward the Allies and the aid West 
Germany received from the United States, Great Britain, and France.  His approach and his 
conclusions are purely economical, very interesting and differing from previously mentioned 
approaches. The calculated value of the dismantling of plants in Western Germany, including 
Soviet dismantling in West Berlin from May to July 1945, as well as the confiscation of the 
German merchant marine is shown in the modified Table 26.  
 Buchheim determined by weight the value of the dismantled plants in the American and 
British zones. The average value per ton he assumed at RM 900833 in the U.S. Zone and RM 420 
in the British Zone.  The “multilateral deliveries” of the British Zone at RM 23 million based on 
a program to seize special machines absolutely necessary for liberated countries, similar to the 
machine tool confiscations by French Forces at an estimated value by German standards of RM 
200-220 million. 
                                                
832 Bernd Josef Fehn, “Die deutschen Wiedergutmachungs- und Kriegsfolgenleistungen nach 1945 unter dem 
Blickwinkel der Reparationsfrage,” in Jahrhundertschuld Jahrhundertsühne, Reparationen, Wiedergutmachung, 
Entschädigung für nationalsozialistisches Kriegs- und Verfolgungsunrecht, herausgegeben von Karl Doehring, 
Bernd Josef Fehn, Hans Günter Hockerts. (München: Olzog Verlag, 2001). 55-6. 
833 Monthly Report of the Military Governor U.S. Zone, No. 50, August/September 1949. 21. 
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    Table 26: Dismantling in West Germany and West Berlin and the seizure of the merchant 
      marine (Value in Million of 1938 Reichsmark) 
 
 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
U.S. Dismantling (Million RM) 













British Dismantling (Million RM) 
Quantity (1,000 t) 



















French Dismantling (Million RM) 
Number of plants 
Machine tool seizure 



















Soviet Dismantling in 
West Berlin (Mill. RM)  
100 - - - - - 
Seizure of German  
Merchant marine (Mill. RM) 
- 156 (6) (6) (5) - 
Total Value (Mill. RM) 125 252 161 154 193 288 
 
     Source: Ch. Buchheim, Die Wiedereingliederung Westdeutschlands in die Weltwirtschaft 1945-1958. 80. 
 
 
The IARA assessed only one third of the sum, Buchheim calculated an amount of RM 75 million 
for the seized equipment, distributed in three rates at RM 25 million.  The total value of RM 173 
million of the merchant marine the author split in a 90 per cent rate of RM 156 million for 1946, 
and the rest of RM 17 million in three rates for the years of 1947 to 1949.834    
 The total sum of the value of dismantling and of the merchant marine added up to RM 
1,173 million.  IARA policies estimated the residual value of the reparations only as a third of 
the actual trade value.  Conforming with this policy, the author multiplied the totals of Table 26 
with three to get the actual trade value.  Then he divided the sum by 3.75, the 1938 purchasing-
                                                
834 Christoph Buchheim, Die Wiedereingliederung Westdeutschlands in die Weltwirtschaft 1945-1958. (München: 
Oldenbourg Verlag, 1990). 81. 
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power parity of 3.75 Reichsmark pro U.S. dollar.  This calculation produced the dollar value of 
the reparations and of the merchant marine with a total of $938 million. 
   1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950   
   100 202 129 123 154 230835 
 
 Buchheim refused to count restitutions as a burden to Germany.  He argued that 
restitutions were only the returning of material unlawfully taken in foreign countries and 
consequently not goods generated in Germany.  His arguments about not counting foreign assets 
and the labor of prisoners of war are controversial.  His major argument stated that both were not 
a unilateral burden of West Germany, rather they were activities of the “not yet perished 
Deutsches Reich.”836 For the intellectual property like patents, production secrets, and 
trademarks taken away by the Allies, Buchheim calculated the loss at RM 6.5 billion (1938).  
Converted into postwar dollars he computed for these losses roughly $3 billion.  
  Based on the figures of the Institut für Besatzungsfragen (see Table 19),837 Buchheim 
converted the sums of the fiscal years 1945 to 1949 into calendar years, producing the following 
occupation costs per calendar year in RM/DM million at a 
                          1945 1946 1947  1948  1949 
     1st half         2nd half    
  1,618 4,570 5,714 2,852         2,208 4,099838  
  
total of RM/DM 21.061 billion.  Further, he differentiated between “contributions in kind” and 
“other contributions.”  This differentiation was necessary, he argued, because only “contributions 
in kind” could tentatively be exported to earn foreign currency for essential imports, while “other 
contribution” like wages and salaries for Military Government employees or compensations paid 
for requisitioned property could not be exported in exchange for foreign currency.  With this 
                                                
835 Ibid. 86. 
836 Ibid. 80. 
837 Institut für Besatzungsfragen, Occupation costs, are they a defence contribution? 7. 
838 Christoph Buchheim, Die Wiedereingliederung Westdeutschlands in die Weltwirtschaft 1945-1958. 89. 
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differentiation in mind, Buchheim calculated a total of RM 3.75 billion for “contributions in 
kind” from 1945 to 1949 provided to the Allies, convertible at an exchange rate of $0.30 per RM.  
For “other contributions” he computed an average exchange rate, based on the black market, of 
RM 50 per dollar prior to the currency reform of June 1948.  Table 27 displays the results of his 
calculations. 
                           Table 27: West German occupation costs ($ million)      
 1945 1946 1947 1948 1948 1949 
“Contributions in kind” 97 274 343 171 132 233 
“Other contributions” 26 73 91 46 530 933 
Total 123 347 434 217 662 1166 
 
                       Source: Christoph Buchheim, Die Wiedereingliederung Westdeutschlands in die   
                       Weltwirtschaft 1945-1958. 91. 
 
 Without further explaining, Buchheim’s approach to the questions of intellectual 
properties, the use of Allied Military Marks (AMM) and captured Reichsmark amounts, of 
irregular requisitioning of goods, the use of the DM stock provided to the Military Government 
at the currency reform, as well as the undervaluation of the German exports, Table 28 
demonstrated his estimate of the occupation burden West Germany had to carry. 
Buchheim calculated the total sum of occupation costs West Germany paid from 1945 to 1949 at 
$7.389 billion.  The payments to the Allies for the year 1950 Buchheim did not count as 




             Table 28: An estimate of the burden imposed on West Germany by the Allies ($ million) 
 
 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 
1. Dismantled Equipment  100 202 129 123 154 
2. Seizure of intellectual property 1,000 1,000 1,000   
Occupation burden      
3. Contributions in kind 97 274 343 303 233 
4. Other contributions 26 73 91 576 933 
5. Goods purchased with Allied Military  
    Marks 
300 - - - - 
6. Irregular requisitioned goods 200 - - - - 
7. Use of the DM stocks of the  
    Military Government (20% for goods) 
- - - 100 
(20) 
 
8. Undervaluation of German exports 5 75 42 10 - 
9. Total 1,728 1,624 1,605 1,112 1,320 
 
            Source: Ch. Buchheim, Die Wiedereingliederung Westdeutschlands in die Weltwirtschaft 1945-1958. 95. 
 
  The burden imposed by the United States, Great Britain, and France on Germany–without 
taking into account the burden imposed on the Soviet Zone had–supersedes the aid the Allies 
delivered at the same time to prevent the German people from starvation.  This discrepancy one 
can watch again by the start of the European Recovery Program in 1948.  Parallel with the influx 
of millions of dollars into West Germany, a noticeable increase of dismantling occurred (see 
Tables 22, 26).  The discrepancy set aside, how much official aid did the western governments 
provide to the German people?  How much food, clothing, medical supplies, and miscellaneous 
item did American and European private relief organizations deliver to soften the fate of the 
Germans?  The following tables present the figures Christoph Buchheim traced down for public 
and private aid to West Germany and its people. 
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USA        
1. SHAEF Supplies 195 - - - - - - 
2. GARIOA 78 237 788 503 177 12 - 
3. Marshall Plan  - - 142 420 303 416 114 
4. JEIA Operating Capital - 18 - - - - - 
5. U.S. Surplus Material (31) (31) (93) (62) - - - 
6. Counterpart Financing - - (-42) (-42) (-42) (-42) (-42) 
Great Britain        
7. UK Contributions 264 317 90 32 1 - - 
8. JEIA Operating Capital - 94 10 - - - - 
France        
9. JEIA Operating Capital - - 16 - - - - 
Drawing Rights         
10. Received - - 8 46 65 - - 
11. Granted - - -17 -147 -53 - - 
Total 568 697 1,088 874 451 386 72 
  
                Source: Ch. Buchheim, Die Wiedereingliederung Westdeutschlands in die Weltwirtschaft 1945-1958. 72.   
 
 Line 6 of Table 29 Counterpart Financing refers to imports paid by JEIA or the German 
Government with dollars, while the German importer paid JEIA/German Government with 
Deutsche Mark.  The United States as the creditor claimed the contractor payments, hence 
withdrawing the money from reinvestment into the German economy.  The Drawing Rights of 
line 10 and 11 “amounted, in effect, to grants-in-aid given by European countries to each other… 
encourage[ing] the participating countries to fulfill their pledge of self-help and mutual aid under 
the European Recovery Program.”839  Regarding Table 29, it implies, par example, that in 1949 
West Germany received short term credits of $46 million and granted short term credits of $147 
million to the participating Marshall Plan countries. 
                                                
839 Imanuel Wexler, The Marshall Plan Revisited. (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1983). 138. 
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 Foreign aid from private European and American relief agencies for West Germany and 
West Berlin amounted to, according to Buchheim’s rough estimate of $370 million.  Table 30 
demonstrates the unbelievable generosity and cooperativeness of the American and European 
people. 
                            Table 30: Private foreign aid to West Germany and West Berlin 
     
 1945/46 1947 1948 1949 
From United States     
1. CRALOG (1,000 short tons; 
    1 short ton = 0.907 metric ton) 
9.8 13.1 30.1 11.3 
2. CARE (million packages) 0.3 1.8 1.6 1.1 
3. Gift Parcels (million lb; 
     1 lb = 453.6 g) 
36.1 164.1 148.7 77.9 
Value of private U.S. aid ($ mill.) 26 106 106 56 
Value of aid from all countries 
($ Million, rough estimate) 
40 130 130 70 
 
                           Source: Ch. Buchheim, Die Wiedereingliederung Westdeutschlands in  
                           die Weltwirtschaft 1945-1958. 76. 
 
 While Christoph Buchheim analyzed in detail the burden the three western occupation 
zones had to bear after the war, Jörg Fisch presented, in Reparationen nach dem Zweiten 
Weltkrieg, a more general account of the material and financial load West Germany bore.  
Buchheim did not reckon foreign assets and the labor of German prisoners of war as reparations.  
He argued that with the outbreak of the war the German power of control of their assets in the 
belligerent countries ended.  The labor of German prisoners of war–the number of workdays 
provided by German prisoners of war in the East and West estimated at a minimum of two 
billion840–Buchheim refused to count arguing that it could not be separated into a western and 
eastern part, an unconvincing argument.    
                                                
840 Jörg Fisch, Reparationen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. (München: C.H. Beck Verlag, 1992). 215. 
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 Fisch did not count the labor of prisoners of war, either.  His argument followed the line 
that as long as there was not full employment in West Germany, the labor of the prisoners of war 
in foreign countries did not reduce the national income.  Exaggerating the argument, one could 
state that without full employment in West Germany, the prisoners of war kept the German 
authorities from paying unemployment benefits, an argument demonstrating the inability to 
define commonly accepted limits for reparations and occupation costs.  In addition to the foreign 
assets and the labor of prisoners of war, Fisch also refused to put a monetary value to the 
intellectual properties such as patents, trademark, and production secrets, because no one can 
estimate the authentic or reasonable value.  His calculations, not reproduced in detail here, 
amounted to the figures in Table 31. 
Based on the figures of Table 31 Fisch claimed a total of $4.8 billion (1938) for 
reparations of all kind for the 8½ years from 1945 to 1953.  Subtracting the $4.8 billion 
from $16.8 billion (1938) he arrived at $12 billion (1938) for occupation costs.  Evenly                                
distributing the $12 billion over the time of 8½ years the average occupation costs per year 
amounted to $1.4 billion (1938).  For the time from May 1945 to December 1949, for four years 
and eight months the computed occupation costs added up to $6.6 billion (1938). 
How did Fisch arrive at these figures?  He calculated a total for restitutions, for the use of 
Allied Military Marks–the official exchange rate of RM 10 to $1 benefitted the Allies through 
favorable prices841–for booty, extractions from current production, for black market operations, 







                                                
841 Ibid. 211. 
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    Table 31: Reparations of the western zones/federal Republic 1945-1953 
                                             (In 1938 dollar) 
 
    Total 
$ Million 
Per head 
     $ 
Per head/year 
         $ 
Reparations     












      42.5 
With Occupation Costs 






      36.1 
 
                                    Source: Jörg Fisch, Reparationen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. 217. 
dollars the sum amounted to $2.093 billion.  He added to this $2.75 billion (1938) for dismantled 
equipment, German foreign assets, and the confiscated merchant marine and arrived at $4.843 
billion in 1938 dollars for all West German reparations (Table 31, line 2).   
 For occupation costs Fisch assumed $12 billion (1938) for the 8½ years from 1945 to 
1953.  For the same time span, the credits West Germany received, he computed at 2.5 billion 
1938 dollars (Table 31, line 3 and 4, 16,800 – 14,300 = 2,500).842  A percentage summary of the 
burden caused by defeat and occupation at total receipts, total government spending, and of the 
national product for fiscal year 1946/47 is demonstrated in Table 32. 
Table 32: Share of the total output for the Occupation Forces in Germany of government receipts, revenues 
from Reich taxes, expenditures, and the share of the national product in percent. 
  
 Berlin U.S. Zone British Zone French Zone Soviet Zone All Zones 
Total Government Receipts 19.7 28.3 27.0 67.0 57.9 41.1 
Revenues from Reich taxes 31.3 35.2 38.7 79.9 78.8 55.8 
Expenditures 25.1 35.6 25.2 51.4 59.1 42.2 













Source: Jörg Fisch, Reparationen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. 218. 
 
                                                
842 Ibid. 216-8. 
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 Interestingly, the independently computed share of occupation costs/related costs for the 
state of Württemberg-Baden at the total state income is 28.5 per cent (see Table 7), one can say 
identical with Fisch’s figure of 28.3 per cent in Table 32.  One could conclude that the burden of 
occupation costs/related costs was equally distributed throughout the U.S. Zone.  
9.3. Correlating the incommensurable 
 Most likely it will be impossible to compare the monetary value of Allied and West 
German efforts after World War II to exact amounts of Dollars, Reichsmarks, and Deutsche 
Marks.  Official figures and the approaches of the authors presented in this chapter to the 
question of reparations and occupation costs are varying in time spans, in exchange rates, what to 
count as reparations or occupation costs and to what amount, making it difficult to get 
comparable results.   
 First, what is commonly accepted as reparations?  While Senator Harmssen, par example, 
counted the value of the ceded territories and the assets of the ethnic Germans, Volksdeutsche, in 
Eastern European countries (see Table 18) as reparations at $44.2 billion (1938), all other authors 
negated this approach.  Christoph Buchheim refused to count foreign assets, restitutions, and the 
labor of prisoners of war as reparation.  Bernd Josef Fehn stated foreign assets as representing a 
value of $3.9 billion.  Jörg Fisch rejected counting the value of the intellectual property taken 
away by the Allies, as reparations because one cannot attach a definite amount of money to it.  
However, Bernd Josef Fehn attached $6 billion to the loss of intellectual property.  These 
examples may explain the difficulties caused by the different angles and view points the authors 
applied.  To this, one must add the complicated procedures the Inter-Allied Reparation Agency 
used to estimate/calculate current market values of equipment predisposed for dismantling.  
IARA transferred the current market value to the 1938 Reichsmark value.  The IARA exchanged 
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this Reichsmark value into 1938 dollars by employing arbitrary exchange rates varying from RM 
3 to 4 for a dollar, which was then transferred into postwar dollars.  With the exception of the 
IARA, the exchange rates used for 1938 Reichsmark and Dollar varied between RM 2.5 to 3.5 
for the Dollar.  The postwar exchange rate used by the authors was RM 1 = $0.30. The exchange 
rate after the currency reform was DM 1= $0.25.  
 For example, Fisch’s figures for public aid, occupation costs and reparations (see Table 
31, 33, 34) cover the time from May 1945 to 1953, 8½ years or 102 months.  The time span of 
this study is May 1945 to 1949, fifty-six months or fifty-five per cent of the 8½ years.  By 
assuming a linear distribution of the amounts Fisch refers to, the amounts had to be reduced to 
fifty-five per cent of the total, to be comparable to other figures used.  Thus, calculating Fisch’s 
public aid figure of $2.5 billion, it has to be cut down to $1.4 billion.  Fifty-five per cent of the 
$12 billion of occupation costs amounts to $6.6 billion, and the reparation costs decrease by this 
computation from $4.8 billion to $2.6 billion.  The method is questionable, however, Fisch’s 
figures, he admits, reveal that the numbers he employed, as well as the figures from all sources 
can only be seen as rough guiding values, implicitly repeating that it is impossible to exactly 
quantify dollar, RM, or DM amounts. 
The figures in Table 33 compare the official public aid West Germany obtained between 
1945 and 1949.  Column 1-3 list the amounts of money provided by GARIOA funds, by Great 
Britain, by the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) authorizing the Marshall Plan 
funds, and of the International Refugee Organization (IRO).  It must be pointed out that Marshall 
Plan funds were used to buy foodstuffs, also labeled Category A imports, as well as Category B 
materials necessary to produce export goods.  The figures of column 1-3 are taken from official   
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              Table 33: Contrasting Juxtaposition of Public Aid 1945 to 1949 (in million $) 
     
                 Official Public Aid from United States, Great Britain, France  
    Food Imports Category B 
Imports 
   G. Hardach Ch. Buchheim  J. Fisch 
GARIOA UK/ECA 
    IRO 
GARIOA ERP Public Aid Public Aid 
1945 476 - - - -        568  
 
  1,400 
1946 - - 263 - 
1947 516 - - 580 -        697 
1948 850 50 - 579 614        1,088 
1949 594 147 289 198 457        874 
 2,436              436 1,620 1,071        3,227   1,400 
Total                        2,872          2,691        3,277   1,400 
 
GARIOA  Government Relief in Occupied Areas 
ECA          Economic Cooperation Administration 
ERP           European Recovery Program 
IRO   International Refugee Organization 
UK   United Kingdom/Great Britain 
Ch. Buchheim, J. Fisch, G. Hardach: Authors cited in Chapter 9 
 
  
Sources – Monthly Reports of the Military Governor U.S. Zone and Reports of the German 
Government concerning the Marshall Plan Aid.843 
Adding up the official sums of the first three columns yielded a total of $2.872 billion.  In 
contrast, we have the amounts of official public aid reported by Gerd Hardach in Der Marshall-
Plan, by Christoph Buchheim reported in his Die Wiedereingliederung Westdeutschlands in die 
Weltwirtschaft 1945-1958, and by Jörg Fisch in Reparationen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg.  The 
figures of the three authors demonstrate again the difficulties in presenting figures based on 
commonly accepted benchmarks. The figures presented by the three authors differ in a wide 
range, from Fisch’s $1.4 billion to Buchheim’s $3.28 billion, roughly two and a half times 
Fisch’s figure.  Gerd Hardach with $2.69 billion is closest to the official figures.  One is not able 
                                                
843 Stadtarchiv Stuttgart, Bestand 21/1, Signatur 21, “Erster Bericht der Deutschen Bundesregierung über die 
Durchführung des Marshall Planes 1. Oktober 1949 bis 31. Dezember 1949.” 
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to explain how the different authors computed the aid with such a wide margin, especially since 
no exchange rates were necessary as all official sums were provided in U.S. currency.     
 Table 34 offers a comparison of occupation costs and reparations.  W. Boelcke, Ch. 
Buchheim, and J. Fisch, as well as the Institut für Besatzungsfragen, present their calculations of 
occupation expenses.  Buchheim and Fisch represented the minimum and the maximum amount 
with $2.95 billion, respectively $6.6 billion.  W. Boelcke and the Institut für Besatzungsfragen 
are close to Fisch’s figure of $6.6 billion.  Their numbers are very similar, because W. Boelcke 
used the figures the Institut für Besatzungsfragen provided, with Boelcke’s figures differing 
marginally in two positions.   
 Buchheim’s low figures-as mentioned before–are based on his argument that only real 
assets can be counted as occupation costs.  They can be exported to earn foreign currency for the 
import of goods needed for the production of export products.  With this argument, Buchheim 
eliminated the major assets such as wages and salaries of Germans employed by the occupation 
authorities, as well as the compensations for goods and services provided to the occupation 
forces from the occupation bill.     
  J. Fisch computed a total of $12 billion for occupation costs from May 1945 to 
December 1953.  The $6.6 billion in Table 34 is the fifty-five per cent share of the $12 billion for 
the time span May 1945 to December 1949.  He does not give detailed information about the 
composition of the total.   
The figures of the Institut für Besatzungsfragen (see Table 19) seems to be the most 
accurate and documented, totaling at $6.034 billion for the fifty-six months from 1945 to 1949.  
The West German Länder, and accordingly the Federal Republic, paid an average monthly 
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        Table 34: Calculated/estimated Occupation Costs and Reparations 1945 to 1949 (in million $) 
 
                                Occupation Costs                       Reparations 
 Institut für 
Besatzungs- 
fragen 
W. Boelcke Ch. Buchheim  J. Fisch Ch. Buchheim B.J. Fehn J. Fisch 









1946 1,522 1,522 347 1,277 
1947 1,658 1,658 434 1,171 
1948 1,240 1,159 879 233 
1949 1,006 937 1,166 154 
Total 6,034 5,884 2,949 6,600 4,440 10,600844 4,570 
 
W. A. Boelcke, Ch. Buchheim, B.J. Fehn, J. Fisch, Institut für Besatzungsfragen: Authors and Institutions cited 
in Table 34. 
 
bill of RM/DM 107.8 million for occupation expenditures.  The figures of the Institut für 
Besatzungsfragen correlate with the numbers of Table 11 of Württemberg-Baden’s occupation 
costs by computing a monthly average of occupation costs of RM/DM 31.7 million.  Also 
identical is the tendency of increasing occupation expenditures with the climax in 1947 and with 
decreasing amounts for 1948 and 1949. 
 The second part of Table 34 presents the figures Buchheim, Fehn, and Fisch calculated 
for reparation payments, ranging from Buchheim’s $4.44 billion to Fehn’s $10.6 billion.  Fisch’s 
$4.57 billion is close to Buchheim’s figure.  Fisch’s figure is taken from a table in his 
Reparationen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, calling for reparations of $4.8 billion for the time 
span 1945 to 1953.  A first idea of reducing the $4.8 billion analog to the occupation costs to 
fifty-five per cent according to the fifty-five per cent of the time 1945 to 1949 turned out to be 
erroneous.  The Federal Republic continued to pay occupation costs under the category of 
defence contribution, reparation payments ended in 1950 with the last plants dismantled and 
                                                
844 In Wiedergutmachung und Kriegsfolgenliquidation, p. 68, B.J. Fehn, H.J. Brodesser, T. Franosch , and W. Wirth 
cite a total  amount of $17.9 billion for reparations, a sum much greater than the $10.6 billion published a year later 
in Jahrhundertschuld Jahrhundertsühne.   
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shipped.  According to Table 21, plants were dismantled in 1950 in the British and French zones 
at a value of RM 288 million.  The RM 288 million represented the value the IARA attached to it 
being only a third of the actual trade value.  Three times the IARA value results in RM 864 
million actual trade value equaling $230 million. One receives a reparation figure of $4.57 
billion for the time 1945 to 1949, after subtracting the 1950 reparations from the total of $4.8 
billion.  This amount is close to the figure Ch. Buchheim calculated.  Bernd Josef Fehn’s 
estimate of $10.6 billion tends in the direction of Senator Harmssen’s calculations and will not 
be closer examined. 
 The next table demonstrates the relation between occupation costs calculated by the 
Institut für Besatzungsfragen (see Tables 19 and 34) and the amounts of public aid spent by the 
western Allies from 1945 to 1949.  The figures of the public aid are based on official sources, as 
well as the calculations from G. Hardach and Ch. Buchheim from Table 33.  Whichever figures 
one applies, Buchheim’s, officials, and/or Hardach’s, it is conspicuous that occupation costs paid 
by the Germans exceeded the aid West Germany received during the time span 1945 to 1949. 
                  
Table 35: Occupation Costs and Public Aid 1945 to 1949 (in million $) 
   
 Occupation Costs 
according to the  
Institut für Besat- 
zungsfragen 
                             Public Aid 






1945 608 476 263 568 
1946 1,522 
1947 1,658 516 580 697 
1948 1,149 900 1,193 1,088 
1949 1,007 1,030 655 874 




 Adding Buchheim’s lowest estimate of reparations of $4.44 billion (Table 34) to the 
occupation costs of $5.944 billion (Table 35) would change the ratio of occupation costs to 
public aid from roughly 2:1 to 3.5:1 with reparation liabilities added.  
 Without taking into account the burden the people of the Soviet occupation zone had to 
bear–Fisch estimates $16.3 billion in total occupation costs from 1945 to 1953845–the figures 
presented prove with convincing clarity the thesis that the contributions of the West German 
people surpassed the aid the United States provided to support the re-emergence of Germany 
after the unconditional surrender.   
 Aside from the quantity of support – more than 19 million tons of foodstuffs West 
Germany received – the intent of the aid has to be recognized.  The realization that–aside from 
the humanitarian aspects – sufficient short-term aid would prevent long-term dependency came 
soon.  The Marshall Plan aid complemented the aid provided under the United States GARIOA 
Program and provided an additional booster to the West German economy already gaining 
momentum.  Until the currency reform, restrictions imposed by the Allied Control Council and 
by Military Governments constrained the German economy. German imports were limited to the 
basic living requirements, German exports had to be paid in dollars, and export proceeds were 
used to pay for imports.846  The restrictions known as the “Dollar Clause” and the “First Charge 
Principle,” as well as the cumbersome bureaucratic input of Military Government regulations 
handicapped the revival of the German economy.  However, the currency reform of 1948 added 
further impetus to the German economy by raising the awareness of the German people that 
work was worthwhile again, able to provide the means for living.  The Marshall Plan proved to 
                                                
845 Jörg Fisch, Reparationen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. 199. 
846 Christoph Buchheim, Die Wiedereingliederung Westdeutschlands in die Weltwirtschaft 1945-1958. 1. 
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be a successful instrument to force the participating countries to closer economic cooperation, 
leveling the path to economic unification.  
 Concluding, one must state that without the essential food aid from the United States and 
without the aid infused into the German economy by the Marshall Plan, West Germany would 
have needed a much longer time to get back on its footing.  It is insignificant, whether the aid 
was given for humanitarian reasons or because of a changing political environment.  The United 
States’ assistance offered West Germany the chance to survive and to pay its liabilities for the 
privilege of having started and having lost World War II.  
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Chapter 10: Conclusion  
 How much did the effort of rebuilding defeated Germany politically, culturally, socially, 
and economically depend on the material and especially financial support the United States 
provided to the three western occupation zones of postwar Germany?  The results of this analysis 
portray an inchoate picture of postwar Germany.  The research centers on the efforts of the 
United States to secure the survival of the German people – an effort contrary to original official 
policies, and on examining the public aid of the western Allies, in particular the aid only the 
United States could provide.  It avoids placing values on the unaccounted for technical and 
material aid and support the U.S. military provided in 1945/46 for rebuilding vital infrastructure, 
allocating road and rail transport capacities for harvesting the crops, and providing medical, as 
well as pharmaceutical assistance.  One has to add the U.S. sponsored libraries, the establishment 
and support of the Amerikahäuser, as well as the many youth activities U.S. troops engaged in.  
The private aid of roughly $370 million West Germany and West Berlin received according to 
Table 30 is also not incorporated in the final comparison.  The narrative does not discuss the 
comparatively heavier burden the people of the Russian occupation zone had to bear for 
occupation costs and reparations, aside from the political objective of the Soviets to install a 
Communist regime.  Neither does the narrative focus on the specifics of reparations, restitutions, 
and Wiedergutmachung. 
Owing to the distinct features of the topic, specific U.S. sources are not available in   
abundance apart from the Monthly Reports of the Office of Military Government in Germany 
(U.S.) of the United States Zone/Bizone, as well as the reports of the U.S. High Commissioner 
for Germany.  Substantial German sources exist dealing with the topic in a more general way, 
whereas only few sources are at hand examining the specific aspects of the topic.  Research in 
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several German archives provided the largesse of data from governmental sources at the city, 
state, and federal level needed for the analysis.    
 Immediately with the start of the occupation it began to dawn on the occupation powers 
that no agency could successfully democratize and re-educate a starving and homeless people.  
With denazification a top priority in the U.S. Zone early in the occupation, the economy of 
hunger soon forced the Allies to a much more humanitarian stand toward the German people 
than originally intended.  From providing millions of tons of foodstuffs – without knowing if 
Germany would ever be able to pay the credits back – the Allied focus shifted to restart the 
economy as quickly as possible within the limits of the Potsdam Protocol-permitted peaceful 
industries.  A prospering economy would enable Germany to export goods and to use the export 
proceeds to buy food and raw materials.  The imported raw materials would produce exportable 
merchandise, so reducing the need for U.S. publicly financed food imports.   
 This study focused on the financial aspects of the postwar situation in the three western 
occupation zones, attempting to contrast the financial burden the western Allies bore trying to 
keep the Germans alive, while at the same time imposing heavy requirements for goods and 
services on the German economy and the people.  It was a unique situation the Allies faced by 
being the ultimate German governing authority with all implications and at the same time the 
oppressive occupier enforcing/trying to enforce the different national interests of the Allies 
contrary to the objectives agreed upon in the Potsdam Protocol by the Big Three. 
 The financial burden caused by human and material losses of the war and by imposed 
occupation costs to the city of Stuttgart and the Land Württemberg-Baden serves as an example 
of what the German communities and Länder faced after the lost war.  However, it is impossible 
to conclude from these two examples the total burden the taxpayers of the U.S. Zone had to 
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shoulder, much less the total costs the German people of the American, the British, and the 
French occupation zones had to bear.  Allied/U.S. numbers differ from the German numbers of 
occupation costs because both sides differed in what one could and would count as occupation 
costs.  This example by itself explains that, in such an investigation, it will never be possible to 
agree on final numbers accepted by all parties.  Further, one cannot extract from the sources 
information about the amounts of food distributed to individual states of the U.S. Zone and later 
of the Bizone, much less the amounts of food a particular city received. 
 To compare the official data distilled from the Monthly Reports of the Military Governor 
U.S. Zone with German calculations, I relied on several of the authors referred to in Chapter 1.  
The research results of the economist Willi A. Boelcke, the economic historian Gerd Hardach, 
the Swiss historian Jörg Fisch, as well as the social and economic historian Christoph Buchheim 
and the finance officer Bernhard Fehn, provided the base for comparing German and United 
States expenses.  The report of the Institut für Besatzungsfragen of the University of Tübingen 
provided additional valuable data for the purpose of comparing costs. 
 Different authors presented different estimates of the costs of the occupation caused by 
the circumstances of the lost war.  Juxtaposing the numbers of the different authors with the 
numbers extracted from the Monthly Reports raises the question of what caused the big 
differences.  It is clear to me that every author chose a different perspective to approach the 
topic.  It is also clear that there will never be a final sum of dollars and cents and DM and 
Pfennig.  The intent of the analysis is to demonstrate the vast dimensions of money and 
foodstuffs expended from both, the United States and the three western occupation zones/Federal 
Republic of Germany.   
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 All said, one can state without doubt, that the German people were responsible for the 
remarkable recovery of the economy.  However, one has to state, also without doubt, that 
without the aid provided by the United States, the recovery would have taken much more time 
and without overstating it, the number of lives lost through inadequate food supply would have 
been much higher.  Germany needed the food support provided through the GARIOA Program 
as well as the financial aid provided through the Marshall Plan by the United States during the 
early postwar years to overcome the devastations of the war, to start to rebuild their 
dismembered and overcrowded country.  Acting like a blood transfusion, the Marshall Plan aid, 
together with the currency reform, infused the German people with hope and confidence.  Aid 
provided by the American people, and hope, confidence and the industriousness of the German 
people, together induced the so-called economic miracle of the 1950s in Germany. 
 Definitely, the Germans benefitted from the growing disagreements among the members 
of the war alliance.  The political developments in the Russian sphere of interest in eastern 
Europe – like the Communist takeover of the governments in Hungary and Czechoslovakia – 
intensified the actions of the United States in preventing West Germany drifting into the Soviet- 
dominated realm.  The outbreak of the Korean War convinced the United States leadership that 
without West Germany, Europe could not be defended against a Soviet attack.  The French 
government, blackmailed by the United States, accepted grudgingly the rearmament of Germany 
in the frame of a common west European defense system.  The no-vote of the French parliament 
in 1954 to the common west European defense system opened the door for NATO membership 




Appendix A: The original Morgenthau Plan 
Top Secret 
Program to Prevent Germany from 
Starting a World War III  
 
1. Demilitarization of Germany.  
  
 It should be the aim of the Allied Forces to accomplish the complete demilitarization of 
Germany in the shortest possible period of time after surrender. This means completely 
disarming the German Army and people (including the removal or destruction of all war 
material), the total destruction of the whole German armament industry, and the removal or 
destruction of other key industries which are basic to military strength. 
 
2. New Boundaries of Germany. 
 
 (a) Poland should get that part of East Prussia which doesn’t go to the U.S.S.R. and the 
southern portion of Silesia. (See map in 12 Appendix.) 
 
 (b) France should get the Saar and the adjacent territories bounded by the Rhine and the 
Moselle Rivers. 
 
 (c) As indicated in 4 below an International Zone should be created containing the Ruhr 
and the surrounding industrial areas. 
 
3. Partitioning of New Germany.   
 
 The remaining portion of Germany should be divided into two autonomous, independent 
states, (1) a South German state comprising Bavaria, Wuerttemberg, Baden and some smaller 
areas and (2) a North German state comprising a large part of the old state of Prussia, Saxony, 
Thuringia and several smaller states.  
 
 There shall be a custom union between the new South German state and Austria, which 
will be restored to her pre-1938 political borders. 
 
4. The Ruhr Area.   (The Ruhr, surrounding industrial areas, as shown on the map, including the 
Rhineland, the Keil Canal, and all German territory north of the Keil Canal.) 
 
 Here lies the heart of German industrial power. This area should not only be stripped of 
all presently existing industries but so weakened and controlled that it can not in the foreseeable 
future become an industrial area. The following steps will accomplish this: 
 
 (a) Within a short period, if possible not longer than 6 months after the cessation of 
hostilities, all industrial plants and equipment not destroyed by military action shall be 
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completely dismantled and transported to Allied Nations as restitution. All equipment shall be 
removed from the mines and the mines closed. 
 
 (b) The area should be made an international zone to be governed by an international 
security organization to be established by the United Nations. In governing the area the 
international organization should be guided by policies designed to further the above stated 
objective.  
 
5. Restitution and Reparation.  
 
 Reparations, in the form of future payments and deliveries, should not be demanded. 
Restitution and reparation shall be effected by the transfer of existing German resources and 
territories, e.g.,  
 
 (a) by restitution of property looted by the Germans in territories occupied by them; 
 
 (b) by transfer of German territory and German private rights in industrial property 
situated in such territory to invaded countries and the international organization under the 
program of partition; 
 
 (c) by the removal and distribution among devastated countries of industrial plants and 
equipment situated within the International Zone and the North and South German states 
delimited in the section on partition;  
 
 (d) by forced German labor outside Germany; and 
 
 (e) by confiscation of all German assets of any character whatsoever outside of Germany. 
 
6. Education and Propaganda. 
 
 
 (a) All schools and universities will be closed until an Allied Commission of Education 
has formulated an effective reorganization program. It is contemplated that it may require a 
considerable period of time before any institutions of higher education are reopened. Meanwhile 
the education of German students in foreign universities will not be prohibited. Elementary 
schools will be reopened as quickly as appropriate teachers and textbooks are available. 
 
 (b) All German radio stations and newspapers, magazines, weeklies, etc. shall be 
discontinued until adequate controls are established and an appropriate program formulated. 
 
7. Political Decentralization.  
 
 The military administration in Germany in the initial period should be carried out with a 
view toward the eventual partitioning of Germany. To facilitate partitioning and to assure its 
permanence the military authorities should be guided by the following principles: 
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 (a) Dismiss all policy-making officials of the Reich government and deal primarily with 
local governments. 
 
 (b) Encourage the reestablishment of state governments in each of the states (Lander) 
corresponding to 18 states into which Germany is presently divided and in addition make the 
Prussian provinces separate states. 
 
 (c) Upon the partition of Germany, the various state governments should be encouraged 
to organize a federal government for each of the newly partitioned areas. Such new governments 
should be in the form of a confederation of states, with emphasis on states’ rights and a large 
degree of local autonomy.  
 
8. Responsibility of Military for Local German Economy.  
 
 The sole purpose of the military in control of the German economy shall be to facilitate 
military operations and military occupation. The Allied Military Government shall not assume 
responsibility for such economic problems as price controls, rationing, unemployment, 
production, reconstruction, distribution, consumption, housing, or transportation, or take any 
measures designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy, except those which are 
essential to military operations. The responsibility for sustaining the German economy and 
people rests with the German people with such facilities as may be available under the 
circumstances.  
 
9. Controls over development of German Economy.   
 
 During a period of at least twenty years after surrender adequate controls, including 
controls over foreign trade and tight restrictions on capital imports, shall be maintained by the 
United Nations designed to prevent in the newly-established states the establishment or 
expansion of key industries basic to the German military potential and to control other key 
industries. 
 
10. Agrarian Program.     
 
 All large estates should be broken up and divided among the peasants and the system of 
primogeniture and entail should be abolished.  
 
11. Punishment of War Crimes and Treatment of Special Groups.  
 
 A program for the punishment of certain war crimes and for the treatment of Nazi 
organizations and other special groups is contained in section 11. 
 
12. Uniform and Parades. 
 
 (a) No German shall be permitted to wear, after an appropriate period of time following 




 (b) No military parades shall be permitted anywhere in Germany and all military bands 
shall be disbanded.  
 
13. Aircraft.  
 
 All aircraft (including gliders), whether military or commercial, will be confiscated for 
later disposition. No German shall be permitted to operate or to help operate any aircraft, 
including those owned by foreign interests. 
 
14. United states Responsibility.  
 
 Although the United States would have full military and civilian representation on 
whatever international commission or commissions   may be established for the execution of the 
whole German program, the primary responsibility for the policing of Germany and for civil 
administration in Germany should be assumed by the military forces of Germany’s continental 
neighbors. Specifically, these should include Russian, French, Polish, Czech, Greek, Yugoslav, 
Norwegian, Dutch and Belgian soldiers.  
 

























Appendix C: JCS 1067 
Directive to Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the 
Military Government of Germany; April 1945 
It is considered appropriate, at the time of the release to the American public of the 
following directive setting forth United States policy with reference to the military government 
of Germany, to preface the directive with a short statement of the circumstances surrounding the 
issuance of the directive to General Eisenhower.                                                                          
 The directive was issued originally in April 1945, and was intended to serve two 
purposes. It was to guide General Eisenhower in the military government of that portion of 
Germany occupied by United States forces. At the same time he was directed to urge the Control 
Council to adopt these policies for enforcement throughout Germany.                                                        
 Before this directive was discussed in the Control Council, President Truman, Prime 
Minister Attlee, and Generalissimo Stalin met at Potsdam and issued a communiquÃ© setting 
forth agreed policies for the control of Germany. This communiquÃ© was made public on 
August 2, 1945. The directive, therefore, should be read in the light of the policies enumerated at 
Potsdam. In particular, its provisions regarding disarmament, economic and financial matters, 
and reparations should be read together with the similar provisions set out in the Potsdam 
agreement on the treatment of Germany in the initial control period and in the agreement on 
reparations contained in the Potsdam communiquÃ©. Many of the policy statements contained 
in the directive have been in substance adopted by the Potsdam agreement. Some policy 
statements in the Potsdam agreement differ from the policy statements on the same subjects in 
the directive. In such cases, the policies of the Potsdam agreement are controlling. Where the 
Potsdam agreement is silent on matters of policy dealt with in the directive, the latter continues 
to guide General Eisenhower in his administration of the United States Zone in Germany. 
Directive to Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the 
Military Government of Germany 
1. The Purpose and Scope of this Directive: This directive is issued to you as Commanding 
General of the United States forces of occupation in Germany. As such you will serve as United 
States member of the Control Council and will also be responsible for the administration of 
military government in the zone or zones assigned to the United States for purposes of 
occupation and administration. It outlines the basic policies which will guide you in those two 
capacities after the termination of the combined command of the Supreme Commander, Allied 
Expeditionary Force.                                                                                                                      
 This directive sets forth policies relating to Germany in the initial post-defeat period. As 
such it is not intended to be an ultimate statement of policies of this Government concerning the 
treatment of Germany in the post-war world. It is therefore essential that, during the period 
covered by this directive, you assure that surveys are constantly maintained of economic, 
industrial financial, social and political conditions within your zone and that the results of such 
surveys and such other surveys as may be made in other zones are made available to your 
Government, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These surveys should be developed in such 
manner as to serve as a basis for determining changes in the measures of control set forth herein 
as well as for the progressive formulation and development of policies to promote the basic 
objectives of the United States. Supplemental directives will be issued to you by the Joint Chiefs 
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of Staff as may be required.                                                                                                               
 As a member of the Control Council you will urge the adoption by the other occupying 
powers of the principles and policies set forth in this directive and, pending Control Council 
agreement, you will follow them in your zone. It is anticipated that substantially similar 
directives will be issued to the Commanders in Chief of the U.K., U.S.S.R. and French forces of 
occupation. 
PART I 
General and Political                                                                                                                       
2. The Basis of Military Government:                                                                                       
a. The rights, power and status of the military government in Germany are based upon the 
unconditional surrender or total defeat of Germany.                                                                     
b. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 below, you are, by virtue of your position, 
clothed with supreme legislative, executive, and judicial authority in the areas occupied by forces 
under your command. This authority will be broadly construed and includes authority to take all 
measures deemed by you necessary, appropriate or desirable in relation to military exigencies 
and the objectives of a firm military government.                                                                                 
  
c. You will issue a proclamation continuing in force such proclamations, orders and 
instructions as may have heretofore been issued by Allied Commanders in your zone, subject to 
such changes as you may determine. Authorizations of action by the Supreme Commander, 
Allied Expeditionary Force, may be considered as applicable to you unless inconsistent with this 
or later directives.                                                                                                                                 
 3. The Control Council and Zones of Occupation:                                                                  
 a. The four Commanders-in-Chief, acting jointly, will constitute the Control Council in 
Germany which will be the supreme organ of control over Germany in accordance with the 
agreement on Control Machinery in Germany. For purposes of administration of military 
government, Germany has been divided into four zones of occupation.                                                      
  
b. The authority of the Control Council to formulate policy and procedures and 
administrative relationships with respect to matters affecting Germany as a whole will be 
paramount throughout Germany. You will carry out and support in your zone the policies agreed 
upon in the Control Council. In the absence of such agreed policies you- will act in accordance 
with this and other directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.                                                                  
  
c. The administration of affairs in Germany shall be directed towards the decentralization 
of the political and administrative structure and the development of local responsibility. To this 
end you will encourage autonomy in regional, local and municipal agencies of German 
administration. The German economic structure shall also be decentralized. The Control Council 
may, however, to the minimum extent required for the fulfillment of purposes set forth herein, 
permit centralized administration or establish central control of (a) essential national public 
services such as railroads, communications and power, (b) finance and foreign affairs, and (c) 
production and distribution of essential commodities.                                                                                 
 d. The Control Council should adopt procedures to effectuate, and you will facilitate in 
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your zone, the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the zones. In the absence 
of a conflicting policy of the Control Council, you may deal directly with one or more zone 
commanders on matters of special concern to such zones.                                                                     
  
e. Pending the formulation in the Control Council of uniform policies and procedures 
with respect to inter-zonal travel and movement of civilians, no civilians shall be permitted to 
leave or enter your zone without your authority, and no Germans within your zone shall be 
permitted to leave Germany except for specific purposes approved by you.                                                             
  
f. The military government personnel in each zone, including those dealing with regional 
and local branches of the departments of any central German administrative machinery, shall be 
selected by authority of the Commander of that zone except that liaison officers may be 
furnished by the Commanders of the other three zones. The respective Commanders-in-Chief 
shall have exclusive jurisdiction throughout the whole of Germany over the members of the 
armed forces under their command and over the civilians who accompany them.                                                        
  
g. The Control Council should be responsible for facilitating the severance of all 
governmental and administrative connections between Austria and Germany and the elimination 
of German economic influences in Austria. Every assistance should be given to the Allied 
Administration in Austria in its efforts to effectuate these purposes.                                                             
  
 
4. Basic Objectives of Military Government in Germany:                                                             
 a. It should be brought home to the Germans that Germany's ruthless warfare and the 
fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed the German economy and made chaos and suffering 
inevitable and that the Germans cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon 
themselves.                                                                                                                                           
 b. Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated enemy 
nation. Your aim is not oppression but to occupy Germany for the purpose of realizing certain 
important Allied objectives. In the conduct of your occupation and administration you should be 
just but firm and aloof. You will strongly discourage fraternization with the German officials and 
population.                                                                                                                                                    
 c. The principal Allied objective is to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a 
threat to the peace of the world. Essential steps in the accomplishment of this objective are the 
elimination of Nazism and militarism in all their forms, the immediate apprehension of war 
criminals for punishment, the industrial disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, with 
continuing control over Germany's capacity to make war, and the preparation for an eventual 
reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis.                                                                     
  
d. Other Allied objectives are to enforce the program of reparations and restitution, to 
provide relief for the benefit of countries devastated by Nazi aggression, and to ensure that 
prisoners of war and displaced persons of the United Nations are cared for and repatriated.           
 
5. Economic Controls:                                                                                                                    
 a. As a member of the Control Council and as zone commander, you will be guided by 
the principle that controls upon the German economy may be imposed to the extent that such 
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controls may be necessary to achieve the objectives enumerated in paragraph 4 above and also as 
they may be essential to protect the safety and meet the needs of the occupying forces and assure 
the production and maintenance of goods and services required to prevent starvation or such 
disease and unrest as would endanger these forces. No action will be taken in execution of the 
reparations program or otherwise which would tend to support basic living conditions in 
Germany or in your zone on a higher level than that existing in any one of the neighboring 
United Nations.                                                                                                                                                         
 b. In the imposition and maintenance of such controls as may be prescribed by you or the 
Control Council, German authorities will to the fullest extent practicable be ordered to proclaim 
and assume administration of such controls. Thus it should be brought home to the German 
people that the responsibility for the administration of such controls and for any break-downs in 
those controls will rest with themselves and German authorities.                                                      
 
6. Denazification:                                                                                                                           
 a. A Proclamation dissolving the Nazi Party, its formations, affiliated associations and 
supervised organizations, and all Nazi public institutions which were set up as instruments of 
Party domination, and prohibiting their revival in any form, should be promulgated by the 
Control Council. You will assure the prompt effectuation of that policy in your zone and will 
make every effort to prevent the reconstitution of any such organization in underground, 
disguised or secret form. Responsibility for continuing desirable non-political social services of 
dissolved Party organizations may be transferred by the Control Council to appropriate central 
agencies and by you to appropriate local agencies.                                                                                                                  
 b. The laws purporting to establish the political structure of National Socialism and the 
basis of the Hitler regime and all laws, decrees and regulations which establish discriminations 
on grounds of race, nationality, creed or political opinions should be abrogated by the Control 
Council. You will render them inoperative in your zone.                                                                                  
c. All members of the Nazi party who have been more than nominal participants in its 
activities, all active supporters of Nazism or militarism and all other persons hostile to Allied 
purposes will be removed and excluded from public office and from positions of importance in 
quasi-public and private enterprises such as (1) civic, economic and labor organizations, (2) 
corporations and other organizations in which the German government or subdivisions have a 
major financial interest, (3) industry, commerce, agriculture, and finance, (4) education, and (5) 
the press, publishing houses and other agencies disseminating news and propaganda. Persons are 
to be treated as more than nominal participants in Party activities and as active supporters of 
Nazism or militarism when they have (1) held office or otherwise been active at any level from 
local to national in the party and its subordinate organizations, or in organizations which further 
militaristic doctrines, (2) authorized or participated affirmatively in any Nazi crimes, racial 
persecutions or discriminations, (3) been avowed believers in Nazism or racial and militaristic 
creeds, or (4) voluntarily given substantial moral or material support or political assistance of 
any kind to the Nazi Party or Nazi officials and leaders. No such persons shall be retained in any 
of the categories of employment listed above because of administrative necessity, convenience or 
expediency.                                                                                                                                                    
 d. Property, real and personal, owned or controlled by the Nazi party, its formations, 
affiliated associations and supervised organizations, and by all persons subject to arrest under the 
provisions of paragraph 8, and found within your zone, will be taken under your control pending 
a decision by the Control Council or higher authority as to its eventual disposition.                                       
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e. All archives, monuments and museums of Nazi inception, or which are devoted to the 
perpetuation of German militarism, will be taken under your control and their properties held 
pending decision as to their disposition by the Control Council.                                                                    
  
f. You will make special efforts to preserve from destruction and take under your control 
records, plans, books, documents, papers, files, and scientific, industrial and other information 
and data belonging to or controlled by the following:                                                                        
  
(1) The Central German Government and its subdivisions, German military organizations, 
organizations engaged in military research, and such other governmental agencies as may be 
deemed advisable;                                                                                                                                      
  
(2) The Nazi Party, its formations, affiliated associations and supervised organizations;                     
 (3) All police organizations, including security and political police;                                            
 (4) Important economic organizations and industrial establishments including those 
controlled by the Nazi Party or its personnel;                                                                                            
  
(5) Institutes and special bureaus devoting themselves to racial, political, militaristic or 
similar research or propaganda.                                                                                                               
  
7. Demilitarization:                                                                                                                                
 a. In your zone you will assure that all units of the German armed forces, including pare-
military organizations, are dissolved as such, and that their personnel are promptly disarmed and 
controlled. Prior to their final disposition, you will arrest and hold all military personnel who are 
included under the provisions of paragraph 8.                                                                                              
  
b. The Control Council should proclaim, and in your zone you will effectuate, the total 
dissolution of all military and pare-military organizations, including the General Staff, the 
German Officers Corps, the Reserve Corps and military academies, together with all associations 
which might serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany.                                                                 
  
c. You will seize or destroy all arms, ammunition and implements of war and stop the 
production thereof.                                                                                                                                       
  
d. You will take proper steps to destroy the German war potential, as set forth elsewhere 
in this directive.                                                                                                                                             
  8. Suspected War Criminals and Security Arrests:                                                                          
 a. You will search out, arrest, and hold, pending receipt by you of further instructions as 
to their disposition, Adolf Hitler, his chief Nazi associates, other war criminals and all persons 
who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in 
atrocities or war crimes.                                                                                                                                                       
 b. All persons who, if permitted to remain at large would endanger the accomplishment 
of your objectives will also be arrested and held in custody until trial by an appropriate semi-
judicial body to be established by you. The following is a partial list of the categories of persons 
to be arrested in order to carry out this policy:                                                                                               
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[NOTE: There follows at this point in the directive a detailed list of categories of Nazi 
war criminals and others who are to be arrested. Some of these have not yet been found. It is 
considered that to publish the categories at this time would put the individuals concerned on 
notice and would interfere with their apprehension and punishment, where appropriate. The list 
of categories is, therefore, withheld from publication for the present.]                                                                   
  
If in the light of conditions which you encounter in Germany, you believe that it is not 
immediately feasible to subject certain persons within these categories to this treatment, you 
should report your reasons and recommendations to your government through the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. If you believe it desirable, you may postpone the arrest of those whose cases you have 
reported, pending a decision communicated to you by the J.C.S. In no event shall any 
differentiation be made between or special consideration be accorded to persons arrested, either 
as to manner of arrest or conditions of detention, upon the basis of wealth or political, industrial, 
or other rank or position. In your discretion you may make such exceptions as you deem 
advisable for intelligence or other military reasons.                                                                                   
  
9. Political Activities:                                                                                                                         
 a. No political activities of any kind shall be countenanced unless authorized by you. You 
will assure that your military government does not become committed to any political group.                               
 b. You will prohibit the propagation in any form of Nazi, militaristic or pan-German 
doctrines.                                                                                                                                                        
 c. No German parades, military or political, civilian or sports, shall be permitted by you.                                  
 d. To the extent that military interests are not prejudiced and subject to the provisions of 
the three preceding subparagraphs and of paragraph 10, freedom of speech, press and religious 
worship will be permitted. Consistent with military necessity, all religious institutions will be 
respected.                                                                                                                                                    
  
10. Public Relations and Control of Public Information:                                                                     
 As a member of the Control Council, you will endeavor to obtain agreement for uniform 
or coordinated policies with respect to (a) control of public information media in Germany, (b) 
accrediting of foreign correspondents, (c) press censorship, and (d) issuance of official news 
communiquÃ©s dealing with Control Council matters. United States policies in these matters 
will be sent to you separately and you will be guided by these in your negotiations on the Control 
Council.                                                                                                                                                    
  
11. German Courts:                                                                                                                            
 a. All extraordinary courts, including the Volksgerichtshof (People's Court) and the 
Sondergerichte (Special Courts), and all courts and tribunals of the Nazi Party and of its 
formations, affiliated associations and supervised organizations will be abolished immediately.                                               
 b. All ordinary criminal, civil and administrative courts, except those previously re-
established by order of the military government, will be closed. After the elimination of all Nazi 
features and personnel you will permit those which are to exercise jurisdiction within the 
boundaries of your zone to resume operations under such regulations, supervision and control as 
you may consider appropriate. Courts which are to exercise jurisdiction over territory extending 
beyond the boundaries of your zone will be reopened only with the express authorization of the 
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Control Council and under its regulation, supervision and control. The power to review and veto 
decisions of German courts shall be included within the power of supervision and control.                   
  
 
12. Police:                                                                                                                                       
 With the exception of the Reichskriminalpolizei (Criminal Police) all elements of the 
Sicherheitspolizei (Security Police), e.g., Geheimestaatspolizei (Gestapo), and the 
Sicherheitsdienst der S.S. will be abolished. Criminal and ordinary police will be purged of Nazi 
personnel and utilized under the control and supervision of the military government.                            
  
 
13. Political Prisoners:                                                                                                             
 Subject to military security and the interests of the individuals concerned, you will 
release all persons found within your zone who have been detained or placed in custody on 
grounds of race, nationality, creed or political opinions and treat them as displaced persons. You 
should make provision for the review of convictions of alleged criminal offenses about which 
there may be substantial suspicion of racial, religious or political persecution, and in which 
sentences of imprisonment have not been fully served by persons imprisoned within your zone.                                
  
 
14. Education:                                                                                                                                     
 a. All educational institutions within your zone except those previously re-established by 
Allied authority will be closed. The closure of Nazi educational institutions such as Adolf Hitler 
Schulen, Napolas and Ordensburgen and of Nazi organizations within other educational 
institutions will be permanent.                                                                                                                     
 b. A coordinated system of control over German education and an affirmative program of 
reorientation will be established designed completely to eliminate Nazi and militaristic doctrines 
and to encourage the development of democratic ideas.                                                                                
 c. You will permit the reopening of elementary (Volksschulen), middle (Mittelschulen) 
and vocational (Berufsschulen) schools at the earliest possible date after Nazi personnel has been 
eliminated. Textbooks and curricula which are not free of Nazi and militaristic doctrine shall not 
be used The Control Council should devise programs looking toward the reopening of secondary 
schools, universities and other institutions of higher learning. After Nazi features and personnel 
have been eliminated and pending the formulation of such programs by the Control Council, you 
may formulate and put into effect an interim program within your zone and in any case may 
permit the reopening of such institutions and departments which offer training which you 
consider immediately essential or useful in the administration of military government and the 
purposes of the occupation.                                                                                                                                                  
 d. It is not intended that the military government will intervene in questions concerning 
denominational control of German schools, or in religious instruction in German schools, except 
insofar as may be necessary to insure that religious instruction and administration of such 
schools conform to such Allied regulations as are or may be established pertaining to purging of 





15. Arts and Archives:                                                                                                                 
 Subject to the provisions of paragraph 6 above, you will make all reasonable efforts to 
preserve historical archives, museums, libraries and works of art. 
 
PART II 
Economic General Objectives and Methods of Control                                                                           
  
16. You will assure that the German economy is administered and controlled in such a 
way as to accomplish the basic objectives set forth in paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Directive. 
Economic controls will be imposed only to the extent necessary to accomplish these objectives, 
provided that you will impose controls to the full extent necessary to achieve the industrial 
disarmament of Germany. Except as may be necessary to carry out these objectives, you will 
take no steps (a) looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany, or (b) designed to 
maintain or strengthen the German economy.                                                                                             
  
17. To the maximum extent possible without jeopardizing the successful execution of 
measures required to implement the objectives outlined in paragraphs 4 and 5 of this directive 
you will use German authorities and agencies and subject them to such supervision and 
punishment for non-compliance as is necessary to ensure that they carry out their tasks.                        
  
For this purpose you will give appropriate authority to any German agencies and 
administrative services you consider essential; provided, however, that you will at all times 
adhere strictly to the provisions of this directive regarding denazification and dissolution or 
elimination of Nazi organizations, institutions, principles, features, and practices.                                           
  
To the extent necessary you will establish administrative machinery, not dependent upon 
German authorities and agencies, to execute or assure the execution of the provisions of 
paragraphs 19, 20, 30, 31, 32, 39 and 40 and any other measures necessary to an accomplishment 
of your industrial disarmament objectives.                                                                         
18. In order to decentralize the structure and administration of the German economy to 
the maximum possible extent, you will                                                                                                            
 a. ensure that the action required to maintain or restore essential public utilities and 
industrial and agricultural activities is taken as far as possible on a local and regional basis;                                     
 b. on no account propose or approve in the Control Council the establishment of 
centralized administration of controls over the German economy except where such 
centralization of administration is clearly essential to the fulfillment of the objectives listed in 
paragraphs 4 and 5 of this directive. Decentralization in administration should not be permitted 
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to interfere with attainment of the largest practicable measure of agreement on economic policies 
in the Control Council                                                                                                                                                           
  
19. You will institute or assure the maintenance of such statistical records and reports as 
may be necessary in carrying out the objectives listed in paragraphs 4 and 5 of this directive.                         
  
20. You will initiate appropriate surveys which may assist you in achieving the objectives 
of the occupation. In particular you will promptly undertake surveys of supplies, equipment and 
resources in your zone. You will endeavor to obtain prompt agreement in the Control Council to 
the making of similar surveys in the other zones of occupation, and you will urge appropriate 
steps to coordinate the methods and results of these and other future surveys conducted in the 
various zones. You will keep the Control Council, United States Representative on the 
Reparation Commission and other appropriate authorities, currently apprised of the information 
obtained by means of intermediate reports or otherwise. 
German Standard of Living                                                                                                                       
  
21. You will estimate requirements of supplies necessary to prevent starvation or 
widespread disease or such civil unrest as would endanger the occupying forces. Such estimates 
will be based upon a program whereby the Germans are made responsible for providing for 
themselves, out of their own work and resources. You will take all practicable economic and 
police measures to assure that German resources are fully utilized and consumption held to the 
minimum in order that imports may be strictly limited and that surpluses may be made available 
for the occupying forces and displaced persons and United Nations prisoners of war, and for 
reparation. You will take no action that would tend to support basic living standards in Germany 
on a higher level than that existing in any one of the neighboring United Nations and you will 
take appropriate measures to ensure that basic living standards of the German people are not 
higher than those existing in any one of the neighboring United Nations when such measures will 
contribute to raising the standards of any such nation.                                                                                
  
22. You will urge upon the Control Council that uniform ration scales be applied 
throughout Germany, that essential items be distributed equitably among the zones, that net 
surpluses be made available for export to Allied countries, and that imports be limited to the net 
deficits of Germany as a whole. 
Labor, Health, and Social Insurance                                                                                                  
  
23. You will permit the self-organization of employees along democratic lines, subject to 
such safeguards as may be necessary to prevent the perpetuation of Nazi or militarist influence 
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under any guise or the continuation of any group hostile to the objectives and operations of the 
occupying forces.                                                                                                                                         
  
24. You will permit free collective bargaining between employees and employers 
regarding wage, hour and working conditions and the establishment of machinery for the 
settlement of industrial disputes. Collective bargaining shall be subject to such wage, hour and 
other controls, if any, as may be instituted or revived by your direction.                                                     
  
25. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 48 of this directive you are authorized to direct 
German authorities to maintain or reestablish nondiscriminatory systems of social insurance and 
poor relief.                                                                                                                                                   
  
26. You are authorized to direct the German authorities to maintain or re-establish such 
health services and facilities as may be available to them. 
Agriculture, Industry and Internal Commerce                                                                                           
  
27. You will require the Germans to use all means at their disposal to maximize 
agricultural output and to establish as rapidly as possible effective machinery for the collection 
and distribution of agricultural output.                                                                                                          
  
28. You will direct the German authorities to utilize large-landed estates and public lands 
in a manner which will facilitate the accommodation and settlement of Germans and others or 
increase agricultural output.                                                                                                                            
  
29. You will protect from destruction by the Germans, and maintain for such disposition 
as is determined by this and other directives or by the Control Council, all plants, equipment, 
patents and other property, and all books and records of large German industrial companies and 
trade and research associations that have been essential to the German war effort or the German 
economy. You will pay particular attention to research and experimental establishments of such 
concerns.                                                                                                                                                       
  
30. In order to disarm Germany, the Control Council should                                                            
 a. prevent the production, acquisition by importation or otherwise, and development of all 
arms, ammunition and implements of war, as well as all types of aircraft, and all parts, 
components and ingredients specially designed or produced for incorporation therein;                                   
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 b. prevent the production of merchant ships, synthetic rubber and oil, aluminum and 
magnesium and any other products and equipment on which you will subsequently receive 
instructions;                                                                                                                                                      
 c. seize and safeguard all facilities used in the production of any of the items mentioned 
in this paragraph and dispose of them as follows:                                                                                          
 (1) remove all those required for reparation;  
(2) destroy all those not transferred for reparation if they are especially adapted to the 
production of the items specified in this paragraph and are not of a type generally used in 
industries permitted to the Germans (cases of doubt to be resolved in favor of destruction);  
(3) hold the balance for disposal in accordance with instructions which will be sent to you.                                                                                                                       
 Pending agreement in the Control Council you will take these measures in your own zone. 
You will not postpone enforcement of the prohibitions contained in subparagraphs a and b and 
the instructions in subparagraph c without specific approval of your government through the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff except that, in your discretion, you may permit the production of synthetic 
rubber and oil, aluminum and magnesium, to the minimum extent necessary to meet the purposes 
stated in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the directive pending action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff upon 
such recommendation for postponement as you may make.                                                                                  
  
 
31. As an additional measure of disarmament, the Control Council should                                        
 a. prohibit initially all research activities and close all laboratories, research institutions 
and similar technical organizations except those considered necessary to the protection of public 
health;                                                                                                                                                             
 b. abolish all those laboratories and related institutions whose-work has been connected 
with the building of the German war machine, safeguard initially such laboratories and detain 
such personnel as are of interest to your technological investigations, and thereafter remove or 
destroy their equipment;                                                                                                                                  
 c. permit the resumption of scientific research in specific cases, only after careful 
investigation has established that the contemplated research will in no way contribute to 
Germany's future war potential and only under appropriate regulations which  
(1) define the specific types of research permitted,  
(2) exclude from further research activity any persons who previously held key positions 
in German war research,  
(3) provide for frequent inspection,  
(4) require free disclosure of the results of the research and (5) impose severe penalties, 
including permanent closing of the offending institution, whenever the regulations are violated.                      
 Pending agreement in the Control Council you will adopt such measures in your own 
zone.                                                                                                                                                              
  
32. Pending final Allied agreements on reparation and on control or elimination of 
German industries that can be utilized for war production, the Control Council should                                     
 a. prohibit and prevent production of iron and steel, chemicals, non-ferrous metals 
(excluding aluminum and magnesium), machine tools, radio and electrical equipment, 
automotive vehicles, heavy machinery and important parts thereof, except for the purposes stated 
in paragraphs 4 and 5 of this directive                                                                                                                  
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b. prohibit and prevent rehabilitation of plant and equipment in such industries except for 
the purposes stated in paragraphs 4 and 5 of this directive; and                                                                     
 c. safeguard plant and equipment in such industries for transfer on reparation account.                             
 Pending agreement in the Control Council, you will put such measures into effect in your 
own zone as soon as you have had an opportunity to review and determine production necessary 
for the purposes stated in paragraphs 4 and 5 of this directive.                                                                    
  
 
33. The Control Council should adopt a policy permitting the conversion of facilities 
other than those mentioned in paragraphs 30 and 32 to the production of light consumer goods, 
provided that such conversion does not prejudice the subsequent removal of plant and equipment 
on reparation account and does not require any imports beyond those necessary for the purposes 
specified in paragraphs 4 and 5 of this directive. Pending agreement in the Control Council, you 
may permit such conversion in your zone.                                                                                                   
  
34. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 30 and 32, the Control Council should assure 
that all feasible measures are taken to facilitate, to the minimum extent necessary for the 
purposes outlined in paragraphs 4 and 5 of this directive.                                                                              
  
a. repairs to and restoration of essential transportation services and public utilities;                                 
 b. emergency repair and construction of the minimum shelter required for the civilian 
population;                                                                                                                                                        
 c. production of coal and any other goods and services (excluding goods specified in 
paragraphs 30 and 32 unless measures to facilitate production are specifically approved by this 
Government through the Joint Chiefs of Staff) required for the purposes outlined in paragraphs 4 
and 5 of this directive.                                                                                                                                   
 You will assure that such measures are taken in your own zone pending agreement in the 
Control Council.                                                                                                                                       
  
 
35. In your capacity as zone commander and as member of the Control Council you will 
take steps to provide for the equitable interzonal distribution and the movement of goods and 
services essential to the purposes set forth in paragraphs 4 and 5 of this directive.                                     
  
 
36. You will prohibit all cartels or other private business arrangements and cartel-like 
organizations, including those of a public or quasi-public character such as the 
Wirtschaftsgruppen providing for the regulation of marketing conditions, including production, 
prices, exclusive exchange of technical information and processes, and allocation of sales 
territories. Such necessary public functions as have been discharged by these organizations shall 
be absorbed as rapidly as possible by approved public agencies.                                                              
  
 
37. It is the policy of your government to effect a dispersion of the ownership and control 
of German industry. To assist in carrying out this policy you will make a survey of combines and 
pools, mergers, holding companies and interlocking directorates and communicate the results, 
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together with recommendations, to your government through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You will 
endeavor to obtain agreement in the Control Council to the making of this survey in the other 
zones of occupation and you will urge the coordination of the methods and results of this survey 
in the various zones.                                                                                                                                      
  
38. With due regard to paragraph 4 a, the Control Council should adopt such policies as 
are clearly necessary to prevent or restrain inflation of a character or dimension which would 
definitely endanger accomplishment of the objectives of the occupation. The Control Council, in 
particular, should direct and empower German authorities to maintain or establish controls over 
prices and wages and to take the fiscal and financial measures necessary to this end. Pending 
agreement in the Control Council you will assure that such measures as you consider necessary 
are taken in your own zone. Prevention or restraint of inflation shall not constitute an additional 
ground for the importation of supplies, nor shall it constitute an additional ground for limiting 
removal, destruction or curtailment of productive facilities in fulfillment of the program for 
reparation, demilitarization and industrial disarmament. 
 
Power, Transportation, and Communications                                                                                         
  
39. Both as member of the Control Council and zone commander you will take 
appropriate steps to ensure that                                                                                                                              
  
a. power, transportation and communications facilities are directed in such a way as to 
carry out the objectives outlined in paragraphs 4 and 5 of this directive;                                                    
  
b. Germans are prohibited and prevented from producing, maintaining or operating all 
types of aircraft.                                                                                                                                  
You will determine the degree to which centralized control and administration of power, 
transportation and communications is clearly necessary for the objectives stated in paragraphs 4 
and 5 and urge the establishment of this degree of centralized control and administration by the 
Control Council. 
 
Foreign Trade and Reparation                                                                                                                  
  
40. The Control Council should establish centralized control over all trade in goods and 
services with foreign countries. Pending agreement in the Control Council you will impose 
appropriate controls in your own zone.                                                                                                          
  
41. Both as member of the Control Council and as zone commander you will take 
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appropriate steps to ensure that                                                                                                                       
  
a. the foreign trade controls are designed to carry out the objectives stated in paragraphs 4 
and 5 of this directive;                                                                                                                                   
 b. imports which are permitted and furnished to Germany are confined to those 
unavoidably necessary to the objectives stated in paragraphs 4 and 5;                                                          
  
c. exports to countries other than the United Nations are prohibited unless specifically 
authorized by the Allied governments.                                                                                                         
  
 
42. Both as member of the Control Council and as zone commander you will adopt a 
policy which would forbid German firms to participate in international cartels or other restrictive 
contracts and arrangements and order the prompt termination of all existing German 
participations in such cartels, contracts and arrangements.                                                                          
  
 
43. You will carry out in your zone such programs of reparation and restitution as are 
embodied in Allied agreements and you will seek agreement in the Control Council on any 
policies and measures which it may be necessary to apply throughout Germany in order to ensure 
the execution of such programs. 
 
PART III 
Financial                                                                                                                                                      
 44. You will make full application in the financial field of the principles stated elsewhere 
in this directive and you will endeavor to have the Control Council adopt uniform financial 
policies necessary to carry out the purposes stated in paragraphs 4 and 5 of this directive. You 
will take no steps designed to maintain, strengthen or operate the German financial structure 
except in so far as may be necessary for the purposes specified in this directive.                                                                  
  
45. The Control Council should regulate and control to the extent required for the 
purposes set forth in paragraphs 4 and 5 the issue and volume of currency and the extension of 
credit in Germany and in accordance with the following principles:                                                                
  
a. United States forces and other Allied forces will use Allied Military marks and 
Reichsmark currency or coins in their possession. Allied Military marks and Reichsmark 
currency and coin now in circulation in Germany will be legal tender without distinction and will 
be interchangeable at the rate of one Allied Military mark for one Reichsmark. 
Reichskreditkassenscheine and other German military currency will not be legal tender in 
Germany.                                                                                                                                                         
 b. The Reichsbank, the Rentenbank or any other bank or agency may be permitted or 
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required to issue bank notes and currency which will be legal tender; without such authorization 
no German governmental or private bank or agency will be permitted to issue bank notes or 
currency.                                                                                                                                                          
 c. The German authorities may be required to make available Reichsmark currency or 
credits free of cost and in amounts sufficient to meet all the expenses of the forces of occupation, 
including the cost of Allied Military Government and including to the extent that compensation 
is made therefor, the cost of such private property as may be requisitioned, seized, or otherwise 
acquired, by Allied authorities for reparations or restitution purposes                                                    
  
Pending agreement in the Control Council you will follow these policies in your own 
zone.                                      
You will receive separate instructions relative to the currency which you will use in the 
event that for any reason adequate supplies of Allied Military marks and Reichsmarks are not 
available, or if the use of such currency is found undesirable.                                                                   
  
You will not announce or establish in your zone, until receipt of further instructions, any 
general rate of exchange between the Reichsmark on the one hand and the U. S. dollar and other 
currencies on the other. However, a rate of exchange to be used exclusively for pay of troops and 
military accounting purposes in your zone will be communicated separately to you.                                 
  
 
46. Subject to any agreed policies of the Control Council, you are authorized to take the 
following steps and to put into effect such further financial measures as you may deem necessary 
to accomplish the purposes of your occupation:                                                                                              
  
a. To prohibit, or to prescribe regulations regarding transfer or other dealings in private or 
public securities or real estate or other property.                                                                                            
 b. To close banks, but only for a period long enough for you to introduce satisfactory 
control, to remove Nazi and other undesirable personnel, and to issue instructions for the 
determination of accounts to be blocked under subparagraph 48 e below.                                          
c. To close stock exchanges, insurance companies, and similar financial institutions for 
such periods as you deem appropriate.                                                                                                           
 d. To establish a general or limited moratorium or moratoria only to the extent clearly 
necessary to carry out the objectives stated in paragraphs 4 and 5 of this directive.                               
  
 
47. Resumption of partial or complete service on the internal public debt at the earliest 
feasible date is deemed desirable. The Control Council should decide the time and manner of 
such resumption.                                                                                                                                           
  
48. Subject to any agreed policies of the Control Council,                                                             
 a. You will prohibit:                                                                                                                           
 (1) the payment of all military pensions, or emoluments or benefits, except compensation 
for physical disability limiting the recipient's ability to work, at rates which are no higher than 
the lowest of those for comparable physical disability arising from non-military causes.  
(2) the payment of all public or private pensions or other emoluments or benefits granted 
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or conferred:                                        
(a) by reason of membership in or services to the former Nazi party, its formations, 
affiliated associations or supervised organizations,  
(b) to any person who has been removed from an office or position in accordance with 
paragraph 6, and  
(c) to any person arrested and detained in accordance with paragraph 8 during the term of 
his arrest, or permanently, in case of his subsequent conviction.                                                                                                                                     
 b. You will take such action as may be necessary to insure that all laws and practices 
relating to taxation or other fields of finance, which discriminate for or against any persons 
because of race, nationality, creed or political opinion, will be amended, suspended, or abrogated 
to the extent necessary to eliminate such discrimination.                                                                                
  
c. You will hold the German authorities responsible for taking such measures in the field 
of taxation and other fields of public finance, including restoration of the tax system and 
maintenance of tax revenues, as will further the accomplishment of the objectives stated in 
paragraphs 4 and 5.                                                                                                                                      
 d. You will exercise general supervision over German public expenditures in order to 
ensure that they are consistent with the objectives stated in paragraphs 4 and 5.                                     
  
e. You will impound or block all gold, silver, currencies, securities, accounts in financial 
institutions, credits, valuable papers, and all other assets falling within the following categories:             
 (1) Property owned or controlled directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by any of the 
following: (a) The German Reich, or any of the Lander, Gaue or provinces, any Kreis, 
Municipality or other similar local subdivision; or any agency or instrumentality of any of them 
including all utilities, undertakings, public corporations or monopolies under the control of any 
of the above; (b) Governments, nationals or residents of other nations, including those of 
territories occupied by them, at war with any of the United Nations at any time since 1 
September 1939; (c) The Nazi Party, its formations, affiliated associations and supervised 
organizations, its officials, leading members and supporters; (d) All organizations, clubs or other 
associations prohibited or dissolved by military government; (e) Absentee owners, of non-
German nationality including United Nations and neutral governments and Germans outside of 
Germany; (f) Any institution dedicated to public worship, charity, education or the arts and 
sciences which has been used by the Nazi Party to further its interests or to cloak its activities; 
(g) Persons subject to arrest under provisions of paragraph 8, and all other persons specified by 
military government by inclusion in lists or otherwise.                                                                                                                                                      
 (2) Property which has been the subject of transfer under duress or wrongful acts of 
confiscation, disposition or spoliation, whether pursuant to legislation or by procedure purporting 
to follow forms of law or otherwise.                                                                                                             
  
(3) Works of art or cultural material of value or importance, regardless of the ownership 
thereof.                                                                                                                                                   
 You will take such action as will insure that any impounded or blocked assets will be 
dealt with only as permitted under licenses or other instructions which you may issue. In the case 
particularly of property blocked under (1) (a) above, you will proceed to adopt licensing 
measures which while maintaining such property under surveillance would permit its use in 
consonance with this directive. In the case of property blocked under (2) above, you will institute 
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measures for prompt restitution, in conformity with the objectives stated in paragraphs 4 and 5 
and subject to appropriate safeguards to prevent the cloaking of Nazi and militaristic influence.                                          
  
 
49. All foreign exchange transactions, including those arising out of exports and imports, 
shall be controlled with the aim of preventing Germany from developing a war potential and of 
achieving the other objectives set forth in this directive. To effectuate these purposes the Control 
Council should                                                                                                                                                
 a. Seek out and reduce to the possession and control of a special agency all German 
(public and private) foreign exchange and external assets of every kind and description located 
within or outside Germany.                                                                                                                             
  
b. Prohibit, except as authorized by regulation or license, all dealings in gold, silver, 
foreign exchange, and all foreign exchange transactions of any kind. Make available any foreign 
exchange proceeds of exports for payment of imports directly necessary to the accomplishment 
of the objectives stated in paragraphs 4 and 5 of this directive, and authorize no other outlay of 
foreign exchange assets except for purposes approved by the Control Council or other 
appropriate authority.                                                                                                                                         
 c. Establish effective controls with respect to all foreign exchange transactions, including:  
(1) Transactions as to property between persons inside Germany and persons outside 
Germany;  
(2) Transactions involving obligations owed by or to become due from any person in 
Germany to any person outside Germany; and  
(3) Transactions involving the importation into or exportation from Germany of any 
foreign exchange asset or other form of property.                                                      
 
Pending agreement in the Control Council, you will take in your zone the action indicated 
in subparagraphs a, b and c above. Accordingly, you will in your zone reduce to the possession 
and control of a special agency established by you, within your Command, all German foreign 
exchange and external assets as provided in subparagraph a. You will endeavor to have similar 
agencies for the same purpose established in the other zones of occupation and to have them 
merged as soon as practicable in one agency for the entire occupied territory. In addition you will 
provide full reports to your government with respect to all German foreign exchange and 
external assets.                                                                                                                                                             
  
50. No extension of credit to Germany or Germans by any foreign person or Government 
shall be permitted except that the Control Council may in special emergencies grant permission 
for such extensions of credit.                                                                                                                
  
 
51. It is not anticipated that you will make credits available to the Reichsbank or any 
other bank or to any public or private institution. If, in your opinion, such action becomes 
essential, you may take such emergency actions as you may deem proper, but in any event, you 




52. You will maintain such accounts and records as may be necessary to reflect the 
financial operations of the military government in your zone and you will provide the Control 
Council with such information as it may require, including information in connection with the 
use of currency by your forces, any governmental settlements, occupation costs, and other 










Appendix D: President Roosevelt’s first draft to partition Germany 
 
Source: Earl Frederick Ziemke. The U.S. Army in the occupation of Germany, 1944-1946. 
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Appendix G: The United States proposal of occupation zones at Yalta 
 







Appendix H: Berlin Declaration of June 5, 1945 
Declaration regarding the defeat of Germany and the assumption of supreme authority 
with respect to Germany by the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of the 
French Republic. 
The German armed forces on land, at sea and in the air have been completely defeated and 
have surrendered unconditionally and Germany, which bears responsibility for the war, is no 
longer capable of resisting the will of the victorious Powers. The unconditional surrender of 
Germany has thereby been effected, and Germany has become subject to such requirements as 
may now or hereafter be imposed upon her.                                                                                       
There is no central Government or authority in Germany capable of accepting responsibility 
for the maintenance of order, the administration of the country and compliance with the 
requirements of the victorious Powers.  
It is in these circumstances necessary, without prejudice to any subsequent decisions that 
may be taken respecting Germany, to make provision for the cessation of any further hostilities 
on the part of the German armed forces, for the maintenance of order in Germany and for the 
administration of the country, and to announce the immediate requirements with which Germany 
must comply.                                                                                                                                 
 The Representatives of the Supreme Commands of the United States of America, the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the French Republic, hereinafter 
called the "Allied Representatives," acting by authority of their respective Governments and in 
the interests of the United Nations, accordingly make the following Declaration:                                                    
  
The Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
and the United Kingdom, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, hereby 
assume supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the 
German Government, the High Command and any state, municipal, or local government or 
authority. The assumption, for the purposes stated above, of the said authority and powers does 
not affect the annexation of Germany.                                                                                            
 The Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics and the United Kingdom, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, 
will hereafter determine the boundaries of Germany or any part thereof and the status of 
Germany or of any area at present being part of German territory.                                                                                 
  
In virtue of the supreme authority and powers thus assumed by the four Governments, the 
Allied Representatives announce the following requirements arising from the complete defeat 
and unconditional surrender of Germany with which Germany must comply: 
ARTICLE 1 Germany, and all German military, naval and air authorities and all forces under 
German control shall immediately cease hostilities in all theatres of war against the forces of the 
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United Nations on land, at sea and in the air. 
ARTICLE 2 (a) All armed forces of Germany or under German control, wherever they may be 
situated, including land, air, anti-aircraft and naval forces, the S.S., S.A. and Gestapo, and all 
other forces of auxiliary organisations equipped with weapons, shall be completely disarmed, 
handing over their weapons and equipment to local Allied Commanders or to officers designated 
by the Allied Representatives                                                                                                                               
  
(b) The personnel of the formations and units of all the forces referred to in paragraph (a) above 
shall, at the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Allied State 
concerned, be declared to be prisoners of war, pending further decisions, and shall be subject to 
such conditions and directions as may be prescribed by the respective Allied Representatives.                     
  
(c) All forces referred to in paragraph (a) above, wherever they may be, will remain in their 
present positions pending instructions from the Allied Representatives.                                           
(d) Evacuation by the said forces of all territories outside the frontiers of Germany as they 
existed on the 31st December, 1937, will proceed according to instructions to be given by the 
Allied Representatives.                                                                                                                    
(e) Detachments of civil police to be armed with small arms only, for the maintenance of order 
and for guard duties, will be designated by the Allied Representatives. 
ARTICLE 3 (a) All aircraft of any kind or nationality in Germany or German-occupied or 
controlled territories or waters, military, naval or civil, other than aircraft in the service of the 
Allies, will remain on the ground, on the water or aboard ships pending further instructions.                          
 (b) All German or German-controlled aircraft in or over territories or waters not occupied 
or controlled by Germany will proceed to Germany or to such other place or places as may be 
specified by the Allied Representatives. 
ARTICLE (a) All German or German-controlled naval vessels, surface and submarine, auxiliary 
naval craft, and merchant and other shipping, wherever such vessels may be at the time of this 
Declaration, and all other merchant ships of whatever nationality in German ports, will remain in 
or proceed immediately to ports and bases as specified by the Allied Representatives. The crews 
of such vessels will remain on board pending further instructions.                                                   
(b) All ships and vessels of the United Nations, whether or not title has been transferred as the 
result of prize court or other proceedings, which are at the disposal of Germany or under German 
control at the time of this Declaration, will proceed at the dates and to the ports or bases 
specified by the Allied Representatives. 
ARTICLE 5 (a) All or any of the following articles in the possession of the German armed 
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forces or under German control or at German disposal will be held intact and in good condition 
at the disposal of the Allied Representatives, for such purposes and at such times and places as 
they may prescribe:                                                                                                                                 
 (i) all arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores and supplies and other 
implements of war of all kinds and all other war materials;                                                                 
 (ii) all naval vessels of all classes, both surface and submarine, auxiliary naval craft and 
all merchant shipping, whether afloat, under repair or construction, built or building;                             
 (iii) all aircraft of all kinds, aviation and anti-aircraft equipment and devices;                        
 (iv) all transportation and communications facilities and equipment, by land, water or air;          
 (v) all military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, ports 
and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, 
fortresses and other fortified areas, together with plans and drawings of all such fortifications, 
installations and establishments;                                                                                                    
 (vi) all factories, plants, shops, research institutions, laboratories, testing stations, 
technical data, patents, plans, drawings and inventions, designed or intended to produce or to 
facilitate the production or use of the articles, materials, and facilities referred to in sub-
paragraphs (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) above or otherwise to further the conduct of war.                                                        
  
(b) At the demand of the Allied Representatives the following will be furnished:                      
(i) the labour, services and plant required for the maintenance or operation of any of the six 
categories mentioned in paragraph (a) above; and                                                                           
(ii) any information or records that may be required by the Allied Representatives in connection 
with the same.                                                                                                                        
(c) At the demand of the Allied Representatives all facilities will be provided for the movement 
of Allied troops and agencies, their equipment and supplies, on the railways, roads and other land 
communications or by sea, river or air. All means of transportation will be maintained in good 
order and repair, and the labour, services and plant necessary therefor will be furnished. 
 
ARTICLE 6 (a) The German authorities will release to the Allied Representatives, in 
accordance with the procedure to be laid down by them, all prisoners of war at present in their 
power, belonging to the forces of the United Nations, and will furnish full lists of these persons, 
indicating the places of their detention in Germany or territory occupied by Germany. Pending 
the release of such prisoners of war, the German authorities and people will protect them in their 
persons and property and provide them with adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical attention 
and money in accordance with their rank or official position.                                                                                 
 (b) The German authorities and people will in like manner provide for and release all 
other nationals of the United Nations who are confined, interned or otherwise under restraint, and 
all other persons who may be confined, interned or otherwise under restraint for political reasons 
or as a result of any Nazi action, law or regulation which discriminates on the ground of race, 
colour, creed or political belief.                                                                                                         
(c) The German authorities will, at the demand of the Allied Representatives, hand over 
control of places of detention to such officers as may be designated for the purpose by the Allied 
Representatives. 
 
ARTICLE 7 The German authorities concerned will furnish to the Allied Representatives:           
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(a) full information regarding the forces referred to in Article 2 (a), and, in particular, will 
furnish forthwith all information which the Allied Representatives may require concerning the 
numbers, locations and dispositions of such forces, whether located inside or outside Germany;                   
  
(b) complete and detailed information concerning mines, minefields and other obstacles to 
movement by land, sea or air, and the safety lanes in connection therewith. All such safety lanes 
will be kept open and clearly marked; all mines, minefields and other dangerous obstacles will as 
far as possible be rendered safe, and all aids to navigation will be reinstated. Unarmed German 
military and civilian personnel with the necessary equipment will be made available and utilized 
for the above purposes and for the removal of mines, minefields and other obstacles as directed 
by the Allied Representatives. 
ARTICLE 8 There shall be no destruction, removal, concealment, transfer or scuttling of, or 
damage to, any military, naval, air, shipping, port, industrial and other like property and facilities 
and all records and archives, wherever they may be situated, except as may be directed by the 
Allied Representatives. 
ARTICLE 9 Pending the institution of control by the Allied Representatives over all means of 
communication, all radio and telecommunication installations and other forms of wire or 
wireless communications, whether ashore or afloat, under German control, will cease 
transmission except as directed by the Allied Representatives. 
ARTICLE 10 The forces, ships, aircraft, military equipment, and other property in Germany or 
in German control or service or at German disposal, of any other country at war with any of the 
Allies, will be subject to the provisions of this Declaration and of any proclamations, orders, 
ordinances or instructions issued thereunder. 
ARTICLE 11 (a) The principal Nazi leaders as specified by the Allied Representatives, and all 
persons from time to time named or designated by rank, office or employment by the Allied 
Representatives as being suspected of having committed, ordered or abetted war crimes or 
analogous offences, will be apprehended and surrendered to the Allied Representatives.             
(b) The same will apply in the case of any national of any of the United Nations who is 
alleged to have committed an offence against his national law, and who may at any time be 
named or designated by rank, office or employment by the Allied Representatives.                      
 (c) The German authorities and people will comply with any instructions given by the 
Allied Representatives for the apprehension and surrender of such persons. 
ARTICLE 12 The Allied Representatives will station forces and civil agencies in any or all 
parts of Germany as they may determine. 
ARTICLE 13 (a) In the exercise of the supreme authority with respect to Germany assumed by 
the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and 
the United Kingdom, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the four Allied 
Governments will take such steps, including the complete disarmament and demilitarization of 
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Germany, as they deem requisite for future peace and security.                                                     
(b) The Allied Representatives will impose on Germany additional political, 
administrative, economic, financial, military and other requirements arising from the complete 
defeat of Germany. The Allied Representatives, or persons or agencies duly designated to act on 
their authority, will issue proclamations, orders, ordinances and instructions for the purpose of 
laying down such additional requirements, and of giving effect to the other provisions of this 
Declaration. All German authorities and the German people shall carry out unconditionally the 
requirements of the Allied Representatives, and shall fully comply with all such proclamations, 
orders, ordinances and instructions. 
 
ARTICLE 14 This Declaration enters into force and effect at the date and hour set forth below. 
In the event of failure on the part of the German authorities or people promptly and completely 
to fulfill their obligations hereby or hereafter imposed, the Allied Representatives will take 
whatever action may be deemed by them to be appropriate under the circumstances. 
ARTICLE 15 This Declaration is drawn up in the English, Russian, French and German 
languages. The English, Russian and French are the only authentic texts. 














Appendix I: Potsdam Protocol (abstract) 
The Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, July 17-August 2, 1945 (a) Protocol of the Proceedings, 
August l, 1945 
The Berlin Conference of the Three Heads of Government of the U. S. S. R., U. S. A., and 
U. K., which took place from July 17 to August 2, 1945, came to the following conclusions: 
I. ESTABLISHMENT OF A COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS. 
A. The Conference reached the following agreement for the establishment of a Council of 
Foreign Ministers to do the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements: 
" (1) There shall be established a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of the United 
Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France, and the United States. 
"(2) (i) The Council shall normally meet in London which shall be the permanent seat of the 
joint Secretariat which the Council will form. Each of the Foreign Ministers will be accompanied 
by a high-ranking Deputy, duly authorized to carry on the work of the Council in the absence of 
his Foreign Ministers, and by a small staff of technical advisers. 
" (ii) The first meeting of the Council shall be held in London not later than September 1st 
1945. Meetings may be held by common agreement in other capitals as may be agreed from time 
to time. 
" (3) (i) As its immediate important task, the Council shall be authorized to draw up, with a 
view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the 
termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace 
settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government 
adequate for the purpose is established. 
"(ii) For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the Members 
representing those States which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the 
enemy State concerned. For the purposes of the peace settlement for Italy, France shall be 
regarded as a signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy. Other Members will be invited to 
participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion. 
" (iii) Other matters may from time to time be referred to the Council by agreement between 
the Member Governments. 
"(4) (i) Whenever the Council is considering a question of direct interest to a State not 
represented thereon, such State should be invited to send representatives to participate in the 
discussion and study of that question. 
"(ii) The Council may adapt its procedure to the particular problems under consideration. In 
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some cases it may hold its own preliminary discussions prior to the participation of other 
interested States. In other cases, the Council may convoke a formal conference of the State 
chiefly interested in seeking a solution of the particular problem." 
B. It was agreed that the three Governments should each address an identical invitation to 
the Governments of China and France to adopt this text and to join in establishing the Council. 
The text of the approved invitation was as follows: 
Council of Foreign Ministers Draft for identical invitation to be sent separately by each of 
the Three Governments to the Governments of China and France. 
"The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the U. S. S. R. consider it 
necessary to begin without delay the essential preparatory work upon the peace settlements in 
Europe. To this end they are agreed that there should be established a Council of the Foreign 
Ministers of the Five Great Powers to prepare treaties of peace with the European enemy States, 
for submission to the United Nations. The Council would also be empowered to propose 
settlements of outstanding territorial questions in Europe and to consider such other matters as 
member Governments might agree to refer to it. 
"The text adopted by the Three Governments is as follows: 
(Here insert final agreed text of the Proposal) 
"In agreement with the Governments of the United States and U. S. S. R., His Majesty's 
Government in the United Kingdom and U. S. S. R., the United States Government, the United 
Kingdom and the Soviet Government extend a cordial invitation to the Government of China 
(France) to adopt the text quoted above and to join in setting up the Council. His Majesty's 
Government, The United States Government, The Soviet Government attach much importance to 
the participation of the Chinese Government (French Government) in the proposed arrangements 
and they hope to receive an early and favorable reply to this invitation." 
C. It was understood that the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers for the 
specific purposes named in the text would be without prejudice to the agreement of the Crimea 
Conference that there should be periodical consultation between the Foreign Secretaries of the 
United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom. 
D. The Conference also considered the position of the European Advisory Commission in 
the light of the Agreement to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers. It was noted with 
satisfaction that the Commission had ably discharged its principal tasks by the recommendations 
that it had furnished for the terms of surrender for Germany, for the zones of occupation in 
Germany and Austria and for the inter-Allied control machinery in those countries. It was felt 
that further work of a detailed character for the coordination of Allied policy for the control of 
Germany and Austria would in future fall within the competence of the Control Council at Berlin 
and the Allied Commission at Vienna. Accordingly it was agreed to recommend that the 
European Advisory Commission be dissolved. 
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II. THE PRINCIPLES TO GOVERN THE TREATMENT OF GERMANY IN THE 
INITIAL CONTROL PERIOD 
A. POLITICAL PRINCIPLES. 
1. In accordance with the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, supreme authority 
in Germany is exercised, on instructions from their respective Governments, by the 
Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the French Republic, each in his own zone of 
occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as 
members of the Control Council. 
2. So far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population 
throughout Germany. 
3. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the Control Council shall be 
guided are: 
(i) The complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or 
control of all German industry that could be used for military production. To these ends:- 
(a) All German land, naval and air forces, the SS., SA., SD., and Gestapo, with all their 
organizations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers' Corps, Reserve 
Corps, military schools, war veterans' organizations and all other military and semi-military 
organizations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military 
tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in such manner as permanently 
to prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and Nazism; 
(b) All arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialized facilities for their 
production shall be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed. The maintenance and 
production of all aircraft and all arms. ammunition and implements of war shall be prevented. 
(ii) To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that 
they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since their own 
ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made 
chaos and suffering inevitable. 
(iii) To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, 
to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all 
Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda. 
(iv) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic 
basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany. 
4. All Nazi laws which provided the basis of the Hitler regime or established 
discriminations on grounds of race, creed, or political opinion shall be abolished. No such 
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discriminations, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated. 
5. War criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi 
enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested and brought to 
judgment. Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi organizations and 
institutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested 
and interned. 
6. All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its 
activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-
public office, and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Such 
persons shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed 
capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany. 
7. German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist 
doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas. 
8. The judicial system will be reorganized in accordance with the principles of democracy, 
of justice under law, and of equal rights for all citizens without distinction of race, nationality or 
religion. 
9. The administration in Germany should be directed towards the decentralization of the 
political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end:- 
(i) local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on democratic principles 
and in particular through elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with military security and 
the purposes of military occupation; 
(ii) all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion shall be 
allowed and encouraged throughout Germany; 
(iii) representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial and 
state (Land) administration as rapidly as may be justified by the successful application of these 
principles in local self-government; 
(iv) for the time being, no central German Government shall be established. 
Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German administrative departments, 
headed by State Secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, 
communications, foreign trade and industry. Such departments will act under the direction of the 
Control Council. 
10. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and 
religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the 
maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted. 
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B. ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES. 
11. In order to eliminate Germany's war potential, the production of arms, ammunition and 
implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships shall be prohibited and 
prevented. Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items that are directly 
necessary to a war economy shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany's approved 
post-war peacetime needs to meet the objectives stated in Paragraph 15. Productive capacity not 
needed for permitted production shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan 
recommended by the Allied Commission on Reparations and approved by the Governments 
concerned or if not removed shall be destroyed. 
12. At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be decentralized for the 
purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified in 
particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements. 
13. In organizing the German Economy, primary emphasis shall be given to the 
development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries. 
14. During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. To 
this end common policies shall be established in regard to: 
(a) mining and industrial production and its allocation; 
(b) agriculture, forestry and fishing; 
(c) wages, prices and rationing; 
(d) import and export programs for Germany as a whole; 
(e) currency and banking, central taxation and customs; 
(f) reparation and removal of industrial war potential; 
(g) transportation and communications. 
In applying these policies account shall be taken, where appropriate, of varying local 
conditions. 
15. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy but only to the extent 
necessary: 
(a) to carry out programs of industrial disarmament, demilitarization, of reparations, and of 
approved exports and imports. 
(b) to assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the 
needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany and essential to maintain in 
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Germany average living standards not exceeding the average of the standards of living of 
European countries. (European countries means all European countries excluding the United 
Kingdom and the U. S. S. R.). 
(c) to ensure in the manner determined by the Control Council the equitable distribution of 
essential commodities between the several zones so as to produce a balanced economy 
throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports. 
(d) to control German industry and all economic and financial international transactions 
including exports and imports, with the aim of preventing Germany from developing a war 
potential and of achieving the other objectives named herein. 
(e) to control all German public or private scientific bodies research and experimental 
institutions, laboratories, et cetera connected with economic activities. 
16. In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls established by the Control 
Council, German administrative machinery shall be created and the German authorities shall be 
required to the fullest extent practicable to proclaim and assume administration of such controls. 
Thus it should be brought home to the German people that the responsibility for the 
administration of such controls and any break-down in these controls will rest with themselves. 
Any German controls which may run counter to the objectives of occupation will be prohibited. 
17. Measures shall be promptly taken: 
(a) to effect essential repair of transport; 
(b) to enlarge coal production; 
(c) to maximize agricultural output; and 
(d) to erect emergency repair of housing and essential utilities. 
18. Appropriate steps shall be taken by the Control Council to exercise control and the 
power of disposition over German-owned external assets not already under the control of United 
Nations which have taken part in the war against Germany. 
19. Payment of Reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to 
subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany the 
necessary means must be provided to pay for imports approved by the Control Council in 
Germany. The proceeds of exports from current production and stocks shall be available in the 
first place for payment for such imports. 
The above clause will not apply to the equipment and products referred to in paragraphs 4 
(a) and 4 (b) of the Reparations Agreement. 
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III. REPARATIONS FROM GERMANY. 
1. Reparation claims of the U. S. S. R. shall be met by removals from the zone of Germany 
occupied by the U. S. S. R., and from appropriate German external assets. 
2. The U. S. S. R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of 
reparations. 
3. The reparation claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries 
entitled to reparations shall be met from the Western Zones and from appropriate German 
external assets. 
4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U. S. S. R. from its own zone of 
occupation, the U. S. S. R. shall receive additionally from the Western Zones: 
(a) 15 per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place 
from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries as is unnecessary for the 
German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones of Germany, in 
exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum 
products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon. 
(b) 10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace 
economy and should be removed from the Western Zones, to be transferred to the Soviet 
Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return. 
Removals of equipment as provided in (a) and (b) above shall be made simultaneously. 
5. The amount of equipment to be removed from the Western Zones on account of 
reparations must be determined within six months from now at the latest. 
6. Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin as soon as possible and shall be 
completed within two years from the determination specified in paragraph 5. The delivery of 
products covered by 4 (a) above shall begin as soon as possible and shall be made by the U. S. S. 
R. in agreed installments within five years of the date hereof. The determination of the amount 
and character of the industrial capital equipment unnecessary for the German peace economy and 
therefore available for reparation shall be made by the Control Council under policies fixed by 
the Allied Commission on Reparations, with the participation of France, subject to the final 
approval of the Zone Commander in the Zone from which the equipment is to be removed. 
7. Prior to the fixing of the total amount of equipment subject to removal, advance 
deliveries shall be made in respect to such equipment as will be determined to he eligible for 
delivery in accordance with the procedure set forth in the last sentence of paragraph 6. 
8. The Soviet Government renounces all claims in respect of reparations to shares of 
German enterprises which are located in the Western Zones of Germany as well as to German 
foreign assets in all countries except those specified in paragraph 9 below. 
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9. The Governments of the U. K. and U. S. A. renounce all claims in respect of reparations 
to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Eastern Zone of occupation in Germany, 
as well as to German foreign assets in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Eastern Austria. 
10. The Soviet Government makes no claims to gold captured by the Allied troops in 
Germany. 
IV. DISPOSAL OF THE GERMAN NAVY AND MERCHANT MARINE 
A. The following principles for the distribution of the German Navy were agreed: 
(1) The total strength of the German surface navy, excluding ships sunk and those taken 
over from Allied Nations, but including ships under construction or repair, shall be divided 
equally among the U. S. S. R., U. K., and U. S. A. 
(2) Ships under construction or repair mean those ships whose construction or repair may 
be completed within three to six months, according to the type of ship. Whether such ships under 
construction or repair shall be completed or repaired shall be determined by the technical 
commission appointed by the Three Powers and referred to below, subject to the principle that 
their completion or repair must be achieved within the time limits above provided, without any 
increase of skilled employment in the German shipyards and without permitting the reopening of 
any German ship building or connected industries. Completion date means the date when a ship 
is able to go out on its first trip, or, under peacetime standards, would refer to the customary date 
of delivery by shipyard to the Government. 
(3) The larger part of the German submarine fleet shall be sunk. Not more than thirty 
submarines shall be preserved and divided equally between the U. S. S. R., U. K., and U. S. A. 
for experimental and technical purposes. 
(4) All stocks of armament, ammunition and supplies of the German Navy appertaining to 
the vessels transferred pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (3) hereof shall be handed over to the 
respective powers receiving such ships. 
(5) The Three Governments agree to constitute a tripartite naval commission comprising 
two representatives for each government, accompanied by the requisite staff, to submit agreed 
recommendations to the Three Governments for the allocation of specific German warships and 
to handle other detailed matters arising out of the agreement between the Three Governments 
regarding the German fleet. The Commission will hold its first meeting not later than 15th 
August, 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its headquarters. Each Delegation on the Commission 
will have the right on the basis of reciprocity to inspect German warships wherever they may be 
located. 
(6) The Three Governments agreed that transfers, including those of ships under 
construction and repair, shall be completed as soon as possible, but not later than 15th February, 
1946. The Commission will submit fortnightly reports, including proposals for the progressive 
allocation of the vessels when agreed by the Commission. 
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B. The following principles for the distribution of the German Merchant Marine were 
agreed:- 
(1) The German Merchant Marine, surrendered to the Three Powers and wherever located, 
shall be divided equally among the U. S. S. R., the U. K., and the U. S. A. The actual transfers of 
the ships to the respective countries shall take place as soon as practicable after the end of the 
war against Japan. The United Kingdom and the United States will provide out of their shares of 
the surrendered German merchant ships appropriate amounts for other Allied States whose 
merchant marines have suffered heavy losses in the common cause against Germany, except that 
the Soviet Union shall provide out of its share for Poland. 
(2) The allocation, manning, and operation of these ships during the Japanese War period 
shall fall under the cognizance and authority of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board and 
the United Maritime Authority. 
(3) While actual transfer of the ships shall be delayed until after the end of the war with 
Japan, a Tripartite Shipping Commission shall inventory and value all available ships and 
recommend a specific distribution in accordance with paragraph (1). 
(4) German inland and coastal ships determined to be necessary to the maintenance of the 
basic German peace economy by the Allied Control Council of Germany shall not be included in 
the shipping pool thus divided among the Three Powers. 
(5) The Three Governments agree to constitute a tripartite merchant marine commission 
comprising two representatives for each Government, accompanied by the requisite staff, to 
submit agreed recommendations to the Three Governments for the allocation of specific German 
merchant ships and to handle other detailed matters arising out of the agreement between the 
Three Governments regarding the German merchant ships. The Commission will hold its first 
meeting not later than September 1st, 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its headquarters. Each 
delegation on the Commission will have the right on the basis of reciprocity to inspect the 
German merchant ships wherever they may be located. 
V. CITY OF KOENIGSBERG AND THE ADJACENT AREA. 
The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government to the effect that pending 
the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement, the section of the western 
frontier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which is adjacent to the Baltic Sea should 
pass from a point on the eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig to the east, north of Braunsberg-
Goldap, to the meeting point of the frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish Republic and East Prussia. 
The Conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Government 
concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the City of Koenigsberg and the area 
adjacent to it as described above subject to expert examination of the actual frontier. 
The President of the United States and the British Prime Minister have declared that they 
will support the proposal of the Conference at the forthcoming peace settlement. 
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VI. WAR CRIMINALS. 
The Three Governments have taken note of the discussions which have been proceeding in 
recent weeks in London between British, United States, Soviet and French representatives with a 
view to reaching agreement on the methods of trial of those major war criminals whose crimes 
under the Moscow Declaration of October, 1943 have no particular geographical localization. 
The Three Governments reaffirm their intention to bring these criminals to swift and sure justice. 
They hope that the negotiations in London will result in speedy agreement being reached for this 
purpose, and they regard it as a matter of great importance that the trial of these major criminals 
should begin at the earliest possible date. The first list of defendants will be published before 1st 
September. 
VIII. POLAND. 
B. WESTERN FRONTIER OF POLAND. 
In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimea Conference the three 
Heads of Government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National 
Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north 'end west which Poland should receive. 
The President of the National Council of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional 
Government of National Unity have been received at the Conference and have fully presented 
their views. The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of 
the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement. 
The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland's 
western frontier, the former German territories cast of a line running from the Baltic Sea 
immediately west of Swinamunde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the 
western Neisse River and along the Western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that 
portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area 
of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for 
such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany. 
XII. ORDERLY TRANSFER OF GERMAN POPULATIONS. 
The Three Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognize that the 
transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take 
place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner. 
Since the influx of a large number of Germans into Germany would increase the burden 
already resting on the occupying authorities, they consider that the Control Council in Germany 
should in the first instance examine the problem, with special regard to the question of the 
equitable distribution of these Germans among the several zones of occupation. They are 
accordingly instructing their respective representatives on the Control Council to report to their 
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Governments as soon as possible the extent to which such persons have already entered Germany 
from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, to submit an estimate of the time and rate at which 
further transfers could be carried out having regard to the present situation in Germany. 
The Czechoslovak Government, the Polish Provisional Government and the Control 
Council in Hungary are at the same time being informed of the above and are being requested 
meanwhile to suspend further expulsions pending an examination by the Governments concerned 
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